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We're tied again! 5-5 on the Italian Embargo Act.
If we want any other new bills, let's get them in by Wednesday at 10 PM CST (-6 GMT). I'll call the general foreign policy debate then too unless at least three people vote for something other than Isolationism.
Honored Members of Congress,
In accordance with my role as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, I have prepared this biannual update on our current situation, which includes information on our current force dispositions, our latest technological developments, and our overall state of readiness for combat.
Should you have any questions about any of the information enclosed in this report, do not hesitate to contact me.
Respectfully,
Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
Chief of Staff, United States Army
N.B. For reference purposes, the term "infantry division" refers to a division containing three infantry brigades; the term "cavalry division" refers to a division containing two cavalry brigades; the term "armored cavalry division" refers to a division containing one light tank brigade and two cavalry brigades; the term "armored division" refers to a division of one tank brigade and two motorized infantry brigades. "Develop" means research, "produce" and "muster" both mean build, and "deploy" means actually fielding a particular unit; "convert" means to upgrade a unit into another, more advanced unit, while "upgrade" means providing better weapons to an existing unit.
At present, the United States Army can be divided into three groups: our active-duty Rapid Response Corps, our reservist National Guard, and our Pacific and Caribbean garrisons.
Rapid Response Corps: Our Rapid Response Corps (RRC) consists of four infantry divisions and one cavalry division. In 1937, we will convert this cavalry division into an armored cavalry division by adding a division of light tanks. If resources permit, we plan to add an identical second active-duty corps to this force; while this expansion would significantly tax our nation's industry, I believe this expansion is necessary to ensure the safety of both America and her allies - particularly the Philippines, in light of their impending independence* - from a hostile surprise attack.
National Guard: Much like the RRC, the reservist National Guard (NG) currently consists of six corps, each consisting of four infantry divisions. I am proud to announce that we will soon outfit each of these corps with a full division of armored cavalry; once we accomplish this, we plan to provide each infantry division with a full regiment of supporting artillery. By 1940, we intend to expand this force to a total of eight corps, each containing four infantry divisions and one armored division. If resources permit, we will also muster at least one airborne corps (which would consist of five four-brigade paratrooper divisions), and will gladly assist the Navy with training and equipment should it decide to re-establish the Marine Corps.
Garrison Units: We currently possess fourteen active-duty garrison brigades, deployed as follows: four brigades protect our Caribbean possessions (primarily the strategic Panama Canal), five brigades hold the various Solomon Islands, four brigades defends the supply lines from Honolulu to Manila, and one brigade monitors Alaska's Attu Island. Currently, I have no intentions of relocating these garrisons, as the administrative and logistical hassle of relocating them outweighs the small increase in firepower that they would afford us; nonetheless, we need these brigades to defend our critical holdings in the event of war, and thus cannot simply disband them.
Armored Forces: By the end of 1937, our ongoing research into tank armament will enable us to produce true tanks, which have the firepower and survivability to lead attacks on hostile forces. Meanwhile, by July 1938, our continued development of advanced cavalry weapons will enable us to muster motorized infantry, enabling us to support these tanks with equally swift infantry. Accounting for production time - and assuming we receive sufficient funding and priority for production - I believe that we will be able to deploy our armored divisions sometime in 1939; once we have this capability, I intend to convert all of our armored cavalry divisions into armored divisions. Of course, we have yet to develop doctrines for these units, but such developments can wait until we actually deploy our completed armored divisions.
Infantry Forces: We have slowly begun to develop new weapons for our infantry forces, with our first post-Great War small arms becoming available at the end of November of this year. Nonetheless, without additional research funding, I cannot accelerate our infantry's weaponry research or tactical development until we gain the capability to produce motorized infantry formations.
Support Units: We are currently organizing prototype engineering regiments, to aid our infantry units in assaulting fortified positions and crossing rivers under bombardment. Nonetheless, despite our projected artillery expansion, we are still using Great War-era field guns; without additional research funding, the development of both more modern traditional artillery and new self-propelled artillery must be delayed until after our infantry and armored forces are up-to-date.
Officer Reports: At present, our army possesses 96%** of the officers it needs to effectively fight a war; consequently, this field is not a problem at present. Nonetheless, as our army expands, we will need to pay close attention to this ratio - especially if we intend to intervene in a war.
Manpower Reserves: We currently have about 151,000 men available for service; in the event of war, we will also likely see a massive surge in recruitment.*** To mobilize our forces, we currently require roughly 180,000 men to reinforce all of our reserve brigades to full strength; as expected, this number will rise dramatically as we expand our military. A major problem for our recruitment officers is that many of the men who would otherwise be available for service are presently employed by the various New Deal labor organizations such as the Civilian Conservation Corps; if these programs were to be scaled back or discontinued (though I realize this is politically impossible at present), we would see a significant increase in our reserves.
In short, our army is currently woefully.unprepared for war; we are using outdated equipment according to obsolete doctrines, and currently lack both the strength and the will to conduct a major war. Nonetheless, given enough time to expand our forces and develop new technologies, America's army will likely be sufficient to defend this country from any one of the major powers.
* ((As it's not MacArthur's place to join in the debate over the Philippines, I'd thought I'd just point this one out here: Historically, the U.S. actually did set a definite date for Filipino independence in the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, planning for independence in 1944. The Japanese invasion delayed that by two years, but the U.S. granted the Philippines independence in 1946.))
** For those who wish to know the raw numbers, we currently have 10,774 officers of the 11,220 we need. - MacArthur
*** We believe an additional 500,000 men will volunteer for the services if America actually goes to war. - MacArthur
In accordance with my role as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, I have prepared this biannual update on our current situation, which includes information on our current force dispositions, our latest technological developments, and our overall state of readiness for combat.
Should you have any questions about any of the information enclosed in this report, do not hesitate to contact me.
Respectfully,
Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
Chief of Staff, United States Army
U.S. Army Status Report, July 1936
Current Forces
Current Forces
N.B. For reference purposes, the term "infantry division" refers to a division containing three infantry brigades; the term "cavalry division" refers to a division containing two cavalry brigades; the term "armored cavalry division" refers to a division containing one light tank brigade and two cavalry brigades; the term "armored division" refers to a division of one tank brigade and two motorized infantry brigades. "Develop" means research, "produce" and "muster" both mean build, and "deploy" means actually fielding a particular unit; "convert" means to upgrade a unit into another, more advanced unit, while "upgrade" means providing better weapons to an existing unit.
At present, the United States Army can be divided into three groups: our active-duty Rapid Response Corps, our reservist National Guard, and our Pacific and Caribbean garrisons.
Rapid Response Corps: Our Rapid Response Corps (RRC) consists of four infantry divisions and one cavalry division. In 1937, we will convert this cavalry division into an armored cavalry division by adding a division of light tanks. If resources permit, we plan to add an identical second active-duty corps to this force; while this expansion would significantly tax our nation's industry, I believe this expansion is necessary to ensure the safety of both America and her allies - particularly the Philippines, in light of their impending independence* - from a hostile surprise attack.
National Guard: Much like the RRC, the reservist National Guard (NG) currently consists of six corps, each consisting of four infantry divisions. I am proud to announce that we will soon outfit each of these corps with a full division of armored cavalry; once we accomplish this, we plan to provide each infantry division with a full regiment of supporting artillery. By 1940, we intend to expand this force to a total of eight corps, each containing four infantry divisions and one armored division. If resources permit, we will also muster at least one airborne corps (which would consist of five four-brigade paratrooper divisions), and will gladly assist the Navy with training and equipment should it decide to re-establish the Marine Corps.
Garrison Units: We currently possess fourteen active-duty garrison brigades, deployed as follows: four brigades protect our Caribbean possessions (primarily the strategic Panama Canal), five brigades hold the various Solomon Islands, four brigades defends the supply lines from Honolulu to Manila, and one brigade monitors Alaska's Attu Island. Currently, I have no intentions of relocating these garrisons, as the administrative and logistical hassle of relocating them outweighs the small increase in firepower that they would afford us; nonetheless, we need these brigades to defend our critical holdings in the event of war, and thus cannot simply disband them.
Technological Developments
Armored Forces: By the end of 1937, our ongoing research into tank armament will enable us to produce true tanks, which have the firepower and survivability to lead attacks on hostile forces. Meanwhile, by July 1938, our continued development of advanced cavalry weapons will enable us to muster motorized infantry, enabling us to support these tanks with equally swift infantry. Accounting for production time - and assuming we receive sufficient funding and priority for production - I believe that we will be able to deploy our armored divisions sometime in 1939; once we have this capability, I intend to convert all of our armored cavalry divisions into armored divisions. Of course, we have yet to develop doctrines for these units, but such developments can wait until we actually deploy our completed armored divisions.
Infantry Forces: We have slowly begun to develop new weapons for our infantry forces, with our first post-Great War small arms becoming available at the end of November of this year. Nonetheless, without additional research funding, I cannot accelerate our infantry's weaponry research or tactical development until we gain the capability to produce motorized infantry formations.
Support Units: We are currently organizing prototype engineering regiments, to aid our infantry units in assaulting fortified positions and crossing rivers under bombardment. Nonetheless, despite our projected artillery expansion, we are still using Great War-era field guns; without additional research funding, the development of both more modern traditional artillery and new self-propelled artillery must be delayed until after our infantry and armored forces are up-to-date.
Readiness of Forces]
Officer Reports: At present, our army possesses 96%** of the officers it needs to effectively fight a war; consequently, this field is not a problem at present. Nonetheless, as our army expands, we will need to pay close attention to this ratio - especially if we intend to intervene in a war.
Manpower Reserves: We currently have about 151,000 men available for service; in the event of war, we will also likely see a massive surge in recruitment.*** To mobilize our forces, we currently require roughly 180,000 men to reinforce all of our reserve brigades to full strength; as expected, this number will rise dramatically as we expand our military. A major problem for our recruitment officers is that many of the men who would otherwise be available for service are presently employed by the various New Deal labor organizations such as the Civilian Conservation Corps; if these programs were to be scaled back or discontinued (though I realize this is politically impossible at present), we would see a significant increase in our reserves.
Synopsis
In short, our army is currently woefully.unprepared for war; we are using outdated equipment according to obsolete doctrines, and currently lack both the strength and the will to conduct a major war. Nonetheless, given enough time to expand our forces and develop new technologies, America's army will likely be sufficient to defend this country from any one of the major powers.
* ((As it's not MacArthur's place to join in the debate over the Philippines, I'd thought I'd just point this one out here: Historically, the U.S. actually did set a definite date for Filipino independence in the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, planning for independence in 1944. The Japanese invasion delayed that by two years, but the U.S. granted the Philippines independence in 1946.))
** For those who wish to know the raw numbers, we currently have 10,774 officers of the 11,220 we need. - MacArthur
*** We believe an additional 500,000 men will volunteer for the services if America actually goes to war. - MacArthur
I would like to take this opportunity to thank both General MacArthur and Admiral Standley for their informative presentations.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
((Two things Tom's presentation addressed. If we do want Marines, those will be considered naval divisions and properly under the purview of Saithis as Chief of the Navy. All related techs and construction would come out of the Navy's budget. Second, I personally consider the debate of the Philippines closed, and will find a way in-game to release them in 1944 per the act.
Oh, Tom, did you change your mind regarding the garrison forces? You'd initially wanted me to combine them in to larger forces.))
Franklin D. Roosevelt
((Two things Tom's presentation addressed. If we do want Marines, those will be considered naval divisions and properly under the purview of Saithis as Chief of the Navy. All related techs and construction would come out of the Navy's budget. Second, I personally consider the debate of the Philippines closed, and will find a way in-game to release them in 1944 per the act.
Oh, Tom, did you change your mind regarding the garrison forces? You'd initially wanted me to combine them in to larger forces.))
((Another question, are we producing reserve divisions (to save IC) or normal? I've read some interesting threads about them which indicate that while reserves are much cheaper to produce, they don't contribute nearly as much to the practicals and cost way more to supply and reinforce.))
((Yeah, I've changed my mind - just leave them in place for now, and we'll figure out what to do with them when we get closer to wartime. Sorry for the confusion. :unsure
)((We have one brigade of Light Armor that's a normal brigade - the rest of the queue is reserve divisions. It's a shame about the practicals, half the reason I ordered those divisions was to build armor/mobile practicals to speed up our research. :sad
)
((Fair enough, Tom; I hadn't gotten around to moving them yet anyway. Saithis, does this change your mind about the redeployment of Panama's fleet? Let me know.))
((Whats the difference between reserve and normal divisions ? Me only played HoI2, this HoI3 stuff is so confusing sometimes! Guess I'll leave that to the great minds of our country!))
? Me only played HoI2, this HoI3 stuff is so confusing sometimes! Guess I'll leave that to the great minds of our country!))
(( I'm happy with Panama's fleet - I wanted the fleet in Manila to move to Texas since I was uncomfortable stationing a fleet in the Philippines without any army (and probably not any air cover) to make them worthwhile. ))
(( I'm not sure, I'll check the save in a bit to verify if we are or aren't, if the Army Minister or Avindian doesn't confirm it first.
EDIT: Nevermind, the screenshot already confirmed, followed by our dear Army Minister's post. Yes, we're building reserve divisions. ))
((Whats the difference between reserve and normal divisions
(( Reserve units only cost a fraction of the industrial cost - I think with our current laws, it's only 25% of normal? But they consequentially deploy with only 25% of their manpower, meaning that when the war begins, we will need to reinforce them up to full strength. This will have roughly the same overall manpower cost, just requiring us to put IC into reinforcements later when we mobilize - it does mean that we can deploy a *lot* more formations than we could compared to not using the reserves system. Reserves are consequentially considered one of the most brokenly overpowered features of Hearts of Iron 3. I wouldn't worry too much about the practicals, guys, we're playing the US - there's gonna be no shortage of IC and the amount of armour you built is *still* going to blow everyone but maaaybe Germany/USSR away in armoured practicals.
EDIT: Oh, and this is important for some countries - reserve divisions generate significantly less threat than standard divisions.
P.P.S. I really would like to produce some Marine divisions, but that won't be for awhile yet - I still have higher naval priorities. ))
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((Another point about reserves is that they have about 1/2 the experience of regular units after mobilization, and I think they take more IC to reinforce combat losses and upgrade too. As the US we can quite easily do a zerg rush, though we'll need to keep an eye on the officer ratio. Perhaps for the US the ideal strategy would be to upgrade the cav's to L-ARM to get the practicals, then build an armor army. A few relevant threads))
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/showthread.php?548386-Reserve-Units-Vs-Regulars
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/showthread.php?558739-FTM-3.05-pre-war-reserve-or-regular-ARM-build-as-Germany-which-is-most-worthwhile&
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/showthread.php?554852-Is-there-any-reason-to-build-regular-forces-%28not-reserves%29
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/showthread.php?548386-Reserve-Units-Vs-Regulars
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/showthread.php?558739-FTM-3.05-pre-war-reserve-or-regular-ARM-build-as-Germany-which-is-most-worthwhile&
http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/showthread.php?554852-Is-there-any-reason-to-build-regular-forces-%28not-reserves%29
Isolationist And nay on embargo'ing Italy. If we are to be Isolationist then we have no right to meddle in the affairs of foreign nations!
Sen. Henry Heidelburg of California.
Sen. Henry Heidelburg of California.
((Re: the Philippines - when we get closer to wartime, I'm planning on deploying the RRC there to try and hold the islands. I'd deploy them now, but that seems a bit too gamey for me, not to mention the supply costs.
Also, do you think we'd be able to keep a supply line from Honolulu to Manila open if we go to war with Japan/the UK? I was originally going to redeploy the Pacific garrisons to cover that line, but that would leave our other island possessions wide open for a takeover.))
((Heh, I may have overdone it a little. That said, I was really trying to get the mobile practicals up so that we could finish the cavalry research and rush for MOT/MEC units. That said, you'll have to wait on the Marines until we can finally get started on infantry research.))
((I was actually planning on upgrading them to MOT/MEC for the CA bonus - figured I'd do ARM + 2 MOT/MEC, then add a fourth brigade (SPARTs, maybe?) until we get Superior Firepower. Don't know what we can do about the regular infantry in the long-term, though - 3 INF + ART is an alright stopgap, but it won't help our MP reserves much. Ideas, anyone?))
(( I think we could if we work in unison. Japan will certainly come after us but with proper investments, Guam won't fall easy. The Philippines will require a strong defence as the Japanese will definitely come in force, but if we've got battleships and carriers lurking about, we have a good shot at hitting their navy as they come in landing, as long as the ports are garrisoned with something - even a militia brigade would do, as long as it gave us early warning. My initial plans were to deploy one of the oldest battleship groups to Manila to serve as a juicy target for Japan when their carriers come out of the traps. If the air force is stationed at Clarks Field in adequate numbers and the islands full of the US Army, then I'm not feeling too uncomfortable. Part of the reason I'm building an escort carrier is to improve our sub-hunting capability, so we don't have to lose as many convoys in the event of war. ))
(( I usually keep to 3 INF + ART for the start, then add on an extra support battalion of ART or AT as the US, as it gives extra bite without having to deplete the MP pool too far. ))
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((Agreed. Also, wherever we go we probably won't be facing the enemy's main forces so 2 INF + ART may be better for grabbing land faster while using stronger, faster units for actual combat and encirclements))
Italian Embargo Act:
Aye 5
Nay 7
Isolation 8
Comintern 1
Axis 0
Allied 0.
((The reserves vs. regulars argument is one I've seen a lot of for FTM. There are advantages and disadvantages, but my two cents is that, for now, we've got low manpower, so reserves make sense.
I also envision paratroopers/marines/RRC as the tip of the spear, so to speak, so if we do have to invade, that would give our units time to act.
Unless, of course, we decide to invade Canada...))
Aye 5
Nay 7
Isolation 8
Comintern 1
Axis 0
Allied 0.
((The reserves vs. regulars argument is one I've seen a lot of for FTM. There are advantages and disadvantages, but my two cents is that, for now, we've got low manpower, so reserves make sense.
I also envision paratroopers/marines/RRC as the tip of the spear, so to speak, so if we do have to invade, that would give our units time to act.
Unless, of course, we decide to invade Canada...
))
Italian Embargo Act:
Aye 5
Nay 7
Isolation 8
Comintern 1
Axis 0
Allied 0.
((The reserves vs. regulars argument is one I've seen a lot of for FTM. There are advantages and disadvantages, but my two cents is that, for now, we've got low manpower, so reserves make sense.
I also envision paratroopers/marines/RRC as the tip of the spear, so to speak, so if we do have to invade, that would give our units time to act.
Unless, of course, we decide to invade Canada...
(I just felt the shivers coming from Canada just as you said that.)
Message from General of the Army Air Corps' Chief of Staff, O. Westover, addressed to Congress
Members of Congress,
The role of the United States Army Air Corps is still unclear. As aviation only got off the ground 33 years ago with the brothers Wright, we are still in our infancy when it comes to this particular field of the new armed forces.
While I and my generals strive for autonomy within the structure of our forces, we currently are still subservient to the Army, and the policies we implement reflect this in general.
The creation of several new Fighter Squadrons will be a continuous project, as the power of planes will only grow and we must be able to deter any aggressive action over our nation's soil by disallowing entry through the skies.
Furthermore, we are creating anti-ship oriented bomber squadrons to coordinate with our navies to supplement Carrier Air Groups, and will create more tactical bomber squadrons when we require them to coordinate with the army.
Last but not least, we are creating strategically oriented long distance bomber squadrons, so we may be able to project ourselves more powerfully to deter any aggression towards us.
Technological developments to increase efficiency of the air force, implement better training for pilots, and the development of new crafts to deploy, are being conducted with priority given to;
- Extremely outdated upgrades for our current active planes,
- Doctrine enhancements for our single engine air crafts,
- Efficiency for our upcoming strategic long range fleet,
- Pilot training centered around our other deployed squadrons such as the tactical and the naval support squadrons,
- Finally the least priority towards the development of breakthrough design.
Looking towards the future, the creation of airplanes is very costly as materials required are more expensive than men's weaponry or a ship's steel will ever be, yet the creation of airplanes is swift and they are ready to be fielded much faster.
I hope this can be taken into account in future budget planning for the Army Air Corps.
Hereby I hope to have informed you well enough, and any specific questions detailing the plans of the USAAC I am willing to answer.
Signed,
General of the AAC Chief of Staff Oscar Westover