1968-1969 - Echoes of an Old Tune
Born in the aftermath of the end of the Third World War, the Solidarity movement had been a major player in Polish political life – rallying mass support behind popular nationalist causes that the mainstream ignored including opposition to the Treaty of Isfahan, support for the rights of displaced Russians and opposition to de-Radicalisation. However, by the mid-1960s these old causes had lost much of their lustre. The International Board for De-Radicalisation and Democracy had closed its operations in 1960, over time the displaced Russians had gradually integrated more fully into Polish society with the chronic housing shortages of the past largely resolved, meanwhile some of the most punishing elements of Isfahan, including heavy reparations, had been softened over the years while the likes of the Jewish Democrats had offered a more appealing voice for territorial revisionists. As such, the party's electoral appeal dwindled. It won just 9 Duma seats in 1963 and 2 in 1965, while it performed atrociously at the inaugural regional elections in 1968.
With its mainstream pull weakening, the party became increasingly influenced by its most active and extreme activists – those who wished to move away from populist nationalism and root themselves firmly in the legacy of the Russian Radical Party. Apologising for its crimes, supporting its former members and seeking to emulate it in the present day.
Two thousand miles to south of Poland, the most internationally transformational events since the War were taking place in the ancient land of Egypt. The decline of Papacy over the past several decades had been staggering. Although having fallen from the peak of its power in the mid-nineteenth century, it was nonetheless a core member of the victorious coalitions in the First, Second and Third World Wars. Despite this, the latter of those two conflicts had seen it shorn of most of its colonial possessions and pay a heavy price for victory. While it held on to its last overseas possessions in South East Asia somewhat longer, these two were lost in 1964, leaving the once sprawling Papal empire confined to its core territories in Egypt and the Sudan. Egypt itself was an overwhelmingly Catholic nation, however there were sharp divided between the indigenous Coptic-speaking masses and the theocratic elite, that highest ranks of whom were largely of European origins. Unlike its European contemporaries, the Pope offered no concessions to democracy, his was an absolute and totalitarian rule. While this might have been acceptable in a more pious age, when the fruits of empire kept the Egyptians happy and strong, by the late 1960s this was utterly unacceptable. In early1968 a broad anti-theocratic movement that united Christian, liberal, moderate leftists, far right nationalists and revolutionary socialists toppled the Pope – sending him into exile back to Rome. In the ensuing months much with Egyptian society was uncertain and influx, however in July the Egyptian Communist Party undertook a violent seizure of power, eliminating all opposition groups and proclaiming a socialist republic in Egypt – the first of its kind anywhere in the world since the Second World War.
The Communists moved quick to seize control over foreign and privately owned assets. As the country was hit by a flight of capital and people, the tiny state of Damietta in the Egyptian Delta provided safe haven to the enemies of the regime in Alexandria. Unwilling to tolerate this, and seeing the Delta as an extension of the traditional Papal-dominion that they had inherited, the Egyptians invaded and annexed Damietta. This action provoked the Americans, Europeans and Poles to implement a raft of crippling economic sanctions on the revolutionary state and raised the prospect of war –with American vessels gathering in the Eastern Mediterranean and troops mass in the Arab Federation. In retaliation, the Egyptians shut the Suez Canal off from all international shipping.
This was a disaster for the global economy. Although there were vast supplies of oil in Turania, Siberia and the Caucuses; production in these regions had actually fallen significantly since they had broken free from Radical Russia given their economic dislocation from Poland and the breakdown in Turania's relationship with Persia had made export challenging. Instead, Europe and North America depended on the cheaply produced and near-limitless oil wealth of the Persian Gulf to provide the cheap energy that fuelled their economies. Although the Arabian Federation had begun works on an overland pipeline to the Israeli port of Beirut, this was far from completion – forcing thousands of miles onto the journey of oil tankers round the Cape of Good Hope. Given this shock, the price of oil began a climb that would see it rise by several orders of magnitude over the coming months, leading to mass economic dislocation around the world.
Although no friend of the Papacy, events in Egypt drew an angry response from Kiev. Damietta had a large and centuries old Jewish population who had formed the state's traditional elite. These Jews were naturally regarded as enemies of the revolution. Those who didn't flee, their properties expropriated, were left to be lined up against the wall by the zealous revolutionaries or wrenched from their homes to unknown fates. Compounding on this, as the Egyptians rattled their sabres during the Suez crisis, they threatened the Kingdom of Israel– launching probing raids into Gaza.
In December 1968, Spas flew to Israel where she promised unlimited Polish support in defence of the sovereignty of the Kingdom – including the deployment of an entire Polish division and the offer of vast quantities of WW3-era equipment, much of which had never been fully decommissioned and remained in warehouses across the Tsardom. She also announced there-establishment of a Polish navy and air force – buttressing the security guarantees offered to the Israelis.
All of this was indirect and flagrant contravention of the terms of the Treaty of Isfahan. For a figure who had been a pro-western conciliator for her entire political career it was a remarkable about face. Naturally, the status of Israel and the persecution of Jews captured intense passions within Poland that had to be responded to, but Spas was at least in part influenced by the Tsar as well. Yaroslav IV had spent half a decade as the King of Israel between its liberation by the Allies during the Third World War and his restoration in Poland in1954 and could not abide being seen to stand by while his former subjects were under threat. Indeed, Yaroslav, who had played a diminishing role in active political affairs over the past decade, was front and centre of a diplomatic offensive aimed at diffusing the backlash to Spas' unilateral actions. Meeting American officials, with whom he had always had a very strong relationship, at a summit in the Free City of Constantinople, Yaroslav was able to extract American acquiescence to a modest increase in the size of the Polish military and its engagement in defensive actions in Israel by leaning heavily on their shared enmity to the Egyptian Communists and the strength of recent Polish-American relations.
Elsewhere, the fallout from the Egyptian Revolution had consequences for European-American relations. Across Catholic Europe, sympathy for the Papacy was naturally very great while memories of the socialist revolutions of the 1930s remained poignant. The Europeans had been largely united in calling for a military intervention to bring down the Egyptian Communists from the first. They would be sorely disappointed to seethe Americans dithering, delay and ultimately step back from an armed intervention. Continental opinion was further upset by the apparent tolerance of Poland's backsliding on the Treaty of Isfahan. For many, it appeared that the Muslim superpower across the Ocean, which had no experience of either Socialist or Radical totalitarianism and could not connect with Christian European sensibility, would never be a reliable guarantor of Europe's security. The nations of democratic, Christian, West and Central Europe had already moved towards integration with the free trade zone created by the 1958 Copenhagen Accords, and would accelerate this drift with the formation of the European Defence Initiative in 1969 – which sought to integrate the armed forces of the continent under a mixed Skottish and German leadership structure.
Just as it shaped global affairs, the Egyptian Revolution and its aftermath had a debilitating impact on the Polish economy and politics. The decade from the late 1950s to the end of the 1960s was one of protected and accelerated economic growth for Poland, a boom initially set off by the reforms of Emma Spas during her prior tenure as Finance Minister while a junior partner in coalition with the JDU. Through those years, Poland not only recovered from the devastation of the Wars, but saw living standards surpass anything witnessed during the Radical era. However, as the boom had proceeded, the rate of inflation had started to rise – surpassing 5% in each year after 1964. This had been a source of tension within the governing coalition for some time, with hawkish Kadets seeking to reign in government expenditure as a means of controlling inflation while the DPF hope to increase spending to share the fruits of economic growth across society. Through the first years of the Spas government, the status quo largely held with state expenditure rising modestly.
The Egyptian crisis brought this convivial situation to an end. The sharp rise in international oil prices that resulted caused inflation to skyrocket in Poland. In response to inflationary pressures, a wave of industrial militancy hit the country – with factories and offices across the Tsardom going on strike while many with fixed or inflexible incomes were left in penury. Faced with this crisis, and a need to ramp up military expenditure, the government would organise an emergency budget in February 1969. With the Kadets controlling the Finance ministry, they proposed an austere budget – refusing any pay rises for those on the public pay roll, reducing public benefits, sharply increasing interest rates and introducing new industrial laws that would place legal limits on striking workers.
With the Jewish Democrats determined to reject the so called 'Poverty Budget' from opposition, Spas could afford no division with the ranks of the government. This was most significant for the leftwing Democratic People's Front, for whom the budget represented a battle for its soul. The DPF was a complex and arcane institution. Born out of the fusion of groups of anti-Radical partisan bands, trade unionists, socialist ideologue sand leftwing exiles; it was not technically a single political party but an alliance of dozens of constituent organisations who each had their own structures and say over its direction. This ungainliness had contributed to its slow decline since the overthrow of Radicalism– once a close competitor with the JDU as the leading political force in the country, now Poland's distant third party. Many on the left of the Front had been uncomfortable with participation in a liberal-led government for sometime, but the Poverty Budget was the final straw.
With socialist controlled member organisations threatening to veto the DPF's support for the budget and a flank of the parliamentary party backing them, the Front's leader Illiya Yablokov gathered an extraordinary meeting of the parliamentary party. There, he informed his parliamentarians that he intended to overrule any dissent from the constituent organisations of the Front and support the Budget and the government, making clear that refusal to do so was incompatible with continued membership of the group. As the meeting descended into anger and even physical violence, Yablokov being punch squarely in the jaw by one of his incensed deputies, a total of 15 Duma members would leave the Front to form the Socialist Workers' Party. This was unmistakeably revolutionary socialist party that would quickly make a name for proactive actions including praising the Egyptian Revolution, sponsoring a statue of Josef Bronstein – the Trudovik leader who had led the socialist faction in the 1914 civil war that led to Boris Makarov's rise to power – and releasing a 1930s-style programme of nationalisations and expropriation.
As the majority faction, shorn of its extreme wing, remained loyal members of the government, Yablokov would subsequently dissolve the DPF entirely in favour of the membership-based Popular Democrats – seeking to pursue the goals of secularisation, minority protection and a centre-left economic agenda while retaining their alliance with the Kadets.
The worsening economic picture and split on the left formed the backdrop for a general election later in 1969, which offered the Polish people their chance to present their verdict on Emma Spas and her administration. The Kadets could hardly of dreamed of the results to come. For the first time since the end of Radicalism, the Jewish Democrats were dethroned as the leading party of Poland, with the Kadets surging to nearly two fifths of the popular vote and a little under half the seats in the Duma. Indeed, had the Kadets not reformed the electoral system ahead of the election, they might have come close to a majority in their own right. Regardless, their success was striking – their popular vote having doubled since 1959 and their parliamentary representation grown five fold.
Liberals success inevitably meant failure for the Tsardom's other parties. While the Jewish Democrats endured a tight contraction of their vote, the expansion of the Duma spared them from any loss of seats –nonetheless the blow of falling behind the Kadets was traumatic itself. While the JDU could put down their loss of power in 1965 to parliamentary intrigue as much as anything, they now had little credible claim to lead the nation. On the left, the squabbling successors to the DPF both endured painful failures. The centre-left Popular Democrats could only muster three quarters of the Front's1965 and were saved from obscurity largely by the party list system. Their leftist competitor, the unapologetically red Socialist Workers' Party, failed to even come close to clearing the threshold to win seats on the national list nor offer a competitive challenge in any constituencies – losing its entire parliamentary block. The combined left vote was lower than it had ever been prior to the dissolution of the Front. The one grain of satisfaction the Socialists in particular could take was that they, unexpectedly, outperformed their hated far-right rivals in Solidarity – who were wiped out as a nationally competitive force, losing their last two Duma seats and registering barely three quarters of a million votes. The only other real winner were the Muscovite regionalists, who secured their best ever election result on the back of their final victory in the long struggle for Muscovite autonomy – rising to become the third largest party in the Duma for the first time since 1954.
In stark contrast to 1965, there was no question over who would lead the next government, with Spas retaining her premiership and forming a narrower two-party coalition with the Popular Democrats.
The Jewish Democratic Union was founded upon an alliance that had two key pillars – the Hasidim, and pious Jews from Mainline Orthodoxy. While their vote had fallen steadily over the past decade, it remained as high as ever among the Hasidim, whose numbers within the electorate had only grown. It was among the mainstream of Jewish Orthodox, the pious although less extreme Mainliners, where they were losing out to the liberals. This had altered the shape of the Jewish Democratic electorate. While in the 1950s, Hasids had made up as little as a third of JDU voters, by 1969 they were the clear majority. Defeated again, the Hasidic lobby within Jewish Conservatism was no longer content to play second fiddle. With Moses Dobik having unexpectedly lost his parliamentary seat in Moldavia to a Kadet challenger, theJ DU turned to an elderly but respected Rabbi from Lvov named Shlomo Mendel to take charge, leading the party to consolidate around a religiously conservative agenda.
This agenda found its touchstone issue not long after the election. With the economic situation remaining dire, the second Spas ministry looked to implement further cuts – targeting the costly subsidies granted to young men continuing their Torah studies into adulthood. These were massively reduced to a mere fraction of their former level, making continued study impractical for millions of the pious. Enraged Jewish conservatives rallied around the issue – leading large demonstrations, severing all cooperation at a regional level with both the governing parties and placing the issue at the heart of their campaigns.