Chapter 26 – April 1946
Foreword
The Far East has become a race between the Allied (Nationalist China and the French-led invasion of the Home Islands) and Soviet advances to gain as much territory as possible, before what now looks like an inevitable defeat (to re-coin a phrase) for Imperial Japan. And so far, the Japanese defence-in-place against the Soviets seems to be far heavier and more resilient than the token forces that are as yet facing the Allies.
Meanwhile, the ‘secret race’ for Stalin’s super weapons continues, though it is a long and slow process. And the General Secretary remains obsessed with forcing a landing somewhere in Japan, despite the desperate and almost catastrophic failure of the last attempts on both Honshu and then
Sapporo in March.
Note: the chapter is a bit longer than usual for this AAR for reasons that will become obvious when you read on!
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1. Eastern Sector
[Note: Naval operations for April are covered in a separate section.]
The Soviets had won a major battle for
Verkhnetambovskoye, started on 31 March, by 2 April (544 Soviet, 746 Japanese killed in the ground battle, with 2,249 Soviets and 590 Japanese troops killed in related air strikes). The Soviets would occupy it on 10 April.
A Japanese attack on
Tyrma succeeded between 6-8 April, with a lack of supplies plaguing the defenders, but no ground battle report was available (1,042 Soviet air raid casualties). The Japanese would occupy
Tyrma by 15 April, but then be struck by a quick Soviet attack on 15-16 April, which was brushed off despite heavy VVS air support. A larger Soviet attack from 25-28 April would succeed (592 Soviet, 570 Japanese ground casualties, 1,597 Japanese killed in air raids). The Japanese retreated but the province had not yet been reoccupied as the month ended.
The fighting in
Tyrma was matched overhead, with two air battles occurring in daylight on 6 April above
Tyrma itself and in
Urgal, with one side and then the other intercepting raids. Both battles left the Soviets with heavier damage than their Japanese counterparts.
That night, three more Japanese raids were intercepted from 1700hr on the 6th to 0600hr on the 7th, but the enemy bombers got through on each occasion, taking some damage but leaving the Soviet fighters disorganised.
On 9 April, the 1st Marine Div was cut away from 14 Mech Div (which had conducted the amphibious landing attempts in March then been sent back to the front line) and was sent back north by rail to
Nikolayevsk na Amure: a new and more specialised Marine Corps was to be raised and readied for future maritime operations. Another marine formation (1. Diviziya Morskoi Pekhoty) was by then also approaching the port in its long journey from
Irkutsk.
Chinese progress still seemed unchecked by 12 April, giving increased urgency to Stalin’s demands for a new amphibious attempt. By then, the
[AI] 6th Army had relocated two air wings to the small forward air base taken at
Tumnin, on the Pacific coast. A TPT wing was added by Theatre
[human] HQ on 14 April and the Parachute Division (3 x PARA brigades) was sent south from
Nikolayevsk na Amure to join up with them
.
Another Soviet success came in
Elban, which the Japanese had retaken on 12 April after winning a battle for it in late March. The Soviet counter-attack came between 13-15 April, with a Soviet victory without VVS air support (625 Soviet ground casualties plus 2,338 from air strikes on
Verkhnetambovskoye; 1,039 Japanese ground casualties).
Elban was regained by the Soviets on 27 April.
Japanese-held
Suluk was another contested province during April, with unsuccessful Soviet attacks launched on 16 April (a probe) and 19-20 April (337 Soviet, 398 Japanese casualties) until a clear victory was won at the end of the month (27-29 April), with 131 Soviet and 642 Japanese casualties. The Soviets were still advancing on
Suluk as the month ended.
The other province to change hands in the east was
Vysokogorny, on the Pacific coast, occupied by the Soviets without opposition on 20 April. The Japanese launched a serious but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to retake it from 22-26 April, with fierce air support (503 Soviet ground and 3,223 air raid casualties, 892 Japanese ground casualties).
Between 25-30 April, the Japanese attacked
Okha once more in the largest ground battle in the Eastern Sector for the month. This attack
[-59% enemy progress as it started] led to HQ 6th Army being given
Okha as a defensive objective, with
Vladivostok removed for the time being.
After a brief intervention by Japanese CAGs (more on that in the Maritime Operations section), the attack was heavily repulsed (552 Soviet, 1,559 Japanese ground casualties, 78 Soviets lost to Japanese CAG ground strikes). The Soviets began a counter-attack
on Alexandrov Sakhalinsky immediately afterwards with fresh troops, which would continue into May.
A large Soviet attack began on
Orlovka on 27 April and it also carried over into May 1946. By the end of the month, Japanese defensive air strikes on Soviet divisions attacking from
Elban and
Verkhnetambovskoye had already killed around 4,150 troops.
A summary of battles and advance in the Eastern Sector, April 1946. Japanese air raids were significantly more destructive in the sector, nearer to their air bases, with occasional dogfights occurring as well, while the Japanese took far heavier casualties in ground fighting – at least where the results were known.
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2. Central Sector
Ground fighting in the Central Sector was less intense than in the East, but the VVS was very active in supporting the ground troops in this sector, the Japanese air wings less so, with no dogfights recorded during the month. Also, some significant gaps in the Japanese line began to form in places, leading to some provinces being occupied by the Soviets without a fight. But on the other hand, supply problems for the Soviets hampered their ability to exploit and in some cases led to provinces being abandoned to Japanese occupation after little or nor resistance.
One of the four larger battles in the Centre during April was an early victory for the Soviets in
Shilka over 1-2 April, leading to its occupation by mid-month (358 Soviet and 958 Japanese ground casualties).
Mangui was attacked by the Soviets for the first time on 2 April, but that attempt was soon defeated. A more serious attack succeeded between 10-13 April (no ground report, but 2,739 Japanese defenders were killed in air strikes). But the Japanese kept managing to put reinforcements in to prevent Soviet occupation. One such group was beaten on 16-17 April (14 Soviet, 227 Japanese ground and 402 air casualties), but in the fourth battle there for the month, there was no VVS support provided and the fight was won by the Japanese defenders (1,686 Soviet v 1,284 Japanese killed) in the largest ground battle for the month across the entire Soviet Far East theatre.
Tahe had been reoccupied by the Japanese on 5 April after a victory there in March. Three Soviet probes, each with heavy air support, were easily brushed off the Japanese. Ground casualties were minimal on both sides, but the VVS inflicted around 4,250 killed on the Japanese in supporting strikes from 5-11 April.
Urusha was lost after the Soviet defenders offered no resistance to a Japanese attack on 7 April, due to being out of supply. Although the Japanese took it on 15 April, they had retreated back south by the end of the month, leaving it unoccupied but still in Japanese hands.
A Japanese attack on
Skovorodino from 8-11 April ended in a Soviet defeat (630 Soviet, 652 Japanese killed), leading to it being occupied on 15 April. But a Soviet division was already moving to retake it, dislodging the Japanese after a short skirmish and taking it back the very same day.
The first short Soviet attack on
Alihe from 13-14 April failed, though over 900 Japanese were killed by VVS air strikes. The next attempt succeeded, though there was no ground battle report for the three day fight between 16-19 April. While VVS support was crucial, with 1,853 enemy killed in air strikes, the Japanese killed over 1,000 of the attackers in
Mordaga over the same period.
Alihe was finally taken by Soviet troops on 28 April.
The Soviets managed to secure an unoccupied
Ushumun on 20 April, but were counter-attacked by the Japanese three days later, losing the gruelling five day battle on 28 April despite heavy VVS defensive air strikes (1,127 Soviet and 895 Japanese ground casualties, with another 3,524 Japanese attackers killed by air strikes on
Tahe).
Ust’ Karsk was retaken by the Soviets without a fight around the same time.
A summary of battles and advance in the Central Sector, April 1946. The balance of air strikes was reversed in this sector, where Soviet air power was stronger. But despite this, while the Soviets did most of the attacking, the Japanese won two thirds of the battles (large and small), in part due to Soviet supply shortfalls.
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3. Western Sector
The Western Sector was quite active in April, with one large battle but many others recording few or even no casualties, where Soviet defenders were already completely disorganised when attacked due to long term lack of supply in the northern portion of the sector. Conversely, in quite a few cases the Japanese had vacated provinces in advance of Soviet or Mongolian attacks, perhaps having been called back east to counter the rampant Chinese offensive approaching southern Manchuria.
East of
Lake Baikal, a battle for
Telemba went from 2-9 April, but no combat report was available. The Soviets eventually retreated after their supplies ran out. In
Barguzin (5-6 April) and
Burjatija (9 and 17 April) Soviet defenders withdrew on first contact due to lack of supply, with no casualties on either side. All three had been occupied by the Japanese by the end of the month.
In response to the terrible supply situation and Japanese advances east of
Lake Baikal, 1st Army was put on a defensive stance from 17 April. With
Bukacaca now under threat, the next day
Tamsong Bulak was withdrawn as a depth offensive objective and
Irkutsk (now less threatened) removed as a defensive objective, replaced with orders for the defence of
Bukacaca.
South of
Irkutsk, the Soviets were beginning to recover momentum, with
Slyudyanka abandoned by the Japanese and the Soviets advancing on it by 6 April, retaking it on 25 April without a fight.
Even though the Japanese won the largest battle in the sector for the month in an attack on
Khantai (9-14 April, 1,243 Soviet and 939 Japanese troops killed), they did not follow it up and in fact had vacated
Selenga Burin,
Ulan Ude and
Altan Bulak by the end of the month, either without fights or against Mongolian attacks for which there were no reports.
As the month drew to a close, a Comintern attack on
Khentel on 29 April (84 Soviet and 278 Japanese casualties) had succeeded, with the advance continuing as April ended.
Neither side launched any air strikes in this sector during the month, mainly based in
Irkutsk – the large Soviet air presence was grounded due to lack of supplies. This led to a major reorganisation of Soviet air assets there on 14 April. There were 15 wings based in
Irkutsk alone at that time and more in
Mutina and
Jakutsk – almost all of them unsupplied and lacking any organisation. A total of 18 wings (2 x STRAT, 5 x TAC, 4 x CAS, 2 x MR, 5 x INT) were reallocated to the various Western Theatre HQs in Russia proper in the hope of improving the general supply situation, leaving just seven in
Irkutsk.
By 23 April the wings left in
Irkutsk were back in supply and starting to regain organisation. 7th Army
[AI] had also deployed a couple of wings forward to
Ulaanbataar. It was hoped the VVS might be able to resume combat support missions in May.
A summary of battles and advance in the Western Sector, April 1946. Neither side flew any air missions and quite a few provinces had been taken without a fight by both sides, mainly depending on Soviet supply status, which remained chronic east of Lake Baikal, but generally good in Mongolia.
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4. Maritime Operations
Once again, the most exciting, complicated and entertaining action occurred in the maritime sphere. The month started with the Red Banner Pacific Fleet split between the ports of
Nikolayevsk na Amure and
Okha, undergoing much-needed repairs.
On 8 April, one of the ‘new’ submarine flotillas was deployed. It was one of the units begun by the Soviets to start improving their construction experience and was a slightly improved version of the old Series II class, with Model 1918 engines and hull and a 1,700km range (the old Series II boats only having an 800km operational range). After earlier losses to Japanese CAGs, only one of the more modern Series XIV flotillas was left. The oldest boats were grouped together in the 5th Sub Sqn, while the Series XIV and improved Series II boats were kept separate to utilise their longer range. But none were sent on any missions yet.
2 DMP was deployed straight into
Nikolayevsk na Amure on 12 April and the 1st Marine Corps formed, with two nearby ordinary rifle divisions. The other two marine divisions were still on their way to join them.
By then, Allied progress in Japan had seen
Hiroshima fall on the south-western tip of Honshu, while the Allies were across the strait and two provinces south of
Nagoya on the approaches to
Tokyo in the south-east of the island. Stalin’s demands for another amphibious expedition grew in their urgency and insistence.
As 20 April came, both these Allied beachheads had expanded, with Allied troops on the outskirts of
Nagoya and
Hiroshima now safely behind Allied lines. Japanese surrender progress was assessed as up to 25.8% (NU of 61.9%). That evening the long-range sub fleet was ordered to
Uchiura Bay for another recon of
Sapporo, as the RBPF was repaired and the new Marine Corps assembled. Not long after they arrived late on 22 April, they were struck hard by enemy naval bombers, most likely based to the south-west at
Akita. By 0600hr the next morning, one flotilla had been sunk and another damaged.
The subs fled as soon as they could, managing to limp back into their bas two days later without losing any more boats. Interestingly, only the older boats had suffered: the Series XIV flotilla was undamaged.
By then, 1st Marine Corps was assembled under LTGEN N.P. Ivanov in
Nikolayevsk na Amure, with three marine and two rifle divisions. However, 2 DMP was not yet battle-ready after its recent initial deployment. Most of the ships in
Okha were either fully or largely repaired and were sent back to join the main fleet in
Nikolayevsk na Amure, while the least seaworthy remained.
Two INT wings were rebased from
Moscow to
Tumnin to provide air cover for any planned amphibious operations, where they could reach out to the southern end of Sakhalin, but not as far as
Sapporo. Work began on the air base at
Tumnin to upgrade it to level 2.
As preparations were finalised on the evening of 26 April for an amphibious attack on
Toyohara, at the southern end of Sakhalin, a mixed group of one MR and one TAC wing was allocated to Theatre
[human] control and ordered to conduct an interdiction mission on
Toyohara, to see if any troops or ships were lurking there. But (frustratingly) the group didn't actually launch a mission at that point.
The naval invasion force set off at 0100hr on 27 April, with the whole of the 1st Marine Corps on board except for 2 DMP, which was still not properly worked up. The RBPF was not completely repaired, but enough for Stalin to make the attempt.
An hour later, with no result from the interdiction mission so far, a logistical raid was ordered instead. It did a little damage to infrastructure and stockpiles, was not opposed in the air and no ground or naval units were reported by the time they returned at 0600hr. The mission was then cancelled, allowing the air group to rest until the invasion began. The INT group would be ordered to start patrolling when the fleet arrived offshore
Toyohara …
… which they did at midnight on 28 April: when all hell broke loose! As soon as they reached the
Gulf of Terpeniya, the RBPF found itself engaging a three-carrier task group on the water while being hit simultaneously from the air by their six CAG wings. Heavy damage began to be taken straight away, especially by the old light cruisers.
Caught napping, the fighters in
Tumnin were immediately ordered to intercept, while the MR-escorted TAC wing was sent to conduct a naval strike on the carrier group, hoping to do some damage and divert the attention of the CAGs that were doing so much damage to the invasion fleet. A group of two NAV bomber wings was ordered to rebase to
Tumnin from up in
Ulya, where they were currently out of range. And the 5th Sub Sqn (the older Series II boats) was ordered to sortie to the
Gulf of Terpeniya to see what they could do.
An hour later, the VVS was engaging the Japanese CAGs as the damage was mounting on the fleet from the enemy’s naval strike, which sank a transport flotilla by 0300hr. Then the CAGs were back at 0500hr, having re-equipped to challenge the Soviet naval strike. By 0600hr all the Soviet wings were getting badly disorganised, while the Japanese suffered little damage themselves.
Kuznetsov was starting to get a little desperate and the NAV group was ordered to put in a naval strike after it arrived at
Tumnin at 0300hr, but this order somehow became garbled and was not carried out. When the strike by the TAC wing finished at 0700hr, they reported having ‘damaged enemy ships’, but not much was apparent on the water, where the weather was poor. And the RBPF was taking more and more damage itself.
The naval battle continued into the middle of 28 April as the Soviet INT and TAC wings originally based in
Tumnin ran out of organisation. The NAV wings were again ordered to strike the enemy fleet once the previous orders ‘SNAFU’ was discovered. But they were unescorted (the VVS fighters apparently unable to fly by then) and badly beaten off by the enemy CAGs flying combat air patrol. Though perhaps they had been briefly diverted from hitting the invasion fleet. By this stage, with all the activity over
Toyohara, it was discovered that two Japanese marine divisions were present in
Toyohara anyway, so any planned landings were abandoned.
Now Kuznetsov just wanted to escape before he lost more ships and especially the transports carrying the 1st Marine Corps. But because the naval battle continued, he could not disengage. Once again, despite extra precautions, with sub and air recons and modest air cover, the Soviets had been comprehensively surprised and badly ambushed.
The Japanese carrier-based dive and torpedo bombers had appeared again at 0800hr. By the time they were finished at 1000hr, another transport flotilla and the old CL
Profintern had been sunk – though none of the ground troops had been lost as yet. The RBPF was now able to break away, at least, with the naval battle formally lost.
The fleet had reached the
Eastern Coast of Shisuka by 1600hr that afternoon and made its best (though not very quick) speed back to sanctuary in
Okha.
By that evening, the Allies had taken
Osaka and were threatening
Kyoto, but had been held up in front of
Nagoya. Then at 2100hr (still 28 April), the RBPF was struck again by enemy CAGs: though this time, there were only two of them (and one seemed to have be effectively destroyed in an earlier dogfight after all, as it was at 0% strength and org). And they had different squadron numbers to those they had fought further south. An hour later, the fleet had slipped north into the
Gulf of Nabil’skiy, but it was clear one of the enemy carriers (or another one) must have been detached to pursue them.
The RBPF was struck once more at 0500hr on 29 April in the
Northern Taratar Strait, just north of the safety of
Okha. In reaction to the renewed CAG strikes, at 0500hr the INT wings in
Tumnin had been ordered to intercept but were heavily damaged and disorganised. The two INT wings based in
Nikolayevsk na Amure had not responded, so were detached from 6th Army command (where they had been supporting land ops under AI control) and ordered directly by Theatre HQ to intercept in the
Northern Taratar Strait. But they had not made contact with the enemy before the fleet reached port. The old CA
Voroshilov, bore the brunt of the attack, but all the ships managed to reach port three hours later without any more being sunk. It was a minor miracle.
The four divisions of 1st Marine Corps soon deployed to help the garrison defeat the existing attack on
Okha described in Section 1 above.
At 1400hr that day, the sole remaining enemy CAG wing conducted a ground attack mission on
Okha, killing 78 defenders. It meant they were still in the area and the enemy task force had just been discovered off the east coast of Sakhalin - where the submarine flotilla despatched a few days before was closing in! It looked like one fleet carrier and two cruisers. The intercept mission was expanded to cover all the way from
Okha to where the enemy had been sighted.
As it happened, the surviving enemy CAG tried to perform another ground attack on
Okha that afternoon, but was jumped by the VVS and badly mauled.
But this did not end the frenetic naval action for the month: at 2000hr, the old Soviet subs found the enemy CTF in the
Gulf of Terpeniya and engaged! Even while the enemy CAG was still off bombing
Okha. Huzzah!
The two escorting enemy heavy cruisers came forward to protect the
Kaga, but there were no screens with the small task force. Perhaps the old subs could actually do some damage. Meanwhile, the VVS declared an air victory over the CAG at
Okha at 2100hr. But unfortunately, as the subs were making their runs against the
Ashigara and
Tone, the
Kaga’s 19th CAG had refuelled and re-equipped. And despite all its damage and disorganisation was still able to strike the subs, causing heavy damage in just an hour or two. The swine! No impression seemed to have been made on the enemy ships at this point.
Belatedly, at 2200hr the still badly damaged fighters in
Tumnin were specifically ordered to provide air cover to the subs but (unlike the Japanese CAG flyers) did not respond accordingly. By the start of 30 April, the Soviet subs were taking more damage from the 19th CAG, but this time the fighters based out of
Nikolayevsk na Amure were able to intercept them at 0100hr, immediately defeating the CAGs.
An hour later, the enemy CTF had broken off and fled south-east. It was declared a Soviet naval ‘victory’, but many of the subs were badly damaged while no discernible damage had been done to the enemy ships. Nonetheless, the sub fleet would return to port claiming a great naval triumph which could be trumpeted in the papers, anyway.
At this point, with naval hostilities apparently over for the time being, the badly degraded NAV and INT wings in
Tumnin were swapped out back to the west for repairs in Mother Russia, replaced by fresh wings from
Leningrad and
Moscow (a 3 x NAV and a 3 x INT group). The RBPF was joined by the ships that had stayed back in
Okha for repairs and had therefore not taken part in the second ill-fated amphibious attempt, then split in two again for more repairs there and in
Nikolayevsk na Amure.
A quick experiment showed that 1st Marine Corps
[under AI control] could not be entrusted to carry out the desired overland attack along Sakhalin down to
Toyohara called for after they had helped beat off the enemy ground attack on
Okha on 30 April
[the AI responded by trying to strategically redeploy them across the strait and down to Tumnin instead]. So they were put back under Theatre command, with 1. DMP and 1st Marine Div in
Okha attacking the two enemy divisions in
Alexandrovsk Skahalinsky at 1400hr on 30 April
[58% progress]. That afternoon, the various INT and TAC wings in the sector were returned to 6th Army
[AI] control for ground support ops. The NAV bombers would be held back for now.
Shortly afterwards, the new INT group engaged an enemy air strike on Soviet troops in
Verkhnetambovskoye, who were attacking
Orlovka. This was desperately needed, as almost 4,000 Soviet troops had been killed by Japanese strikes there since 28 April, while the focus had been on the dramatic sea battles off Sakhalin. They seemed to have now discouraged the enemy air effort, but this would only be known for sure when it all started over again on 1 May.
5. Production, Logistics and Research
As noted above, supply across the front remained a major problem in certain areas throughout the month. Apart from the air unit ‘thinning’ with many wings sent back west mentioned earlier, some land units still drawing supplies up north around
Ulya and beyond were withdrawn and sent down south on 14 April. By the end of the month, there had been a definite improvement south of
Irkutsk and a little in the Central Sector, but elsewhere it varied from patchy to dire.
It may come too late to matter against Japan, but a new landing craft flotilla began construction on 9 April. On 15 April, a fourth para brigade was ordered to supplement the currently three-brigade parachute division.
On 16 April, the expansion of the busy air base in
Tyndinskiy to level six was completed (nine VVS wings currently based there), but no new work was begun as it was hoped it would soon become redundant as the front advanced further. Then on 20 April, the
Nikolayevsk na Amure air base reached level three (six wings based there at present) and work to expand it further was started. There was still one new air base available for deployment, but it was still being kept back in case one of the naval landings or the advance down Sakhalin ever succeeded.
A new rocket test site had been started on 1 April in the hope it would speed up research and/or building of the new strategic rocket arm down the track
[do let me know if that is misplaced optimism, as I’m not familiar with the mechanic and the tool tips and wikis seemed a bit ambiguous about it]. This was accompanied by another big round of infrastructure building to keep improving supply throughput into what now looked like it would be a long-term front, whether against Japan now or the Allies – including China – later.
And after recent progress in sub research, a new flotilla was laid down on 22 April – with the Soviets now able to construct the more modern Series XIV boats themselves.
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On 5 April, with their first nuclear device now 20% completed, nuclear technology advanced to double that production rate, with the next level of research rolled straight into. The first strategic rocket device – the flying bomb – should be ready to commence production in early May. Just in case it might still be relevant when researched, more advanced invasion tactics were pursued when the first level of landing craft support was achieved on 9 April.
TAC ground crew training was improved and continued on 18 April, while the next much-anticipated progress in supply organisation was welcomed and continued on 21 April. At that time, with other demands on Soviet leadership increased (more below), one project was suspended (the recently started TAC training), in order to keep pursuing improved supply throughput (despite the ‘ahead of time’ penalty). By 29 April, more leadership effort had to be directed elsewhere, so the project list was reduced further to 21, heavy bomber crew training not being replaced in the queue.
6. Espionage and Diplomacy
Given the rapid progress of China and of the Allied invasion of Japan, a decision was taken to start courting the other currently pro-Axis Chinese warlord states in the hope of creating some opportunities later. With three diplomatic teams required to launch each such mission and two LS points permanently assigned to maintain each one, the LS assigned to diplomacy steadily increased through the month. At first, this was taken from espionage and (principally) officer training, where the officer pool currently stood at 120%.
The first mission to influence the Guangxi Clique started straight away (ie 2300hr on 31 March). With the extant Spanish and Turkish missions, this required 6 LS points to maintain plus more to rebuild the expended diplomatic teams. This rose to 8 LS on 2 April when Xibei San Ma was added, then to 10 on 20 April when Yunnan made the fifth Soviet influence mission on the books.
It would take some time to bring the three Chinese states to the Comintern, but at present neither the Axis nor Allies were attempting to influence them. The first few had already begun to drift a little to the left.
And on 14 April, a claim for Guandong was added to Soviet war goals for Japan, in the hope of maximising Soviet gains if they surrendered mainly due to Allied encroachments.
[A question here: if Japan hits the surrender threshold and both France and the Soviets have competing puppet and government change goals (as they do here), who gets the territory still unoccupied by either side at that point? Any idea how it is usually broken up between the contenders?]
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By 20 April, the Soviet spy surplus was also beginning to be run down (see summary below) as teams on overseas missions were caught. The reserve was down to 4, with 0.2 LS put back into training spies (it had been reduced to zero in March).
By 22 April, with Manchurian spy strength back up to 3 and Japan to 4, counter-espionage in both was increased from an even balance with disrupting NU. Manchuria went to a 75-25% balance, while in Japan, with the Allies now running rampant, all NU influencing was suspended, with everything going into counter-espionage. When a series of team losses followed and the reserve was down to 1, spy training was trebled on 25 April to 0.6 LS.
Turkish spy strength was now up to 4 and the resurgence in local Communist Party popularity had to be abandoned temporarily, with the effort going back to 100% counter-espionage after a team was lost there that day. When another was captured in Turkey on the 26th, spy training was ramped up to 1 LS, research down to 21 active projects and officer training (where the pool had dropped a little to 119%) was put back to 1.55 LS, with 10.2 currently invested in diplomacy, mainly spent on influencing campaigns with 0.2 on diplomat training.
The increase in counter-espionage efforts saw a number of enemy agents neutralised in their own countries from 22 April onwards, but Soviet losses had been heavy, with nine teams lost (most in Japan and Turkey) and only one produced in April, to just keep each mission at a strength of 10 with no reserve. The Communist party had rebounded in popularity in Turkey but dropped back a little (from 12 to 11%) when the support effort had to be suspended. The Party continued to lose ground to a miniscule 2% in Spain, calling that whole mission into question. Germany, followed by the UK and US, had the most agents caught in the Soviet Union in April.
7. Theatre Summaries
The Far East in general had seen both gains and losses for the Soviets, with only barely better than a stalemate overall. Air power on both sides had caused heavy casualties, ground combat less so (Soviet supply issues having again decreased op tempo). The Soviets had attacked more but the Japanese had won more battles, in fair part due to supply-related ‘no contests’.
By contrast, Nationalist China had liberated nearly all of its former territory, had occupied Communist China (from the Japanese) and was now beginning to push into the south of Japan’s puppet states of Mengukuo and Manchukuo.
In Japan, the Allied invasion had progressed steadily during the month. They now had a solid front across the south of Honshu, but the Japanese had at least been able to halt them for now at
Nagoya with an infantry division in place. However, the British 1st Armd Div was now directly south of
Kanazawa, where the Soviets had failed to land in March. With more Allied units on the way, the Japanese still seemed doomed at home, while they fought on doggedly against the Soviets in Manchuria.
There had been no changes at all during the month in South East Asia, New Guinea or the Pacific.
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Time seemed to be running out for the Soviets to make significant gains in the Far East, while the Allies gobbled up territory. And rather than having a puppeted Japan and neutral China to perhaps allow a ‘victory dividend’ of units sent back west for a possible war in Europe, it appeared a large Soviet presence would have to remain in the east for the foreseeable future, to fight a new two-front war against China and a strong Allied expeditionary presence. The call for strategic weapons to help tip this strategic balance more towards the Soviet’s favour became even more strident.