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Chapter LX: Fallout and Aftershocks Part XI - Latin America.
  • Chapter LX: Fallout and Aftershocks Part XI - Latin America.

    Leaving North America behind us we head south into Mexico, a nation that held the rare distinction of having improved it's economic position during the early 1930s, though admittedly it was from a war ravaged base. The end of the Catholic Cristero War had neatly coincided with the onset of the Great Depression, barely had Mexicans finished celebrating the peace deal than the battered economy collapsed. This however would be the low point, the establishment of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party, PNR) would, ironically, mark the final end of the Mexican revolution that had been ongoing in various forms since 1910. The immediate post-war President, revolutionary war general Plutarco Calles was originally a pragmatic social democrat who, though bombastically radical in speech, preferred slow and steady reform to dramatic change. Unfortunately his time in the Presidency gave him a taste for the power and money of high political office, his reforming zeal petering out by the early 1930s being replaced by corruption and nepotism. After his first term Calles declared himself "Jefe Maximato" the Political Chieftain of Mexico, and became the de facto ruler of Mexico through a string of puppet Presidents.

    Calles' reign came to an end when he was forced to appoint one of his old colleagues, Lázaro Cárdenas, as President. Playing on the growing dissatisfaction with both the lack of reforming zeal, and the growing corruption, Cárdenas soon outmanoeuvred Calles, culminating in the deportation and exile of Calles and his entire inner circle. This would mark the start of radical change in Mexico as Cárdenas accelerated the pace of change, increasing labour rights and union power while pushing through wide ranging land reform, seizing the haciendas of land owners and turning them into 'Ejido' areas, state owned land that was parcelled out for communities to use for free. At the industrial end of the economy he continued Calles policy of nationalise the weakened private railways at bargain prices, extending it to other small scale 'strategic' industries that could be seized with minimal compensation. Ordinarily this would have caused problems for the Mexican economy, giving foreign investors the entirely accurate impression that property rights and the rule of law were less important than the ill-defined 'social revolutionary justice'. However due to the Depression Calles judged such concerns were unimportant, overseas investment had been reduced to minimal levels already, while Mexico's exports had never been a vital part of the economy, even before the Depression decimated trade, so could easily be sacrificed. The one exception was the vital oil industry, such a key area of the economy that successive Mexican Presidents had trod lightly around it. However as the new generation of Mexican engineers proved capable of running the nationalised industries unaided, and the US oil majors pulled out of the Middle East to consolidate at home, Calles thoughts naturally turned to the fate of the oil industry, his decision would prove fateful for all parties involved.

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    Lázaro Cárdenas, the reforming President of Mexico. His brand of state intervention, nationalisation and land reform would gain him many admirers across the region, not least for the impressive results it yielded for the Mexican people and economy. Significantly this included many people north of the border, for whom the policies of Cárdenas offered a genuinely new alternative.

    Leaving Mexico we pass over the remainder of Central America, not because these nations lack interesting and diverse histories of their own, but because their affairs were of a more regional nature, impacting and being impacted on only by their neighbours and, of course, the ever present US commercial and military interests. As such matters are outside the scope of this work we pass over them, though it is perhaps worth noting that relations between the United States and it's Caribbean and Central American neighbours remained tense during the period. The somewhat idealistic non-intervention doctrine that had been floated after the Les Cayes incident in Haiti, short handed to 'The Good Neighbour Policy' by some, had failed to find favour with President Smith and thus the Roosevelt Corollary remained the guiding principle of US regional policy. Though public pressure had forced a scaling back of many US interventions, particularly the occupation of Haiti, this was more to do with a desire to see Federal funds spent at home on domestic problems or tax rebates rather than on foreign adventures. Thus it was that many a government in the region still had to keep half an eye on the potential US reaction to any policy decision, for fear of economic, political or military intervention should they go too far for American tastes, a state of affairs naturally resented by many in the region.

    We end our tour of the world in South America, where the entire range of reactions can be found; from the interest of Venezuela and Argentina, through to the regional focus of Ecuador and finally the quiet indifference of Uruguay. For all the events across the world South America had concerns of it's own, a ceasefire in the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia had only been arranged the in June of the previous year and negotiations on a final peace treaty were still ongoing. Moreover a second territorial dispute, between Ecuador and Peru over border territory and the start of the Amazon basin, was growing increasingly bad tempered despite, or may because of, an agreement over the status quo border line arranged over the summer. Quite naturally for many governments these events, being closer, were of far more importance than any affair in Europe. There were however exceptions, countries for whom overseas affairs could have large domestic impacts and thus naturally paid greater attention to world affairs. As one might expect Venezuela was one of these nations, as the second largest oil producer on earth and with oil comprising over 90% of exports anything that might affect the price was naturally watched carefully. After prices fell dramatically at the start of the Great Depression, sinking to less the £1 a barrel in the early 1930s, the Abyssinian War had seen prices spike to well over £10 a barrel over fears the Iraqi and Persian fields may be cut off, the resultant injection of funds naturally welcomed in the Venezuelan Finance Ministry. The other notably observant party was Argentina, possibly unique as the only nation outside the protagonists to express any interest in the Anglo-Irish trade war, for higher tariffs on Irish trade could only mean greater imports of Argentinian beef. There were also the strong ties between the two nations, after the Roca-Runciman Treaty of 1933 the Vice-President of Argentina summed up the new agreement; "It can be said that Argentina is an integral economic part of the British Empire." As trade between the two nations expanded there was an appetite on both sides for a revised and expanded deal, further strengthening ties and increasing the already considerable British influence in the continent.
     
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    Chapter LXI: Hope and Hubris.
  • Chapter LXI: Hope and Hubris.

    The 1936 US convention season is mainly remembered for seeing the re-emergence of a meaningful third party candidate for the race to the White House, meaningful in the sense of converting popular support into electoral college votes. Whereas previous meaningful candidates had come from Republican splits, the Progressive of Theodore Roosevelt and later Robert La Follette, in 1936 it would be the turn of the Democrat Party to split. The decision to drop the unpopular John Nance Garner from their ticket and pick a fresh, more radical candidate, prompted Garner his partners in the New York Tammany Hall political machine to break from the party in an attempt to keep hold of office. Garner's new party, the States' Rights Democratic Party, was initially pleased to welcome such a 'big name' into the fold, but soon found it had got more than it bargained for, the Tammany Hall operation ousting the original committee and re-orientating the organisation. Originally launched as a pro-segregation party, State's Rights being little more than a polite euphemism, the party was hollowed out and used as a short cut by Garner, providing him with the basis of a Southern political organisation to match the Tammany Hall controlled political machines of the Northern states.

    With the party solidly under the control of the master manipulators of Tammany Hall it was a simple matter to ensure that Garner gained the nomination, along with his freshly selected running mate George White. White was another ex-Democrat, a former chair of the Democratic National Convention and contender for the Presidential nomination in 1932 he had served as Governor of Ohio since 1931 but lost the nomination after falling foul of personal politics in his local party. He was thus more than willing to join Garner's platform and combine a bid for power with a chance for revenge, bringing with him, Garner hoped, the electoral college votes of Ohio and a better shot at the neighbouring states. The Garner-White platform was simplicity itself, interpreting the party's name literally it called for a smaller Federal Government and the return of power, control and money to state level. This quite cunningly allowed Garner to be all things to all men, by simply arguing that the solutions needed in one state were different from those needed in others. Thus at one rally he could call for government investment and increased spending, while at the next, in a different state, he could demand the complete opposite, all while technically remaining completely consistent. On foreign policy, as with all the candidates to a greater or lesser degree, the message was isolationist and keeping America out of overseas conflict. He did strike out on defence however when he advocated cautious re-armament because 'A strong America is a safe America'. This translated into a promise of more fighters and new navy ships, all to be constructed by firms that, conveniently, were based in, or had manufacturing plants in, key battleground states such as California. Finally, in yet another clean break from the Smith Presidency, Garner pledged to repeal the 18th Amendment and return the choice on prohibition to the state level. The key question for Garner was whether his populist reinvention would strike a chord with an electorate disillusioned with Washington or if the public would blame him as much as President Smith for the failures of the Federal Government in the first place.

    Moving onto the Democrats, Garner's defection understandably caused massive consternation. While the party may not have wanted Garner as a candidate they certainly hadn't intended to force him out and cause a split in the party. Instead the plan had been to use the assassination of President Smith to respectfully, but firmly, blame everything on the Smith-Garner presidency and promote two brand new, un-tainted, candidates. While still something of a long shot, the previous mid-term elections had seen the Democrats lose controls of both houses of Congress, it was certainly a far brighter prospect than trying to get the unpopular Smith re-elected. Garner's candidacy however was expected to split the Democrat vote, certainly it was believed he would attract far more Democrats than Republicans, and so transformed a tough, but winnable, fight into forgone conclusion. Naturally this thinned the field somewhat, many candidates who had been prepared to take a chance decided they did not wanting to 'waste' a shot at the White House in such unfavourable circumstances. When the pre-convention favourite, the Louisiana senator Huey Long, withdrew to support his close ally John Overton, it was widely interpreted as the Long faction giving up the election as lost and waiting until 1940 for his run. This left the field wide open, many other candidates pulling out or backing proxies of their own, until finally, after several rounds of voting (and doubtless even more rounds of back room talks) the convention nominated party veteran Cordell Hull as Presidential candidate with the former Alben Barkley his running mate.

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    Alben Barkley, Democratic Vice Presidential candidate. Renowned for his campaigning skills, once giving 16 separate barn-storming stump speeches in a single day, he had earned himself the nickname 'Iron Man' for his stamina on the campaign trail. He would need all those skills as he criss-crossed the country trying to give the ticket a fighting chance.

    Though many saw Hull as a default candidate, or worse a sacrificial lamb entered just so the Democrats were in the race, the man himself was determined to make a fight of it. With the party in such disarray, and the majority not expecting him to win anyway, Hull had a free hand to determine his platform on most issues, something he took full advantage of to craft a radical platform. He did not have complete freedom however, the Southern party elders, all the more influential after so many Northern big city bosses defected with Garner, issued several red lines he could not cross, most notably on Prohibition where Hull was forced to remain 'Dry'. On foreign policy Hull managed to push the platform away from isolationism, pushing for greater involvement in world affairs, though he was always careful to publicly support the Neutrality Acts for fear of alienating too many voters. This translated into championing a 'Good Friend' policy for Latin America and a promise of greater co-operation with other nations to lower tariffs and revive international trade, thus hopefully reviving the economy. Domestically Hull proposed a radical programme built on a vast expansion of the federal government; Agricultural programmes and controls to revive the rural economy and raise farm prices, a National Industry Board to 'guide' an industrial recovery through controls and standards and, controversially, taking the country off the Gold Standard and letting the dollar float. Hull's hope was that this radical programme and shear hard graft on the campaign trail, particularly from his running mate 'Iron Man' Barkley, could overcome the many obstacles the ticket faced.

    Finally we turn to the Republicans, a party more concerned with what to do once in office than how to achieve it. This was not just arrogance, though the implosion of the Democrats left many feeling the election was theirs to lose, but a genuine ideological problem for much of the conservative wing of the party. Simply put the low spending, fiscally conservative policies of President Smith had not worked, as these were the default policy approaches for many Republicans this presented something of a problem. While the die-hards argued they could cut spending still further (the corrupt Delaware Valley Authority being a favourite target) most delegates feared this was just doing the wrong the thing but even harder, that the problem wasn't the implementation but the concept. Thus it was that the progressives Alf Landon and William Borah emerged as leading candidates, with Landon eventually triumphing as the conservative wing refused to back the outspoken and unpredictable Borah. For Vice-President the long time favourite, newspaper magnet Frank Knox, was rejected as the convention didn't want, or feel they politically needed, two progressive on the ticket. Instead they picked the Michigan senator Arthur Vandenberg who, though intended as a moderating influence on Landon, was not without reforming instincts or a desire for government action.

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    Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican Vice Presidential pick. His priorities were fiscal responsibility through a balanced budget, isolationism and states' rights. While seemingly at odds with Landon's platform of increased spending on assistance schemes, a bigger role for the federal government in combating the depression and better foreign relations, that was the point of his selection. Vandenberg was picked to show the conservative right of the party agreed with the platform, but also to keep an eye on Landon and hopefully stop him from going too far.

    While Landon's domestic platform remained fiscally conservative, the idea of a balanced budget was still a strong one, it also had a strong social element and was in favour of expanding the role of the federal government. The main domestic dividing line with the Democrats was on the issue of 'national economic planning', Hull being in favour of the government directing the economy and guiding it out of recession while Landon felt that such policies would reduce economic freedom, which he believed went hand in hand with personal liberty. That is not to say the platform was a pro-business blank cheque, there was support for a minimum wage to stop the "chase to the bottom" deflationary cycle, a more relaxed stance on trade union laws and support for federally managed public works and rural electrification (though explicitly not the notorious DVA or any scheme like it). Landon described the difference between the two main parties as the difference between a helping hand and a guiding hand; the former supported you if you needed help, while the latter was more interested in telling you what to do regardless. While somewhat unfair on Hull, though not completely without merit, this would be a contrast the Republicans would push for the entire campaign.

    On foreign policy the tensions between the interventionist Landon and the isolationist Vandenberg were palpable at times, in the end though the convention decided on an moderate isolationist position, avoiding both the severe 'Total Neutrality' of Vandenberg and the moderate interventionist 'Moral Neutrality' of Landon. This position, combined with need to balance the budget while increasing government social and economic spending, pushed re-armament of the agenda and to the bottom of the priority list. There was however a commitment to keep defence spending at a tick-over level, to keep key defence firms in business and stop the country losing their specialist skills and knowledge. Finally on prohibition the convention went 'wet', bowing to the considerable public opposition and putting a commitment to make the matter a state level choice on the platform. In summary the Landon-Vandenberg ticket was something of a compromise for the Republicans and was constructed more with an eye on what to do in office that how to gain it. As the candidates and delegates left the convention hall for the campaign trail they would find out if such thinking was sensible planning or merely foolish hubris.


    ---

    OK so there are you three choices so get voting. You can vote for a candidate/party in general or you can cast your vote for a candidate in a specific state (which will help me fill out the map ;) ).

    This election will operate on 'Florida Rules', so remember; vote early, vote often but only once a day. In the event the election is close the judges decision is final and may bear no resemblance to the actual popular vote tally. :D
     
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    Chapter LXII: The Politics of Defence.
  • Chapter LXII: The Politics of Defence.

    The Parliamentary recess often gives the impression that the British government takes much of the summer off on holiday, that no governing is done between parliament rising in late July and returning for the state opening in October. This is a distinctly false impression for while there are certainly no laws being debated or passing through committee, the work of government continued behind the scenes. Thus it was that in the summer of 1936 the offices of Whitehall were working hard, quite aside from the show piece of political theatre that was the King's Speech to parliament there was the little matter of the Autumn budget to prepare. For our purposes the King's Speech is not especially relevant, thus the doubtlessly fascinating intricacies of the such vital legislation as the Exportation of Horses Act need not detain us and we will proceed to focus on the two main areas of interest; The Chamberlain Report and the Autumn Budget.

    The Chamberlain Report started life as a political gesture, an attempt by the new Prime Minister Austen Chamberlain to placate those worried about the costs of the war, rearmament and the general economic strategy being pursued. The fiscally conservative group on the right of the party was just one of the many that Churchill had so studiously ignored, offended or both while in office and thus had to be kept happy, or at the very least quiet. The natural choice for the report therefore was Neville Chamberlain, not because he was Austen's half-brother but because he had retained a significant power base in the very wing of the party the report was aimed at. Though originally given the role of Lord President of the Council as a step towards rehabilitation the office gave Neville access to the very heart of government without the onerous official duties that normally accompanied that privilege. This access, combined with his background as Chancellor, gave an ideal base on which to build a intimate and detailed document from the best information the government had. While the final report would not emerge until the new year, the draft copy circulated in early October would have a significant impact on both the Autumn budget and Conservative economic policy for years to come.

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    The monarch, King George VI, visiting one of the Rover shadow factories in the Midlands. The scheme of 'Shadow Factories' had been vital in enabling the British war economy to rapidly get up to speed, as had the 'Rationalisation' scheme of re-tooling disused factories. The Report also noted the excellent performance the Merchant Marine which vindicated the support given to that sector to re-build the merchant fleet with modern, faster and cheaper vessels.

    The report mixed credit claiming for past policies, the 'Shadow Factory' scheme for instance had proven itself highly valuable, with acceptance of mistakes, particularly over the role of government intervention during the Depression. While not accepting full blown Keynesian economics, that would remain a step too far for many, the report did mark the grudging acceptance by the Tory right that there was a role for increased state spending. However the report was just as quick to rule out vast swathes of the economy as being 'unsuitable' for such government intervention, N. Chamberlain being particularly concerned that spraying government money around the economy would both ruin the nations finances and stunt the private sector recovery. The report therefore called for spending to be concentrated in sectors where there was no existing market to distort. This idea was leapt on by the service ministries who were quick to point out that defence spending was perfect for the kind of intervention outlined in the report, a conclusion the report's authors were, by their own logic, forced to agree with.

    The remainder of the report concerned itself with an industry by industry breakdown of the effects of the war, much of it obvious (heavy industrial firms had done very well) some less so (the 'knock on' benefit of so many workers being hired to fill orders had boosted consumer spending far more than anyone, save perhaps the team around Keynes, had expected) and some surprising (the rail industry had, despite the vast increase in rail freight, made slightly less profit than during peace time). These observations, together with the ideas from the first section of the report, formed the basis of a set of recommendations for on-going economic policy; most significantly for our purposes was continued higher defence spending until the recovery was 'firmly established' and a major re-think of transport policy. The former will be discussed in later chapters, while the latter was focused on preserving a strong and viable rail network without resorting to government subsidies or intervention. The solution, as implemented, saw the repeal of the 'Common Carrier' requirements on the Big Four railway groups in areas where road freight was established and a commitment to maintain 'strategic' rail capacity between the main military bases of the country and the industrial heartlands. The lifting of these restriction would not reverse the inexorable rise of road haulage, indeed their share of freight haulage would grow as the railways axed 'light' freight capacity across the South East, Midlands and North East. It did however save the Big Four millions of pounds almost instantly as they no longer had to maintain a vast freight infrastructure that was only used for the unprofitable runs the road hauliers didn't want. Released from their shackles the railways would finally be able to turn a healthy profit and enter a new golden age, the faster and higher capacity network that would emerge would prove a boon to the country and be of immense strategic value scant years later.

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    The LNER Gresley A4 Pacific, one of the iconic trains of the era that would find lasting fame when one of it's number, the Mallard, would set a world record for steam trains that stands to this day. Despite such visible signs of health as this and the major electrification works by the Southern Railways the long term prospects for the railways were not good in the early 1930s The lifting of Common Carrier and the shift to making road freight pay for the costs of the roads would help the railways stabilise their finances and remain viable.

    Turning to the second major political event, the budget, the first surprise, not least for the government, was that the financial position was far stronger than had been expected in the immediate aftermath of the war. While this can partly be attributed to the stronger consumer spending noted in the Chamberlain Report the importance of the considerable upswing in exports, particularly by the arms industry, should not be under-estimated. Quite aside from the high profile strategic deals, such as the Handley Page Hampden sales to Sweden, there had been a mass of less publicised, but nevertheless valuable deals done; ranging from the construction of a flotilla of modified G-class destroyers for Greece through to the selling on of dozens of Hawker and Gloster biplanes that Minister for Air Churchill was forcing out of RAF service. The rising tensions in Europe and subsequent acceleration of re-armament programmes across the continent left British manufacturers in a strong position to sell 'war proven' designs to countless smaller nations across the continent, even if the product in question had spent the conflict lying in a storage depot miles from the enemy.

    There was, however, one deal that was resolutely un-publicised and was the cause of much anxiety in many quarters - the truly immense arms sales to Monarchist Spain. Ignoring the growing concerns over British involvement in Spain in the first place, the Spanish were paying in their only hard currency, the vast gold reserves of Spain, hence forcing the British government to get involved in the deal. After being transferred from Madrid to Gibraltar, it was the Royal Navy that moved the gold back to the vaults of the Bank of England and the Treasury that then paid the manufacturers in sterling. As a further twist the Treasury was valuing the gold at the government official price of £4.25 an ounce, far below the London market rate of over £7 a ounce. Before the end of the year over 500 tonnes of gold, almost three quarters of the total reserves of Spain, would have been transferred from Madrid to London, amounting to almost £70 million at official rates, or over £110 million at market rates. For comparison the total cost of HMS Ark Royal, from design to final commissioning and including all aircraft, was less than £7 million. It is clear, therefore, that the British government was making a very large, if unofficial, profit from the deal, and that is before considering the incalculable economic benefits of so many large contracts going to the likes of Vickers-Armstrong, Hawker and BSA. In the end it was this immense financial boon that over-rode the concerns over British involvement and drove through the official recognition of Monarchist Spain, so as to put the deal on a (slightly) firmer legal footing.

    The upshot of all this was that the government had both the motivation and the finances to continue re-armament and keep defence spending at a far higher level than had seemed possible scant months earlier. While spending did indeed fall considerably from the wartime peak, primarily driven by the massive drop in fuel and supply use, it remained higher in both real and absolute terms than any settlement since the Geedes Axe. The problem therefore was not the availability of funding, but what to spend it on. Attempts to solve this problem would evolve into a vast multi sided squabble between the Treasury, the service ministries, the Ministry for Defence Co-ordination and the Board of Trade. As an added spice many in the armed forces had not finished learning the lessons of the conflict, indeed as we shall see many had learnt entirely the 'wrong' lesson from their wartime experiences.
     
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    Chapter LXIII: The Backbone of the Empire.
  • Chapter LXIII: The Backbone of the Empire.

    Before we begin dissecting the autumn defence estimates it is worth outlining the role of the Ministry for Defence Co-ordination. Having only been established at the beginning of the year the ministry had proved it's worth during the Abyssinian War in prioritising war production, working with the service ministries and industry to push through the most vital projects quickly. Post-war however the department would lose both it's first minister, Leo Amery, and many of it's powers to the Treasury in Chamberlain's first cabinet reshuffle. With a far reduced budget, but a new and enthusiastic minister in Harold Macmillan, the ministry began it's slow evolution into the modern Ministry of Defence, starting with it's work in drawing up a unified defence budget with the service ministries, an innovation that allowed the military to present a common front to the Treasury in budget discussions and stop the Chancellor playing one service off another. Equally vital was it's role of coordinating those projects that fell into the gaps between the services, the units that spanned two ministries, both of which accepted the value of the unit but for various reasons had no desire to pay for it. Prime examples were Coastal Command and the Royal Marines, units that would prove of immense value in later conflicts but who's mother service would have treated as a very low priority had it not been for the compulsion of Macmillan and his successors at Defence Co-ordination.

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    A Coastal Command Avro Anson. Put bluntly the Anson was slow, short ranged and poorly armed. While it would eventually find it's role as cheap and forgiving multi-engine crew trainer, the Anson should never had been near a front line squadron. That Coastal Command had accepted it at all was only because the Air Staff placed them plumb bottom on the priority list, a side effect of the RAFs desire to control all military aviation, even in areas they had no interest in funding. The dire position of Coastal Command would be just one of the areas Macmillan would have to focus his department's energies on.

    Turning our attention to the defence estimates we begin with the Senior Service and pride of the British Empire; The Royal Navy. The war with Italy had come as a considerable strategic surprise to the Navy, most planning since the end of the 1920s had revolved around a war in the Far East against Japan while retaining enough strength to protect home waters and the Mediterranean. That so much planning had been so wrong would normally prompt a major re-think, yet the Admiralty could find little fault with their original thinking. Of the great naval powers war with either the United States or France, even allowing for the collapse of the Entente Cordiale, was considered highly unlikely. This left only the Imperial Japanese Navy as the only remaining great naval power, the Italian fleet having been decimated during the Abyssinian War. The Naval Board therefore dug out the previous years Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC) report, dusted it down and used it as the base for their naval estimate. The DRC was based on the 'One Power' standard, requiring the Royal Navy to be able to engage in a full blown war in the Far East while keeping control of Home Waters and the Mediterranean. While the demise of the Regia Marina had made securing the Mediterranean that much easier, this was however balanced by the loss of the French fleet as a likely ally and the concerns over long term German naval ambitions therefore the Royal Navy pushed for the same recommendations;

    DRC 'One Power Standard' strength required by 1942
    • Capital ships (Battleships and Battlecruisers) - 15
    • Aircraft Carriers - 8
    • Cruisers - 70
    At first glance a none too ambitious target, the same number of capital ships and only two extra carriers, even the increase in cruiser strength appeared modest, given the target date it boiled down to five new vessels a year, hardly an onerous expense. As a brief aside it is illuminating to note that even after the success of the carriers in the war, and the spectacular strike on Taranto, the Admiralty still could not bring itself to call aircraft carriers 'capital ships', preferring instead to give them a separate category of their own. In balance however carriers had finally been promoted from below cruisers in the list of priorities, which was at least a move in the right direction.

    The raw ship numbers however were not the whole story as they did not include the DRC's recommendations on replacement vessels, a difficult issue for a fleet still containing many Great War veterans. The DRC baldy report stated that the entire Revenge class of battleships were unsuitable for modernisation and would have to be replaced, as would both the Renown class battlecruisers along with the carriers HMS Argus, HMS Hermes and HMS Eagle. The marked disparity amongst the upgraded and not-upgraded Queen Elizabeths was also noted and HMS Valiant, HMS Malaya and HMS Barham were all recommended to be thoroughly modernised. Almost as an afterthought the 'C' and 'D' class light cruisers that formed the bulk of the cruiser fleet were also earmarked for replacement along with almost all the early 'Post war standard' destroyers. All told the final naval estimate was for seven new capital ships, the full modernisation of three more and the construction of five new aircraft carriers. In addition dozens of cruisers and destroyers, both for fleet and escort duty, were to be constructed in a series of rolling programmes, all programmes to be complete by 1942.

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    HMS Warspite entering the Grand Harbour at Valletta, Malta. After a string of modernisations she had been all but completely rebuilt, she received new engines powered by new more efficient small-tube boilers, thicker deck armour, revised secondary armament, extra anti-aircraft weaponry, improved gun laying equipment and countless other improvements. The DRC report proposed bringing the rest of the class up to the standard of Warspite and her sister Queen Elizabeth, an option not available for the smaller and more cramped Revenge class.

    Despite the vast cost and scope of the scheme it was being based on an existing agreed plan and so was tricky for the Treasury, or indeed anyone else, to argue with, not that the War Office and Air Ministry didn't try. The crux of the argument against the plan was that the Admiralty was too cautious and that a fleet that so handily defeated the Regia Marina was clearly in no need of new ships. The Admiralty's response was to use the great deal of political capital it has accumulated after the string of naval successes in the Abyssinian War, spending in both in Parliament and the press, the First Sea Lord Keynes being particularly vocal. His offer of keeping the Revenges in service if the RAF would agree to stick with the Sopwith Camel and the Army in Mark I 'Male' tanks being particularly effective.

    Such efforts though were, perhaps, unneeded, put simply Britain was still primarily a naval power, the Empire had been built on, and thus depended upon, control of the seas and safe shipping lanes. For as long as that remained the case the Royal Navy would remain top of the military pecking order and retain first call on resources for rearmament. Having established the long term plans of the Royal Navy in the next chapter we will see how this translated into actual hulls in dockyards and how the experience of the Abyssinian War influenced the design of those vessels.
     
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    Chapter LXIV: Learning From The Past.
  • Chapter LXIV: Learning From The Past.

    The Navy Board's post war design review is generally regarded as an infuriating mix of intelligent analysis and missed opportunities, some experiences carefully dissected and thoughtfully applied while others languished ignored. In fairness to the Admiralty many of the lessons so obvious in hindsight were far from clear at the time, especially given the facts of the engagements that the conclusions were based on. Before looking at the review in detail it is worth briefly outlining the war experiences and the doctrine that informed the review.

    From a purely naval perspective, and excluding the amphibious operations, the Abyssinian War consisted of four major set piece engagements (First Taranto, Coast of Tobruk, Second Taranto and the Taranto Raid), a determined convoy raiding campaign against the Italian supplies lines and a ongoing convoy protection operation for British shipping. Naturally the large battles had dominated both public and political opinion, being both better spectacles and the simplest for laymen to follow, though they were also the subject of much discussion throughout the fleet; a chance to serve on a battleship and fight a grand battle being the reason many officers had signed up. For the Naval Staff however the major battles were but one part of the picture, an important part no doubt but not something that could, or should, be considered in isolation from the other operations of the war. This wider view of the role of the fleet was a reflection of the essentially Corbettian attitude of the Admiralty, not that they would have expressed it in such terms. Given the vast size of the Royal Navy, even allowing for it's disparate and globe spanning commitments, the Admiralty felt it was more than possible to maintain both the correct 'Corbettian' control of the sea while a portion of the fleet engaged in seeking a 'Mahanian' decisive battle. Such had been the strategy of the Abyssinian War and events had, in the opinion of the Naval Staff, shown it to be correct. Future events however would show this position was not tenable in the face of more formidable opponents than the Regia Marina.

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    Sir John Knox Laughton. Considered by many the 'father' of modern naval history his work would form the basis for the first proper studies of naval grand strategy. Though fated to relative obscurity he was a profound influence on those who followed, in particular his 'disciple' Rear-Admiral Alfred Mahan and his 'protege' Sir Julian Corbett. Despite a common base these two gentlemen took profoundly different views on naval warfare; Mahan preached the importance of forcing a decisive battle for the stronger force and recommended the opposite 'fleet in being' strategy for the weaker force. Corbett instead believed the key was 'command of the seas', the control of lines of communication and the safety of convoy routes, a concept he argued was relative not absolute. For Corbett the actual destruction of the enemy was less important than sea control, a controversial view for many naval officers who saw fleet battles as the main purpose of a fleet. Despite the advances in technology and tactics the ideas of both men still had committed followings and formed the basis of strategic thinking for any naval power worthy of note.

    Having briefly touched on grand strategy we move onto the specific lessons of the war, ignoring low level tactical lessons on ship movement and positioning and the miniature of revised bridge layouts and so on. Reproduced below are the main lessons drawn from the conflict, presented in the same order and wording as found in the conclusion of the the Naval Review;

    • Battleships remain the main 'battle winning' unit for at-sea engagements
    • The role of aircraft, both shore and ship based, is to support and supplement battleships.
    • The main aerial threat comes from air launched torpedoes not bombs.
    • High speed, in both sustained long cruises and in combat, is of considerable, but not vital importance.
    • Anti-Submarine operations were far less effective than expected and further investigation is recommended.

    While hindsight tells us that the rapid advance of technology would render much of that list incorrect, save for the last two points, it is a most interesting insight into the thinking of the time. The list will be broken down below, but the general trends were the promotion of carriers and aircraft in general (though not as high as perhaps it should have been), the inclusion of shore based aircraft in the review (a nod towards Coastal Command and the MoDC's push for inter-service co-operation) and the focus on the submarine threat as pre-war confidence was proved somewhat misplaced.

    Taking the first point, the primacy of the Battleship for 'at sea' engagements, it is tempting to believe the more conservative elements of the Staff determined that outcome first and then distorted the following lessons fit. In reality however the chain of reasoning in fact started with the third point; the perceived ineffectiveness of aerial bombing. While this would prove to be equally incorrect, it was at least a far more justifiable believe given the evidence to hand at the time. The history of aerial attack on surface vessels was, at best, patchy; the much touted 'decisive' Osterfiredland test conducted by United States in the 1920s had only proved that heavy bombers with 2000lb bombs could indeed sink stationary, uncrewed and obsolete vessels if given enough time. Conversely the test against HMS Agamemnon conducted in the late 1920s had shown that a slow, unarmed battleship manoeuvring on remote control could avoid being hit from the air. Outside these trials there was much evidence from actual attacks on smaller vessels; the Dutch De Zeven Provinciën and Greek Averoff had both been ineffectually but deliberately bombed by their own side, more pertinently there was the disappointing performance of the Fleet Air Arm Seals at the Battle of the Coast of Tobruk. Taken together these experiences had left the Navy convinced aerial bombing was not a threat, even arch FAA advocate Lord Keyes conceded that battleships had less to fear from bombers than from from plunging fire with armour piercing ammunition or, significantly, large torpedoes.

    There were, of course, caveats to that view. The complete lack of a purpose designed dive bomber in either RAF or FAA service had prevented that type from being tested, an oversight the FAA was well aware of but had not been able to overcome due to RAF resistance to the concept. The FAA's drive to acquire a dive bomber, discussed later, is indicative of the high hopes they had of the concept, however at the time of the review it remained just that - hopes, not something on which you could base a radical change in strategy. The other major caveat was hinted at in Lord Keyes comment above, the air launched torpedo was quite explicitly excluded from the assessment of the aerial bombing threat. However the torpedo was considered a known quantity, ever since the first torpedo boats in the late 19th century people had been claiming the torpedo meant the end of the Battleship. That's not to say the Naval Staff ignored the problem, for instance there was a general re-assessment and uprating of torpedo protection on the new capital ship designs, however the threat was not considered grave enough to require re-thinking the very basis of British naval strategy. This perhaps shows the key problem of the review in microcosm, the failure to think ahead and make any allowance for improving aircraft performance and advancing technology. Fortunately they were far from alone in this mistake, air power advocates the world over encountered similar problems, however given the pioneering role of the Royal Navy in naval aviation the failure to capitalise on that lead must be marked as, at best, a missed opportunity.

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    HMS Emerald, lead vessel of the two ship E-Class of light cruisers. The E-Class, also known as the Emerald Class, was in many ways a ground breaking class for the Royal Navy, everything from the twin turrets to the bridge design would be copied for later cruisers. However it is for it's relatively high speed the class is most remembered, at 33 knots fully laden they were the fastest cruiser in the fleet for most of their service lives. With Italian light cruisers sometimes exceeding 40 knots in trials and even French cruisers managing over 35 knots it is perhaps surprising the Royal Navy viewed the E-class as 'too fast'. The reason for this judgement was the believe that too much had been sacrificed for the speed, the follow up Leander class could just exceed 32knots, barely 1 knot less, on the same basic hull and tonnage, yet had 10% less installed power and used the tonnage for an extra 6" gun and improved secondary armament. Successive British cruisers classes would keep to a maximum design speed of around 32 knots as the Admiralty traded speed for guns and armour.

    Moving on down the list, we come to the somewhat vaguely worded statement on speed. This point reflects the difficulty in compressing a somewhat wide ranging idea down to a brief sentence, for the review had reflected long and hard on the 'ideal' speed for future warships. This was no easy task for speed, unlike the other elements of the warship triad armour and armament, was a very subjective attribute; while the value of an extra inch of belt armour or an additional turret were obvious and would be useful in any engagement, an extra half knot of speed (which could easily take more tonnage and cost more than either of the previous) could be vital in catching a fleeing enemy but equally could never be used outside of trials. There was also the matter of cruising speed to be considered, traditionally this had only been thought important for convoy escort and protection vessels so 'fleet' units had maximised top speed at the cost of economic cruising. The war experience had shown not only did roles swap and merge as operational requirements shifted, several destroyer flotillas had spent the war switching between escort work, submarine hunting and serving in traditional fleet roles, but that even 'pure' fleet units needed a fast economic cruise speed, in order to move between theatres quickly without needing regular refuelling stops. The final consideration was the Italian navy's experience with high speed vessels, with several prized former units of the Regia Marina in dry dock in Rosyth, the Naval Staff took the chance to study them for lessons the Royal Navy could learn. The investigation revealed that, as suspected, Italy had been breaching the various naval treaty limits and all the vessels were indeed over prescribed tonnage. However despite their extra tonnage all of them had been compromised to varying degrees in order to reach their high speeds, indeed the most balanced were also the slowest; the formidable Zaras barely making over 30knots when fully laden. These findings confirmed the Royal Navy's own experiences of high speed vessels;that any ship could be made faster or slower for relatively little change in tonnage up to a certain point, beyond which any speed change required exponentially more power and tonnage for the same increase.

    Taking all of the above into consideration the review attempted to produce a series of recommendations that were not too prescriptive but equally avoiding being vague to the point of uselessness. The first problem was that to be useful the recommendations needed firm numbers, yet one of the key findings was that designs should not be compromised by aiming for arbitrary speeds. Secondly there was the issue of the legacy fleet; in practice none of the battleships in commission could exceed 25knots when fully laden, a speed that was believed too slow, and had equally poor sustained cruising speeds. Yet under the recently agreed re-armament plans the Nelsons and the Queen Elizabeths were to remain in service for a minimum of six years, likely longer, and thus would have to operate along side the newer, potentially faster, design. Such was the importance of the decision, effectively it would set the battle line speed for the future fleet, the Naval Staff passed the buck, referring the decision up to the top for consideration by the Navy Board. The eventual decision of the Sea Lords was to break with the past and set the speed at 'not less than 30knots when fully stored and equipped for war', commenting that if the Navy only concerned itself with older vessels then it would never build anything faster and thus the speed would never rise. The remainder of the specific recommendations ruled out any speed focused designs such as the E-Class cruisers and confirmed that, subject to the minimum speed set by the Navy Board and any specific requirement, speed should be treated as the least important leg of the warship triad.

    Finally we come to the consideration of the anti-submarine campaign of the navy, operations that had been strategically successful but tactically very worrying. While the main aim had been successful, the supply and troops convoys had reached the theatre un-molested, the worrying fact was that no Italian submarines had been sunk. This was of particular concern as the entire campaign had been conducted under almost perfect conditions; The Royal Navy had been able to concentrate the bulk of the fleet in theatre allowing for heavy convoy escorts and numerous 'striking groups', the convoy routes had been limited with the vast majority running between only three points (Gibralta <-> Malta <-> Alexandria) and the campaign had been conducted in the spring/summer giving the British maximum daylight 'hunting time' and the submarines the fewest hours of 'safe' darkness. The optimistic interpretation was that the Regia Marina had appreciated all the British advantages and not risked their submarines out of fear of losing them. While this is perhaps partially true, certainly there were no engagements or detections near convoys, the destroyers of Rear-Admiral Horton's 'Striking Groups' based out of Malta were involved in several engagements with enemy submarines, however they singularly failed to sink any of them. The conclusions drawn were that ASDIC detection and tracking was far less reliable in actual engagements than hoped and that a major re-think on anti-submarine weaponry was required. The former had been suspected as ASDIC was known to have significant limitations, particularly when close to target, while the latter was an unpleasant surprise as rear-dropped depth charges had been thought sufficient. On the positive side the Naval Staff were able to confirm that the convoy system was effective, though the 'loss of efficiency' (the time spent waiting while convoys formed up and the time lost by travelling at the speed of the slowest merchant) remained a concern. Overall, however, the campaign had been disconcerting to an Admiralty that had believed the submarine menace had been dealt with, on the evidence of the war they were forced to accept that both tactically and technologically they were still some way from that goal.
     
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    Chapter LXV: The New Pride of the Fleet.
  • Chapter LXV: The New Pride of the Fleet.

    Having considered the long term plans and the doctrinal considerations we can at last turn our attention to the actual design of the Royal Navy's new warships, a field that was the purview of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors (RCNC) and it's head, the Director of Naval Construction (DNC) Sir Stanley Goodall. The post of DNC had been in decline since the days of the great Sir Tennyson d'Eyncourt, designer of everything from the pre Great-War R-class destroyers through to the Nelsons. The relatively brisk rate of naval expansion therefore was a test of a branch that had not fully designed anything larger than a slightly modified County class cruiser for almost a decade. Even the many smaller vessels that had been designed had been essentially evolutions of existing vessels, the progression of the 'Post-war standard' class of destroyers being the classic example. On the positive side the many modernisation programmes had allowed some experience of large vessels to be retained and the Naval Staff attached several officers, both staff and fleet, with experience from the Abyssinian War to ensure the hard learned lessons were communicated to the more detached designers.

    Following the Navy's priorities let us begin with the battleship, specifically the new King George V class. The class had begun life as a series of design studies, a method for the Admiralty and Government to establish the British position for the abortive Second London Naval Conference. By producing a string of outline designs with varying tonnage, speed, armament and armour it was hoped to establish what limits Britain could accept and which restrictions would produce unacceptably compromised designs like the Nelsons. By late 1935 the design had been progressed to a 35,000 ton, ~28knot, well armoured vessels armed with 10 x 14" main guns, far from what the Admiralty had originally wanted but all that could be extracted from the tonnage given the diplomatic, political and treaty considerations. With the failure of the conference the Naval Staff were free to push up the specification and while the Abyssinian War raged the RCNC worked away to 'optimise' the design. Of course the ideal solution would have been a blank sheet of paper design to completely break free of the treaty limits, however the Admiralty was very keen to get hulls on the slipway as soon as possible, before the government, or the Treasury, had a chance to change their mind. This compressed schedule forced the designers to reuse much of their earlier design work and would mean the Royal Navy having to wait for it's first proper post-treaty battleship.

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    HMS King George V, the lead ship of her class she would be a formidable new addition to the Royal Navy when she entered service. Originally designed using the long standing Admiralty priorities of Protection, Guns and Speed (in that order) the work of the RCNC saw the vessels emerge with a slightly higher speed, less guns but more fire-power and a similar level of protection. For all the innovations it was the main guns that attracted most attention, new designs in new turrets they owed much to the work of Ordnance Board's experimental programme. After the disastrous post-Great War testing of German guns produced the erroneous recommendation of high speed, low weight shells for the 16"/45 MkI guns used on the Nelsons the Board had implemented a root and branch reform of all testing and development work. One of the fruits of this work was the purely experimental 12"/45 MkIV gun, used as a test bed for many of the features that would be adopted by the KGV class.

    The final design was essentially a fusion of two earlier designs, coded 14A and 15C, the former was used for the basic hull and armour, while the latter was the basis for the armament and machinery. Turning our attention to the 15C design elements first, as their heart were 9 x 15" main guns in three triple turrets, two forward and one aft. Notably these guns were not to be the venerable 15"/42s MkIs used by the rest of the battlefleet but the brand new 15"/45s MkIIs in equally new mountings. Though using identical ammunition to the older guns the new 15"/45s incorporated many new features, most importantly switching from wire-wound to all steel construction and a revised "all cast" recoil mechanism. The effect was lighter, stronger and more accurate guns, testament to the value of Ordnance Board's belated re-discovery of thorough testing and experimentation. The mountings were based on the triple turrets of the Nelson class but incorporating all the many changes and revisions that had been implemented on the originally far from successful design. As excellent as this work was, and both guns and mounts proved reliable and accurate in service despite slight initial teething problems, it did take up much of the RCNCs time and thus other areas of the design received less attention. This was most apparent in those elements drawn from the the 14A, many of which were essentially adopted wholesale with little time for revision or alteration. While the impact was slight in most cases, this enforced prioritisation would see the final design fall just short in one significant area.

    The 14A design had been for 12 x 14" guns in three quad turrets, a decidedly optimistic target given the substantial amounts of armour and 28 knot speed the design also specified. To accommodate this the original design was longer and beamier than the 15C, making it a more stable gunnery platform but pushing up the tonnage further. While the 14A had been discarded precisely due to such concerns, hence the 10 x 14" of the final 1935 design, it was those very 'problems' that made it perfect for the RCNC who, no longer constrained by tonnage limits, could afford to breach the now arbitrary 35,000 ton barrier. The main work was in switching the three quad turrets for the three triples and simplifying the below deck gun workings accordingly; for instance dropping from 12 to 9 guns allowed a theoretical 25% decrease in magazine size and ammunition handling facilities. Gains such as these, even after the switch from 14" to 15" guns and shells reduced the theoretical gain, provided significant extra internal tonnage, space that the RCNC used to fit extra machinery in order to reach the 30 knot target speed recently set by the Naval Staff. Despite these efforts something had to give and, even though the new ships came in at a hefty 38,000 tons standard load, it was the target speed that suffered; HMS King George V herself just breaking 29 knots when in trials. It was somewhat unfortunate for the Sea Lords that so soon after setting the battleline speed at 30 knots they had to approve a design that didn't meet it, however the priorities of the Admiralty remained "Armour, Arms then Knots" and, given the tonnage, the new battleship certainly fulfilled the first two categories with aplomb.

    Turning from the battleship we consider it's great rival the aircraft carrier, in this case represented by the new Ark Royal class. While the design work on the King George Vs had been rushed the speed was as nothing compared to that put into the carriers for the simple reason that the lead ship, the Ark herself, was on the slipway when the order for the re-design went out. The re-design had two parts; increased protection and improving air operations. Taking the former first the work is as notable for what was not done as what was carried out, had it not been for the post-war review it is likely the work on the Ark Royal would have been to implement the 'armoured box' design concept, essentially armouring the flight deck and sides of the ship. This concept was very much in line with the thinking of the RAF, and hence the FAA of the time, that 'The bomber will always get through', hence the necessary protection from the inevitable bombing. The concept had been dropped from the original design as the weight increase would have taken the new ship beyond treaty limits and, more worryingly, risked compromising stability and manoeuvrability of a design that already had an alarming large turning circle. With the official policy set to counter the torpedo, not the bomb, it is unsurprising that that 'armoured box' concept was not revived and that instead torpedo protection improved. In the case of the second Ark Royal class, HMS Bulwark, this entailed a re-design of her 'sandwich' protection and interior division, increasing her beam and bringing her torpedo protection up to the standards of the KGVs. For the Ark herself this was not an option, too much work had been done on the keel and the dockyard would have had to virtually start from scratch to implement it. Thus the decision was made to retrofit the slightly out-dated 'torpedo bulge' form of protection onto the part built hull, a most inelegant fix that required significant internal cross bracing and disrupted the lower deck layout. The upshot for the Ark was a marginal increase in torpedo protection, a 0.5knot slower top speed than her half-sister HMS Bulwark and an un-necessarily complex machine room arrangement that complicated maintenance and upgrades her entire life. With the benefit of hindsight it would have been better to either start again or not do the work at all and, given the later changes to the hangar and flight deck depended on a beamier hull, it would have been wisest to do the former.

    The second set of changes came from operational experience but also allow an insight into the naval bureaucracy of the time, a system that was both a great strength and a terrible liability for the Royal Navy. Admiralty records were amongst the most comprehensive in Britain, almost everything was recorded officially whether success or failure giving the Navy an outstanding 'institutional memory' of what it had tried, tested or examined stretching back centuries. The flip side was the tendency of temporary decisions to be made permanent by bureaucratic inertia, in the case of the FAA a late 1920s target strength of 360 machines had been transformed into a mid 1930s limit of 360 machines, certainly in the eyes of the treasury and the RAF neither of whom wanted to increase FAA spending. This decision prompted the navy to artificially limit carrier air groups, for the simple reason that putting too many on one hull would 'use up' too much of the limit and severely reduce their chances of getting additional ships authorised. Hence the original 72 machine target for the Ark Royals had been allowed to wither away down to 48, though in fairness some of this shrinkage was also needed to help meet the target tonnage; less aircraft meant less support equipment (fuel/ammunition storage, crew quarters, repair equipment, etc) and hence less tonnage. With the tonnage limitations removed, and the FAA quick to abolish the 360 machine limit, the designs were pushed back up to the 72 machine target, indeed as the FAA began to establish itself and break away from it's former parent's thinking that target would be pushed still higher.

    The FAA was still very much a service in transition in late 1936, despite the re-establishment of the post of Fifth Sea Lord and the Naval Air Service, complete with as much staff and support as the Navy could muster, the FAA still relied upon everything from RAF training programmes through to shore based repair and maintenance depots. As we shall see later it would take the judgement of the independent Ministry for Defence Co-ordination to oversee the sharing and splitting of those facilities, however in terms of strategic and operational thinking the FAA managed to break away far faster, doubtlessly helped by the Abyssinian War which enable a great deal of junior, and not so junior, officers to try new ideas out in combat. Amongst dozens of tactical lessons and design 'tweaks' that came from that experience several key ideas came out, not least the confirmation that the pre-war air groups were too small for extended fleet operations. Having been denied funding for large scale exercises it took the experience of the war to confirm that the RAF figures on availability, turn around times and so on did not translate well from land based aerodromes to carriers. To solve this problem the FAA wanted to further increase the machine target, however it was apparent that most of the extra beam was needed for support equipment and aircrew/mechanic quarters for the 72 machine target. The solution was to turn to the previously mentioned 'institutional memory' of the Navy, digging out an old investigation into 'on deck' aircraft stowage an option that had been previously rejected, however it soon became apparent this was a political, not practical, rejection. 'On deck' parking was not an operational problem, particularly not for the Ark Royal class as they were equipped with twin hydraulic catapults and purpose designed arrestor gears, but would have meant the 360 machine limit being reached far earlier, thus potentially robbing the fleet of additional carrier tonnage. Thus the final design of the Ark Royal was to included provision and, crucially, supporting equipment and crew quarters for aircraft stowed on deck using the last of the extra tonnage and volume made available by 'bulging' the hull.

    In summary the final designs were far from perfect; the aircraft lifts and hangars would prove to be too small for the rapidly advancing aircraft size, the much vaunted hydraulic catapults would require a string of upgrades to deal with the increasing weight of aircraft and HMS Ark Royal herself continued the tradition of early British carriers by being something of a compromised design. However HMS Bulwark would prove a fine ship and the starting point for the larger, follow on designs of carrier and both ships were the first in the Royal Navy that could carry and support large air groups, a pattern that would be followed in latter designs. For those reasons alone the designs have to be considered a success, regardless of their other qualities.

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    A snapshot of government spending during the late summer of 1936. From the top the key points are the industrial programmes in Scotland and the North East of England, the naval programme with two King George V class battleships and the carrier Ark Royal already authorised and the RAF expansion programme of new fighters squadrons and 'Chain Home' radar. Also of note is the dockyard expansion programme, a scheme the Admiralty managed to attach to the general Keyes Plan of investment and so get central funds to pay for rehabilitating and enlarging many atrophied shipyards and drydocks. This work would prove most useful for the next generation of Royal Navy warships which would no longer be so constrained by small dry dock size.

    Leaving behind capital ships we turn to the new cruisers and destroyers where, in stark contrast to the designs considered above, things were considerably simpler. With most of the RCNCs time devoted to the capital ships there were quite simply not the resources to engage in wholesale redesign elsewhere as well. However given the generally high standard of the existing designs this was not a significant omission, though it is interesting to speculate what would have emerged if the Sea Lords had felt able to delay the designs while they re-thought their requirements for a post-treaty world.

    Taking the Southampton or 'Town' class cruisers first, they were treaty ships through and through; conforming to the letter but perhaps not the spirit of the agreements. With heavy 8" armed cruiser restricted the obvious loophole was equally large ships but armed with a preponderance of 6" guns, a common solution that produced the USN's Brooklyn class and the IJN's Mogami class. While the class was partly a response to those vessels it was also designed to fill a gap in the fleet, that of 'fleet' cruiser as opposed to the 'trade protection' classes that had dominated construction in the 1920s and 30s. Taking one quite harsh assessment no new 'fleet' cruiser had entered service since the Great War era 'C' and 'D' classes, while perhaps an exaggeration it is certainly true post war cruisers had tended to emphasise the 'trade protection' requirement of endurance, high free board and efficient cruising speed at the expense of the bristling guns and large ammunition stocks looked for in a fleet cruiser. While a true fleet escort cruiser would have to wait for the follow up Dido class the Southamptons were certainly better designed for fleet work than their predecessors. The design process of the class was something of a challenge for the RCNC, aiming to equal or exceed the IJN's design it was found impossible to match the Mogami's 37 knot speed and 15 x 6" guns within the tonnage, indeed even getting respectable armour and 15 guns on a 32 knot vessel proved impossible, Sir Goodall summed up the RCNC view of the Japanese design by stating "They must be building their ships out of cardboard or lying". The reality was the IJN were doing both; the Mogamis were both over weight and incredibly lightly built, making extensive use of thin aluminium and light duty welding (leading to serious hull cracking during trials) and seriously skimping on protection.

    All this however would not be known by the Royal Navy until the Secret Intelligence Service operations in Japan kicked into high gear later in the decade, thus while the Admiralty suspected such tricks being used they could not prove it and get a cautious government to allow them a similarly relaxed attitude to tonnage. Hence the design emerged at 32 knots with 12 x 6" guns in triple turrets, the 6"/50 BL Mark XXIII gun from the Leander class that had given solid, in unspectacular, performance in the Abyssinian War. With the treaty lifted the way was clear for a total rethink, everything from uprating the guns to the 8"/50 Mark VIIIs from the County class through to skipping the design entirely and jumping to the Dido class was proposed. However the Admiralty was, as with so much of the 1936 Naval Programme, keen to get tonnage laid down, or at least approved, while the Navy's stock was high and the Treasury was prepared to pay for it. While not the best reason for pursuing a design bitter experience had taught the Sea Lords that opportunities for new tonnage should be taken whenever they became available, their belief was better a less than perfect ship than no ship at all.

    Finally we come to the Tribal class of destroyers, by far the simplest to cover for the simple reason it was a design that the Navy had no desire to change. As a destroyer the class had been, mostly, free from treaty constraints and so the design had evolved naturally, if somewhat slowly, via many permutations (including an abortive attempt at being a very light fleet cruiser) to a point the Admiralty was happy with. As with the Southampton class the Tribals were more a fleet unit than an escort unit, though it is worth noting that destroyers were considered 'maids of all tasks' by the Admiralty; a destroyer could be expected to lay mines, hunt submarines, act as a scout, form the screen for a fleet, defend against enemy aircraft or engage capital ships in torpedo attacks. Indeed it was this flexibility, and the relatively low cost (including weaponry the 'I's had come in at around £250,000 a unit, a bargain compared to a £2,000,000 County class cruiser) that gave rise to the Admiralty's regular request for more destroyer tonnage. Such attitudes not withstanding there was a distinct lack of fleet destroyers, again it is arguable the last fleet destroyers had been the Great War era V and W classes, the post-war standards lacking the fire-power, particularly gunnery, necessary for the role. Moreover it was realised that a ~1,400 ton destroyer was fast becoming somewhat small in comparison to the designs of rival navies and that a major jump in tonnage would be required to retain parity. Taken together this produced a 37 knot, 1,850 ton design with eight 4.7"/45 QF Mark XII in four twin mounts and only four torpedo tubes (as opposed to the four single 4.7"/45s and ten tubes of the 'I's). While the design suffered the Achilles heel of most of the 1936 Naval Programme, a worrying lightness in terms of anti-aircraft weaponry, they were overall a great success in service, being both popular with crews and admired by the public.

    With our analysis of the Royal Navy complete we can move on to the Royal Air Force, a service having to cope with major organisational changes while absorbing the lessons of the Abyssinian War. As we shall see in these tasks the Air Staff were alternately helped and hindered by the new Secretary of State for Air, a certain Winston Churchill.
     
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    Chapter LXVI: An Independent Service.
  • Chapter LXVI: An Independent Service.

    The Royal Air Force was very much the junior service, not just chronologically but in terms of political clout and influence. This lack of political support had seen the RAF fighting for survival for much of the 1920s, while the Royal Navy and Army could call upon Admirals and Generals in the House of Lords to fight their corner the RAF would have to wait until 1930 for Marshall Trenchard to be created Baron Wolfeton to get the first 'Air Peer'. While the RAF survived as an independent force it had left an unfortunate legacy of mistrust, any suggestion for closer co-ordination between the other services and the RAF army or navy co-operation squadrons were viewed with deep suspicion, the Air Staff wary of giving up any hint of control in case the scheme was a prelude to abolishing the service. This had a predictably poor effect on operational efficiency which, as we shall see later, even the Air Staff were forced to acknowledge. This lack of influence was also evident in the form of the post war review, while the Royal Navy was able to present it's own finding to the politicians and the Army managed to get a dominant position in it's formal review, the Air Staff were limited to 'advising' the Air Council who were then entirely free to draw their own conclusions, a liberty they took full advantage of, much to the frustration of the RAF hierarchy.

    The other important point to remember is that the RAF was still very much Trenchard's service, despite having retired as Chief of the Air Staff at the end of 1929 his influence could be seen in almost all aspects of the service. Mostly this was of benefit; the RAFs organisational structure of squadrons, stations and groups was flexible and rapidly expandable for instance while the many training and apprentice schemes he started were producing the technically skilled ground and air crew the service required in ever increasing numbers. On the negative side however his attitudes had helped fuel the inter-service mistrust, indeed many blame Trenchard for the problems with naval aviation due to his wilful misleading of the then First Sea Lord Admiral Beatty in the immediate post war years. More seriously he was fixated on the power of strategic bombing and not just through self interest (though for many in the RAF that was it's main attraction; a mission that was theirs alone). While this attraction to strategic bombing was common among many air forces, particularly those like the US Army Air Corps that hankered for independence through their own, unique, mission, Trenchard took things a step further. Despite originally being sceptical of the abilities of aircraft to wage war alone, indeed under his direction the RAF Air Staff College dismissed Giulio Douhet's "The Command of the Air" (a hugely influential book across Europe and in America) as fanciful, he experienced a fundamental conversion during the mid and late 1920s.

    The cause of this volte face was the policy of "aerial policing" of the Empire, using aircraft to bomb rebellions into submission rather than extensive, and expensive, ground campaigns. After good success during the annual North West Frontier troubles in India the policy produced spectacular results in Mesopotamia, a success that influenced not only Trenchard and the Air Staff of the time but also a then young squadron leader Arthur Harris. With the zeal of a convert Trenchard became convinced of strategic bombing as a war winning method, producing evidence and doctrines to support this argument, most famously his entirely unsupported assertion that the morale effect of bombing was 20 times greater than any physical damage. Despite no hard evidence, and indeed very little anecdotal evidence, this statement became an article of doctrinal faith in the RAF and would prove very hard for successive Air Ministers to dislodge.

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    Air Chief Marshall Sir Edward Ellington, Chief of the Air Staff since 1933. Along with his colleagues Ellington had high hope that the appointment of Winston Churchill as Secretary of State for Air. While Churchill fought hard for extra funding for the service and undoubtedly raised it's political profile he did not implement the management 'reforms' the professionals wished for. Indeed far from giving the Air Staff more power and independence Churchill used his 'double hatted' position as President of the Air Council to delve into the detail of the RAFs plans or 'meddle incessantly' as exasperated senior officers complained.

    The pre-eminence of the heavy bomber can be seen in the major RAF re-organisation instituted at the start of the year. Prior to 1936 all aircraft based in the Home Islands (The 'Metropolitan RAF') were under control of the umbrella Air Defence of Great Britain, an arrangement that was proving increasingly unwieldy for the growing number of aircraft in service. The decision was made to break up ADGB into a series of new commands; Fighter, Bomber, Coastal and Training. While the last three covered what one would expect, Fighter Command was something of a dumping ground, being made responsible for not only fighter squadrons but also the army co-operation squadrons, the observer/reconnaissance squadrons and some of the light bomber squadrons. This neatly demonstrates the priority of the 'bomber men' at the top of the RAF, indeed the only reason Coastal Command got it's own HQ and organisation was to make sure the resourcing of the Command could be kept tightly under Air Staff control. It is fair to say that at the start of 1936 the RAF was in the process of cementing the bomber offensive at the heart of their strategic thinking, with almost everything else relegated to a supporting role or secondary priority.

    With a better understanding of the RAF of the time we move onto the service's war experience, something of a contentious issue given the very different conclusions drawn by those involved. Objectively, and in purely military terms, the RAF had the 'worst' war of any of the services, not managing to make the same decisive contribution that either the Army or the Royal Navy managed. For a service looking to establish itself as a vital cog of defence policy this was not promising material, hence the Air Staff's focus on the Rome raid, an attack that was cited as proof of the 'morale effect' of heavy bombers and presented as the vital coup de grace on the Italian leadership. Outside the RAF this was seen as yet another unverifiable claim by the Air Staff and one that was vigorously opposed by the other services who wished to preserve the credit for victory for themselves. It was, however, broadly in tune with the political and public view of the all powerful bomber that could not be stopped from levelling whole cities and, therefore, found more support than the facts alone could perhaps support. Sadly for the RAF leadership the Air Council, having accepted the Air Staff view of the Rome raid, drew completely different conclusions; rather than ordering more bomber squadrons, they instead declared the heavy bomber force 'sufficient' for predicted needs and instead increasing funding for Fighter Command and accelerating the radar programme, the aim being to stop similarly 'devastating' bomber raids threatening Britain.

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    The Armstrong Whitworth A.W.38 Whitely, note it's distinctive 'nose down' attitude when in flight. Originally ordered as a heavy night bomber the ~7,000lb bomb load carried by the Whitely made it the heaviest bomber since the Great War era Handley Page V/1500. Rushed into service to replace ancient biplanes the Whitely itself would be obsolete by the end of the decade, newer designs surpassing it in speed, defence capability and bomb capacity. Though the Bomber force was declared sufficient by the Air Council that view was caveated by the continuation of all existing bomber orders and research projects, evidence of the Air Ministry hedging their bets and giving in to the strong views of the RAFs hierarchy.

    After this initial disappointment for the RAF the review moved rapidly downhill, despite the odd high spot (the new Hurricane was picked out for praise, as was the smooth and rapid expansion of RAF Luqa from a quiet station to a main base operate everything from fighters to heavy bombers) the report found far more negatives than positives. In particular the Air Council was alarmed that many in the Army rated the contribution from the Royal Australian Air Force as equal, or better, than that from the RAF during the early and mid stages of the conflict. Given the relative budgets and sizes of the two services the RAF should have been dominant, yet the RAAF contingent had more than held it's own in the Desert Air Force for much of the conflict. The reasons were quite simple; The RAAF has sent the cream of their officers and crews in their best airframes while the RAF forces had been taken from the various local commands that made up RAF Middle East, commands that despite (or perhaps because of) regular activity on 'Aerial Policing' operations were very low on the priority list for new equipment. As newer aircraft began to flow into theatre from Britain the situation improved, though it was not until the Blenheim and Wellesley equipped squadrons arrived in strength that the RAF's contribution became markedly larger. However the many Hawker Hart variants and RAAF Westland Wapitis remained on operations till the end of the conflict, the old biplanes soldiering on in the 'light' bomber role that the newer, larger aircraft were unsuited to.

    For the RAF hierarchy, already suffering from wounded pride at being shown up by a service they saw mainly as a source of aircrew, the upshot of this was particularly galling. The Air Council, not immune to the general fears of having the air force disbanded, and very worried by the precedent of the Navy regaining control of the FAA, decided to make air-army co-operation one of their post-war priorities in order to pre-empt any Army 'coup' attempts. The headline decision was the extension of the earlier 'Command Decision', reforming the light and army co-operation squadrons into the new 'Strike Command', separate from both Bomber and Fighter Command and with the head sitting on the Air Staff along side the other Chiefs. The report also instructed all home based Commands to work on their large scale redeployment plans, specifically focusing on the rapid movement of the vital ground based support elements that had been the sticking point for the squadron transfers during the war. Internally the most recent Air Staff expansion plan, Scheme E, was knocked back entirely and the Staff ordered to prepare a new scheme that reflected the revised priorities of the service. Scheme F was to reverse the 'scrapping' of light bombers, build up Strike Command and speed up the expansion of Fighter Command. In stark contrast to the Army and Navy, services that struggled with the speed of aircraft development, the Air Ministry found the speed of development too slow. As we shall see despite the change in focus the aircraft 'pipeline' of new designs still reflected old priorities, with not entirely unfortunate results.
     
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    Chapter LXVII: New Kites All Round.
  • Chapter LXVII: New Kites All Round.

    The previous chapter concluded on the observation of the delay in the translation of new thinking into new designs caused by the aircraft design 'pipeline' at the Air Ministry. This was an inevitable consequence of the extended gestation period behind a new aircraft, to illustrate this consider the story of the Hawker Hurricane. The process started deep within the RAF's Directorate of Technical Development in 1933 with the decision to break away from biplanes, this work was evolved into a Operational Requirement by the Autumn and from there into a Air Ministry Specification (F.36/34) issued at the start of 1934. This specification drew together several strands of Air Ministry thinking and specified which engine to use (The Rolls Royce 'PV-12', which would become the famous Merlin), the eight gun armament and various other features such as retractable under-carriage. After progressing through several design iterations, wind tunnel tests and full scale mock ups a prototype was constructed in Summer 1935 and put through full scale testing with a final operational decision made at the end of the year. At this stage the process was overtaken by events and the Hurricane was rushed into full scale production by an Air Staff keen to get a modern fighter into service to be ready for war. Even with the best efforts of Lord Beaverbrook and the highest priority the Air Ministry could set, the first Hurricane squadrons only made it to theatre by the spring and Hawker weren't into efficient volume production until well into the summer. Had it not been for this dramatic intervention the production decision wouldn't have been made till the summer of 1936, that decision would have lead to a 'production prototype' being constructed by the end of the year for further testing and development throughout 1937. The final model would then have been approved for volume production, with squadron delivery beginning either at the end of 1937 or, more likely, the beginning of 1938.

    It's important to note that the Hawker Hurricane was, as we shall see later, a relatively straight-forward aircraft being produced to a well defined specification and yet, even after being pushed to top priority, it still took three and a half years to make it from idea to squadron service. Without the war, and the extra funding and priority that brought, that timespan would have been nearer five years. While some of the delays were a consequence of tight budgets at the Air Ministry, decisions were often delayed till the next financial year when funding could be scrapped together, the simple fact is that the testing and development of aircraft and their engines was a time consuming task that could not be rushed, not without risk to the price, reliability, performance or all three of the final aircraft. Thus, despite the extra money the Air Staff had available and Air Minister Churchill's best efforts to speed up the process by moving to engineering led timetables, not budgetary ones, the speed of development was never as fast as the Ministry would like, inevitably this led to the occasional disastrous prototype as designers under pressure tried to cut a few too many corners. Such thinking was a very long way from the frugal caution of the 1920s and was perhaps not the most fiscally efficient way to procure new aircraft, but it was certainly effective at pushing the envelope and rapidly advancing aircraft and engine design. This approach would be applied not just to the new specifications being issued, where the changes in strategic thinking would not filter through until almost the end of the decade, but to the designs being proposed for the existing specifications, leading to the progression of designs that would not have passed muster with the previous, more conservative administration.

    We begin with the Hawker Hurricane, as mentioned above the aircraft was rushed into production and so an immediate post war priority was to correct some of the more glaring design problems that had sneaked through. The greatest strength of the MkI Hurricane was also it's greatest weakness; it was basically a monoplane Hawker Fury with a better engine and a few other refinements. This made the design cheap, allowed a very rapid ramp up of production (Sydney Camm had produced a design that used as many Fury jigs and tools as possible) and also contributed to the forgiving handling, stability and reliability that became hallmarks of the Hurricane 'family' of designs. On the negative side the 'old fashioned' construction techniques used (mainly the choice of mechanical fastening instead of welding and the use of steel tube sub-assemblies rather than a single monocoque) resulted in a design that was significantly heavier than it's contemporaries, around 25% more than a Spitfire for most comparable marks, and had thicker, more drag inducing wings. While none of those problems could be changed without re-doing almost the entire design there were several other Fury legacies and rushed decisions that could be, and were, enthusiastically changed. The most obvious visual change was the switch from a wooden two bladed propeller to a metal three bladed one, moving back the pre-production Merlin 'C' engines that had been rushed in were replaced with the far more reliable Merlin IIIs and provision added for a permanent chin mounted dust filter instead of the hastily fitted bolt-on filters used in the Abyssinian War. Based on the reports of pilots back from that war a new gun sight and a much 'clearer' radio were added as priorities, as well as the very welcome addition of armoured glass for the cockpit. One interesting change was the switch from fabric covering to stressed metal coverings for the wings; the use of doped Irish linen had been partly a legacy from the Fury and partly a conscious choice to keep the unit cost down. With the resumption of the Anglo-Irish trade war the supply of cheap fabric was cut off, eliminating the cost advantage, and so the stiffer and more durable duralumin wings were substituted. While the change was probably inevitable, the aircraft would only get heavier as it evolved while the rapidly increasing power of the Merlin engine would put ever greater loads on the wings, the jump in price (and some not so subtle political pressure) perhaps brought the decision forward. This economic blow, though slight in itself, was just one of the hundreds raining down on the Irish economy with, as we shall examine in later chapters, dramatic political consequences.

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    The Hawker Hurricane MkII, clearly showing the new variable pitch three bladed propeller, the revised 'thrusting' exhausts of the Merlin and the all metal wings. The extra power from the new propeller, or more technically the higher all altitude efficiency of the new propeller, and the ducting of exhaust gases into thrust more than offset the extra weight of the other alterations. The less visible benefit of the new Merlin was the significant increase in engine reliability, Rolls Royce's 'run to destruction' testing programme had produced a quantum leap in reliability, a benefit all Merlin engined planes would enjoy.

    Returning to aircraft we move onto arguably one of the most famous fighters in the history of the RAF, the Supermarine Spitfire. If the Hurricane was a workhorse design then the Spitfire was more of a thoroughbred racer; smaller, lighter, faster but considerably more temperamental, a slightly unfair pair of caricatures but not without a few grains of truth. Where Hawker had designed for ease of production and maintenance, Supermarine had pushed for peak performance, producing a far more complex design that proved considerably harder to prepare for mass production. The extra work was undoubtedly worth it as the Spitfire comprehensively outperformed the Hurricane in flight, save for turning circle where the thicker winged Hurricane could be put into turns that none but the bravest of Spitfire pilots would even contemplate. Despite the excellent achievements of the Hurricane in the war the Air Ministry recognised that the higher performance of the Spitfire would be needed against foes more formidable than the Regia Aeronautica. Therefore the final production design was approved in the autumn of 1936 with a target of volume production starting early in 1937 leading to 'full rate' squadron deliveries beginning in the summer.

    It rapidly became apparent that, despite vigorous protests to the contrary, Supermarine did not have the capacity to fulfil anything but the smallest order, busy as they were with the Walrus and Stranraer amphibious aircraft. With Supermarine's parent Vickers equally busy, and fanatically opposed to sub-contracting the work out, Churchill's solution was to scrap the entire Stranraer contract, freeing up capacity at Supermarine. While something of a radical solution the Stranraer design was, at best, marginal and had only narrowly scrapped through to production as it was a 'low risk' design, being essentially the final evolution of the venerable Southampton line of flying boats. It's loss then was not a major blow to Coastal Command, particularly given the more promising designs in the pipeline, and it should be noted that scrapping a design pushed forward by predecessors is considerably easier than admitting your own mistakes. As we shall see later Churchill was less keen on cancelling un-promising programmes or prototypes that he had initiated and championed, a problem made all the more embarrassing by the precedent he himself had set. However in the short term it ensured the Spitfire programme stayed on schedule and sent a clear message to aircraft manufacturers the optimistically promising capacity in the assumption of getting delays would be seriously dealt with by the Ministry.

    Moving from production to prototypes let us now look into the Air Ministry's fighter pipeline, the specifications that had just left the drawing board and were moving towards the initial prototype stage. The designs for the 'hot climate' high performance specification, F.5/34, were all overlooked for Fighter Command service, after the success of adapting the Hurricane to desert conditions the Ministry considered the requirement fulfilled. The blow was somewhat lessened as it became apparent that the Fleet Air Arm was interested in several of the designs for it's own purpose, an area we will look into in future chapters. That left two very different, almost contradictory, specifications; F.9/35 for a 'turret fighter' and F.37/35 for a 'cannon fighter'. Somewhat ironically for fighters the source of the contradiction was in bomber tactics, a subject of much debate and discussion in RAF circles. The early 1930s had seen bombers, particularly the bigger multi-engined bombers, being significantly faster than the comparable fighters of the time. This had lead to the doctrinal concept of unescorted bomber streams; fast multi-engined bombers that could out-run enemy fighters. The problem came as fighters inevitably caught up in performance, first matching and then overtaking the bombers. The reaction from Bomber Command, and the bomber arms of many other air forces the world over, was defensive guns, bombers bristling with everything from pintle mounted machine guns to powered twin turrets, yet the central idea of unescorted bomber streams remained.

    To counter these well armed but alone bombers Fighter Command resurrected the 'turret fighter' idea that had produced the Hawker Demon, producing specification F.9/35 for a two seat fighter with a powered quad turret to serve in a dedicated bomber destroying role. That last part is important to emphasise for the Air Staff were fully aware that 'turret fighters' would be at a severe disadvantage in a dog fight and was never expected to have to engage enemy fighters. However in the bomber destroyer role the 'turret fighter' was expected to be far superior to conventional fighters, able to close on bombers in their blind spots and blaze away with carefully targeted concentrated firepower. With assurances from Bomber Command that unescorted bomber streams would certainly be the tactic of choice of any enemy the specification process continued, the field narrowing to the Hawker Hotspur and the Boulton Paul Defiant. With Hawker heavily committed to several other high priority programme they had fallen significantly behind the development timetable and were convinced to drop out, leaving the Defiant alone to progress. Despite the lack of competition it would not be until the start of 1937 that the go ahead was given for a full scale prototyping, the Ministry requiring an un-turreted version by the summer for basic flight testing with a full production aircraft for some time in the late autumn. These long lead times were a reflection on both the difficulty of the project and the lingering uncertainty about the basic concept, the delay therefore gave Boulton Paul a chance to iron out problems and the Ministry time to reach a conclusion on the basic doctrine underlying the design.

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    The Bristol Type 153A, one of the final three contenders for the 'cannon fighter' specification. The most unusual design submitted it attracted significant comment in the Ministry, it's set back cockpit in particular dividing opinion. As with all the designs the Ministry's biggest concern was over engines, Bristol having selected to use a pair of somewhat under-powered Aquilas. Though put forward for prototyping the Ministry had heavily hinted that a switch to the larger Perseus would be looked upon most favourably, a decision Bristol reluctantly accepted, effectively signing the death warrant for the almost unused Aquilas.

    The second design, the 'cannon fighter' was a sign of the Ministry hedging it's bets, not just on the tactics for a bomber destroyer but on the whole idea of unescorted bombers. The specification was essentially a response to the Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt Bf 110, a twin engined, long ranged, cannon armed 'heavy fighter' that was rumoured to be able to defeat single-engined fighters with ease. While the reports were treated with entirely justified scepticism (the Bf 110 was in fact distinctly lacking in agility and would prove vulnerable to all but the most unwieldy single engined fighters) the potent combination of heavy firepower and long range was felt worthy of further investigation and a specification prepared. To avoid Bomber Command interference the specification only called for a day/night fighter armed with four cannon, however the manufacturers were unofficially informed that long range and endurance were most desirable. Out of the six responses received the Hawker F.37/35 and the Supermarine 312 were rejected early in the process, being essentially cannon armed variants of the Hurricane and Spitfire respectively the Ministry instructed the firms to concentrate on getting the basic versions reliably into service first. The Boulton Paul submission, the single engined P.88, was next to fall by the wayside due to concerns over the lack of range and a wish to avoid producing an aircraft too similar to the Hurricane or Spitfire. That left only the three twin engined submissions, the small and light Westland P.9, the elliptical winged Supermarine 313 and the somewhat unconventional Bristol Type 153A. Within the Air Ministry the Westland design was the leading contender, though that had more to do with Westland's lack of work than the actual merits of the designs. At the other extreme the unconventional Type 153A would likely not have passed muster with the old regime and even for the more broad minded it was very much the outsider, it was progressed as much out of curiosity as to how the design would work as out of interest in seeing it in service. The manufacturers were given a similar timeframe to that for the Defiant, the Ministry keen to put the designs up against each other, as much to test the concepts as to test the designs. Theses trials would be watched with interest throughout the RAF, not least by the still influential Bomber Command who had strong views of their own on the merits, or otherwise, of escort fighters and bomber interceptors.

    --
    Game Notes;
    First things first aren't you all glad I only did a brief fighter only update, just think how long a whole RAF one would have been. :eek: I think I need to join long-updates Anonymous and try and cure my inability to write short updates....

    Anyway next most important thing; the second picture is not a Bristol Type 153A it's a Grumman XF5F Skyrocket. However the two were very, very similar by all accounts and, more importantly, I can find nothing but a bad line drawn sketch of a 153A. With that confession over onto the actual game effects;

    Hurricane MkII - What's described isn't an OTL MkII, more a late MkI (for some reason the huge host of changes to the MkI didn't merit a Mk change) with bits from the MkII, significantly though not the Merlin XX engine. However as I've just got Lev IV INT I decided to make more of a meal of those changes than the RAF did and justify the upgrades.

    Spitfire MkI - In game I'm researching Basic Fighters (or whatever Lev I is called) so allowing for R&D time then production time those dates are probably about right for getting the first in game unit built.

    Defiant - The turret fighter, had a fairly bad war as people kept using it as a fighter, a role it was frankly awful at and even the RAF knew it. However desperate times and all that. This timeline, much as I'd like to kill it off, I think it has to stay. Bomber Command still believe in unescorted bombers as do most other airforces (or so the RAF think). Hence the turret fighter makes sense to the Air Staff. Though who knows what may have changed by late 1937?

    Cannon fighter - Now OTL the P.9 (Whirlwind), the Boulton Paul P.88 and the Spitfire 313 were selected for prototyping, then the treasury took an axe to the budget and only the Whirlwind survived. This time round that isn't a problem, however with the Hurricane and Spit further along I can see the P.88 being dropped (and the cannon armed Hurry/Spit being rushed along if necessary) and the 'radical' 153A making it as the Air Ministry is less cautious.
     
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    Chapter LXVIII: Questions of Classification.
  • Chapter LXVIII: Questions of Classification.

    Turning to bombers it is important from the outset to confront the often confusing RAF categorisation of bombers, a system that was often far more about politics than useful description. The base of the problem was that the technical differences between the groups were decidedly ill defined, the boundaries set by a mixture of range, role and bomb load. Moreover the advance of technology and the merging of aircraft roles blurred the boundaries further; a mid 1940s fighter-bomber could carry more load, further and faster than many 1930s light bombers. The formation of Strike Command was the final complication, with many aircraft types straddling the borders their exact classification would determine which squadrons went to which command. With more squadrons meaning more power and influence it was in the interest of both Bomber and Strike Command to massage the definitions, in the end most decisions had to be referred all way up to the Air Council before being settled. It should therefore be noted that the classifications used for RAF bombers should be treated with caution, being often wrong and regularly down right misleading.

    We begin with the heavy bombers, or to be strictly accurate the heavy bomber, there only being one modern aircraft in RAF service in 1936 that met even the most lax definition of the term. The Armstrong Whitworth Whitely had by some margin the largest bomb load of any active British bomber and would form the backbone of the strategic bomber force until the the far large four engined heavies came into service at the end of the decade. Aside from the high profile Rome Raid the Whitely squadrons, along with the rest of the RAFs older strategic bombers, had a very quiet war and had suffered in the post war settlement as a result. Despite the Air Council re-organisation of priorities the Whitley didn't lost out entirely, the procurement programme would continue until the biplane squadrons had been completely replaced and there would even be a modest expansion, though far below what Bomber Command had been expecting. Equally significantly while the volume production Whitley would incorporate several improvements, not least replacing the thoroughly archaic bungee cords on the bomb bay doors with proper hydraulics, they would not be allowed to use the Merlin engine but would have to retain the radial Tiger VIIIs used on the MkI. Taken together these decisions demonstrate the fall from grace of Bomber Command, no longer would they have first call on the budget and be able to automatically secure the best equipment. The modest Whitley programme and the reservation of the Merlin where deliberate choices by the Air Council under it's plans to re-allocate resources away from Bomber Command towards the new Strike Command and, to a lesser extent, the historically under-resourced Coastal Command. While the Air Staff were far from pleased with the arrangement, the 'bomber boys' still dominated much of it's upper reaches, a combination of professionalism and the growing number of non-bomber staff officers ensured the Air Council had few practical difficulties implementing it's plans.

    Dropping down to medium bombers the RAF had a slightly wider choice of modern aircraft, with the Vickers Wellesely and the Handley Page Hampden both entering service, even if the latter was somewhat rushed to enter service in time for the war. With bomb loads of 2000lb and 4000lb respectively the two types bracketed the usual range for a medium bomber and certainly offered vastly improved performance and payloads than their biplane predecessors. After a significant bout of institutional horse trading both Commands came away with a reasonable compromise, the heavier Hampdens would stay with Bomber Command while the lighter Wellesleys would be transferred to Strike Command. It is tempting to consider this more an organisational ideal than a harshly enforced division, certainly in the overseas bases and stations the squadrons would serve side by side in the same chain of command. For the Metropolitan based squadrons, however, it determined training; the Hampden crews joining the heavy squadrons in practising long distance navigation and night bombing tactics, while the Wellesley trained with their lighter brethren in Strike Command, working on the techniques of direct ground support. As Strike Command refined their doctrines and tactics in light of the war experience and exercises the differences between the two medium bombers capability would widen, despite both aircraft materially changing very little.

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    Two Vickers Wellesleys in flight over North Africa, note the distinctive streamlined 'pannier' bomb containers on the wings and the panel effect on the fuselage indicating the geodetic structure beneath. The Wellesley began life as an alternate entry to Specification G.4/31, a highly demanding specification that called for a design capable of level, dive and torpedo bombing in addition to reconnaissance and general army co-operation duties. Despite Vickers winning the contract with their original Type 253 submission they had developed a bomber only variant, the Type 246, as a Private Venture and submitted that to the RAF as well. In the end the Air Staff preferred the superior performance of the Type 246 and abandoned the original specification in favour of pushing the design into production as the Wellesley. Aside from it's bomber role several Wellesley variants would serve with the RAF's Long-Range Development Flight, modified aircraft flying non-stop from Ismailia (Egypt) to Darwin (Australia), taking the world distance record to over 7,000 miles, one they would hold for over a decade.

    We finally come to the light bombers where things were somewhat less clear, the Air Staff desire to abolish all the light bomber squadrons being more a power grab than a genuine reflection of the aircraft coming into service. While the new designs were far larger and had heavier bomb loads than the biplanes they replaced, compared to the new heavy and medium bombers most were considerably smaller; several front-line designs had an all up weight less than the bomb load of a single Whitely. However that was certainly not the case for the first design we will consider, the Bristol Blenheim, an aircraft that very clearly demonstrates the classification problems discussed at the start of this chapter. The Blenheim began life as a high speed passenger aircraft, Bristol answer to Lord Rothermere's challenge of recapturing the fastest civilian aircraft in Europe title away from Germany. First flying in April 1935 the aircraft proved faster than almost anything in RAF service, the unarmed prototype could just top 300mph making it far faster than the biplane fighters then in front-line service. Naturally this piqued the Air Staff's interest and a formal specification for a military version soon followed, indeed so great was official enthusiasm that the design was ordered straight from the drawing board. The wisdom of this move would become apparent when the Abyssinian War broke out, the new Blenheims forming a significant part of the reinforcement squadrons the RAF sent to reinforce the Desert Air Force. Despite it's twin engines and large size (the production models tipped the scales at just over 12,000lb all up, making them heavier than the single engined Wellesley 'Medium' bombers) significant sacrifices had been made to give the aircraft their high speed; the small cross-section had produced a cramped cockpit and fuselage while, crucially, the bomb load was limited to just 1,000lb total. It was the combination of high speed and small bomb capacity that pushed the Blenheim into the light bomber category and into the willing arms of Strike Command, for whom the former was important and the latter an acceptable price to pay. To judge by the export success of the design many other air forces agreed; Blenheims served in all the Dominion air forces, were licensed for production by Finland and Yugoslavia and were brought outright by air forces across Europe from Turkey to Portugal.

    We conclude our look at designs by considering two different specifications with the same aim; the replacement of the legions of Hart and Hind light bombers. The first issued was P.27/32 which produced the Fairey Battle, later out of the blocks was P.4/34 that resulted in the Hawker Henley and the Fairey Firefight. The two specifications produced markedly different aircraft, a reflection of the ideas of those who framed them. Taking the Battle first, despite starting life as a two seat light bomber it had grown into a larger three man aircraft, reflecting Bomber Command's preference for large bomb load and dedicated navigators and gunners. This 'bloating' had left the Merlin engine over-worked and produced a relatively slow aircraft, about the same speed as a Gloster Gladiator and far slower than the monoplane Spitfire and Hurricane. The close air support proponents in the RAF at the time, few in number and chaffing under Fighter Command control, had nevertheless noticed this worrying trend and managed to convince the Ministry to issue a new specification, P.4/34. This repeated much of the earlier P.27/32, but was less open ended and explicitly put performance above bomb load in stark contrast to it's predecessor. The manufacturers, correctly anticipating that the design would not find favour with the 'bomber boys' in the Air Staff, responded with variants of existing designs rather than going to the extra expense of starting from scratch. The final submissions were the Hawker Henley, a two seater sister to the Hurricane and the Fairey Firefight which was, somewhat ironically, a smaller version of the Battle.

    While the Battle had been the front runner of the three the formation of Strike Command had a decidedly negative impact on it's prospects, the design being too slow and heavy for the tastes of the new Strike Staff yet lacking the bomb load to tempt the Bomber Command into purchasing it for strategic work. Lacking support or a champion on the Air Staff the type 'fell between the gaps' and was not taken past the prototype stage. In contrast the smaller Henley and Firefight were both pushed forward to final prototype with trials starting at the beginning of 1937. While that mean volume production would not begin until the summer of that year Strike Command were prepared to wait for a good aircraft instead of rushing for an average one, though there is little doubt that the decision to wait was made easier given the other new aircraft pouring into service at the time.

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    The Fairey Firefight in flight during flight trials. Developed from the earlier Battle the Firefight traded away a 1000lb of bomb load and a third crew member for speed and manoeuvrability. The design was not to the taste of Bomber Command who, quite aside from finding the 500lb bomb load too low, disliked giving bombing control to the pilot and feared the second crew member would be overloaded working as navigator, telegraphist and air-gunner on the rear mounted Vickers. For Strike Command however combining pilot and bomber made sense, indeed was considered vital for successful dive bombing, and believed that close air support work by it's very nature would not involve too much complex navigation. Piggy backing of the Battle gave Faireys a big lead in development, especially with Hawkers concentrating on rushing the Hurricane for much of the year, but had come at the cost of several compromise to performance. Conversely the Hurricane inheritance meant the Henley was faster, cheaper and simpler to maintain but had suffered development delays as the Air Ministry demanded 100% effort on getting the Hurricane ready. The Summer 1937 trials were generally considered too close to call, the question being if Hawker could make up for lost time or if the more refined Fairey design could hold onto it's development lead.

    Before leaving the world of bombers we will briefly look at the development pipeline, the upcoming designs and the specifications issued that indicate the thinking of the Air Ministry as they looked to the future. Nearest to completion was the Vickers Wellington, the elder and larger brother to the Wellesley bomber. Despite starting life from the same specification as the Hampden the design had suffered due to it's more complex geodesic construction; with so many designs being rushed into service due to the Abyssinian War something had to give and the Wellington development programme was one of the things that did. The delay however did give time for Vickers and the Ministry to evolve out some of the design kinks, so many in fact that the name formally changed (the design had originally been named the Crecy). With all the delays and so many other designs entering service the Wellington prototype would not be completed until the late spring of 1937, with trials running until almost the end of the year.

    Moving further out we see the 'bomber boys' of the Air Staff had not lost all their influence, issuing two ambitious specifications of their own; P.13/36 and B.12/36. Both specifications would be given a high priority by the Air Ministry, a quid pro quo for the sacrifices made over Strike Command and a gesture towards the very strong feelings of the Air Staff. P.13/36 was another attempt at the twin engined, 'general purpose' medium bomber for worldwide use, a pre-occupation for a service with world wide commitments and used to limited budgets. Requiring capability for long range, high altitude and a large bomb load the specification was ambitious and demanding, though fortunately the truly challenging demand for dive bombing capability with an 8,000lb+ bomb load did not make the final draft. Attracting interest from Avro, Handley Page and Vickers this specification was intended to provide the future 'main force' of Bomber Command and be in service in the majority of the hoped for future bomber squadrons. B.12/36, was the actual heavy bomber specification that explicitly called for a four engined design and an even vaster bomb load. Somewhat ironically the specification was a big beneficiary of the formation of Strike Command, early drafts contained mention of the ill-fated 'Support bomber' concept, the idea of a heavy bomber flying troops out to a remote Imperial frontier base then acting as air support. Fortunately the formation of Strike Command, and the logistical experiences of the Abyssinian War, quickly killed of the concept as Bomber Command washed their hands of supporting troops. The Air Staff also took the chance to remove the train portable requirements and relax the harsh runway requirements, the later after RAF staff officers in North Africa saw how just quickly Royal Engineers could clear obstructions, if given enough explosives. Despite all this the specification was still very demanding in terms of bomb load, altitude and speed, given the struggles the tendering firms of Armstrong Whitworth, Shorts and Supermarine had the mind boggles at the difficulty of designing such an aircraft as a 'Support Bomber'.

    The natural progression at this stage would be to consider the Army, however even in comparison to big changes in the other services the Army was very much the service most in flux. Partly this is due to the considerable debate over the role of tanks and mechanisation (while the Imperial General Staff were all committed to mechanisation as an idea, they were deeply divided over how to implement it in practice). However the Army was also busy with the ongoing British involvement in the Spanish Civil War. This was not a problem for the other services; at sea the Royal Navy felt, quite rightly, it had nothing to learn from a conflict that lacked a naval dimension while in the air a variety of factors kept the air forces of both sides mostly grounded thus keeping Royal Air Force interest low. On the ground however both Monarchists and Republicans were receiving significant material aid and were clashing regularly, providing the British 'advisers' with a constant stream of experience and lessons. Moreover, as we shall see later, the line between advise and influence was blurring, particularly as more British supplied equipment arrived, presenting the Army with fertile ground to test tactical ideas and develop new doctrines. This experience, on top of the Abyssinian War lessons and the existing differences over mechanisation, left the Army overloaded as it struggled to digest all the information. The delay in settling internal differences and deciding on a new way forward would last until well into 1937 and as such is best covered in later chapters. Until then we will move back to the murky world of politics, there being few murkier places in 1936 than the smoke filled rooms of post-election America.


    --
    Game Notes;
    Heavy Bombers - One more unit of Strats to give me a rounded off 4 x Lev I Strats (no escort fighters though). And the bungy cord part is entirely true, until worryingly close to the war many British heavy and medium bombers had bungy cord to keep the bomb bay doors shut and used the weight of the bombs to open them. Unsurprisingly this did little to help bombing accuracy and so hydraulic opening doors replaced them. The Short Stirling is being lined up to be the Lev II, should be a good deal faster than OTL without the ridiculous wing size, runway and troop carrying restrictions. The other spec is the Halifax and Manchester/Lancaster one so expect a few delays and problems on that one. ;)

    Medium Bombers - Something had to suffer, the Wellington is that aircraft. Still a few delays will push it back far enough to fit Lev III TAC so the delay serves two purposes.

    The Blenheim and Wellesley are pretty much just for flavour, no tech modification but they were around and had to go somewhere. If you want to think of them as something, they probably represent the new CAS and TAC units I'll put in the queue once I get the capacity.

    Light Bombers - The Fairey Firefight is the OTL P.4/34 which was never named. This time round, as it goes forward, it gets a a name; Firefight as the design is clearly smaller than a Battle....

    Game effect is CAS I researched but not in the queue yet.

    Coastal Command - No NAVs researched so no mention here. Ditto the FAA as no new carrier tech.

    Finally, as promised onto the US election. I do hope the 'official' explanation for the delay is acceptable.
     
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    Chapter LXIX: From Hope to Confusion
  • Chapter LXIX: From Hope to Confusion

    The results and aftermath of the 1936 Presidential election were neither unprecedented nor exceptionally controversial, the 19th century contains several elections with clear parallels, notably those of 1824 and 1876. That is not to say the results were straightforward, far from it, the distribution of votes and states was well outside the typical electoral patterns of the time, a factor that fuelled conspiracy theories as people struggled to interpret the results. Some of those theories live on to this day, for the simple lack of a more conventional explanation to otherwise inexplicable results.

    lyVuuY5.jpg

    If pressed most experts would nominate the State's Rights Party success in Wyoming and the Republican breakthrough in Louisiana as the most unexpected results, though there are plenty of contenders. The former still has no convincing explanation while the latter remains a breeding ground for conspiracies, usually involving Huey Long. The general form of the conspiracy argues that the Kingfish, eyeing up a Presidential run in 1940, used his dominant influence in the state to keep the Democrat vote at home and ensure Hull's defeat.
    Electoral College Winning Line - 266 Electoral Votes

    Landon / Vandenberg - Republican - 262 Electoral, 44.1% Popular

    Hull / Barley - Democrat - 180 Electoral, 35.9% Popular

    Garner / White - State's Rights - 89 Electoral, 20% Popular


    The first thing you will notice in the map and table above, after digesting the unusual distribution of winning states, is that Landon is just short of the electoral college winning line of 266 electoral college votes. As noted above this was not unprecedented, indeed in the election fever prior to the voting had been discussed as a distinct possibility. Under the 12th Amendment there was a clearly defined procedure; the candidates would be put forward to Congress, the House of Representatives picking the President from the top three candidates while the Senate selected the Vice President from the top two. All eyes therefore turned to the Congressional race where, it was believed, the State's Rights Party would not be able to produce such success, if only due to a lack of candidates outside it's main power base. The Senate results, being far fewer in number, were naturally the first to come in and soon showed that the Republicans would retain control of the upper house, however many observers noted that the State's Rights vote had held up better than expected, the party picking up half a dozen Senators in states across the South. Finally the tallies for the House elections were announced and a country struggling with the idea of a Presidential election not producing a winner was thrust the matching problem of a House election that left no one party with a majority.

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    The make up of the House of Representatives for the 75th United States Congress. With no party able to muster the 218 votes needed for a majority, legislative progress would depend upon multi-party coalition politics; a different beast from the majority government or bi-partisanship Congress was used to.

    As the country tried to digest the news the political power brokers from all sides began their calculations. Assuming no faithless electors the electoral college would not produce a majority for any ticket and thus Congress would choose the President and Vice-President, where the options began to multiply. In the Senate the Republicans had a majority, and there were only two candidates to chose from, so they could ensure that Vandenberg was selected as Vice President. However in the House all three candidates went forward and no party had an overall majority, therefore deadlock was a distinct possibility. Assuming the deadlock persisted, and the House couldn't pick a candidate before inauguration day, it would be the Vice-President elect Vandenberg who would serve as Acting President until the House could make up it's mind. It was against this backdrop that the negotiations began, the Republicans having the strongest mandate but the balance of power lying with the State's Rights leadership, who's deadlocking breaking House votes put them in the position of king makers.

    The negotiations between the Republicans and the State's Righters were initiated by Vandenberg, due to his favourable views on increasing the power of the states he was viewed as an ideal 'link man'. Somewhat amusingly however it soon became apparent the price of the Righters support in the House for Landon was the Vice Presidency for their candidate. Despite Vandenberg obviously trying to pour cold water on the idea, this offer formed the basis of the negotiations as it served the leadership, if perhaps not the candidates, on both sides. For the Republicans the price, while high, was not extortionate, certainly not compared to the risk of the Righters rejoining the Democrat fold and letting Hull into the White House. From a practical perspective they believed that the office of the Vice President could be sidelined by a skilful Chief of Staff while a 'bi-partisan' Presidency would allow them to spread the blame should anything untoward crop up. For the president himself the prospect of the inexperienced, and low profile, White instead of the combative Vandenberg was particularly appealing, more so as White's views on foreign policy were far closer to Landon's than the absolute isolationist views of Vandenberg.

    For the Righters themselves, and particularly the dominant Tammany Hall grouping, the Vice President was as high as they could practically aim given the strength of their hand; the key cabinet posts that were arguably more important than the Vice Presidency were clearly off limits. More importantly White was rapidly becoming a favoured son of the wider party, without the baggage of Garner's disastrous term as Vice President he had embraced the party's platform with the vigour of a convert, something the party leadership had happily exploited on the campaign trail. Much to their surprise the party's platform, having started as a cynical ploy to aid electioneering, had actually had resonated with large swathes of the country, the message getting home to those disillusioned with Washington regardless of President. By the end of the campaign it was the enthusiastic and compelling White, not the distrusted Garner, who was the big draw at the rallies, a fact noted by a leadership more than aware of Garner's shortcomings. Pushing White forward thus pleased the emerging 'base' of the party and gave the party an untainted figurehead, one who's profile could only grow higher over the coming years.

    Thus a deal was hammered out, Alf Landon would be President while George White would be his Vice President, the cabinet beneath them would be Republican dominated, though the Righters did get the Department of the Interior and the Department of the Navy. While the latter traditionally a key post the Republicans made it clear Garner's promises of naval expansion were not on the agenda, pushing the Navy down the tree significantly. Conversely the former was generally considered a political backwater yet was a key Righter's target, officially because it was a post the Republicans would be prepared to give up, however the real reason was the department's role as gate keeper to all federal land. While the Departments of Labour and Commerce would attract the attention, all of Landon's commitments to federal public works and rural electrification would have to go through the Department of the Interior, giving it power and influence beyond it's normal remit. More importantly with the Republicans determined to break up the notorious Delaware Valley Authority most of the DVA's responsibilities and records would end up with the Bureau of Reclamation, an agency of Interior. The Righters were naturally keen to retain control of such a source of power and influence, not to mention the chance to ensure the inner workings of the DVA remained suitably obscure. This pattern was repeated down the government as the experienced Righters, many of whom had been with Garner in the White House, out-manoeuvred Landon's staff who

    There was, of course, the little matter of how to constitutionally arrange the deal. While Landon's progression to the Presidency could be ensured by letting the system run it course till the Republican and Righters House vote could confirm him, getting White into office would require more creativity. The solution was to convince Vandenberg to publicly pull out, the leadership making it clear he could either leave voluntarily and be rewarded later or be forced out and suffer accordingly. This left the way clear for the Republican Electoral College voters to switch to White, an option perfectly acceptable under the constitution despite Democrat complaints of the moral problems with 'faithless electors'. As Landon and White prepared for office their first problem was, somewhat surprisingly, the US delegation to the Amsterdam Conference. Despite the US presence being little more than an electoral stunt by Garner the new administration was determined to take it seriously, to the extent that one of the conditions from the Republican's in their negotiations was that White be despatched as head of the delegation. The conference would be the first indication of exactly what Landon's 'Moral Neutrality' would mean in practice, by sending the Vice President elect Landon was sending a signal that the US intended to engage more with the outside world, what was less clear was how meaningful that engagement would be and if it would extend beyond words into meaningful actions.

    --
    Notes;
    So Landon is President with White as his VP, the popular vote percentages are exact from the thread election while the states are as per the specific votes (for those that tied I used the popular vote percentage to divy them up). Bit of a mess, but that is what you all voted for. ;)

    The P/VP combo should prove fun, particularly when Alf finds out just how dodgy some of his new partners are. That said he doesn't have a lot of choice, the Righters (couldn't think of a better short hand) hold the balance of power in the House so they have to be dealt with and kept relatively sweet.

    However Alf will get a fairly free hand in Foreign Policy, though what he'll do with it is a different question. He's no FDR chomping at the bit but equally no pig headed isolationist. 'Moral Neutrality' will be his watchwords, but what he means by them is anybody's guess, till Amsterdam anyway :D

    Finally look at the length, a mere 1400 ish words, half the size of the last one. I may yet crack this short update malarkey (assuming no-one felt short-changed by the lack of words). In any event now onto Spain and the war!
     
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    Chapter LXX: Drawing the Battle Lines
  • Chapter LXX: Drawing the Battle Lines

    The opening weeks of the Spanish Civil War were more about political positioning than military operations, the people and regions of the country occupied with aligning themselves to the two sides and drawing the battle lines. Though priorities would change as the various factions waxed and waned the two sides established their core values early on; The Republicans espousing a looser, more federal Spain with a strong anti-clerical streak while the Monarchist would reunite Church and State under the King in strong centralised state working against the 'twin enemies of socialism and secessionists'. For many, both in Spain and abroad, there was no right side, only one that was least bad, a problem keenly felt by the conservative Basque and Catalan parties. While the Republicans offered autonomy, perhaps even eventual independence, they were also fiercely anti-church to the point that their programs would constitute one of the most intense persecutions the Catholic Church would ever experience. Conversely the Monarchist would return the Catholic religion to the heart of the state but at the cost of repressing all autonomy for the regions, power being centralised in Madrid as the nation would be remade as 'One Spain'. The choice therefore was between independence or faith, a far from simple decision for many and one that occupied many as the nation descended into Civil War.

    hd9Qnuh.jpg

    A firing squad of Republican militia 'executing' the Monument to the Sacred Heart. One of the most well known images from the beginning of the Civil War it's iconoclastic and slightly surreal nature made it far more memorable than photos of Nationalists boarding up trade union chapters. Sadly for Spain the firing squads of both sides did not limit themselves to statues or symbols; tens of thousands of ordinary Spaniards found themselves on the wrong side of the rapidly evolving front lines as grudges and vendettas were settled in the most permanent manner.

    As the people chose sides the leaders of both sides plotted their opening moves and tried to balance the need to wait while forces were built up and militias trained with the need to strike before the other side did. This fear of losing the initiative would lead both sides to strike before they were truly ready, with predictably poor consequences. These opening offensives were perhaps the only truly 'Spanish' campaigns of the war, coming before the flood of foreign 'volunteers' and 'advisers' gave outside party's considerable leverage on both sides' strategic thinking. Certainly it is interesting to note that the two sides, despite all their differences, experienced similar problems and came up with similarly compromised solutions.

    We begin with the Republicans who's preparations had faced a fundamental problem; there was a clear need for a unified command structure to organise the disparate troops, yet they were politically and dogmatically committed to less central control. The solution was an unfortunate fudge and typical of the problems that dogged the Republicans military efforts; a command centre was set up in Valencia for the new Ejército Magnífico de la República (Grand Army of the Republic) but none of it's constituent parts were required to pay it much attention. Thus while the well trained paramilitary Guardia de Asalto (Assault Guards) retained their loyalty to the government the hastily formed anarchist militia columns acted as their locally elected delegates felt they should. Military planning therefore consisted of finding out what everyone was going to do then trying to stitch the many local acts together into one grand plan, perhaps one of the worst ways to produce a coherent strategy imaginable.

    The Republican 'plan', such as it was, boiled down to an attack north to re-take the French border and link up with the 'Northern Pocket' around Bilbao and, in parallel, an attack towards Madrid in an attempt to retake the capital. While either would have been acceptable military options, the northern offensive better for a 'long war' strategy while Madrid was the 'knock out' blow choice, the pursuit of both was a dangerous dilution of strength that left both attacks short of the manpower they needed. However to concentrate on one would mean cancelling the other, or at best making it a diversion, an act that would take more political capital than the embattled President Azaña possessed. That is not to say Azaña was without influence, he did possess an excellent trump card in the shape of the Assault Guards who he kept out of both offensives to act as central strategic reserve, intending to commit them to the most successful attack to claim as much of the spoils at minimal cost. While the other factions were less than pleased with this plan they did recognise the need for a reserve force and could hardly complain about 'not working for the greater good' when they themselves were hardly paragons of that virtue.

    The Monarchist's problems were similar and, despite being less complex due to the lack of factions, no less intractable; General Franco's faction along with the national-syndicalist Falange Española (Spanish Phalanx) wanted an immediate march on Valencia, a mirror of the Republican attack on Madrid, while the Mola faction wanted to attack through Badajoz to connect up Monarchist territory. As with the Republicans the difference was between a knock out blow strategy and a more cautious long war strategy, either being acceptable but not both. Unfortunately for the Monarchists the two factions could not agree and, despite being mostly military men who should have known better, both offensives went ahead with only the barest of co-ordination or co-operation.

    VTXrAC5.jpg

    The Madrid offensive was mainly manned by the militias of the hard left as they kept their promise to Moscow that Madrid was the top priority. The Border offensives was far less homogeneous consisting of the many separatist militias (Basque, Catalan and so on) along with the massed ranks of the CNT-FAI (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, National Confederation of Labour - Federación Anarquista Ibérica, Iberian Anarchist Federation) Militias. On the Monarchist side the Southern offensive was conducted by the Army of Africa and the Falangist militias while the 'Link-up' troops were drawn from the rebel regular army and the Carlist militias that had rallied to the Ejército del Rey (Army of the King).

    Game Notes:
    The war begins and the world is reminded of the difference between a war in the desert and a war in a populated country. While I initially wondered if taking the ideological heat out of the war might make it less bloody there was, sadly, a great deal more to it than that. The 'Red' and 'White' terrors I fear are inevitable, perhaps a bit more subtle to protect British/French sensibilities but still there.

    As to the two sides, the Republicans are fairly divided and will take a while to actually pull together. Expect fun and games as they try and co-operate while pursuing different goals. Equally the Monarchists are not exactly united, as Franco's 'Military Council' knocks heads with Mola's faction, if anything it's less excusable as they all (should) know how bad such infighting is. That said conceding control of the military effort probably means giving up post-war political control so it's not quite that simple.

    On the lack of foreign involvement, I would imagine that all sides would be trying to avoid their 'backers' (from whatever nation) having much influence, after all any wartime favours will be asked back with interest. So while I see a great deal of observers and other shady characters knocking around the place I think all sides would designate grand strategy as 'off limits' in all but the vaguest terms. At this stage at least. ;)

    Next update will cover the actual fighting in Spain, then onto the Conference of Imperial Defence (where we shall see the disposition of the Royal Navy and many other Royal prefixed forces ;) ) before finally onto the Amsterdam Conference.
     
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    Chapter LXXI: Revolving Doors Part I - The North.
  • Chapter LXXI: Revolving Doors Part I - The North.

    In the battle of nerves that was campaign timing the first side to blink were the Republicans, specifically the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) and the Partido Comunista de España (PCE, Communist Party of Spain) militias keen to recapture Madrid and assert themselves as the dominant faction. Quite aside from the large, and strengthening, forces garrisoning the capital the PSOE/PCE commanders faced the formidable barrier of the River Tagus; the second largest river in Iberia. Having diligently destroyed most of the bridges across the river during the retreat from Madrid, a vital move to give their battered troops time to rally and hold the line, the Republicans were left with no obvious way back across, save for the handful of exceptionally well guarded surviving crossings. Lacking heavy artillery and tanks (there were only ten tanks in the whole of Spain at the time and all under Monarchist control, though the aid pouring in from across Europe would soon change that) a direct assault on the strong points was out. Equally as the Spanish Army's engineering battalions, along with most of the country's professional civil engineers, had rallied to the Monarchist cause a bridging operation was also discarded. Thus the PSOE/PCE force had but one option left; if they couldn't go through or over the river they would have to go around it.

    Forming up in the town of Cuenca the armies of the left marched north, through passes in the Albarracin mountains to ford the Tagus near it's source while it was still slow and shallow. Emerging from the mountains they occupied the sparsely populated plains of Soria province and wheeled round to attack the city of Sigüenza. Sigüenza was the guardian of the North Eastern approaches to Madrid, controlling the valley between the peaks of the Albarracin mountains and the imposing Sierra de Guadarrama. Despite achieving a measure of surprise, the local Monarchist commander had arrogantly assumed amateur militias couldn't possibly be ready faster than his professional troops, the attack failed to take the town when the hoped for 'rising of the oppressed' failed to occur. Short on men, supplies and over-stretched the offensive fizzled out as the commanders tried to plot a way forward.

    xIpK8sD.jpg

    The Mancheguian Flag, banner of those who rallied to La Mancha regionalism. Primarily a reaction against pan-Castilian sentiments they represented a sub-faction of a faction, too large to ignore but too small to deserve the diplomatic efforts needed for effective co-ordination. The Mancheguian militias were tightly grouped around Albacete, Cuenca and Toledo and were more interested in protecting kith and kin than fighting for the Republic. During the Madrid offensives the Mancheguian battalions participated in the opening attacks in the mountains, but refused to advance into Soria, unwilling to stray too far from La Mancha. Arguably those few extra battalions would have made the difference at Sigüenza, turning stalemate into victory.

    As the PSOE/PCE force hurled itself at Sigüenza the Eusko Gudarostea (Basque Army) began it's part of the Border Offensive, marching from Bilbao to attack Vitoria. In stark contrast to their hard left comrades experiences a rising did occur, the population attacking the Monarchist garrison and assisting the assaulting troops, though in fairness Vitoria had the largest Basque population outside of Bilbao so the ground for a rising was ripe. Having taken Vitoria, and much of the surrounding country, the traditional Basque country was all but liberated, an achievement that prompted the Eusko's commanders to slow their advance, less willing to risk their forces for non-Basques. This decision, a significant change to the agreed plan for the campaign, was not communicated to Ejército Magnífico de la República (Grand Army of the Republic) command in Valencia, an omission conveniently blamed on 'communication problems'.

    The Monarchist reaction to these attacks was forceful and immediate, from the perspective of Madrid the Republican operations appeared to be two prongs of a pincer movement to separate Catalonia from the rest of Monarchist territory. Recognising that such a pocket would be vulnerable to destruction and almost impossible to re-supply, particularly as France would doubtless aid the Republican blockade, preventing such a pocket forming was considered a top priority. General Mola, commander of the Monarchist Northern Army, reacted by calling up his reserve forces from the strategic river town of Plasencia on his 'southern' border and launching an attack towards Catalonia. Somewhat amusingly by the time the Monarchist's advance unit, the 1a Division Calaberia (1st Cavalry Division), reached Soria both Republican attacks had already faltered for the reasons discussed above. While it's certainly true the arrival of Major-General Cabanillas' horsemen did help convince the PSOE/PCE and Basque commanders not to restart their offensives, it was not the vital intervention Mola presented it as. Indeed as we shall see in the next chapter, Mola's commitment of his reserves and drawing of forces towards the east would have dramatic consequences for Franco's campaigns in the south.
     
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    Chapter LXXII: Revolving Doors Part II - The South.
  • Chapter LXXII: Revolving Doors Part II - The South.

    If the Republicans had moved first in the North, in the South it was the Monarchists, and Franco in particular, who had the initiative. Despite being the senior commander in the South and conduit for all German aid Franco's position was somewhat shaky, many Monarchists blamed his insistence on an early start date for the failure of the coup. Facing such pressure, and sharing the common failure of all early war Monarchists, arrogance, Franco had set his sights on a grand thrust towards Valencia to end the war at stroke. The key choice was route, either the 'southern' option through Granada and Murcia, or the 'northern' option through Cordoba and Albacete. The 'southern' route was shorter and would have the Mediterranean on one side providing a relatively secure flank, it would however mean traversing a series of hills and mountains, not least the mighty Sierra Nevada range around Granada. Franco therefore chose the longer, but flatter, Cordoba route following the Guadalquivir River valley then across the Albacete plains, a decision he would soon come to regret.

    It has been mentioned Franco was arrogant in his assessment of the challenge posed by the Republican forces, however it must be admitted he had reasonable grounds for such belief. At the head of the Army of Africa his forces were the best equipped and best trained in Spain, moreover many of the senior officers and NCOs had combat experience from the Rif War, a not inconsiderable advantage, though one which would prove to be double-edged. As icing on the cake these troops had just come back from a large scale exercise, so were fully worked up for action, and included the ten Renault FT-17s that made up the entirety of Spain's pre-war tank force. With such advantages on Franco's side it was unfortunate for the Monarchists that his plan was not the equal of the troops carrying it out.

    yrR6zN6.jpg

    The whole of Spain's tank force on manoeuvres. While the FT-17 was almost thirty years old, slow and short ranged it still bestowed a massive tactical advantage when deployed, particularly given the static nature of the early phases of the war. Franco intended to use his FT-17s as line-breakers, creating initial breakthroughs at the start of an offensive then dropping into reserve when the advance, hopefully, streaked away into the distance.

    The offensive began well, the tank force breaking the Republican lines near La Carlota allowing the Regulares cavalry to be unleashed, their infantry brethren and the Spanish Legion flowing through the gap. The problems began to emerge when the Primera Tabore (1st Regulares Cavalry Squadron) reached the well garrisoned city of Cordoba, lacking the equipment or numbers to assault the garrison the cavalrymen cleared the surrounding outposts then stopped. This decision came not from the units' commanding officer, the experienced cavalry man Queipo de Llano y Sierra, but from Franco's HQ back in Seville. His reasoning had nothing to do with the current war and could be expressed as one word; Annual. The Battle of Annual, or the Disaster at Annual as the Spanish army referred to it, had seen a large Spanish force advance into the heart of the Rif Desert only to be isolated, surrounded then slaughtered by a far smaller force of Riffian irregulars. Annual had left many in the Spanish Army with a deep fear of unprotected flanks and a desire to ensure total security of lines of communication, none being more affected than officers who had served in the Rif War. Even though Franco had enjoyed a comparatively 'good' Rif War, gaining command of the Spanish Legion and emerging as hero following the march to relieve Melilla, it had still left it's mark on him.

    Thus instead of sending the Tabore onto the next objective, the bridges of El Carpio, Franco pulled up his cavalry and handed the Republicans a vital delay to react, a opportunity they did not miss. Indeed as the foot sloggers and artillery train made it's way to Cordoba to take the city, Republican command in Valencia ordered it's counter-stroke, President Azaña committing the Assault Guards from the reserves to repel Franco's attack. Despite taking Cordoba with relative ease, once his full force had concentrated, Franco's campaign soon began to bog down as the Army of Africa was forced to plough through a series of river towns; El Carpio, Villa del Rio, Andujar, each with it's bridges destroyed and citizens militia alert and dug in. Worse the fixation on flank security and guarded supply line was weakening the army far more than any enemy action, the stream of units detached from the main force making a large dent in the notionally 30,000 strong army. It was thus inevitable that when the Army of Africa finally clashed with the Assault Guards, outside the mining town of Bailén, it was the Republican's who triumphed. The freshness and superior numbers of the para-military defenders winning out over the training of the depleted Regulares and Legionaries.

    As Franco's offensive fizzled to a halt the troops that could of made the difference, the Regular Army divisions that had been part of the pre-coup army exercises in Africa, were not marching to reinforce him but instead marching north as part of the 'Link up' offensive. The troops left Seville and advanced along the route of the Vía de La Plata (Silver Way), aiming for the ancient city of Cáceres, hoping to both connect with the Monarchist armies in the north and isolate the loyal Republican garrison of Badajoz. The commander in Badajoz, General Linares, noticed the envelopment and was forced into a choice; Dig in and wait for relief or attempt a break out before being encircled. Knowing of the problems in Valencia Linares discounted any hope of an early relief and determined to break out, the choice being east or north. Linares' decision was helped by Mola's over-reaction to the Border Offensive, the rushing of troops east had left the Monarchist's line north of Badajzo thin and over-stretched. Deciding that the weaker opposition more than outweighed the longer distance Linares's force, a mixture of militias and loyalist of the 4th División, broke through at Plasencia and marched north, towards the Basque Northern Pocket. While Mola would, eventually, manage to scrape together a force to stop them Linares' troops did manage to seize the far more defendable city of Salamanca, moving them close to both Madrid and the key Monarchist city of Burgos. In a final insult to Mola, barely had the reserve been recalled from the east arrived in Burgos, too late to help stop his attack, did the CNT-FAI militias launch the last offensive of the year, seizing Tarragona and giving the Republican's a foothold in Catalonia, a substantial harbour far nearer to France and putting them within striking distance of Barcelona.

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    The final positions in Spain at the end of late Autumn. In the North the Basque country was complete and secure, while the Republicans had a foothold in Catalonia and the approaches to Madrid. In the South the Monarchists had connected their two territories, but let a Republican field army escape to Salamanca, and were left with an over-exposed salient around Cordoba .

    As the dust settled and armies began to dig in for the Winter the two sides evaluated the summer campaigns and in each case it had been a decidedly mixed bag. The key difference between the sides was, perhaps, expectations, the Republicans were mostly just pleased to have stabilised the front and still be standing after the shock of the coup. For the individual factions things were more complex, the separatists were broadly pleased with the Basque's having expanded their pocket while the Catalans had seen the first part of their 'homeland' liberated. The CNT-FAI, the victors of Tarragona, had both the propaganda boost of a military success and the practical benefits of boots on the ground at a major port, strengthening their hand in the power struggles in Valencia, equally the government faction around Azaña claimed the credit for halting the main Monarchist offensive, bolstering the President. Only the PSOE-PCE were truly disappointed with the campaign, having failed to take Madrid they had to explain their failure to Moscow and their supporters, the failure prompting many of their supporters to defect to other, more successful, militias. It's worth noting at this point how correct General Linares was in plotting his breakout, in all the post-campaign planning many words, but little effort, was expended on the subject of relieving Linares force, there simply wasn't enough political advantage to outweigh the military risks. In summary the summer and autumn had been about survival, over the winter of 1936 the Republicans turned their minds over to plotting victory. The key problem remained however, while all the factions agreed unity was the way to victory, they each thought the other groups should unite around them.

    If the Republicans were deep down pleased to have survived the Monarchists were generally disappointed with their campaigns. Franco's offensive had bogged down relatively early and he was left with a small but exceptionally vulnerable salient into Republican territory. Rather than give up territory to shorten his lines Franco insisted on digging in, tying up most of the best troops in the Monarchist Army on garrison duty. Even the entire concept of the campaign was being questioned, while few officers risked challenging Spanish orthodoxy over the issue of the flanks many did argue Franco should have gone 'south' through Granada, potentially halving the number of detachments needed for flank security. Having started the campaign insecure Franco's position was further damaged by such arguments, indeed the only things saving Franco from an ignominious demotion were the flow of German aid and the failure of his rivals to do any better. The latter in particular was a source of frustration to the British backed Carlist/Regular Army faction who's troops had spent the summer marching around Northern Spain to little effect. While the success of the link up offensive had reunited the two Monarchist sectors the escape of Linares, not to mention the losses in the North-East of the country, had overshadowed that achievement. As with the Republicans the Monarchist's all agreed on the importance of unity, but refused to countenance serving under the other faction.

    As both sides wound down for the Winter many eyes in Spain therefore turned to Amsterdam, where the Great Powers were meeting to ostensibly discuss the Rhineland. From a Spanish perspective however it was realised the deals struck in the Dutch capital would directly impact on the quantity and quality of support pouring into Spanish harbours. The realists on both sides admitting, if only to themselves, that their struggle would be reduced to just another bargaining chip for the powers to haggle with.

    ---
    Notes

    Not sure on this whole update. Ideally I'd leave it a few weeks, write something else, then come back to it. However I didn't want to leave Spain (or my readers) hanging. Slight change of style, few more town names and a bit more discussion on terrain. Any thoughts on that?

    In game terms a mild freezing up of Spain occurred Novemberish, so I figured it was everyone 'digging in' for winter. I'll load up as both side in spring to poke them into life for the next 'season' of campaigns.

    Upshot of all that. No-one did fabulously well on either side, no stand out candidates for leadership (though Azana for the Republicans is probably closest). Thus it comes down to foreign support, hence everyone waits for Amsterdam. I think a lot of the ideological poison has been drawn from the conflict this time so I can see the powers being a bit more 'negotiable' over Spain, willing to trade away 'their' faction for advantages elsewhere.
     
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    Chapter LXXIII: Family Meeting Part I - The Newest Members
  • Chapter LXXIII: Family Meeting Part I - The Newest Members

    As a rule Britain tried to avoid Imperial Conferences; they always tended to involve the Dominions asking for, and getting, more powers and influence. While the progression from Dominions being told what was happening to being consulted was considered inevitable, and in many cases had already taken place, Whitehall saw no reason to encourage the process. Thus it was with a due sense of trepidation that the civil service arranged the 1936 conference, wondering which previously British area of policy would be subject to increased 'co-operation'. The Dominion Prime Ministers did not disappoint, exploiting the gains made at the Ottawa Economic Conference to have a greater say over trade policy and begin to intrude into military affairs such as grand imperial strategy and defence procurement. Before delving into such matters we must first deal with the expansion of the conference, the conference seeing several changes to the African membership of the Imperial family.

    British central Africa at the time was best described as confusing. Starting in the the south the vast Bechuanaland Protectorate was in fact not a protectorate but a High Commission Territory administered by the Governor-General of South Africa. The poorest of the territories it had resisted all attempts to be 'lumped in' with any of it's neighbours and operated under the 'Indirect Rule' policy of letting the natives get on with their own affairs. Moving up the continent Southern Rhodesia was the complete opposite, rich from tobacco and chrome exports she was the only 'self-governing colony' of the Empire and the only colony represented by the Dominion Office not the Colonial Office in Westminster. Government was through an elected legislative council but from an almost exclusively white electorate. Heading north we logically come to Northern Rhodesia, not as rich as it's neighbour but catching up fast thanks to it's rich copper belt. While only a protectorate Northern Rhodesia had it's own elected legislative council for the urban areas with tribal councils running the rural areas as part of the policy of 'Indirect Rule'. In contrast to it's southern neighbour the electorate was far broader racially, though a good way short of universal suffrage. Finally the small protectorate of Nyasaland completed the region, while it had a governing council the membership was appointed by the Crown directly, a growing source of frustration for the settlers but an arrangement the Colonial Office was keen to keep as we shall see later.

    The mid 1930s had seen a growing desire for amalgamation between the two Rhodesias with the aim of the union having complete self governance, a movement Whitehall had considered most ominous. The key problem for London was balancing the official 'enlightened' line of increased African rights laid down in documents like the Passfield Memo with the reality of practical white minority rule. It was one of the ironies of British colonial policy that the most 'liberal' colony in central Africa was Nyasaland; as it's council was appointed in London it was the only council in the region which actually put official policy into action. The Colonial Office therefore quite correctly feared that any Rhodeisan union without constitutional reform would effectively bury London's good intentions beneath the settler's self interest. The government was therefore tempted to follow the classic British solution, set up a Royal Commission to kick the problem into the long grass and get on with other less intractable problems. This outcome was avoided thanks to a chance meeting of the South Rhodesian Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins with his South African counterpart Jan Smuts at one of the many receptions held during the Conference, a meeting the British civil service would subsequently categorise as yet another good reason to avoid Imperial Conferences.

    The two leaders hit it off immediately, shared Great War service and Huggins earlier enthusiasm for South Africa annexing Rhodesia doubtless helping, and soon discovered they faced the same political challenge; voting reform. In both nations the aim was to produce a system that looked fair, kept London and international opinion happy (or at least quiet) but ensured white majority rule. Drawing on ideas from both nations, and a few from Northern Rhodesia as well, the two men sketched the outline of a new political system; Partnership. The essential concept was to limit the electoral franchise by wealth and education, setting the bar such that the emerging black middle class passed it, but the majority did not, instead being represented by a limited number of 'Tribal MPs'. As a further gesture to London the idea of 'Indirect Rule' would be extended, using councils of tribal elders and chiefs as a form of devolved local government, the aim being to leave most native communities to their own devices on domestic matters.

    When news of this new system reached the British representatives it caused a considerable stir and almost split the government; the Colonial Office insisting the proposed 'Partnership' did not meet the ideals of the Passfield Memo and was likely just a whitewash, on the other side the Dominion Office was far more favourable to the settlers and pointed out the proposal would still be a considerable improvement over the current situation for the natives. Such was the dispute that the two ministries were unable to reach an agreement and the matter was the subject of intense debate until, eventually, the Prime Minister was forced to adjudicate the matter in cabinet. This was a fortunate break for Huggins and the Dominion Office as Chamberlain was personally sympathetic to the 'White Man's Burden' under-currents of their position, as indeed was much of his cabinet. It should therefore be no surprise that Chamberlain came down in favour of unification with a 'Partnership' style constitution and the eventual goal of Dominion status. The Colonial Office did win a key concession, the newly united Rhodesia would retain the self-governing status of Southern Rhodesia 'until such time as the political system has stabilised'. The Colonial Office believed such an entirely arbitrary test would allow them to delay Dominion status until a more favourable solution than 'Partnership' could be devised.

    fZEH4S1.jpg

    Sir Herbet James Stanley. Governor of Southern Rhodesia, and a former Governor of Northern Rhodesia, he would serve as the first Governor-General of the united Rhodesia. A complex character he was an avid campaigner for the amalgamation of the region's colonies while also maintaining the official line on native rights. Indeed many in the region still resented him for having reserved vast acreages for native use and stopping settler land grabs while a young Resident Commissioner. As part of the general re-organisation the Bechuanaland Protectorate would be transferred from the South African Governor-General's office to his office. In addition he would gain a supervision role for the Nyasaland Protectorate's Commissioners, both moves part of Whitehall's plan to merge all four colonies and reduce the burden on the Imperial purse.

    The announcement about a unified Rhodesia was something of a public non-event, mainly for the brutally frank reason that few people outside of Africa had much interest in the goings on in the dark heart of the continent. While there was some Imperial murmuring the fact South Africa intended to adopt a similar 'Partnership' style constitution muted criticism, the few Dominion politicians even aware of the issues were reluctant to criticise the internal policies of a fellow Dominion. Domestically there was slightly more opposition, including a minor back bench revolt from some of the National Liberals, but the legislation passed with relative ease. Interestingly the Labour party also split on the matter, the left leaning sections opposing the policy while the TUC faction took a more pragmatic view and gave it cautious, but heavily caveated, support.

    ShMTNWd.jpg

    The British interest in Libya began at the top with the British resident Duncan Cumming. The British interest in Libya was as much about denying the region to others as anything else, though there were many in government interested on 'turning a profit' from the British presence. While the Royal Navy preferred the docks and harbours of Alexandria and Valletta the other services maintained a significant Libyan presence and Imperial firms secured all of the rebuilding works initiated by the new Libyan government. The big work however was the Tripoli to Cairo railway, part of the great Imperial venture that hoped to connect up all the British railways in the region. The dream was to run trains from Tripoli in Libya to Basra in Iraq, requiring not only the Tripoli-Cairo line but also a connection across the Nile to the Palestine Railway and gap filling to reach the sprawling Baghdad Railway. While not as ambitious as those who hoped to revive the dream of a Cape to Cairo dream it was a measure of renewed British self confidence that the project had backing at the highest level in Whitehall.

    Before we leave Africa, and the subject of the Imperial family, the conference also saw the formal recognition of the new Libyan state. The previous months had seen the Libyan constitution finalised and Emir Idris successfully installed as King Idris I of the Kingdom of Libya. With the British representatives keen to see the pro-Britain Idris secure the constitutional settlement left the King with considerable powers, though not the absolute monarchy Idris would perhaps have preferred. The final settlement saw Idris 'double hatted' as both King of Libya and Emir of the three provinces of Libya (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan), each province having it's own regional government but reporting to the central government for 'national' issues. The country itself was doing relatively well though it would take many years to fully recover from the Italian occupation, not least to rebuild the professional middle class that had been thoroughly 'pacified' by successive Italian governors. As expected the British influence on the country was considerable, starting with the large RAF presence at the Mellaha Air Base outside Tripoli and extending to the British firms tendering for the Libyan leg of the new Tripoli-Cairo railway. The new railway formed part of the Idris' plan to stich together his country, inspired by such ventures as the Canadian Pacific Railway or the Trans-Australian Railway it was hoped the railway would link together the three provinces as a symbol of a united Libya. For the British the key thing was that Imperial firms built it and that it would be inter-operable with their other railway interest, a good example of their policy in microcosm.

    ----
    Notes.

    Sadly I've fallen of the 'Short and to the point' bandwagon and diverted into a vast splurge on central Africa. It was only supposed to be a paragraph. :(

    In my defence the united Rhodesia flag is quite spiffing. Not much a defence I admit but it's the best I've got.

    OTL the Rhodesia's tried to merge in 1936 but only got a Royal Commission that took 3 years to say "Yes, but later". By then the war intervened and the idea was shelved. Post war Labour ignored the entire issue so it wasn't until the 1950s it was raised again, by which point the face saving fudge was 'Federation' lumping together the richer North and South Rhodesia with the dirt poor Nyasaland in a Federal arrangement. That worked about as well as the other British federal ideas (i.e. very badly) so fell apart and the individual parts became independent eventually.

    TTL with the last of the old Victorians as PM, not to mention a good smattering of old Imperialists in the cabinet, I think they get the go ahead to 'shoulder the white man's burden' or some such similar rubbish. 'Partnership' was a post-war OTL idea implemented by the British keen to avoid Apartheid spreading from South Africa and is theoretically not a bad idea for a slow change of power (though still clearly racist). Failed miserably when the white politicians didn't take it seriously, so Britain shrugged and went straight to independence and black majority rule. Will it go better TTL? Well Stanley was a fair governor but Huggins wasn't, so it comes down to a clash between the Governor-General and the Prime Minister. Which will be fun.

    Finally Libya, after the annoyance of liberating the place to find Italian fascists in office I dropped the 1939 cabinet in place. The Tripoli-Cairo railway was, as far as I can tell, never really proposed but then post-war pretty much anything extravagant was out of the question. However I can see Idris being keen on a grand 'Libyan' project to unite all the coastal settlements, while Britain goes along as it can connect up all the various colonies, puppets and territories while making Empire construction firms some good money. As an added bonus the surveyors will probably find the Sirte Basin oil fields (OTL the Italians found subsurface oil 1938 so not out of the question)

    Duritz - If I could get Japanese tanks in the SCW I would. I was tempted by a scheme as follows; Very early, stronger anti-commintern pact. Japan gets it's historic bloody nose of the Soviets but, instead of ignoring it, decides she needs to learn about tanks and armoured warfare. Using German connections she ships her prototype tanks to Spain to get some practice along side the Panzers.

    Sadly I just can't see the Japanese military being that humble. Ah well.

    Faeelin - On the positive side France doesn't have the Popular Front so not Matignon Agreements, this will have helped the economy somewhat. On the flip side the fundamentals are still poor and the 1937 pay round will be a flash point, plus of course France, like the US and large chunks of Europe, is still 'on gold'. Should be fun all round in the next French update then.
     
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    Chapter LXXIV: Family Meeting Part II - A Matter of Naval Planning
  • Chapter LXXIV: Family Meeting Part II - A Matter of Naval Planning

    There are many who recommend that the key to understanding almost any political problem or issue is to 'follow the money', sage advice so long as one keeps in mind the broadest definition of money and follows the ebb and flow of resources of all kinds. In such vein when considering the issue of British foreign policy the advice would be to follow the fleet, the deployments and disposition of the Royal Navy being a far better indication than any number of memos, speeches and briefings from the Foreign Office. It is therefore no surprise that the Imperial Conference saw Australia and New Zealand keen to see the previously theoretical defence plans become reality through actual warship movements.

    At first glance the decision should have been simple; successive Committees of Imperial Defence had stated the Far East would be reinforced if the need arose or when the Mediterranean calmed down, whichever was the sooner. After the defeat of Italy the only ships of note in the region, baring the French of course, were the Spanish Republic's two ancient Espana class battleships and an equally venerable Turkish battle-cruiser. As war with France was considered exceptionally unlikely, even after the chilling of relations, and the Admiralty believed a squadron of heavy cruiser would suffice to counter the other vessels there was seemingly no reason to maintain a strong Mediterranean Fleet. This should have left those vessels free to be deployed East, yet in reality strong opposition would be mounted to the very idea of sending a fleet to Singapore.

    HPMVzUs.jpg

    The TCG Yavuz, flagship of the Turkish Fleet. Formerly the SMS Goeben she was a Moltke class battle-cruiser that had been transferred to the Ottoman Empire during the Great War and then retained by Turkey. During a four year overhaul in the late 1920s to repair war damage and bring her back into service the Yavuz had been barely modernised, indeed the effects of age and wear in service had left her considerably less effective than her original configuration. Despite this it was the opinion of the Admiralty that she was the biggest non-French threat in the Mediterranean, though as the rivals were the smaller, slower and badly maintained Spanish Espana battleships nothing too impressive should be read into this. As with the Espana's the Admiralty believed the speed, accuracy and superior crew of a County class should make it a fair match with the Yavuz, making a whole County squadron more than sufficient.

    Before going into the issue in depth it will be valuable to establish the background. The Royal Navy's planning for the Far East had been developed over many decades through the War Memorandum (Eastern), most recently revised in 1933. This document covered the general strategy for the Far East, covering what ships to send, how they would get there, repair and refuelling for the force and an outline strategy of how to win. Through the memorandum the Royal Navy had argued for and received the vast Singapore complex of docks, storage and fortifications, indeed the entire Singapore fortress only existed to protect the dry docks and oil tanks. It had also been the driver for the network of refuelling bases from Suez to Singapore, most notably in Aden and Ceylon, to support any fleet movement and as staging points for the tanker train needed to keep any deployed force supplied. In terms of grand strategy the assumption had always been that any war would be defensive in nature, with Japan as the aggressor and Britain aiming for a negotiated surrender through economic blockade and destruction of the Japanese fleet. In broad terms the war strategy could be broken down into four stages;

    * Phase I - Relief of Singapore.
    * Phase II - Relief/Recapture of Hong Kong.
    * Phase III - Northward advance to draw the Japanese fleet into decisive battle.
    * Phase IV - Complete the economic starvation of Japan through blockade and convoy warfare, forcing Japan to negotiate or surrender.

    The astute reader will note the first phases imply the Royal Navy arriving in force only after the war has started and the main British bases in the region have been besieged. This was not just a 'worst case' plan that assumed Japan achieved total tactical surprise but also an acknowledgement that the Royal Navy did not intend to permanently base a substantial fleet in the Far East. Originally this had been due to practicality, while the then First Sea Lord, Admiral Beatty, had wanted to station a battle-cruiser squadron in the Far East in the early 1920s, he had been thwarted by the lack of a dockyard capable of supporting anything larger than a cruiser for an extended period. After the enormous floating drydock was installed in Singapore harbour in the late 1920s that became less of an issue, indeed in pursuit of a truly modern base of operations the Admiralty had commissioned the vast King George VI drydock to allow Singapore to handle even the largest vessels on the DNC's drawing boards. However by the time such practicalities had been addressed politics and economics had intervened, changing the nature of the problem.

    To deal with the later it was quite simply very expensive for the Royal Navy to maintain a large squadron 8,000 miles away from Britain. Quite aside from the large tanker train needed to keep the required weekly supply of fuel from the refineries, all the food, ammunition, spares and other supplies and victuals a modern fleet needed would have to be transported from Britain to Singapore, a large expense for government finances squeezed by the depression. There was therefore considerable opposition from the Treasury to any such plans, particularly given the vast sums already expended on 'Fortress Singapore' and the network of refuelling bases across the Indian Ocean. The other problem, the politics, came in the form of the Washington and London naval treaties which had seen the Royal Navy lose considerable numbers of battleships, to the point where the Naval Staff no longer believed they could maintain two 'effective' fleets. As the Admiralty fundamentally objected to 'ineffective' forces, that is squadrons too small, or not powerful enough, to the war time job required of them, they determined the Eastern Fleet would be an all or nothing affair; either all of the fleet battleships needed to defeat Japan or none of them. As economics and political reality would not allow the fleet to be permanently based in Singapore the Far East got nothing larger than a heavy cruiser. Instead the Admiralty plan was for the light forces of the China Station to harass and delay any advance on Singapore until such time as the main fleet could make the 40 day transit from Home Waters or the 30 day journey from the Mediterranean. Once the main fleet had arrived, assuming Singapore had held out, it would execute the general war plan outlined above.

    The battle lines were thus drawn, opposed to the plan were the Royal Navy (unwilling to disperse the fleet), the Treasury (who baulked at the cost) and the Board of Trade (alarmed at the disruption to the Merchant Marine the vast supporting fleet train would cause). Against this most rare alliance of Admiralty and Treasury were the Antipodean Dominions and the Dominion Office for obvious reasons, the Foreign Office (keen to see a force in the East to 'fly the flag') and a general sense that Australia was 'due' such a deployment, in recognition of the sterling service of the RAAF in North Africa and her steadfast support for the war. In the end the pro-deployment faction won out, Chancellor Leo Amery weakening the Treasury's opposition to defence spending while the Royal Navy's case was, ironically, undermined by their own insistence that Japan was a real threat. While motivated as much by a desire for higher defence spending as any real appraisal of the threat, their view had been wholly accepted by a political class still chastened by the shock of the Abyssinian War. There was therefore a political need to 'do something' about Imperial defence and, more importantly, be seen to be 'doing something'. The gesture of a force being sent to Singapore was deemed to fit the bill perfectly, it would reassure the public the government was on the case, keep the Dominions happy they had a voice in defence matters and 'send a message' to deter Japan. Though out-manoeuvred the Admiralty could draw comfort from the fact that the Japanese threat was still believed to be mostly theoretical and that by spreading the fleet so thin they had ensured the naval estimates would remain well funded.

    LkmtFYm.jpg

    HMS Malaya, after a successful Abyssinian War where she had accounted for more than her fair share of enemy ship her reward was a return 'home' to her sponsors, the Federated Malay States. Despite a hastily completed two year refit just prior to the war Malaya was not as capable as the more thoroughly modernised Queen Elizabeth, having received neither the longer ranged Mk2 'high elevation' 15" turrets or the more efficient small-tube Admiralty boilers. Despite this she remained an effective warship and as one of the relatively few vessels afloat to have actual combat 'kills' to her name would attract the crowds on the many port visit made while transiting to Singapore. For the Foreign Office her presence in the Far East would be invaluable, as one senior mandarin put it "The navy is the chief sanction of our Foreign Policy, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that every Foreign Office telegram is backed by it" and as such it was hoped Malaya would aid in deterring Japan and adding weight to the pressure being applied to still neutral Siam.

    So we come to the disposition of forces where we see that Home Waters retained it's primacy, if not in raw numbers then certainly in priority. Both the Nelsons, arguably the most powerful warships afloat in 1936, were retained by Home Fleet with HMS Nelson herself as flagship, in addition HMS Renown and HMS Repulse were retained as the Battle-cruiser Squadron to counter the threat of Germany's Deutschland class 'pocket battleships' that could easily outrun the lumbering Nelsons. Home Fleet also kept two carriers, the battleship sinkers HMS Eagle and HMS Courageous, and the pick of the cruisers and destroyer flotillas. Moving south North Atlantic Command, previously home to a handful of ancient 'C' class cruisers the Admiralty had despatched two 'R' class battleships to serve the diplomatic role of reminding the warring nations in Spain of the power of the Royal Navy. Also operating out of Gibraltar were the heavy cruisers of Force K which enforced the informal British blockade and escorted the many 'independent' merchant convoys. The Mediterranean Fleet itself was reduced to only two 'R's and the carrier Hermes, the presence of most of the Revenge class in or around the Mediterranean a consequence of the Admiralty doubting their value against either Germany or Japan, thus making the Med, with it's more limited opposition, their natural theatre. Before leaving the region the new Suez Station should be noted, though comprised of but a single squadron of 'D' class cruisers she was another symptom of the political will to be seen to act, no matter how late or ineffectively. Finally we come to the object of the exercise, the Eastern Fleet. After the detachments elsewhere, and with almost 25% of the fleet either in repair or long term refit, the force sent comprised three Queen Elizabeths and two carriers. In the opinion of the Admiralty it was exactly the wrong size, too small to fight the Japanese main fleet but big enough it's loss would materially affect the balance of power, however as the threat was believed to be low and the deployment presumed temporary it was considered a risk worth taking to ensure a steady flow of new tonnage.

    Home Fleet - Portsmouth
    Nelson
    Rodney
    Renown
    Repulse
    Eagle
    Furious


    Eastern Fleet - Singapore
    Queen Elizabeth
    Barham
    Malaya
    Courageous
    Glorious


    North Atlantic Command - Gibraltar
    Royal Oak
    Royal Sovereign


    Force K - Gibraltar
    8th Cruiser Squadron (County class)

    Mediterranean Fleet - Valletta
    Ramillies
    Resolution
    Hermes


    Suez Station - Alexandria
    7th Cruiser Squadron ('D' class)

    Reserve Fleet
    Argus
    20th Cruiser Squadron (Hawkins class)

    Repair/Refit
    Hood
    Warspite
    Valiant
    Revenge


    IhJOLV4.jpg

    Suez Station, not the most respected of commands as the motto of the unofficial crest shows, the Latin roughly translating as "After the horse bolted." Despite inauspicious beginnings it would a busy station, the Eastern Mediterranean was a decidedly unstable place at the end of 1936 with turmoil in Italy as the economy collapsed, industrial riots in Greece and instability in Turkey as President Atatürk's health declined. In such an environment the ships of Suez Station would regularly find themselves escorting HMS Ramillies and HMS Resolution, 'flying the flag' in foreign ports as London tried to apply pressure or show support throughout the region.

    With the Royal Navy dealt with we now turn our attention to the Army and RAF, while the fleet had always been dominant in Far Eastern plans the other services were agitating for a role beyond 'slotting in' where the Admiralty plans ordered. The Imperial Conference would show the Dominions were fully supportive of such a position, while they lacked the industrial might to be anything more than a squadron of the Royal Navy, the Australian experience had shown they could punch well above their weight in the other services. An increased aerial or land role therefore was their way into grand strategy, something that caused great disquiet among more conservative elements in London. The discussion therefore turned to the next revision of the War Memorandum (East), traditionally reviewed every four years the contents, and indeed the authors, of the 1937 revision would form the next battleground between the services and between London and the Dominions.


    ---
    Notes:
    OK so I'm completely of the short update wagon, that was quite a titan but, I hope, worth it.

    As it happens I don't think the Abyssinian War would change British plans for the Far East that much, OTL it wasn't till a bit later in the decade that N. Chamberlain and Backhouse started the process of abandoning the Far East with 90 day deployment plans and hedging promise of reinforcements. So at this stage it's business as usual, but without the distraction of the Italian fleet and with perhaps a bit more appreciation that surprises can happen.

    To the actual deployment, it is a bit on the small side and I don't think the Admiralty would be keen on diluting their forces. However Keyes was a political animal so as First Sea Lord I think he would play the game, spreading the fleet thin to justify more expenditure while ensuring the Far Eastern fleet is under orders to keep itself alive and do nothing silly in the unlikely event of war.

    On the repair/refits Warspite and Revenge are just in to get battle damage fixed, while Hood and Valiant are getting much needed upgrades while being repaired. The plan is to cycle ships around as the capital ship upgrade programme get accelerated, no game effect though. Perhaps I should get Armageddon for that reason? While talking ships the captured Italian cruisers are still being taken apart by the DNC, expect them to make an appearance in the next update as a carrot dangled at the Aussies.

    On which note, next update will see the RAF/Army plans for the Far East and fallout from the RAAF outperforming the RAF at the start of the war. Plus some other Imperial Conference chat that I think doesn't deserve it's own update but should be covered.
     
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    Chapter LXXV: Family Meeting Part III - Fight on Land, Win at Sea.
  • Chapter LXXV: Family Meeting Part III - Fight on Land, Win at Sea.

    The 1937 draft of the War Memorandum (Eastern) was the subject of much debate, from the level of grand strategy down to the composition of individual units. The discussion naturally included the vexed issue of inter-service co-operation, with the Army and RAF trying to wrench the planning role from the grasp of the Senior Service, a move the Navy naturally fiercely resisted. To deal with the key strategic problem first, the Royal Navy's local commanders were decidedly unhappy with Phase II of the 1933 plan (The Relief/Recapture of Hong Kong). While it was believed Singapore could hold for the required time for fleet reinforcements to arrive, Hong Kong was considered far less secure, a situation made worse by the standing orders for China Station to fall back to Singapore in the event of war. While in many ways a wise move to prevent attrition at the hands of the enemy, it would severely weaken Hong Kong and make recapture, not relief, the most likely step for Phase II. As a properly defended and garrisoned Hong Kong could be made into a fortress it was feared that such recapturing would be a difficult and bloody task and, more importantly, a distraction from the main strategy.

    The obvious solution therefore was to reinforce the colony such that it could hold out for the 50 or so days estimated as necessary for reinforcements to reach Hong Kong from Home Waters. Given the lack of additional Royal Navy ships this ask could only be performed by the other services, dooming the Admiralty rear-guard action to keep control of the planning process. After some more wrangling the task fell to the Ministry for Defence Co-ordination, the ambitious minister Harold Macmillan continuing to try and increase his ministry's stature (and his own personal importance) by grabbing up as many defence 'grey areas' as possible. While this was a wise decision, only an independent ministry could fairly adjudicate on the differences between the services and make the tough judgements necessary, it was as much politics as anything else. Macmillan, being a relatively junior member of the cabinet, owed his position to being a member of the pre-war 'Rearmament Mafia' that now dominated the government. Supportive on defence matters, with the trust of his superiors (and the failsafe that any plan would have to be approved by cabinet) the position was given as much to Macmillan personally as his ministry.

    It should be noted at this stage though that it was only the co-ordination role that was taken from the services, the blending together of their individual plans into one over-all strategy. This high level role was to prove somewhat challenging given the stark differences between the services approach to planning. For the Royal Navy all planning was kept at a high strategic level, there being great faith in the officers who would have to implement the plans as being more than capable tactically. There was therefore little planning on the details of what the Eastern Fleet would do in the event of war, the document only laid down the instructions to harass any invasions where possible and the absolute necessity of avoiding unfavourable fleet engagements until reinforced. The concessions towards the protection of Hong Kong were the deployment of additional light forces (Torpedo boats and other such craft) to bolster the 'stay behind' section of China Station and the reinforcing Hong Kong's existing fleet of 'O', 'P' and 'R' class submarines with the new 'T' class.

    vCM5jI1.jpg

    HMS Triton, lead ship of the 'T' class. Originally intended to be a copy of the older 'P' class, hence the original name 'Repeat Ps', the design evolved to meet the changing strategic role of submarines in the East. With an emphasis on sinking warships, not merchant vessels, the design emphasised long range and maximum forward fire-power, sporting ten forward tubes but none to aft. The design was as much about deterrent as combat effectiveness, their purpose being to show a British commitment to defending Hong Kong and to force any Japanese advance to move slowly and with caution, providing the delay Britain would need to get the main fleet into position. On those terms the design must be considered a failure, while Japan noted the deployment of the class to Hong Kong they did not have any impact of Japanese planning.

    In stark contrast the Army produced detailed operational plans with both an offensive option (Operation Matador, assuming pre-conflict reinforcements allowed a counter-invasion up the Malay peninsula) and a defensive option (Operation Acre, a layered defence designed to hold out with what was available until reinforcements arrived). This top down planning was not due to a lack of faith in officers on the ground, though many in the IGS despaired at the old guard elements 'clogging up the ranks', but reflection of the differences between services. The most obvious example was terrain, irrelevant for the navy but vital for the army; a good operation had to work with the landscape not against it. The IGS, in contrast to the Naval Staff, thus felt that time spent planning in advance and studying the problem would reap significant benefits in war time. The finalised Army document came down to the two detailed operational plans for Malaya, recommendations for fortifications in Hong Kong and expanding the garrison forces in both locations. The IGS made it very clear that even if they got all they asked for Hong Kong could not resist a long siege, all their plans only aimed to hold out until relief arrived within two months. On that basis the fortifications for Hong Kong were accepted, becoming the "Gin Drinker's Line" along the New Territories, but the cost of the garrison expansion was baulked at. The compromise decision was an expansion of the local forces, The Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps and the The Malay Regiment, the former was re-organised as The Hong Kong Regiment (The Volunteers) and re-equipped with modern weaponry while the latter saw it's ranks expanded with the authorisation of a second battalion. These forces, still somewhat short of what the IGS would have preferred, were considered an affordable compromise by a cabinet looking to avoid expensive long term commitments. If they would be sufficient for their intended role was a different question.

    In all this planning there is the conspicuous absence of any Dominion involvement, quite simply at sea they didn't have the forces to meaningfully contribute while on land the commitment of large numbers of troops overseas in peacetime was, to put it mildly, politically inadvisable. However in the air things were different, a significant aerial presence could be deployed with a fraction of the manpower and cost of an infantry force, particularly if operating for an RAF airfield with RAF ground crew and support staff. Thus while the land and sea portions of the conference attracted little Dominion involvement, beyond approval from Australia and New Zealand that their concerns had been noted, the aerial portion would be far more of an 'All Empire' effort.

    --
    Notes.

    Short but hopefully sweet. Game effects are a land fortress in Hong Kong, (probably a waste of IC but it did happen OTL and I'm trying to make some mistakes.), laying down a few T-class subs (almost definitely a waste of IC for the UK, see above) and one militia division each for Hong Kong and Singapore in addition to their existing garrison. The Army is in the middle of it's reform process and, more importantly, everyone still things the Fleet is the key to winning against Japan so land forces suffer accordingly.

    On the air side I'm still struggling with quite why the RAAF picked the NA-16 (Wirraway), I'm just not sure why they wanted a two seater low winged trainer when they didn't have any front line low winged aircraft? It's making writing that part quite tricky. Unless anyone knows why I'll just have to make a best guess.
     
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    Chapter LXXVI: Family Meeting Part IV - A Matter of Family Pride.
  • Chapter LXXVI: Family Meeting Part IV - A Matter of Family Pride.

    As we consider the aerial portions of the Conference there is one question that must be answered before all others; Why were the Dominions keen on involvement at all? The costs were not insignificant, especially given the fragile recovery and stretched budgets, and there was a world of difference between rallying to the Empire at war and committing to an extended peace time deployment. The answer can be found in the the successes, both military and political, of the Royal Australian Air Force during the Abyssinian War.

    The relatively modest force sent had out-performed it's British counterpart for much of the early stages of the war, forging itself a strong reputation with friend and foe alike. These military feats had bestowed upon the Australian government a string of advantages, not least a strong position at the Imperial conference and a substantial boost in the opinion polls. While the latter concentrated the minds of many a politician it was the former that exercised the minds of the more statesman like thinkers. The RAAF experience showed was that a meaningful air force was within reach, one that could work with it's British parent service on almost equal terms. This was a goal both Empire loyalists and independence seekers in the Dominions could support, if perhaps for different reasons.

    Having covered the positive of the RAAF's war we should also consider the negatives, the successes not being entirely welcomed by the Australian government. If the RAAF's performance had caused embarrassed consternation for the British Air Ministry, that was as nothing compared to the reaction of their Australians counterparts. The Australian Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, had sent out a political gesture but got back conquering heroes with a literally sky high profile and a long, expensive, shopping list. While modernisation of the RAAF had been on the agenda pre-war, it had been as much with an eye to the industrial and commercial aspects as the military arguments. Post war, particularly after the heroic return of the aircraft and their pilots, public opinion swung behind re-armament as an end in itself. For a government looking to cash in on the military successes of the war and benefit in a 'Kahki Election' that meant giving the military at least some of what it wanted, regardless of tightly budgeted pre-war plans. On balance though the political positives were felt to more than outweighed the financial costs, and were enough to encourage other Dominion governments to look more carefully at their own air forces.

    8CXWhBV.jpg

    The Westland Wapiti, backbone of the Royal Australian Air Force during the Abyssinian War. Though relatively young by any other standard, even the oldest models were less than ten years old, the rapid pace of aircraft development had left them on the verge on obsolescence. This led to the slightly unusual scene of the returning pilots demanding immediate replacements for the planes that they had just flown to victory. In fairness however the arrival of the RAF's new Blenheims and Wellesleys had fundamentally out-classed the Wapiti in most, though not all, roles. More seriously the RAAF was very much aware it had only been the almost complete absence of Italian fighters or competence air-defence that had allowed such success, against a better calibre of opponent it was all too obvious 1920s biplanes would not be enough.

    As one would expect Australia and New Zealand were the keenest on the initiative, being nearest to Japan they were closest to the biggest military threat facing the Empire. At the other end of the spectrum Prime Minister Smuts made it clear that, despite his own keenness on Imperial co-operation, South Africa's lingering domestic issues forced his hand and Imperial Defence would have to remain an 'At war only' issue for the short term. That left Canada where the situation was quite different from that in Britain and the other Dominions. Quite simply the Abyssinian War had had little impact on most Canadians; the Royal Canadian Navy had roused itself into energetic anti-submarine patrols, until it was confirmed the Italian Navy was indeed bottled up in the Mediterranean, and the government did mobilise, calling up the navy and army reservists. However these units were soon stood down when it became apparent there could be no role for them in the war and the navy returned to port with no Italians to hunt, at which point the only Canadians involved in the war were the official observers, newspaper reporters and those workers enjoying the upswing in British orders to fuel the war. The political situation was therefore somewhat unfavourable for the government; despite Canada having technically won she had not fought, thus there was little 'Khaki' poll boost, indeed support actually dropped as the Anglophile section of the electorate punished their leaders for failing to support Britain.

    This outcome was somewhat unfair on the Canadian government, Prime Minister Mackenzie King would never be the keenest of Imperialist but he had supported what he believed was an entirely 'just' war of self defence. It was not lack of will or motive that had stopped Canadian involvement, but lack of means to do so. The mobilisation had exposed the decidedly poor state of Canada's armed forces, while patriotic fervour had ensured the reservists turned up when the call was issued, there had been precious little modern equipment to give them. The non-permanent militia battalions were issued with equipment their Great War forebears would have though obsolete, while the RCAF's 'wartime' squadrons existed mostly on paper. The Royal Canadian Navy, by managing to get to sea and conduct their wartime role of trade protection and submarine hunting, was by far the best performing service but was not immune to problems. The quick tempo of war time operations soon told on the ancient 'S' class destroyers HMCS Vancouver and HMCS Champlain, hastening their paying off and leaving a gaping hole in an already small fleet.

    While these performances were something of an embarrassment for the government King had the additional problem that the war was just too short. Barely had the government begun the slow, and expensive, task of bringing the military up to scratch than news of the first victories filtered back from North Africa. By the time Canada felt ready to begin talking with Britain about a military contribution the war was clearly in it's final stages, making such a contribution moot and denying King the possibility of a popularity-recovering gesture. Fortunately King did have available the entirely accurate justification of blaming the problems on the savage defence cuts of his predecessor, Richard Bennett's government having slashed spending in the early years of the Depression. While this was effective in the short term King was well aware that unless he kept his promises of increasing defence spending and better co-operation with Britain the short term polling damage could well become permanent.

    Committed to spending the problem became where to direct the extra resources and how to demonstrate co-operation with Britain in a way that would be 'useful' to Canada. At the simplest level every service benefited, the breadth of pressures and influence from newspapers and select committees pushed the cabinet towards ensuring all branches benefited. The detail revealed that while funding was indeed spread around, it was not spread evenly, some doing considerably better than others. The 'losers' were undoubtedly the Army, King using the age old political ploy of announcing an existing plan as something new and dressing up a long planned re-organisation as a new initiative. That is not to say things were all bad, the original plan had called for several regiments to be disbanded or amalgamated to consolidate manpower and resources, the new plan instead paid for new equipment and funded a recruitment drive to fill out the empty rank, a most welcome change. The headline news however was slightly more controversial - the mechanisation of the cavalry and the formation of the Canadian Armoured Corps. As in Britain the Canadian General Staff was in favour of the former but somewhat unsure about the later, while there was general consensus on the horse being obsolete how to replace it with was far less clear. The announcement was therefore long on words but short on detail, promising funds for the ubiquitous 'Two Ms' (Mechanisation and Modernisation) but not actually saying how the money would be spent. The Canadian General Staff indicating a preference to wait until the results of Britain's post-war review to see what lessons Canada could learn before spending their windfall, a money saving position King was more than happy to go along with.

    AsjWFwf.jpg

    The Carden Loyd MkVI tankette. Though little more than a tracked machine gun it had achieved significant export success and was the only armoured vehicle in Canada at the time, a dozen equipping the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicle School since 1930. The 1936 review saw the future of Canadian armour at cross-roads; the tank lobby and it's indefatigable advocate, the then Colonel Frank Worthington, pushing for all armoured regiments while the mainstream opinion pressed for a more conservative, infantry led approach. Before the Abyssinian War the mainstream had been winning with their plans for three type of infantry battalion (rifle, machine gun and tank) with the tank subservient to the infantryman and the cavalry converted to armoured cars. However with actual combat experience to draw on the tank lobby forced a delay, holding off until the British 'lessons learned' could be applied to the Canadian situation. Thus not for the first or last time decisions made in London would shape Canadian defence policy.

    At sea the Royal Canadian Navy had very high hopes, given Canada's position and dependence on exports their mission of trade protection gave them a strong position in relation to the 'useful' strand of King's thinking. The Navy could also be certain as to what to spend it's money on, the big post-Abyssinian naval debates were frankly irrelevant for the RCN; they would not be getting either battleships or aircraft carriers so the relative superiority of one over the other was of almost purely academic interest. Finally the early paying off of the 'S' class destroyers gave them a very imminent claim on the money just to maintain their current position, let alone any expansion. On the negative side though was politics, even under the most ambitious expansion plans the RCN would be far smaller than the nearest Empire naval force, the Royal Navy's America and West Indies Station. Therefore on a 'bang per diplomatic buck' measure the RCN was at a considerable disadvantage to it's main rival in the review, the Royal Canadian Air Force.

    The final outcome of these competing arguments was a naval settlement better than the Army received, in pure cash terms at least, but far from what the Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Nelles had asked for. Nelles had hoped that Canada's previous naval purchases, the two River class destroyers HMCS Saguenay and Skeena, had set a precedent and that the RCN would be procuring new build vessels instead of old Royal Navy types. Unfortunately for the Naval Staff economic reality and political necessity insisted otherwise and a delegation was duly despatched to London to look into purchasing ex-RN inter-war standard destroyers for Canadian service. The big plus for Nelles though was that rather than just the two replacements they needed, the delegation was instructed to return with half a dozen vessels, including a large flotilla leader, enabling the RCN to put a 'proper' squadron to sea for the first time since the 1920s. On the co-operation front there were also to be discussion over the permanent detachment of at least one RCN destroyer to the America and West Indies Station to work on the anti-piracy and smuggling patrols, both problems Canada was keen to see confined to the Caribbean.

    That left the Royal Canadian Air Force, a force very much in transition at the time due to long planned institutional changes. The force had been almost entirely civilian orientated for much of it's brief existence, indeed it was only in early 1936 that it became a purely military force and was able to hand off it's fire-fighting, forestry patrol and other such duties to the newly formed Department of Transport. Years of focus on non-military missions had left the RCAF with a cadre of technically skilled pilots and ground crew but absolutely no experience of actual combat operations and a dearth of suitable aircraft. The first step had been forming purely military squadrons, as opposed to the 'dual-use' or pure civilian squadrons that had gone before. The Air Staff had signalled their ambition by forming Army Co-operation, Bomber and Torpedo Bomber squadrons, indicating their desire for an all-role air force. This however had been the easy part, the harder question was which aircraft to equip with, a decision interrupted by the outbreak of war and the despatching of as many officers as possible to the theatre as 'observers', the hope being they would gain the experience necessary to help transform the force. When these observers returned they found themselves in an enviable position; the RCAF was, thanks to the example of her sister service the RAAF, politically favoured and would have the all funds she so desperately needed. This made Canada the only Dominion to attend the aerial portion of the conference with both an open mind and the funding to carry through any decision. There was however a gap between the Canadian airmen keen to make the RCAF a world class, active air force and their political masters who took a wider, though less well focused view. This made the discussions between Australia and Britain on Far East deployments and procurement the subject of intense Canadian interest.

    ---
    Notes:
    The Canadian section is a bit of a detour I know, but after I'd written it I could hardly discard it. Even if it is somewhat larger than I first intended.

    So the Canadian Armoured Corps comes around ~4 years early, as does mechanising the cavalry (there were still alarming numbers of Canadian horse soldiers in 1940). However they're still not sure how to buy tanks so are waiting for an idea from Britain, no guarantee they'll slavishly follow it of course but Britain has at least used tanks in combat so it would be quite foolish to utterly ignore such experience. The 1936 re-org did indeed plan for disbanding and amalgamations to try and concentrate manpower, and formalising infantry-tank regiments. TTL the Army could probably argue for recruiting a few more men instead and waiting to make the correct choice on tanks. Game effects will make the Canadian AI pumping out INF divisions a bit more realistic, on tanks who knows?

    The RCN gets a slight boost, not what they were looking for but at least they start expansion earlier than OTL which will help (if they keep up the pace). As with the Army they're probably going to study the British war record, particularly the failure to sink any subs. Not sure what they'll do about it but they will look at it.

    Piracy and smuggling in the Caribbean? My thoughts are that an extra few years of Prohibition means an ever stronger Mafia and general criminal underworld, more specifically I has an interesting scenario based around the growth in water borne smuggling (gangs far from the Mexican or Canadian border trying to 'cut out the middle man' and import booze directly) escalating into piracy as Mob wars expanded onto the seas, helped by an impoverished USN being confined to base and massive bribery of the US Coast Guard. Sadly with Landon as President I had to cut that idea, though as it's now States Rights Prohibition repeal not the OTL version I'm hopeful of saving some part of it in a different form.

    The RCAF was indeed in a terrible state and only started to emerge in the late 1930s. It was pretty much a civilian operation until late 1936 OTL so no real change in re-org changes, the big difference being King waving around a cheque book for political and domestic reasons. As with the Army I can see the Canadian Air Staff waiting before making a final decision, King can't back down from spending commitments so they can wait till post-conference to decide what to buy and where to put it.

    On interesting point, Canada was not without it's own 'built it yourself' approach to trainers (see the equally 1937 CCF Maple Leaf) and trying to expand beyond licence manufacture. Could be an interesting three-way scuffle between London, Canberra and Ottawa over the 'who builds what where' issue. ;)
     
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    Chapter LXXVII: Family Meeting Part V - The Best Laid Plans.
  • Chapter LXXVII: Family Meeting Part V - The Best Laid Plans.

    The Australian government's pre-war plans had been for a specially formed private company, the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC), to construct licensed Australianised version of the next generation of aircraft and thus develop a modern domestic aircraft industry. With a bomber clearly beyond the existing industrial base, the industry mainly consisting of assembling imported kits, the government had despatched a technical team to trawl the world for a suitable trainer/general purpose aircraft while negotiations about the formation of CAC continued. The men of the technical mission were given the public brief to find a balance between ease of manufacture, performance, availability and design maturity. The demand for a proven monoplane design ruled out the available British options, which were either biplanes or still at the prototype stage at the time, so the search had therefore turned to Europe and America, eventually selecting the North American NA-16 as the most appropriate aircraft.

    That at least was the public version of events, in private the Australian government hoped to develop the new aircraft into a design for export, targeting the RAF trainer market and other Dominions looking for general purpose aircraft. While an ambitious plan with considerable economic and domestic logic behind it it had terminal political and military flaws. The military flaws were simple, while the NA-16 was a passable trainer, indeed after a major re-design and a new engine it would become the USAAC's fine T-6 Texan, it's anaemic Wright Whirlwind engine gave it decidedly poor performance, even for a general purpose aircraft. While the proposed fitting of the moderately more powerful Pratt & Whitney R-1340 engine the NA-16 would have helped somewhat, it would still have been slower than it's contemporaries, not least the Gloster Gladiator and the Hawker Hart/Fury biplanes. That however, was not the biggest problem, merely being a poor design does not disqualify an aircraft from government purchase as countless air forces will testify. The key problem was politics, quite simply trying to sell an Australian produced version of an American design to the Royal Air Force was never even slightly possible. With defence spending viewed as a zero-sum game (any Australian production was 'stolen' from a British factory), the Shadow Factories providing plenty of spare capacity and no shortage of excellent indigenous British trainers it is hardly surprising London was opposed to the scheme from the beginning.

    That this reaction came as a surprise to the Australian delegation to the conference is a testament to the optimism of those involved and their exceptionally rose-tinted view of the world. In a similar vein they were also shocked that their fellow Dominions had no intention of buying the decidedly ropey NA-16 and angering Britain just to help Australian aero industrialisation. These discoveries left the scheme in tatters, the cost (both political and financial) of the production line could not possibly be recovered from a mere 40 aircraft and continuing down an 'American' route undermined the government's aim of very public Imperial defence co-operation. That said too much had been politically invested to completely abandon aero industrialisation, it had become a key policy and to back down from it would have severely damaged the government's credibility. Fortunately for those involved, and the cause of Imperial defence, the aerial plans for the Far East would provide a route past the impasse.

    For the Far East the Air Staff identified four inter-connected roles the air force would need to carry out, three of them the moment war started and so requiring pre-positioned squadrons. The tasks were maritime reconnaissance, subsequent naval strikes on any ships found, ground support to remove any invaders that did land and fighter cover for the previous. While the removal of any landed invaders could be dealt with by reinforcements from Britain after the reinforcement fleet had arrived, the remaining tasks would form a key part of the delaying operations needed to buy time for the fleet to arrive. Indeed some in the Air Staff believed a strong enough RAF presence could stop the IJN dead through massed torpedo strikes, however such thinkers, despite showing the desired 'independent mission' mindset, were still in a very small minority on the Air Staff. The recommendations therefore were for a strong balanced force of reconnaissance aircraft, torpedo bombers and fighters capable of operation from both Hong Kong and Singapore. The main strength was to be concentrated on the Malay peninsula for space reasons, though the report also requested airfield expansion in the region to support a greater force once aerial reinforcements arrived. Somewhat controversially the report also asked for airfield construction on Borneo to be considered, the hope being to push back the perimeter around Singapore by providing forward bases for earlier spotting and striking any enemy naval force. All told the Air Staff wanted just over four hundred modern frontline aircraft in theatre as well as the countless training and support aircraft that went with such a deployment.

    PGRE6n1.jpg

    The Short Singapore, a four engined push-pull flying boat that had been in gestation for almost five years prior to entering production. This extended development combined with an already conservative design had produced an aircraft that was considered obsolescent even before it entered production in 1935. As a biplane it had fallen victim to Minister for Air Churchill's cull, but not before several squadrons scattered from Gibraltar to Singapore had been equipped with it. The question of what to replace these aircraft with would occupy the Air Staff in the months following the Imperial Conference.

    Such a requirement was a vast increase over the current RAF Far East Command, which at the time consisted mainly of Vickers Vilderbeest biplane torpedo bombers and various flavours of flying boats for reconnaissance. Moreover while the majority of the new aircraft were to be bombers of some form or another the Air Staff also requested almost two hundred fighters, the first time they had proposed permanently deploying fighters outside the Metropolitan RAF. It was, however, the cost of the deployment not it's composition that exercised the politicians interest, the almost ten fold increase in aircraft numbers would mean an over ten fold increase in maintenance cost; modern multi-engine aircraft were more expensive to maintain than ancient biplanes. Then there was the little matter of procuring the new aircraft, training their crews and ground support and then deploying the new units to the Far East and building the new airfields, fuel dumps and defences. It should therefore come as no surprise that the government baulked at the cost and immediately began looking for ways to cut the cost, which brings us back to the Australian government.

    The Air Staff proposed the fighter contingent consist of Hawker Hurricane MkIIs with the 'hot climate' air filter and long range fuel tanks tested in North Africa. As has been previously discussed the Hurricane was a relatively basic design with somewhat 'old fashioned' construction methods, two factors the RAAF contingent had noted during the war. The Hurricane was therefore perfect for CAC as it was easy to 'tool up' for and well within Australian industrial capabilities, moreover having served over Malta and in North Africa it was a 'proven' design with all the features the government had requested. The problem was that Britain was far from keen in seeing Australia starting to manufacture it's own aircraft, particularly not brand new designs such as the Hurricane and it's cutting edge Merlin engine. The solution was a trade-off, Britain would drop her objections if Australia would base some of her newly built Hurricanes in Malaya. The upcoming Vickers Wellington, the RAF's latest attempt at a 'general purpose' bomber, was the final incentive needed to secure Canberra's agreement; offered for Australian production on the same terms as the Hurricane it would give Australia the modern twin engined bomber she had sought and save the RAF the expense of basing quite so many bombers in the Far East. The deal suited both parties, while Britain 'lost' the sales and had to concede Australia's right to some form of aero industry the Treasury felt the long term saving in defence expenditure more than out-weighed such concerns. Conversely the Australian government gained a foothold on the aero industry ladder, with the promise of British assistance for moving up to the higher rungs, at the cost of defence commitments for the RAAF.

    The twist in the tail would come from the other Dominions, Canada and New Zealand having noted the Australian's negotiations adjusted their own positions accordingly. New Zealand, who's own defence review under the seconded RAF officer Wing Commander Cochrane had recommended an expansion of the RNZAF, volunteered to contribute a squadron of Hurricanes to Malaya and, to the delight of Canberra, announced they intended to acquire the airframes from the new CAC factory. This surprise move was essentially a cost saving move by the New Zealand government, quite aside from the reduced shipping costs Wellington expected (and duly received) a significant discount as the first 'foreign' purchaser from CAC. The move did however confirm all the worse fears of many in Westminster and the British aviation industry and was used by the British Government to insist on a re-jigging of the make-up of CAC. The key change was forcing out General Motors-Holden and substituting in several large British defence firms. While some of these firms already had a presence in Australia (the vast Vickers-Armstrongs group owned the Cockatoo Island Docks & Engineering Company and de Havilland Australia had been established in the late 1920s) the main Hurricane firms, Hawker Siddeley and Rolls-Royce, did not and were duly 'encouraged' to set up Australian subsidiaries. These new firms, which in hindsight were the forerunners of the later Empire wide defence concerns, ensured British interests would remain well represented in CAC and were accepted in Australia as a price that had to be paid; overseas expertise would be required and it was though better to partner with British firms than be dependent on Americans such as GM.

    bopRnch.jpg

    The North American Aviation's NA-16, the first 'might of been' of the Australian aero industry and certainly one of it's shadier corners. The selection was controversial at the time; the presence of General Motors-Holden as a founder member of CAC prompted many to comment on the suspicious coincidence of CAC picking a North American Aviation (NAA) design, NAA being owned by General Motors. These questions only intensified as the NAA 'experts' indicated a surprisingly large amount of work had to be done by GM-Holden using expatriate Americans or imported American equipment. The final nail in the coffin was GM-Holden's fierce resistance to changing over to the Hurricane, with the original export plan shot to pieces and a good deal from Britain on the table persisting with the NA-16 would clearly not have been a wise move for Australia. With their US connections already being unpopular with much of the public taking such a patently 'unpatriotic' line only made it easier for GM-Holden to be forced out of CAC and replaced with the new British firms.

    The Canadian position was somewhat more complicated, Canada already possessed an aero industry industry capable of licence building not only fighters and light aircraft but flying boats as well. The Canadian delegation was therefore less interested in industrial incentives to start an industry, preferring instead ways to migrate even further up the food chain towards larger aircraft and even domestic designs. As with the Antipodeans the Vickers Wellington was the design Canada had it's eye on, the long-range and general purpose nature of the design making it a good multi-role aircraft, an attractive option for an air force with few airframes. After the Australian precedent, and fearing the possibility of American firms increasing their presence in Canada, the British government felt it had little option but to agree. Taking as it's model the Australian CAC Britain did manage to ensure the Canadian version, Canadian Associated Aircraft (CAA), included Canadian Vickers and de Havilland Canada instead of the American based firms such as Fairchilds. While Prime Minister King was less than pleased with such conditions, a US firm would have furthered his hopes of stronger American-Canadian ties, he could not push too hard lest he drive Britain out completely, with potentially fatal electoral consequences. In the shorter term the RCAF Air Staff, worried about too much 'jam tomorrow' and not enough actual orders being placed, managed to secure purchases of both the Hawker Hurricane (from the British factories, much to London's relief) and the 'Arctic' version of the Handley Page Hampden as sold to Sweden. Finally the RCAF announced their desire to station a squadron of the new Hurricanes in Singapore until such time as the RAAF's new aircraft were available to replace them. This last move was the compromise between an Air Staff keen for an overseas deployment to gain experience and a government equally keen to avoid an expensive commitment in South East Asia. Limiting the presence until Australia was ready gave the RCAF time to pick up doctrines and procedures from a 'live' RAF station while re-assuring King it would only be a temporary and limited expense, the poll boost of 'Supporting Imperial Defence' also doubtless helping his decision. For Britain it filled a defence gap, allowed Whitehall to send less forces East (producing a not insignificant saving) and, amongst the more experienced hands, lit the hope that Canada would find it as hard to pull back from a defence commitment, even an explicitly temporary one, as everyone else did.

    Before leaving the Far East it is worth covering the 'Going forward' section of the aerial plan as it highlights the still considerable gap between the Air Staff and the Ministry of Defence Co-ordination. Both bodies started from the same problem, range, but then went in distinctly different directions. The root problem was the Far East was a far larger theatre than Europe; London to Berlin was barely 600 miles, while Singapore to Hong Kong was 1,600 miles and Singapore to Tokyo was 3,300 miles, only slightly less than the distance across the Atlantic from London to New York. Such distances were beyond even the proposed four engined heavies, let alone anything actually in RAF service. For the MoDC the solution was forward air bases, not just the Borneo scheme they pushed through but plans for capturing Japanese islands and getting basing rights in the Philippines. Conversely the RAF Air Staff, reluctant to rely on any other service for their operations, turned their attention to in-flight refuelling and the work of both the Royal Aircraft Establishment and Alan Cobham's Flight Refuelling Limited, the later having spent much of the summer of 1936 engaged in highly successful trials for Imperial Airways new Trans-Atlantic Short Empire mail service. Away from the Air Staff's focus on strategic bombing the two bodies were able to find more common ground, essentially agreeing on the need for a wholesale overhaul of almost the entire Coastal Command inventory. For the reconnaissance role the problems with the Avro Anson had been identified shortly after it entered service and the cancelling of the Supermarine Stranraer had left a gap for a large general-purpose (anti-submarine, convoy escort and reconnaissance) flying boats. The connected matter of land based torpedo bombers was complicated by the transfer of the Fleet Air Arm to Royal Navy control and the tendency of the Air Staff to tack on a torpedo capability to aircraft designed for strategic bombing. Given the difficulty of attacking a fully screened fleet the need for a dedicated RAF torpedo bomber, compared to a 'general purpose' bomber shoe-horned into the role, was recognised. Finally the need for a longer ranged fighter was noted, despite the additional external fuel tanks the Hurricane lacked the range required for the vast size of the theatre while the new Spitfire was even shorter legged.

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    The Handley Page Hampden TB Mk I, the Coastal Command version of the Hampden equipped with a single Mk XII 18" torpedo carried in a fixed open bomb bay. Despite the performance hit from the open bomb bay, the poor accuracy caused by the somewhat improvised release mechanism and the general feeling that a four man crew was overly elaborate for a torpedo bomber the aircraft was warmly welcomed by both Coastal and Far East Command as a welcome change from the slow biplanes they were used to. For Bomber Command the move was less welcome, the bomber boys having assumed the entire run of Hampdens was for their use only. However even the most optimistic strategic advocate had to concede that heavy bombers would be very little use in defending Singapore or Hong Kong from naval attack, undermining any opposition before it began.

    In the short term there was little option but for the Anson, Short Singapore and Saro London to continue in the reconnaissance role along side the Fairey Swordfish and torpedo-equipped Hampden for anti-ship work. While the long term solution was new aircraft, something that prompted a flurry of operational requirements and Air Ministry specifications, the Air Staff felt the need for an interim solution through modifying current design and altering existing specifications. While many changes were focused on 'tropicalisation' for hot and humid operation there were a few key alterations worth mentioning. Beginning with the Vickers Wellington, the use of Merlin engines as an option was mandated a the request of the RAAF, as was being torpedo capable; the RAAF's smaller budget making mulit-role aircraft all but compulsory. As an interim fix to the reconnaissance problem a Bristol proposal for a long-ranged version of the new Blenheim bomber was accepted, while the Air Ministry resolved to finally decide the long drawn out saga of the R.2/33 flying boat specification and pick a winner for production. Turning to fighters the tenderers for F.37/35, the twin engined cannon fighter spec, were instructed to ensure the long range portion of the requirement was met, either in the main design or a submitted variant, as it was now non-negotiable. Almost as an after-thought a tender was put out for converting the fixed fuel tanks on the Hurricane to far safer 'drop tanks', no-one in the Air Force being happy about Hurricanes going into battle with fuel vapour filled and highly explosive containers still attached to them.

    The results of these changes, the details on the specifications and the beginning of the long running conflict over RAF/FAA torpedo bombers will be discussed later, for now it is time to leave the Far East and Imperial Defence and turn our attention to the Amsterdam Conference. After wrestling with the unknowns of Japan and the Orient there were many in the government and Foreign Office secretly looking forward to a return to the familiar stomping ground of Europe. The conference would remind these gentlemen that familiar was not the same as 'simple' or 'predictable'.

    --
    Notes.

    Short regular updates, what on earth are they? ;) So we finally leave the Far East and the RAF has joined the 'If Japan's the enemy we'll give you ways to spend money' bandwagon. The CAC comes out as probably the best compromise, no-one gets what they wanted and everyone gets something. Ohh and it might have killed Holden cars post-war, but I'm sure that'll have no impact...

    The target of 400 aircraft for Far East Command is about the OTL request (varies between 3-500 depending on source), just the request brought forward considerably and slightly more integrated with the rest of the defence plan. Short term they'll only get some of what they want, but they will at least be modern aircraft. Will Canada be able to pull out it's commitment? Probably depends on the international situation at the time, if Japan is still quiet King can probably pull the RCAF out with little fuss when the ANZAF (Australia New Zealand Air Force) comes to replace them.

    Strange as it seems the RAF had indeed never based fighters outside Britain permanently till the mid 1930s, any deployments were temporary and only during wartime or international tensions. The fairly strong reasoning being there were never any hostile aircraft based nearby, or at least none the RAF was ever bothered about. TTL if everyone else is taking Japan seriously the RAF has to, if only to grab the money available from the Treasury, so Hurricanes and Hampdens head for Singapore. On which note Coastal Command is still trying to figure out what it wants; flying boats, GP bombers, pure recon or multi-role. But more on that later.

    Finally there's a great deal hanging on the Wellington to actually be a 'General Purpose' heavy bomber/long range recon/torpedo bomber/everything else aircraft. All roles it managed OTL so that should be OK, as would Merlin engines (I can't see CAC maintaing two engine production lines so they will want to re-use the line used for the Hurricane engines). The torpedo carrying Hampdens are pretty much OTL, Coastal Command had them several years later after Bomber Command was done with them (and forced to hand them over).

    Game effects;

    The existing TAC at Singapore gets upgraded and a new TAC and two INTs are sent out to join it. Australia gets three new IC in Melbourne for the CAC works and gets an INT added to her build queue. Canada gets an INT and a TAC in the queue and has just be given the blueprints for a few air doctrines as the RCAF squadron in Singapore 'learns lessons'.
     
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    Chapter LXXVIII: A Way with Words Part I - The Rhineland Question.
  • Chapter LXXVIII: A Way with Words Part I - The Rhineland Question.

    For connoisseurs of the darker arts of international diplomacy the Amsterdam Conference has much to recommend it, the full range of deceptions and misdirections being employed by participants on both sides. The prevalence of such techniques was undoubtedly helped by the somewhat confused agenda, the stated intent of 'A re-negotiation of the Versailles Treaty' covered such a multitude of topics that days of low level talks would be needed merely to agree on what could even be discussed. This problem was complicated by the unintentionally 'global' nature of the conference; despite the key topics being essentially European in nature (the Rhineland Question and the war in Spain topping the list) the presence of both Japan and the United States prompted the other, smaller, Versailles victors to send a delegation to Amsterdam. Thus protocol and national pride turned focused negotiations into a full blown diplomatic conference with delegates from everywhere from Siam to Ecuador present.

    We begin with the Rhineland Question, the most urgent of the two key issues at the Conference and for many the more important; failure to reach agreement would have been seen by many delegates as a possible precursor to open conflict. In reality this was never a likely outcome, neither Germany nor France was ready for war and, somewhat ironically, both sides agreed that French troops should leave the area. For France the matter was essentially financial, even if the political will had been there to maintain an occupation in the face of growing domestic and international opposition the economy was buckling under the strain. Though the relief in the money markets at the defeat of the Popular Front had brought the economy time, it had not fixed the underlying problems. The cost of maintaing the force in the Rhineland (and the attendant 'High Alert' status of much of the armed forces on the border and in reserve) was contributing to a ballooning budget deficit. With a strong Franc policy one of the few things uniting the fragmented parliament devaluation was out of the question, thus the country was burning through it's hard currency and gold reserves trying to prop up an ever weakening currency. With the budget spiralling out of control and reserves running low France quite simply had to do a deal before the country ran out of money, putting the French delegation in a decidedly weak position to bargain from, the only glimmer of comfort being that the problems were still mostly private.

    If the French position was bad then that of the Germans was scarcely much better. On the positive side despite being technically at fault by making the first move in the Rhineland Germany enjoyed considerable international sympathy and, as we have seen above, was in the stronger long term situation; Merely agreeing to the status quo for a few months would see France forced to pull out or risk a full blown economic catastrophe. However as the assembled delegates would all agree (in private at least) international goodwill was rarely worth anything in high stakes diplomacy while a long term advantage was of precious use to a government under short term pressure. The French reaction had been a political disaster for the Nazi party in general and Hitler in particular, the stark clash between the rhetoric of a strong resurgent Germany and French boots marching though the Rhineland had stirred up discontent bordering on anger across Germany. Combined with economic policies that were causing effective wage drops for most workers it was taking the best efforts of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, liberally helped by the Gestapo for truly 'un-patriotic cases', to keep a lid on public unease. Hitler therefore needed a deal and, as a measure of how important the matter was and the pressure he was beginning to feel, it was the experienced Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath who was sent, not the politically favoured but less successful Joachim von Ribbentrop.

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    After a string of successful trade deals and being proved correct on many of the riskier mistakes of foreign policy, Baron Konstantin von Neurath was in the ascendency. As the proverbial safe pair of hands he was trusted with the high stakes negotiations over the Rhineland Question while the unpredictable and tainted Ribbentrop was relegated to the 'Ambassador at Large' role in the conference. Ironically this division of skills was probably completely wrong; the blustering Ribbentrop offended almost everyone he met at the soirées and receptions, damaging Germany's reputation and undermining any sympathy the diplomatic community had for her cause. Conversely Neurath was not suited to high stakes bluffing and was out-manoeuvred by Flandin's deceptions. Swapping the two men may have produced far better results, Ribbentrop more than capable of matching Flandind bluff for bluff while the diplomatic circuit was Neurath's natural home where he could have cultivated support against French 'aggression'

    Unfortunately for Germany Neurath's presence ensured his opposite number, the French Foreign Minister Pierre Flandin, would lead the French delegation; diplomatic protocol demanded equality of rank in such talks. With both sides needing a deal the negotiations came down to who could convince the other they were actually in a position of strength, a task that favoured the flashier style of Flandin over the respectable realism of Neurath. In a display of bluster and bravado Flandin was able to convince the German delegation that France would only accept a return to the status quo, any alteration would have to be purely cosmetic and only for domestic consumption. The final agreement left the Rhineland in effect de-militarised, while Germany was permitted to keep paramilitary troops in the area no heavy weapons, artillery, tanks or fortifications were allowed. On the thorny question of compliance the German delegation was left in no doubt that France would swiftly re-occupy the area if Germany attempted to even bend the agreement, another Flandin bluff but an effective one. While Hitler correctly suspected Germany could have got a better deal, his own foreign policy failures and the disaster of Ribbentrops charm offensive ("Light on charm, heavy on offence" was one British diplomat's damning assessment) pushed him into accepting the deal and instructing Goebbels to publicise the "heroic" SA paramilitaries marching back to the Rhineland.

    The world wide reaction to the issue was decided much as one would suspect, the rights and wrong of the matter almost a distraction from the guiding principle of politics and the complex web of alliances and pacts. The New Entente naturally supported France, anything that kept German attention in the West and on France's border not theirs was popular in the capitals of Eastern Europe. Germany's closest partner, Yugoslavia, kept quiet; while the nation was drifting towards the German orbit the French lobby still had considerable influence. With no direct threat to Yugoslavia and divided domestic opinion silence seemed the best option for politicians with more immediate issues to face. In their silence they were joined by their fellow European neutrals Greece, Romania and significantly Belgium, their own preference for neutrality prompting those nations to keep their own counsel. It was the Italian led Three Powers Pact who's support was most sought, Germany naturally hoping her fellow fascists would act as a counter-weight to the New Entente while France hoped to resurrect the Franco-Italian Agreement and surround Germany on all sides. For Mussolini the choice was tough, diplomatic silence was obviously out of the question for such a bombastic man so he had to back one side over the other. Without the distractions of Africa the European situation became much more important, in particular territorial ambitions over Yugoslavia and the Italian 'sphere of influence'. This tipped the balance towards France, German ambitions over Austria were well known and incompatible with Italian influence while with Yugoslavia drifting towards Germany, and away from France, the best chance to reclaim the Dalmatian coast came through backing France not Germany. Thus, in exchange for France guaranteeing the independence of Austria, Italy backed the French solution to the Rhineland Question. For France this was an excellent deal, in exchange for Italian support against Germany they were only required to support something they already agreed with; No forced Anschluss between Germany and Austria. For Italy French support for Austria both re-assured fellow Pact members and helped to ensure their sphere of influence remained intact, not unimportant aims for a country so recently shaken by military defeat.

    Outside of the continent the issue was not considered especially important, the countless delegations from the Americas and Asia following the lead of Japan and the United States in dismissing the issue as a 'European matter'. For many it was not the formal conference but the informal receptions that attracted them, for instance the Siamese delegation's prime concern was gauging the relative strength and weaknesses of Japan, France and Britain to help the nation pick a side as tension in the region grew. At the other end of the spectrum came the Uruguayan diplomats, sent by their authoritarian President Gabriel Terra to seek out the best foreign investment partners and to open negotiations on debt forgiveness. To these gentlemen it appeared Germany had been humbled while France was in the ascendency, an impression heightened by the ineffectual blustering of Ribbentrop as he blundered from mistake to faux par around the conference. Thus we finally come to the British delegation which, to the discomfort of the Foreign Office, had been marginalised during the talks due to the ambiguous position of the British government. With the Entente Cordial long buried the Foreign Office was coming round to the more traditional 'balance of power' view of the continent that worried France was too strong and Germany too weak. France's humbling of Germany, her growing Eastern European alliances and the ominous Franco-Italian rapprochement did little to calm those concerned by the balance of power. However the logical balance of power option, support for Germany, was not an option; lingering sympathies with France in the Foreign Office, distaste at the German regime and the somewhat ham fisted German demands for the return of 'their' colonies (not least the conspicuous exclusion of those territories that had been transferred to Japan) mitigated against diplomatically supporting Germany.

    Thus it was the more Imperially minded diplomats that prevailed, promoting the option of leaving Europe well alone and concentrating on the Empire and the trade opportunities in South America and elsewhere. While this went against the personal preference of both Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, the lack of any better alternative tied their hands. Quite simply the failure of France to support Britain during the Abyssinian War had left 'Continental' faction with an up-hill fight, continental connections were seen as costing Britain plenty for precious advantage. The cabinet therefore agreed on a return to something closer to 'Splendid Isolation' in preference to cultivating new continental attachments. While popular amongst the public the flaw in the scheme soon became apparent when the drafts of the post-Versailles Treaties were circulated; Britain had no support for continued ship building limits against Germany. For France giving Germany a fleet was considered an acceptable price for keeping a stranglehold over the Rhineland, without the distractions of Italy (courtesy of the Royal Navy) they could concentrate their fleet in the North Sea/Atlantic while trade and supply links to the colonial Empire went through the secure Mediterranean. Italy went along with the deal as a gesture to Germany, Mussolini hoping to keep the German option open should his French gambit not work out. Amongst the other Great Powers the United States was indifferent and Japan positively supported anything that would distract the Royal Navy from the Pacific. Isolated and with little leverage Britain had little choice but to agree, the cabinet reacting to public disquiet over the revelation by boosting naval spending for the 1937 programme.

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    The suspicious speed with which Germany managed to get her new tonnage onto the slipway, keels being laid scant weeks after the Amsterdam Conference, was considered proof by many she had been planning naval expansion all along. Despite the efforts of the Germans to allay British fears, the new battle-cruisers would 'only' have 11" guns for instance, the British government still felt compelled to react with new tonnage for the Royal Navy. With the new King George V class lacking in top speed the Admiralty identified the need for a 'fast battleship' to counter the new German commerce raiders. The final design, along with the French Dunkerques and indeed the German Scharnhorsts would see the distinction between fast battleships and battle-cruisers blurred still further.

    Notes
    ---
    Well that didn't go well for Britain did it? No allies in Europe, growing Franco-Italian relations and facing an unwanted naval distraction from Germany. And they haven't even reached the SCW portion of the conference yet.

    On the Rhineland deal I pondered that one for quite some time. I found Pierre Flandin a decidedly complex character to pin down, though I'm sure Atlantic Friend will point the flaws in my portrayal of him here. ;) However while he would never have gone to war over the Rhineland he was not above bluffing about it (Admittedly it was Britain who he bluffed, but the point still stands). Conversely Neurath was something of a pessimist, his response was usually 'Not possible' as he kept under-rating the power of bluff and the lack of resolve in the West. Thus I think Flandin would chance his arm and, discovering that Neurath wouldn't challenge him over it, keep going until he ended up with the result we see.

    At sea, I think France would probably allow Germany a fleet as a concession, no-one is going to want to push Germany too far in case their bluff is discovered. And with the Regia Marina sunk they can concentrate in the North Sea with their soon to commission Dunkerques while the Med remains safe. Not a good result for Britain, but then Anglo-French relations are far from cordial and getting worse.

    Game Effects;
    The forts Germany starts the 1936 scenario with have been deleted, and they get some garrisons in those provinces. The AI probably wont keep that deployment, but I'll deal with that come wartime.

    Build wise Germany gets a few ships in the queue as does France. Britain gets some new BCs as well when the current builds clear the system. And yes there will be a naval porn update to discuss these new ships. ;)
     
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    Chapter LXXIX: A Way with Words Part II - A Surprise to all Involved.
  • Chapter LXXIX: A Way with Words Part II - A Surprise to all Involved.

    The general attitude to the Spanish Civil War was best summed up a junior diplomats pithy quote "A war everyone wanted to win, but no-one wanted to fight". With international tensions still high over the Rhineland Question Spain was recognised as an obvious flashpoint and not worth risking open warfare or fighting domestic opposition over. This did not mean the war was unimportant, as France's southern flank having a friendly/hostile government in place was a matter of keen interest for many powers, however it did mean that any involvement would fall short of actually sending troops or even official 'volunteers'. Thus Spain's fate became a bargaining chip, a valuable chip certainly, but a chip nevertheless; it's fate determined not by ideology or moral conviction but by the calculations of realpolitik and the demands of great power's domestic politics.

    Off all those present it was the US diplomats who had, in relation to the Spanish Civil War at least, one of the most challenging jobs of any delegation at the conference. Merely by attending they had drawn the fire of many hard-core domestic isolationists, men who felt that even attending a conference was an un-necessary foreign involvement if not an out-right breach of neutrality. The US diplomats were therefore constrained by the need to strongly and repeatedly emphasise the their commitment to enforcing the Neutrality Acts and the lack of US interest in enforcing Versailles or even signing any replacement treaty. Worse the country was 'between Presidents' with Garner a lame duck until Landon entered office in late January, forcing the US delegation to expend considerable time convincing everyone these were Landon's policies, but without openly breaching the 'One President at a time' protocol and undermining Garner. With so many topics off limits, and so much verbal gymnastics required to express the little that was discussed, there was considerable interest as to why the US had even sent a delegation. The mystery was answered towards the end of the first week when the head of the US delegation, former Secretary of State Henry Stimson, began outlining what Landon's 'Moral Neutrality' actually meant and how it applied to Spain.

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    Henry Lewis Stimson, former Secretary of State and Secretary of War and head of the US delegation to the Amsterdam Conference. Ordinarily John Raskob, the sitting Secretary of State, would have been present to match up with his opposite numbers, however as Raskob was both a foreign policy novice and the choice of the outgoing administration he was not considered to have either the ability or gravitas for the role. As a favour to the new President the State's Righters party leadership therefore prevailed upon President Garner to send a more suitable representative and Garner, who had become thoroughly disillusioned with the entire political process, agreed. Therefore Landon was able to nominate Stimson who had both the experience of international diplomacy (from the London Naval Conference and the Geneva Disarmament Conference) and the Republican credentials to ensure the new doctrine of 'Moral Neutrality' would be skilfully explained and taken seriously.

    Quite simply it meant the US was taking sides, declaring their support for the 'legitimate democratically elected government of Spain' and backing the Republican government against the Monarchists. The headline change would be a total embargo of all goods against the Monarchists and any third party intermediaries once Landon entered office, a move of little practical impact given the Anglo-German grip on Monarchist spending but an important symbolic gesture. However Stimson soon moved on, outlining all the moves the US would not be taking; no military observers or 'volunteers', US firms would be advised against (but crucially not banned from) credit sales to the Republicans and US citizens would be strenuously advised not to enter Spain and, if they did go, would be considered on their own (in effect a land based version of the "Lusitania clause"). Despite these restrictions, which were only just enough to prevent total domestic uproar when reported in the US papers, the mere fact the US had picked a side prompted frantic efforts to induce more 'side picking' on everything from the Rhineland to the countless territorial disputes of Eastern and Central Europe. The sheer volume of request, petitions and indeed outright demands almost overwhelmed the US delegation, the diplomats only surviving by following the example of Stimson's implacable stonewalling. The fact was that even after the terrible and continuing ravages of the Depression continued access to US markets, or denial of the same to a rival, was a prize worth fighting over.

    While the minor powers vainly attempted to interest the US in the 'moral' value of their own territorial disputes the Great Powers sat back to take stock. While practical differences to the war were expected to be few the political and strategic implications were considerable, not just for Spain but for the much plotted over post-Spain situation. Naturally France was delighted her fellow republic had chosen the same side and there were many who hoped this would be but a first step on America's return to the world stage. In deference to American sensibilities, and the actual priorities of France, the French government decided to base it's charm offensive not on politics or the international situation but on economics, inviting the US to a 'Gold Bloc' conference for nations still on the Gold Standard and applying pressure to Spain to ensure a few high profile cash orders went to US firms. Conversely their notional ally, the Soviet Union, was less than pleased with the announcement, correctly realising that their influence could only decline as the moderate Republicans gained support and the Spanish government tried to keep the US on-side. However the Politburo was attracted by the idea of getting victory on the cheap, using the resources of capitalist France and America to defeat the fascist while ensuring their men would rise to the top post-war. The Soviets therefore kept quiet, aiming to let others take the glory of winning the war while they devoted their efforts to building an organisation capable of seizing control of post-war Spain.

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    The M2A2 Light Tank. Objectively it was just another variant of the venerable and ubiquitous Vickers 6-ton tank. In the context of the Spanish Civil War it became one of the more prominent symbols of US involvement, the Republicans making as much propaganda use of them as on the battlefield. As the war progressed it would become common to see footage featuring M2A2s alongside French H35s as part of 'Republics Fighting Together' propaganda, the directors going to great lengths to exclude any inconvenient Soviet tanks from their footage. Despite this the M2A2s were not the most significant contribution from the United States, that honour went to the trucks, the fuel oil and above all the generous credit terms US firms continued to extend in defiance of the public wishes of the US government.

    For the Monarchist supporting British and Germans the news was a somewhat unpleasant surprise, but under the terms outlined by Stimson the governments were confident it would have little impact. Indeed the initial military reaction to the arrival of M2A2s in Spain was positive, the Republicans wasting hard currency on light machine gun armed tanks instead of the far more formidable French cruisers was considered a good thing. As an added bonus the imperial sized US tanks would be utterly incompatible with the metric based French and Soviet, increasing the maintenance workload for the Republicans. This attitude would change as it became apparent countless US firms, including such giants as Ford, General Motors and Texas Oil were ignoring the 'No credit sales' advice of the government and providing support to the Republicans. The British response would pose the first major foreign policy headache for the Landon administration as they grappled with the consequences of the Landon Doctrine.

    If the announcement of US involvement was the most shocking event of the conference, a close second place must go to the success of a League of Nation's initiative. The year had started with the League continuing it's seemingly inevitable drift towards irrelevance, the condemnation of Italian aggression in Abyssinia having been as ineffective in stopping Italy as it had been in stopping the Japanese in Manchuria. The change in the League's standing began to turn when the British government closed the Suez Canal to Italian shipping and mentioned the League's sanctions and condemnation as one of the justifications. While this was stretching the truth almost to breaking point, the motivations were primarily domestic and driven by public revulsion over chemical weapons not the actual war itself, it served to give a veneer of international legitimacy to British actions and gave the League a considerable boost. However the resulting Abyssinian War both further reduced League membership, Italy departing in protest over 'The lack of League action against naked British aggression' and induced a minor crisis of confidence, many League insiders distraught than in seeking to stop a small war they had provoked a larger one. This in part explains the Leagues silence over the Rhineland Question as the secretariat feared to take any action in case it worsened the situation, though in truth the larger part of the explanation lay with with Joseph Avenol, the French Secretary-General of the League who saw his first priority as promoting French foreign policy with upholding the League's covenant coming a very distant second.

    When war broke out in Spain the Republican government immediately appealed to the League to help 'Defend democracy and protect Spain's territorial integrity', a decidedly unwise choice of appeal given the questions over the honesty of the elections and the ongoing territorial argument with Britain (a permanent council member) over Gibraltar. However even if the delegate had been more skilful or chosen his arguments better he would not have succeeded, with France and Britain both permanent council members and both backing different sides the League Council could never have agreed on a decisive course of action. Despite this the League did manage, to the considerable surprise of the secretariat, to agree a initiative to stop international volunteers and to arrange a general non-intervention agreement. While the former was somewhat woolly and lacking any real teeth the latter was a serious affair, all sides realising that if they started sending contingents of troops in then it could easily end in general warfare on the continent, something no-one wanted or was ready for. Indeed in addition to the League's remaining membership the agreement soon acquired the signatures of the major non-League powers; the United States delegation signing to further underline their commitment to non-intervention, Italy agreeing as part of their efforts to improve Franco-Italian relations and even Germany agreed as a gesture to show her 'peaceful intent'. While the League was buoyed up by this success, their attempt at a follow up economic embargo was scuppered almost before it began, Secretary-General Avenol trying to suppress it internally while the great powers all indicated they had no intention of stopping their various shipments to Spain.

    Before we leave Amsterdam it is worth noting the anger among many of the smaller European powers that their concerns had been so thoroughly swept under the carpet. The French promise of 'Re-negotiating Versailles' had re-opened old wounds and re-ignited territorial arguments, the realisation that the great powers had no intention of even discussing those matters, let alone dealing with them, had left many delegations facing domestic problems and somewhat disillusioned with diplomacy. This anger was matched in Turkey where nationalists seethed over not being invited and the international disinterest in their demands for a re-scheduled Montreux Conference. While they had no intention of actually discussing their intentions or waiting for international approval before fortifying the Bosphorus they could not tolerate being ignored or considered irrelevant. As the Great Turk's decline accelerated foreign policy became increasingly important among those jostling to replace him, Turkey status (or lack of it) in the world becoming a major issue.


    ---
    Notes;
    So the US is backing the Republicans but trying it's best to stay out of it, no-one ever said Moral Neutrality had to be that logical. Why the switch? Well TTL the Republicans are less obviously Communist (the French influence) and haven't nationalised any US firms, where as the other side are Monarchist and the US is traditionally anti-monarchy. I figure that's probably enough to shift the balance.

    France is seriously making an effort to butter up the US now they know they're in play, expect much talk of 'France is America's oldest ally' along with 'Republics fighting together' and subtle bad mouthing of Britain. Will they reveal the Brits and Germans are backing the Monarchists? Probably not as that would allow the British to retaliate with revealing Soviet involvement. If that came out Landon is severely compromised and the cause of US interventionism is dead in the water, so I can see a conspiracy of silence by all involved. Of course the US could find out herself, but US intelligence is badly organised, under funded and focused on Japan so that's unlikely.

    Joseph Avenol is a truly unpleasant chap, he did indeed see a big part of his job as implementing French foreign policy to begin with. Then later on he became a full on collaborator, publicly praising Italy and Germany and damning Britain and the US, enthusiastically supporting Petain and purging the League of anyone not a big fan of fascism.

    Game effects;
    A few trade deals between the US and the Republicans and a large amount of oil, supplies and a low strength light armour unit given to Rep Spain by event.

    Up Next;

    Your choices are
    1. Tanks and Trucks- Army Reform update
    2. Schisms and Scheming - UK domestic politics with added Indian action
    3. Battle-cruisers and Dive Bombers - Naval porn including the FAA and Coastal Command.
     
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