Chapter XXXIX: Unintended Consequences.
For all the words expended on the Rhineland Crisis two areas regularly escape discussion and, in many ways, they are the most fundamental; Why Germany felt the need to reoccupy the Rhineland and why the German leadership chose the date they did. The first part is relatively simple, it was a matter of national embarrassment that an entire region of the country was off limits due to the dictat of a foreign power. Even though there was no immediate need for troops to be stationed on the border, Franco-German relations weren't that bad, the fact they weren't allowed to be there was reason enough for many to demand the re-militarisation. To this long-standing desire for re-occupation must be added two additional more immediate reasons. Firstly the humiliation felt in Berlin over the collapse of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The end of the talks effectively forced Germany to 'officially' maintain a Versailles treaty sized navy or openly defy Britain over an area of vital British interest. While such a risk may have been taken before the Abyssinian War, the change in British foreign policy that had occurred since the election made any such move very risky. Thus while pride demanded a major diplomatic coup to re-establish Germany's credentials as a Great Power, common sense dictated that it not be in a area vital to Britain.
The second factor was more logical yet less tangible, the need to assert the German sphere of influence. The leaked ANGA text had alarmed much of Scandinavia, in particular the 'Baltic Dominance' clauses had worried Sweden and Finland with the possibility of being utterly dependent on German good will for Atlantic access. These fears had pushed those countries nearer to the British sphere of influence for protection while British public opinion had been angered at the thought of the Navy being 'barred' from any body of water. German worries therefore focused on the possibility of closer ties leading to the formation of a Royal Navy 'Baltic Squadron', perhaps based in Stockholm or Oslo, seriously upsetting the balance of power and threatening Germany's Baltic coast. As unlikely as that prospect was, hindsight tells us none of the Scandinavian nations were seriously contemplating any breach of neutrality let alone allowing the British naval basing rights, it was a genuine fear in German political circles.
These fears were heightened by events in Sweden, where the Swedish Airforce was selecting it's next generation of medium bomber. After being rebuffed in it's desire for the US B-18 the Air Administration had turned it's attention to German offerings where, after again being denied it's preferred choice of the He-111, the assessors had selected the Ju-86. However the Swedish government had then stepped in, blocking the purchase of any German aircraft and making contact with the British manufacturer Handley-Page for a 'Arctic' version of their Hampden. Ostensibly this decision was on political grounds, the governing Social Democrat coalition was facing an election later in the year and claimed to be worried about purchasing combat aircraft from a country that, technically, shouldn't even have an airforce. A more honest assessment is that Prime Minister Hansson, who was renowned for his un-idealistic double dealing, merely wished to play the Germans off the British to secure a cheaper price. Regardless, what had started as nothing more than a potential foreign sale had come to be seen by many as a vital barometer of the region's intentions, the choice of aircraft indicating who's sphere of influence Sweden fell into. The Swedish government, seeing their hope for neutrality diminishing before their eyes, stalled on the deal as they sought a way to defuse the situation without alienating either side or Sweden being forced to abandon the purchase.
Prime Minister Hansson, the notorious Swedish Prime Minister who planned to ensure Sweden sat out any conflict in an ideologically indifferent, and highly profitable, armed neutrality.
With the stakes, both real and imagined, so high the Reich Foreign Ministry demanded action to shore up Germany's position and re-assert herself on the international stage. Believing the situation to be critical they wanted not only a show of German power but also a way to highlight the weakness of the Western Allies. Based on past experience it was believed another blatant violation of Versailles would have no serious consequence, bar harshly worded telegrams, and as such was considered perfect.
Having dealt with why the German political leadership wished to re-occupy, we move on the question of timing. The consensus view holds that one of the main reasons the crisis escalated so rapidly was the poor German timing, yet it is clear from examining the general situation that the constraints on timing were in fact severe. The window of opportunity, such as it was, was squashed between the aftermath of the British raid on Taranto and the final rounds of the French legislative elections. Before Taranto the French Army, mobilised on the Italian declaration of war, was still on high alert and any troop movements could be misinterpreted as war, something Germany was far from ready for. At the other end of the time frame the paralysis crippling the French government would almost certainly end the after the elections as the focus switched from winning or retaining power back to running the country. Gambling that aggressive posturing would be a vote-loser in France it was hoped Sarraut would limit any complaints to harmless diplomatic complaints, handing Germany the propaganda victory she sought.
Operating within that window it is clear that the later the better for Germany; As Italy's position deteriorated the French armed forces lowered their alert status, reducing the chances of a panicked over-reaction. Equally the French Government would become desperate to avoid angering the electorate, knowing there would be no time to correct the damage bad publicity would cause. For all the effort expended on plotting the perfect time and rationalising the justifications the operation was regarded as a considerable gamble, particularly by the War Ministry who feared the consequences of a French counter-attack against Germany. Allaying such fears with promises of a withdrawal in the event of a French military reaction Hitler ordered the re-occupation to take place on the morning of Friday the 24th of April.
