Chapter III: Part XII
Part III: The Lion’s Den
Part XII
August 7, 1936
At this hour, the Berlin offices of the Völkischer Beobachter would normally be deserted as the staff dispersed for lunch, but today the second floor was in an almost delirious frenzy of activity that had lasted since the day before. Just after noon on the sixth, over-editor Bauer had burst onto the second floor shouting raggedly. The British government had fallen. There was precious little information, but no shortage of hope and conjecture. The junior staff was all certain: within a month, there would be peace. The joy of the thought was intoxicating. Over-editor Sassen had been skeptical. For more than an hour, he worked the phones, trying to figure out what was going on. A food inspector in Richard Walther Darré’s office had it from his brother in the SD that there had been a communist uprising in London. VB editor-in-chief Wilhelm Weiss didn’t know any more than Sassen did, but said he had been getting reports that there had been a fleet mutiny at Scapa Flow. One of Goebbels’ assistants denied reports of insurrection but believed that the House of Commons had passed a motion of no confidence. One of the staff photographers brought in several bottles of champagne, which were rapidly consumed. And then, the flash from Weiss in Munich. It was definitive: the government had not fallen. It seemed that there had indeed been a motion of no confidence, but the Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin had narrowly survived.
“Numbers?” Ernst Trommler had asked Sassen across the room. The over-editor had not understood him over the din of editors working frantically to learn what had happened. “How close was the vote?”
“We don’t know yet. No matter what, we’ll write that it was very close.”
They had worked late into the night and returned early the next morning. Bit by bit, more information had come together. It appeared that the Labour Party, Britain’s primary opposition party, had initiated the motion following a piece in the Times highly critical of Prime Minister Baldwin’s prosecution of the war. Based on the best sources available, it seemed that the vote had indeed been close, perhaps as little as two dozen votes, following widespread rebellion in Baldwin’s own party.
British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin found his government nearly ousted in a vote on August 6.
Now, Trommler was sifting through a file of names of contacts to select nine or ten for Sassen to call by telephone. Someone at the other end of the room was calling out names of British politicians who had voted against the government. None of the names meant anything to him. He returned to his work. Appel, Erika. Appel, Gerd. Arbe, Karl. The first two were brother and sister Professors, not well connected. Arbe, Trommler remembered, was a lawyer for the Foreign Ministry. He was likely the best they would get from the diplomats -- von Neurath, they were told, had gone home early, and none of his direct subordinates would talk without his permission. He copied down the telephone number for Sassen’s later use. In fact... Trommler remembered with a ripple of insight that he had accompanied Sassen to a meeting at the Foreign Ministry in which Arbe had telephoned von Neurath at his home. He would have the number that the over-editor needed. He picked up the paper on which he had written the number and marched to Sassen’s besieged office. He forced his way through the crowd and found the his boss sitting up straight in his chair, reading a several-page document which he had slipped out of a manila folder.
After several minutes, after having finished, Sassen nodded appraisingly. “Trommler, tell the others to be quiet and come closer.”
Clapping his hands, Trommler was able to call for silence. About a dozen editors crowded around the desk of Sassen, who now stood.
“The British Prime Minister gave a speech to their parliament less than two hours ago. I have here the text of the speech. A translated version will be forthcoming from the Foreign Ministry this afternoon. I shall read the original text first, then recapitulate its main points in German for those who need it.”
Trommler’s English left much to be desired, but his experience dealing with the British press made his comprehension rather good. He would imagine Baldwin's stuffy, highbrow voice delivering the speech, not Sassen's oily one.
“Although the failure of yesterday’s vote means that I am not compelled to answer the charges which were brought up in the course of that vote by the Opposition, the severity of their charges against the Government, and the importance of national solidarity in wartime, compel me to address those charges. I propose to make answer to two of these charges, those which I find most intolerable, made by the Leader of His Majesty’s Opposition, and also, if I may, to answer one of the charges made during the same debate by the Honorable Member for South Shields.
“First, I should like to address this last point, because it is possible to do so most quickly. The question has been raised in the newspapers for some time, and in the debate yesterday by the Honorable Member for South Shields, whether the replacement of Lord Monsell as First Lord of the Admiralty was politically motivated. Allow me to state to this House in the most unequivocal terms: it was not. It was said in the press that because of public criticisms made against me by Lord Monsell with regard to the disposition of the Fleet prior to the Pact of May the Eleventh and the entry of the Italians into the war, and because of Monsell’s support for public criticisms of same by Admiral Chatfield, that I had him sacked. This is untrue. Lord Monsell’s performance in his position and his prosecution of the naval aspect of the war were the only considerations taken into account. After consultation with the Cabinet, an agreement was reached that better leadership was required in the Admiralty. There was a consensus that in mind of the prescient perception of the threat from Germany by Monsell’s predecessor, Chamberlain, that we should bring him back if he would accept. I offered, and he accepted. If I were the proud and petty sort of man who would sack Lord Monsell for political reasons, I surely would not replace him with a man who in his own turn had criticized me just as harshly.
“I would like to next address the first charge by the Leader of the Opposition, the Right Honorable Member for Limehouse. Mr. Attlee has contended that my incompetence is responsible for the destruction of lives and property lost to German bombers. He brought before this House a copy, neatly typed, of my speech four years ago in which I now famously warned that ‘The bomber will always get through.’ He spent some time on the point that had I only not caused the nation to despair of stopping hostile aeroplanes, we would now be in a position to shoot them out of the sky at will. There is this notion, and Attlee is not the only one to speak of it in this House, that had I only kept my mouth shut, we would naturally have developed the means to destroy any hostile aircraft we wish. This notion holds that we were making brilliant advances in that area until 1932, until I said those six words and all work came to a halt. The first, and I believe most obvious, reply to this, is that at the time I delivered that speech Attlee agreed with me. Before I gave that speech I consulted numerous military experts, all of whom concluded that what I was saying was the soundest thing -- and after I gave the speech almost everyone in the Commons seemed to find it perfectly sensible. Where were Mr. Attlee’s objections then? Or is it simply that he wishes to lash out in hindsight for personal gain?
“It is curious that only now he criticizes me for lacking Cassandra’s foresight. Do not forget that it was Mr. Attlee’s Labour which denounced rearmament even as German soldiers were crossing the bridges into the Rhineland. Do not forget that it was Mr. Attlee’s Labour which opposed the ordering of new battleships when the Germans launched the most modern one in the world. Do not forget that it was Mr. Attlee’s Labour which called for the reduction of our Mediterranean Fleet so as not to provoke war with the Italians. The Italians, Mr. Lansbury assured the Commons, had no ambitions against us in North Africa. I regret to say that the Italians were wishing us ill all along, so let us not talk of foresight!
“The second reply is that, to be plain, Mr. Attlee is wrong about the present situation. We are no more losing the air war than we are the war at sea; victories at every turn. In fact I must state humbly that throughout this year I was more right on the matter of the air war than I have been given credit for. At the start of the war, the General Staff was of the opinion that German air raids would cause mass hysteria among the people of Britain. On April eighth, a report was placed on my desk which estimated that within four months, casualties from air bombardment would have reached five million. Although they were the military experts, I replied that their figure was too high. It has now been four months, almost to the day, and through the valiant fight put up by our Royal Air Force, fewer than two thousand Britons have lost their lives.
“Make no mistake: the German attack has been blunted. Even now, hundreds of aeroplanes from around the Empire are being assembled for the further defense of the Home Islands. Within twenty miles of this chamber, dozens of planes are being built ‘round-the-clock, and when they are built we will work ‘round-the-clock to build dozens more. And they will join countless like them, old and new, to go back on the offensive, defeat the Germans, and drive them back, never again to maraud over the skies of England. Far more than simply to say that I am not responsible for the disasters in our skies, as Mr. Attlee suggests, I say that there have not been disasters in our skies, but rather laudable victories which he ought to give our armed forces credit for.
“Yet it is Mr. Attlee’s final claim, one echoed, I am pleased to say, by commendably few members of the Opposition, that I must answer most vigorously. Yesterday he said, quote: ‘He has prosecuted the war as one would were one only doing so to satisfy a diplomatic pledge, rather than serve a military necessity.’ What the Right Honorable Gentleman implies is that it is my intention only to fight this war insofar as it is useful to me politically. If that is so, then I have the blood of six thousand soldiers on my hands. Is that what he really means? If not, then it is a contemptible innuendo to suggest such a thing in the way he has. For he criticizes me for somehow not prosecuting the war aggressively enough, if I am to take that meaning from his statement to this House, or not being rash enough in our war conduct. The position of my opponents is self contradictory: I am first accused of stirring up a war where there ought be none, and then denounced for not prosecuting it wantonly enough.
“Let it be made plain that there are some members of this House, Mr. Attlee included, that were thundering just this past spring for a peace settlement. When in April I promised the French President the assistance of our Army and Navy, a member of this House called me a ‘self-interested warmonger’. Dear Mr. Orwell quipped to the press that my handling of the crisis did not even rise to the level of an uninspiring stuffed shirt, but that I am, rather, just a ‘hole in the air’. The central claim of these people is that I should have done more to send British soldiers to France, or even to Belgium, and that I am therefore responsible for the fall of those countries.
“In that matter I must with utmost sincerity recuse myself of any responsibility. The French generals were criticized even by their own government for acting irresolutely. They were overcautious and retreated before inferior German forces. As a result, the continuous front collapsed before an expeditionary force could be readied. Following the collapse of the front and the faltering of the French government’s will to make the whole of France into a battlefield, I was advised that precipitous landings in France would only endanger hundreds of thousands of soldiers, as well as our future capacity to carry on the war. Unless Mr. Attlee would have me ignore the counsel of our generals and take action based on my own insoluble sense of what is politically right -- which I believe is the very sort of thing he is at the same time accusing me of -- I was bound to accept their professional judgment. Again, it was through their own indecision that the French brought about this dismal repeat of the disasters of 1870. I was never in a position to reverse the situation myself.
“Yet that is as it is. Let us return for a moment to my speech which Mr. Attlee so eagerly quoted from yesterday. For he seems to have omitted another phrase, just as widely quoted at the time at which the speech was given. ‘The only defense,’ I said, ‘lies in offense.’ With most of France now under German occupation, it will fall to Britain to restore Europe. At this very hour, French and British soldiers are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder against the Italians in the sands of North Africa. Although they are more numerous than we are, our soldiers are superior in training and leadership. Some day, we shall drive them out of Africa. Then, some number of months or perhaps a year from now, French and British soldiers will return to France and drive the Germans out, marching all the way to Berlin if necessary. This is my pledge.
“In the mean time, our island is safe. Our people are strong. Our will is intact. My foremost interest, in this hour of renewed European war, is the successful conclusion of that war. Never have I placed any interest above that of Country, and with God’s help I will not waver in the months ahead. I ask the continued faith of the Commons in this endeavor, and that of the British people, whose faith I have never doubted.”
Baldwin’s speech, although generally well-received in the Commons, was criticized in the British press for being blustery and overly defensive.
There was enthusiastic applause -- probably more for Sassen’s reading than Baldwin’s oratory, Trommler realized.
Over-editor Bauer spread his hands out before him, visualizing a headline. “British Government Nearly Collapses. Defensive Premier denies ‘all responsibility’.”
Lorenz Sassen seemed less than pleased. “‘Nearly collapses,’ ahm, ‘nearly collapses,” he buzzed. “No, no, no. That’s no good. That tells readers that although it came close to collapsing, it will not collapse. You need a stronger phrase that keeps the focus on ‘collapse’.”
“On the brink of collapse?” piped Trommler.
“Yes, much better. British Government on the Brink of Collapse. And something tells me that the translation from the Foreign Minister’s office might be a little bit too sympathetic to the British. Someone must take a second look at that. And Baldwin’s remarks are to have as little context as possible, yes?”
The editors gathered around Sassen’s desk voiced their agreement.
“No time to lose then. The Lion is wounded.”
Part III: The Lion’s Den
Part XII
August 7, 1936
At this hour, the Berlin offices of the Völkischer Beobachter would normally be deserted as the staff dispersed for lunch, but today the second floor was in an almost delirious frenzy of activity that had lasted since the day before. Just after noon on the sixth, over-editor Bauer had burst onto the second floor shouting raggedly. The British government had fallen. There was precious little information, but no shortage of hope and conjecture. The junior staff was all certain: within a month, there would be peace. The joy of the thought was intoxicating. Over-editor Sassen had been skeptical. For more than an hour, he worked the phones, trying to figure out what was going on. A food inspector in Richard Walther Darré’s office had it from his brother in the SD that there had been a communist uprising in London. VB editor-in-chief Wilhelm Weiss didn’t know any more than Sassen did, but said he had been getting reports that there had been a fleet mutiny at Scapa Flow. One of Goebbels’ assistants denied reports of insurrection but believed that the House of Commons had passed a motion of no confidence. One of the staff photographers brought in several bottles of champagne, which were rapidly consumed. And then, the flash from Weiss in Munich. It was definitive: the government had not fallen. It seemed that there had indeed been a motion of no confidence, but the Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin had narrowly survived.
“Numbers?” Ernst Trommler had asked Sassen across the room. The over-editor had not understood him over the din of editors working frantically to learn what had happened. “How close was the vote?”
“We don’t know yet. No matter what, we’ll write that it was very close.”
They had worked late into the night and returned early the next morning. Bit by bit, more information had come together. It appeared that the Labour Party, Britain’s primary opposition party, had initiated the motion following a piece in the Times highly critical of Prime Minister Baldwin’s prosecution of the war. Based on the best sources available, it seemed that the vote had indeed been close, perhaps as little as two dozen votes, following widespread rebellion in Baldwin’s own party.
British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin found his government nearly ousted in a vote on August 6.
Now, Trommler was sifting through a file of names of contacts to select nine or ten for Sassen to call by telephone. Someone at the other end of the room was calling out names of British politicians who had voted against the government. None of the names meant anything to him. He returned to his work. Appel, Erika. Appel, Gerd. Arbe, Karl. The first two were brother and sister Professors, not well connected. Arbe, Trommler remembered, was a lawyer for the Foreign Ministry. He was likely the best they would get from the diplomats -- von Neurath, they were told, had gone home early, and none of his direct subordinates would talk without his permission. He copied down the telephone number for Sassen’s later use. In fact... Trommler remembered with a ripple of insight that he had accompanied Sassen to a meeting at the Foreign Ministry in which Arbe had telephoned von Neurath at his home. He would have the number that the over-editor needed. He picked up the paper on which he had written the number and marched to Sassen’s besieged office. He forced his way through the crowd and found the his boss sitting up straight in his chair, reading a several-page document which he had slipped out of a manila folder.
After several minutes, after having finished, Sassen nodded appraisingly. “Trommler, tell the others to be quiet and come closer.”
Clapping his hands, Trommler was able to call for silence. About a dozen editors crowded around the desk of Sassen, who now stood.
“The British Prime Minister gave a speech to their parliament less than two hours ago. I have here the text of the speech. A translated version will be forthcoming from the Foreign Ministry this afternoon. I shall read the original text first, then recapitulate its main points in German for those who need it.”
Trommler’s English left much to be desired, but his experience dealing with the British press made his comprehension rather good. He would imagine Baldwin's stuffy, highbrow voice delivering the speech, not Sassen's oily one.
“Although the failure of yesterday’s vote means that I am not compelled to answer the charges which were brought up in the course of that vote by the Opposition, the severity of their charges against the Government, and the importance of national solidarity in wartime, compel me to address those charges. I propose to make answer to two of these charges, those which I find most intolerable, made by the Leader of His Majesty’s Opposition, and also, if I may, to answer one of the charges made during the same debate by the Honorable Member for South Shields.
“First, I should like to address this last point, because it is possible to do so most quickly. The question has been raised in the newspapers for some time, and in the debate yesterday by the Honorable Member for South Shields, whether the replacement of Lord Monsell as First Lord of the Admiralty was politically motivated. Allow me to state to this House in the most unequivocal terms: it was not. It was said in the press that because of public criticisms made against me by Lord Monsell with regard to the disposition of the Fleet prior to the Pact of May the Eleventh and the entry of the Italians into the war, and because of Monsell’s support for public criticisms of same by Admiral Chatfield, that I had him sacked. This is untrue. Lord Monsell’s performance in his position and his prosecution of the naval aspect of the war were the only considerations taken into account. After consultation with the Cabinet, an agreement was reached that better leadership was required in the Admiralty. There was a consensus that in mind of the prescient perception of the threat from Germany by Monsell’s predecessor, Chamberlain, that we should bring him back if he would accept. I offered, and he accepted. If I were the proud and petty sort of man who would sack Lord Monsell for political reasons, I surely would not replace him with a man who in his own turn had criticized me just as harshly.
“I would like to next address the first charge by the Leader of the Opposition, the Right Honorable Member for Limehouse. Mr. Attlee has contended that my incompetence is responsible for the destruction of lives and property lost to German bombers. He brought before this House a copy, neatly typed, of my speech four years ago in which I now famously warned that ‘The bomber will always get through.’ He spent some time on the point that had I only not caused the nation to despair of stopping hostile aeroplanes, we would now be in a position to shoot them out of the sky at will. There is this notion, and Attlee is not the only one to speak of it in this House, that had I only kept my mouth shut, we would naturally have developed the means to destroy any hostile aircraft we wish. This notion holds that we were making brilliant advances in that area until 1932, until I said those six words and all work came to a halt. The first, and I believe most obvious, reply to this, is that at the time I delivered that speech Attlee agreed with me. Before I gave that speech I consulted numerous military experts, all of whom concluded that what I was saying was the soundest thing -- and after I gave the speech almost everyone in the Commons seemed to find it perfectly sensible. Where were Mr. Attlee’s objections then? Or is it simply that he wishes to lash out in hindsight for personal gain?
“It is curious that only now he criticizes me for lacking Cassandra’s foresight. Do not forget that it was Mr. Attlee’s Labour which denounced rearmament even as German soldiers were crossing the bridges into the Rhineland. Do not forget that it was Mr. Attlee’s Labour which opposed the ordering of new battleships when the Germans launched the most modern one in the world. Do not forget that it was Mr. Attlee’s Labour which called for the reduction of our Mediterranean Fleet so as not to provoke war with the Italians. The Italians, Mr. Lansbury assured the Commons, had no ambitions against us in North Africa. I regret to say that the Italians were wishing us ill all along, so let us not talk of foresight!
“The second reply is that, to be plain, Mr. Attlee is wrong about the present situation. We are no more losing the air war than we are the war at sea; victories at every turn. In fact I must state humbly that throughout this year I was more right on the matter of the air war than I have been given credit for. At the start of the war, the General Staff was of the opinion that German air raids would cause mass hysteria among the people of Britain. On April eighth, a report was placed on my desk which estimated that within four months, casualties from air bombardment would have reached five million. Although they were the military experts, I replied that their figure was too high. It has now been four months, almost to the day, and through the valiant fight put up by our Royal Air Force, fewer than two thousand Britons have lost their lives.
“Make no mistake: the German attack has been blunted. Even now, hundreds of aeroplanes from around the Empire are being assembled for the further defense of the Home Islands. Within twenty miles of this chamber, dozens of planes are being built ‘round-the-clock, and when they are built we will work ‘round-the-clock to build dozens more. And they will join countless like them, old and new, to go back on the offensive, defeat the Germans, and drive them back, never again to maraud over the skies of England. Far more than simply to say that I am not responsible for the disasters in our skies, as Mr. Attlee suggests, I say that there have not been disasters in our skies, but rather laudable victories which he ought to give our armed forces credit for.
“Yet it is Mr. Attlee’s final claim, one echoed, I am pleased to say, by commendably few members of the Opposition, that I must answer most vigorously. Yesterday he said, quote: ‘He has prosecuted the war as one would were one only doing so to satisfy a diplomatic pledge, rather than serve a military necessity.’ What the Right Honorable Gentleman implies is that it is my intention only to fight this war insofar as it is useful to me politically. If that is so, then I have the blood of six thousand soldiers on my hands. Is that what he really means? If not, then it is a contemptible innuendo to suggest such a thing in the way he has. For he criticizes me for somehow not prosecuting the war aggressively enough, if I am to take that meaning from his statement to this House, or not being rash enough in our war conduct. The position of my opponents is self contradictory: I am first accused of stirring up a war where there ought be none, and then denounced for not prosecuting it wantonly enough.
“Let it be made plain that there are some members of this House, Mr. Attlee included, that were thundering just this past spring for a peace settlement. When in April I promised the French President the assistance of our Army and Navy, a member of this House called me a ‘self-interested warmonger’. Dear Mr. Orwell quipped to the press that my handling of the crisis did not even rise to the level of an uninspiring stuffed shirt, but that I am, rather, just a ‘hole in the air’. The central claim of these people is that I should have done more to send British soldiers to France, or even to Belgium, and that I am therefore responsible for the fall of those countries.
“In that matter I must with utmost sincerity recuse myself of any responsibility. The French generals were criticized even by their own government for acting irresolutely. They were overcautious and retreated before inferior German forces. As a result, the continuous front collapsed before an expeditionary force could be readied. Following the collapse of the front and the faltering of the French government’s will to make the whole of France into a battlefield, I was advised that precipitous landings in France would only endanger hundreds of thousands of soldiers, as well as our future capacity to carry on the war. Unless Mr. Attlee would have me ignore the counsel of our generals and take action based on my own insoluble sense of what is politically right -- which I believe is the very sort of thing he is at the same time accusing me of -- I was bound to accept their professional judgment. Again, it was through their own indecision that the French brought about this dismal repeat of the disasters of 1870. I was never in a position to reverse the situation myself.
“Yet that is as it is. Let us return for a moment to my speech which Mr. Attlee so eagerly quoted from yesterday. For he seems to have omitted another phrase, just as widely quoted at the time at which the speech was given. ‘The only defense,’ I said, ‘lies in offense.’ With most of France now under German occupation, it will fall to Britain to restore Europe. At this very hour, French and British soldiers are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder against the Italians in the sands of North Africa. Although they are more numerous than we are, our soldiers are superior in training and leadership. Some day, we shall drive them out of Africa. Then, some number of months or perhaps a year from now, French and British soldiers will return to France and drive the Germans out, marching all the way to Berlin if necessary. This is my pledge.
“In the mean time, our island is safe. Our people are strong. Our will is intact. My foremost interest, in this hour of renewed European war, is the successful conclusion of that war. Never have I placed any interest above that of Country, and with God’s help I will not waver in the months ahead. I ask the continued faith of the Commons in this endeavor, and that of the British people, whose faith I have never doubted.”
Baldwin’s speech, although generally well-received in the Commons, was criticized in the British press for being blustery and overly defensive.
There was enthusiastic applause -- probably more for Sassen’s reading than Baldwin’s oratory, Trommler realized.
Over-editor Bauer spread his hands out before him, visualizing a headline. “British Government Nearly Collapses. Defensive Premier denies ‘all responsibility’.”
Lorenz Sassen seemed less than pleased. “‘Nearly collapses,’ ahm, ‘nearly collapses,” he buzzed. “No, no, no. That’s no good. That tells readers that although it came close to collapsing, it will not collapse. You need a stronger phrase that keeps the focus on ‘collapse’.”
“On the brink of collapse?” piped Trommler.
“Yes, much better. British Government on the Brink of Collapse. And something tells me that the translation from the Foreign Minister’s office might be a little bit too sympathetic to the British. Someone must take a second look at that. And Baldwin’s remarks are to have as little context as possible, yes?”
The editors gathered around Sassen’s desk voiced their agreement.
“No time to lose then. The Lion is wounded.”
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