Ah, I see that Vengeance has not diminished your anti-Swedish bias, Pippy. Interesting explanation and a lovely interjection of your knowledge of aircraft history into the AAR. More! More, say.
Ruddy
Ruddy
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Much depends on Sarraut, the man who in OTL said France wouldn't let Strasbourg in range of German guns...
The issue might go both ways politically, prodding voters to gather around a bold move by the government to protect the Motherland, or instead alienating them with what could seem an irresponsible action which could cause yet another Franco-German war. It seems easy to say, with 20/20 hindsight, that the French government should have gone for it (and yes, it would have been the right move in my opinion too), but in 1936, not even 20 years after the Great War massacres, it was not an issue to be decided this lightly.
The issue might go both ways politically, prodding voters to gather around a bold move by the government to protect the Motherland, or instead alienating them with what could seem an irresponsible action which could cause yet another Franco-German war. It seems easy to say, with 20/20 hindsight, that the French government should have gone for it (and yes, it would have been the right move in my opinion too), but in 1936, not even 20 years after the Great War massacres, it was not an issue to be decided this lightly.
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Alexus - Indeed you did and a most entertaining update it was. As I will explain below my feelings on Sweden are based entirely on fact. Well mostly. Sort of.
Jalex - Everyone should read it, provided they have no problem with amusingly (hopefully) gamey events and a complete refusal on my part to write a sensible gameplay AAR.
Sir Humphrey - It's not a standard Rhineland Crisis certainly, with the French already fully mobilised the stakes are far higher before it even starts.
Funkatronica - That was the intention and I'm glad I succeeded. Britain wont (and can't if we're honest) lead in every situation, this is one such situation.
Duritz - Such gratitude! Frankly given your slightly lax attitude over in UK Co-op I'd have kept quiet about that. As they say, people in glass houses... should fire the architect. Not relevant here, but good advice none the less.
Vann the Red - It's not bias I swear. Sweden did collaborate with the Germans, regularly and in vital areas, and did so until damn near the end of the war. Yet she also helped the Allies, for suitable payment, over such matters at information about the Bismark and intercepted messages between Germany and Norway. Frankly the government played both sides off each other for maximum profit with no regard for anything beyond safety from invasion. It may well have been the safest course, certainly the most profitable course, but, as it depended upon someone else standing up to the Germans, it was certainly the most shameful and dishonourable course.
Rant over, it's always nice to through some aircraft history in, particularly when it's tied up with the grander geo-political scheme of things. Something that will crop up again in the future mark my words.
Fulcrumvale - It's not that long, but it has quality not quantity (Fingers crossed)
Atlantic Friend - As you say France is the key. Even more than in OTL Britain will have to let France dictate policy as she is far too tied up in the Med, bar the fleet of course, but the French Atlantic Squadron alone could deal with the Kriegsmarine so that's not much help.
I see Sarraut, and France in general, in a stronger practical position; The army has already been mobilised and is on alert because of the Abyssinian War, hence they have a great deal more options than they historically did. No worries about the diplomatic fall out from the 'aggressive move' of mobilisation for instance. Politically however it's mixed. A backdown is going to play very badly with some people, seeing Britain, one of your traditional rivals, stand up to fascism and win while seeing France back down will cost votes. Conversely however some will focus on the losses and wish for France to avoid bloodshed of any kind, no matter how 'light'.
It's a political calculation which, for once, isn't too cynical. If the electorate want to see France stand up against Germany, they'll vote for the government which did that. Or vice-versa. Democracy in action. Of course whether the democratic will of the people is actually the best course of action is an entirely different question...
Jalex - Everyone should read it, provided they have no problem with amusingly (hopefully) gamey events and a complete refusal on my part to write a sensible gameplay AAR.
Sir Humphrey - It's not a standard Rhineland Crisis certainly, with the French already fully mobilised the stakes are far higher before it even starts.
Funkatronica - That was the intention and I'm glad I succeeded. Britain wont (and can't if we're honest) lead in every situation, this is one such situation.
Duritz - Such gratitude! Frankly given your slightly lax attitude over in UK Co-op I'd have kept quiet about that. As they say, people in glass houses... should fire the architect. Not relevant here, but good advice none the less.
Vann the Red - It's not bias I swear. Sweden did collaborate with the Germans, regularly and in vital areas, and did so until damn near the end of the war. Yet she also helped the Allies, for suitable payment, over such matters at information about the Bismark and intercepted messages between Germany and Norway. Frankly the government played both sides off each other for maximum profit with no regard for anything beyond safety from invasion. It may well have been the safest course, certainly the most profitable course, but, as it depended upon someone else standing up to the Germans, it was certainly the most shameful and dishonourable course.
Rant over, it's always nice to through some aircraft history in, particularly when it's tied up with the grander geo-political scheme of things. Something that will crop up again in the future mark my words.
Fulcrumvale - It's not that long, but it has quality not quantity (Fingers crossed)
Atlantic Friend - As you say France is the key. Even more than in OTL Britain will have to let France dictate policy as she is far too tied up in the Med, bar the fleet of course, but the French Atlantic Squadron alone could deal with the Kriegsmarine so that's not much help.
I see Sarraut, and France in general, in a stronger practical position; The army has already been mobilised and is on alert because of the Abyssinian War, hence they have a great deal more options than they historically did. No worries about the diplomatic fall out from the 'aggressive move' of mobilisation for instance. Politically however it's mixed. A backdown is going to play very badly with some people, seeing Britain, one of your traditional rivals, stand up to fascism and win while seeing France back down will cost votes. Conversely however some will focus on the losses and wish for France to avoid bloodshed of any kind, no matter how 'light'.
It's a political calculation which, for once, isn't too cynical. If the electorate want to see France stand up against Germany, they'll vote for the government which did that. Or vice-versa. Democracy in action. Of course whether the democratic will of the people is actually the best course of action is an entirely different question...
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El Pip said:
True that, England's naval support would seem redundant, particularly since the French Med squadron can also be redeployed to other theaters of operation with the demise of the Italian navy.
Yes, the politicians were more gung-ho than the generals, who started to object any reaction would require general mobilization. If that horse has already run out of the barn, then Gamelin and his potential successors have no excuse to brandish. They have all the troops they need to cross the Rhine in force. I guess it will send shockwaves through Belgium, which may or may not result in the kingdom renouncing French alliance in the light of what might seem an aggression to some of its Francophobic officers.
The last French garrisons left the German banks of the Rhine only 6 years before. The public opinion might think it's time to bring the boys back - but now I wonder what will the international opinion be ? The 1923 occupation of the Rhineland by French and Belgian forces drew irate comments from London and Washington where the governments considered Germany was not exactly in breach of her commitment to pay war reparations. Will the Americans consider the remilitarization as a normal move by Germany to exert full sovereignty on German territory, or will they see it as a potentially dangerous move by a distateful regime, I wonder ?
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You just can't have enough aircraft details in your AAR El Pip, especially not if they are spiffing Brit aircraft details!
...As to what that slimey swine Herr Hitler is up to on the continent, I just wish I could trust the bally French to sort him out. I don't though. Oh, if only our Winston was back in power - he'd know what to do!
:rofl:
...As to what that slimey swine Herr Hitler is up to on the continent, I just wish I could trust the bally French to sort him out. I don't though. Oh, if only our Winston was back in power - he'd know what to do!
:rofl:
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Interesting, interesting. So Hitler makes his move while Italy is busy losing Africa to Britain - and Britain is in the middle of a government crisis and still occupied beating Italy. So it all comes down to the French reaction - I hear the sound of dice rolling....
Great AAR, by the way.
Great AAR, by the way.
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Chapter XL: A Battle of Nerves.
Chapter XL: A Battle of Nerves.
German planning for the re-occupation was typically thorough, the operation carefully timed so as to minimise the chances of anyone finding out before the late on Friday evening. This delay, combined with the tendency of civil servants to not work weekends, would, it was hoped, present the world with a fait accompli on Monday morning and allow cooler heads to prevail. While such a plan may have worked under normal circumstances the situation in Europe was far from normal; even though peace negotiations had begun Britain was still at war and the French military on heightened alert making neither government disposed to stopping for the weekend.
The German plans began to unravel early in the day when the advancing re-occupation force was spotted by an Armée de l'Air ANF Les Mureaux 115 reconnaissance plane on 'High Alert' patrol. The 'High Alert' plans, which had been activated following the mobilisation, implicitly assumed Germany would either be the cause of the mobilisation or would attempt to take advantage of the situation that had caused the mobilisation and so required regular aerial patrols along the Franco-German border. While the pilots and ground staff had soon realised there was no 'High Alert' along their part of the border the patrols were taken very seriously, partly because 'real' missions, regardless of actual importance, were much preferred to training exercises and partly as the patrols had become a competition to see who could bring back the best, and most intrusive, photographs. As a double blow to the Germans the chain of command to transmit the photos and information had already been established and tested under the same 'High Alert' orders, meaning there was no delay in the alert reaching the French Minister of War, Jean Fabry.
The ANF Les Mureaux 115, an adaption of the older 113 it had only entered squadron service in mid-1935, but in less than a year it had established itself as the Armée de l'Air's premier reconnaissance aircraft.
On the orders of the French cabinet the Armée de l'Air despatched additional 115s to confirm the initial sighting and provide additional information on numbers and possible intent. As the reports flowed back to Paris it soon became apparent to the French military the Germans troops were not on an offensive; the forced lacked tanks, artillery or heavy equipment and was moving very slowly, pausing in towns to be mobbed by civilians and raise flags. As the military worked to clarify the situation the men of the Quai d'Orsay worked to inform and consult Allies and neighbours while attempting to ascertain their position, the results of which were not encouraging. The Belgian government, while expressing it's displeasure at the re-occupation, indicated it's reluctance to actually do anything to oppose it. The United States' ambassador confessed his country was almost exclusively focused on internal matters, the various national conventions for the Presidential elections being less than two months away. Bluntly President Garner's administration was concerned with shoring up the former Vice-President's reputation and could see neither votes nor compelling reasons to involve itself in a 'European matter'. The news was, however, not all bad; the Polish government indicated it would honour the Franco-Polish alliance even though it was not, strictly, required to while the Czech government made a similar, if less enthusiastic, commitment to uphold the Franco-Czech alliance.
As important as those counties stance was the key reaction, in the mind of many both in and out of the French Cabinet, was that of Britain. While many of the popular stories about the British reply are untrue, for instance the Foreign Office's response to the French request for aid was not to return the telegram France had sent when Britain had asked for aid over Abyssinia, the general gist is generally correct. Quite aside from the disappointment, and anger in many cases, felt at France's failure to support Britain over Abyssinia the issue was far less important to Britain than France. The island dwelling British could never truly understand the visceral fear a shared border could sometimes induce, the wars of the British Empire had been fought on foreign fields, as terrible as the horrors of the Great War had been they had almost all happened 'somewhere else'. For all that the Foreign Office was keen to rebuild Anglo-French relations and there was no serious will in the government to needlessly alienate France. Moreover with the bulk of the Army and RAF in North Africa, and the French in no need of naval assistance, the offered support could honestly be limited to diplomatic backing and co-operation with any economic sanctions, balancing the desire not to cause offence with avoiding British commitment to a possible conflict.
The French cabinet, acutely aware the longer the Germans remained in the Rhineland unchallenged the more chance they would stay, had split between those who favoured military action to remove the Germans, those seeking a diplomatic solution and those urging acceptance of the new status quo. The leading lights of the 'acceptance' group were General Gamelin and the French General Staff, reluctant to risk another war by directly confronting the occupation force and unwilling to see France humiliated by grand posturing only to back down later they seized upon the luke-warm response of many Allies to urge a League of Nation authored face saving statement. In the middle ground stood Foreign Minister Pierre Flandin and his right-wing Alliance Républicaine Démocratique, while they appreciated the advantages of the Rhineland 'buffer' they felt it was not worth risking war over, yet they wanted France to oppose the re-occupation. As such Flandin wanted to call in the British offer of help and use economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure to force a German climb down, hoping to achieve France's aims while humiliating Germany. The action group was headed by Prime Minister Sarraut and his Minister of War Louis Maurin, for this group the reoccupation was a clear threat that had to be countered with force. Maurin more than most knew the strategic advantage that a demilitarised Rhineland offered to France; in the event of a crisis Frances could occupy Germany's industrial heartland without firing a shot, providing a powerful hold over any German government. Losing this would tilt the long term advantage back in favour of Germany with it's larger population and stronger economy. It was, however, Sarraut who swung the meeting, first by assessing that the risks of inaction far outweighed the risks of action and then by appealing to the patriotism of the cabinet by declaring "We shall not permit Strasbourg to remain within range of German guns."
The venerable Renault FT-17 was once more called into service, leading the French advance into the Rhineland.
On such phrases does the world turn, ordered by the cabinet the French military sent a mixed force of FT-17s and infantry from the 2ème Division Cuirassée de Réserve to confront the advancing Germans. As the troops left their billets the French Foreign Ministry urgently summoned the German ambassador to explain what was going to happen while ordering their man in Berlin to send the same message directly to the Reich Foreign Ministry. As this news filtered down through the German hierarchy the tensions between the government and the military, which had been bubbling beneath the surface ever since the AGNA talks collapsed, exploded. Seeing their worst fears come true the War Minister von Blomberg and the head of the army von Fritsch had met and agreed to unilaterally pull the troops out. When Hitler heard he flew into a towering rage, accusing all nearby of betrayal, treason and incompetence, stretching the already strained relationship between the state and it's generals to breaking point. While the short term row was defused, the generals merely cited Hitler's earlier orders to withdraw if the French crossed the border, the damage had been done and the seeds of later conflict sown.
As Monday the 27th dawned it was clear France had won a tactical victory, the Rhineland was once more free of German troops. Solving that problem had, however, left them with a new problem; French troops were once more marching on German soil with their only legal justification being upholding an already much breached, and widely regarded as unfair, peace treaty. Yet for the French cabinet such concerns were for the future, in the short term the move proved wildly popular, propelling both Sarraut's Socialist Radicalis and Flandin's ARD into a substantial lead in the polls, convincing Sarraut to break with Leon Blum's Popular Front and run alone, dealing the centre-left a crippling blow.
To conclude this section it is worth mentioning the great controversy over Prime Minister Sarrauts action, mainly from historians of a revisionist bent but also by more serious scholars. Although their are countless variations the essential argument contends that a more 'moderate line', polite code for appeasement and giving in to aggression, towards Germany would have prevented the later conflicts that raged across Europe. While it is undoubtedly true that Germany in general, and Hitler's leadership in particular, was left bruised and humiliated by the first few months of 1936 to contend that this was the sole reason for the later aggression is a supreme folly and displays a terrible naivety and wilful blindness. The most accurate, and damning, appraisal of taking a 'moderate line' against aggression remains that of Churchill; "Deterring aggression by appeasement is the same as trying to fend of a hungry bear by throwing meat at it, not only do you still have to fight the bear when you run out of meat but it will have grown all the stronger on all the meat you have fed it."
Up Next; The fallout and the consequences. Also a return to the murky world of Westminster politics.
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*claps* I'll be damned, Pip, you wrote an update!
I do wonder what the concequences of the non-occupation will be..
I do wonder what the concequences of the non-occupation will be..
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Marvellous stuff, I love a good update. This one was so good, it makes me want to do an update of my own
KUTGW, Pip, and more frequent updates! I demand it!
KUTGW, Pip, and more frequent updates! I demand it!
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Oh Look!
Caught us all unaware E-P!
Good update, and extraordinary to relate, it looks like I was wrong and the bally French are actually doing something useful for a change...
...I'd love to have been a fly on the wall when 'Old Carpet-Eater' started ranting and raving at the news from the Rhineland! :rofl:
Caught us all unaware E-P!
Good update, and extraordinary to relate, it looks like I was wrong and the bally French are actually doing something useful for a change...
...I'd love to have been a fly on the wall when 'Old Carpet-Eater' started ranting and raving at the news from the Rhineland! :rofl:
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Lovely! This is, of course, the turning point so many of us had wondered about. I'm interested to read how this plays out.
Vann
Vann
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Ouch. Adventurism meets resistance, leaving egos bruised. The first consequence I can imagine will probably be the sacking in disgrace of the timid "vons" of the Bendlerstrasse, soon to be replaced by more daring (and blindly obedient) officers.
I also wonder if it will lead the French government to feel a little overconfident.
Just a little question : did Louis Marin replace Jean Fabry as War Minister because of a dissension on how to manage the crisis ?
I also wonder if it will lead the French government to feel a little overconfident.
Just a little question : did Louis Marin replace Jean Fabry as War Minister because of a dissension on how to manage the crisis ?
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great update.
I particularly love the history-book style at the end; the question of whether appeasement would of worked.
so is this march 1936??
I particularly love the history-book style at the end; the question of whether appeasement would of worked.
so is this march 1936??
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An update!
I like the part with the revisionist historians suggesting that appeasement might have worked.
I like the part with the revisionist historians suggesting that appeasement might have worked.
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Inkana - Cheeky bugger. I think it's worse than you say, it's not a non-occupation it's a failed attempt at a re-occupation. Don't act and people might say you're a coward, act and fail and they will call you a fool...
Alexus - Anything that helps keep your multi-style epic "Alone" going is clearly a good thing.
RAFspeak - Indeed sir, the French have that little bit more confidence needed to act. Pride at not being outdone by the British probably helped them act as well. Certainly better to be a fly on the wall than a German general when a certain gentlemen in Berlin found out what had happened.
Fgorginator - You'll be pleased to here I have actually started the next update, terrifying I know.
C&D - Your comment triggered an interesting thought; I wonder how many Germans are accusing the Reich foreign ministry of 'appeasing' the western allies and not having the courage to stand up to them? Backed down over AGNA, backed down over the Rhineland, didn't join in when the neighbouring fascists of Italy were attacked. Quite a damning case for "Hitler the appeaser" not standing up to those evil non-fascist democracies.
Vann the Red - Complicated but slow burning I believe. While the gloves may now be off no-one is yet in the mood, or able, to use fists.
Funkatronica - I'm glad it was noticed, while poking around and researching I came across a review for a book on 1930s British conservatives "Burying Caesar". As far as I can tell it was a revisionist tome which had two central arguments: 1. Churchill was a war-mongering idiot who should have been totally ignored the entire war. 2. Chamberlain's main fault was not appeasing enough and his big mistake was to draw a line after Munich, actually he should have carried on appeasing Hitler endlessly so Britain could avoid the war entirely.
Frankly it seemed such a pile of tosh I had to write something about revisionists and other such bad historians.
Oh and it's April 27th 1936 at the end of the update, over a month later than OTL.
Duritz - Thank you sir.
madsb - Glad you liked it. If even here and now there are historians who are desperate for publicity who'll be pro-appeasement I figured there had to be some in my timeline, only right to point them out and laugh at them.
Atlantic Friend - Easy part first, Fabry got booted out in the fallout of the Hoare-Laval affair, which happened pretty much historically in France.
I think all the Western governments are going to be a bit over-confident and perhaps a bit too keen to abandon re-armament in light of the apparent reduction in threat. Belgium, Holland and Scandanavia will feel safer certainly. The little Entene are still squeezed between the Germans and the Soviets, so are never going to feel entirely safe, but Germany has been humbled and they've earned some handy good will with France for their unneeded (so far?) support.
Hardest part, reaction in Germany. How high is Hitler's stock with the Wehrmacht? The Night of the Long Knives was barely two years ago and that was mostly to appease the Army's Prussian leadership who worried about Röhm's ambitions to extend Party control over them. They still want independence from government control and he doesn't have the reputation yet to take it from them, his last forrays into foreign/military affairs were failures after all.
In this situation the 'Werners' warned Hitler it wouldn't work and it didn't, they were then forced to recall the troops (in accordance with orders) to prevent a war Germany was utterly unprepared for. If you were a still distrustful Prussian you'd be fully behind the Werners and have a very low opinion of Hitler's diplomatic and military judgement. Replacing two men who've been proved right and 'saved' Germany from war when your very unpopular is an exceptionally risky move even for a compulsive risk taker like Hitler.
Alexus - Anything that helps keep your multi-style epic "Alone" going is clearly a good thing.
RAFspeak - Indeed sir, the French have that little bit more confidence needed to act. Pride at not being outdone by the British probably helped them act as well.
Certainly better to be a fly on the wall than a German general when a certain gentlemen in Berlin found out what had happened. Fgorginator - You'll be pleased to here I have actually started the next update, terrifying I know.
C&D - Your comment triggered an interesting thought; I wonder how many Germans are accusing the Reich foreign ministry of 'appeasing' the western allies and not having the courage to stand up to them? Backed down over AGNA, backed down over the Rhineland, didn't join in when the neighbouring fascists of Italy were attacked. Quite a damning case for "Hitler the appeaser" not standing up to those evil non-fascist democracies.
Vann the Red - Complicated but slow burning I believe. While the gloves may now be off no-one is yet in the mood, or able, to use fists.
Funkatronica - I'm glad it was noticed, while poking around and researching I came across a review for a book on 1930s British conservatives "Burying Caesar". As far as I can tell it was a revisionist tome which had two central arguments: 1. Churchill was a war-mongering idiot who should have been totally ignored the entire war. 2. Chamberlain's main fault was not appeasing enough and his big mistake was to draw a line after Munich, actually he should have carried on appeasing Hitler endlessly so Britain could avoid the war entirely.
Frankly it seemed such a pile of tosh I had to write something about revisionists and other such bad historians.
Oh and it's April 27th 1936 at the end of the update, over a month later than OTL.
Duritz - Thank you sir.
madsb - Glad you liked it. If even here and now there are historians who are desperate for publicity who'll be pro-appeasement I figured there had to be some in my timeline, only right to point them out and laugh at them.
Atlantic Friend - Easy part first, Fabry got booted out in the fallout of the Hoare-Laval affair, which happened pretty much historically in France.
I think all the Western governments are going to be a bit over-confident and perhaps a bit too keen to abandon re-armament in light of the apparent reduction in threat. Belgium, Holland and Scandanavia will feel safer certainly. The little Entene are still squeezed between the Germans and the Soviets, so are never going to feel entirely safe, but Germany has been humbled and they've earned some handy good will with France for their unneeded (so far?) support.
Hardest part, reaction in Germany. How high is Hitler's stock with the Wehrmacht? The Night of the Long Knives was barely two years ago and that was mostly to appease the Army's Prussian leadership who worried about Röhm's ambitions to extend Party control over them. They still want independence from government control and he doesn't have the reputation yet to take it from them, his last forrays into foreign/military affairs were failures after all.
In this situation the 'Werners' warned Hitler it wouldn't work and it didn't, they were then forced to recall the troops (in accordance with orders) to prevent a war Germany was utterly unprepared for. If you were a still distrustful Prussian you'd be fully behind the Werners and have a very low opinion of Hitler's diplomatic and military judgement. Replacing two men who've been proved right and 'saved' Germany from war when your very unpopular is an exceptionally risky move even for a compulsive risk taker like Hitler.
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Now don't get over-excited but there is another update coming very soon (I make no promises to keep this schedule mind so no getting your hopes up either).
Those of you prone to mis-clicking and getting the first page may have noticed we have started a new section; The 'Month of Crises' is over we're now in 'The Calm Between the Storms'
Those of you prone to mis-clicking and getting the first page may have noticed we have started a new section; The 'Month of Crises' is over we're now in 'The Calm Between the Storms'
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