Note to Readers: This AAR has been in hiatus for almost a year. Now that April is here, I'm going to stir it up again and begin posting, slowly. We're now officially open for business again!
It's also been a year since I've done gameplay, so I don't want to get too far ahead in the AAR so that I'm not sure where the future is going -- I love foreshadowing, so I need to know where it's going. So I may post slowly at first (the next update is already ready, so not TOO slowly...). I do hope you enjoy the reinvigoration of this AAR! If you have lost tabs with it, you might go back a few updates, or you might even want to start from the beginning. This update, and the previous 3, have tracked Operations Griff and Brise -- the two first counteroffensive operations by Germany, against the Soviet invasion of Poland. Keep in mind there are TWO stages to this AAR -- the first, experimental run, and the 2nd where I artificially started a war with the USSR to test out the other potential historical branch. Enjoy!
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Operation Griff – The Southern Front, Part 2
In the first part of August, 1941, the Soviets, having pushed quickly through Poland, had overextended themselves along the Czechoslovak border, and there was hope that Operation Griff could entrap some Soviet divisions there, and elsewhere along that border.
At this very time – the 20th of August – it seemed very like operations in the north, Operation Brise, mounted from northern Poland and East Prussia, might actually succeed in a second attempt to entrap a large number of overextended Russian divisions there. And so confidence was high – it appeared that after initial failures in the north and the south, the Germans were catching onto the game and would succeed in pocketing in either region. However, the earlier failure had infused German generals with a measure of caution. The German Heer was not as wildly superior to the Soviets as had been expected, and the sheer numbers of Communist divisions had proved a waterfall against which it was hard to swim.
Gen. Haase’s 2nd and 9th Panzers (light) had just initiated a spearhead into Pruchnik – his second attempt, the first having been blunted earlier in the operation. Gen. von Thoma was supporting this thrust with a holding action to the north into Rzeszow, with his 6th Panzer (medium).
To the south of the main spearhead, Gen. von Schobert’s 28th Infantry was holding a strong position at Nowy Sacz (essentially occupying the units they hoped to entrap, by allowing them to continue their futile assault), while Gen. Ruoff’s 23rd Infantry put pressure upon the pocket, pinning the units trapped at Nowy Targ, preventing their escape.
Haase’s panzers broke through at 0700 on the morning of the 20th. They quickly set a plan in motion to exploit the breakthrough, and trap the remaining Soviet units, pressing them against the Czech border. The deepest penetration was assigned to Gen. Gudowius’ 2nd Panzer, which was tasked with capturing the airfields at Przemysl, then driving further to Drohobycz to complete the encirclement.
Gen. von Thoma’s 6th Panzers were tasked with holding back the enemy drive at Rzeszow, but against 4 enemy divisions they were quickly disorganized and lost combat effectiveness. When they ceased to advance, once Haase had arrived in Pruchnik, these four Soviet divisions concentrated their might upon the 6th Panzers, which were hard pressed to hold at Gorlitz. His tanks needed rest, badly.
More attacks were being deployed against Gen. Halder’s 13th Motorized Infantry, and the 9th Panzer, trying to hold the neck of the spearhead open, at Pruchnik. That position would hold for a while, but the rest of the operation seemed in question. As with many penetration efforts, it was not clear who was most in danger of being cut off. And with such a numerical advantage for the Soviets, the Germans were unquestionably in danger from their risky gambit.
It was fortunate, all in all, that there was not a huge depth of forces in the Przemysl and Drohobycz area – the Germans had managed to encircle almost all of the divisions in the far south. On the other hand, those pocketed Soviet divisions were not yet feeling the pinch of being out of supply, so they still had potent forces putting pressure upon the inside of the circle.
Stung, the Soviet war machine turned its attention south to extricate its southernmost elements from this trap. At the same time, as much military power as could be managed – on the ground and from the air – was turned against the pocket of trapped Soviet divisions, which were in many cases weakened from the attack upon Nowy Sacz and other operations. But the brunt of Soviet efforts, both from within the pocket and from outside, was concentrated upon the weak link at Pruchnik.
By the 23rd, the attack upon Drohobycz was spent, and Gudowius’ panzers could turn their attention toward pressing the Soviets in the pocket back. Soon after, the attack by the 13th Motorized against Tyrawa Woloska succeeded in forcing the pocket back, simultaneously relieving some of the pressure upon Pruchnik. And then, around 0900, the Soviets relented in the battle against von Thoma’s panzers at Gorlitz.
It began to look as if the thin arc of the spearhead might hold, and the operation would bring victory. But then, an attack was resumed upon Gorlitz by fresher Soviet units from the north. Gen. Leeb’s 3rd Infantry was ordered to attack these units – no fewer than 5 divisions – at Tarnow, lest they roll over Gorlitz. More pressure was brought against Pruchnik, and while it was clear that the Soviet divisions in the pocket were weak and growing weaker with lack of supply, time was running out, as more Soviet divisions were closing in on the field of battle from behind the lines.
In the late evening of the 23rd, rear guard elements of Gudowius’ 2nd Panzer came under increasing fire from skirmishers of an approaching division, arriving from the east. After 4 days of constant action, 2nd Panzer was tired, and not operating as efficiently as could have been wished.
Quickly, Gudowius ordered a halt of the attack upon the pocket. Recognizing his extreme position, and the overall fragility of the whole of Operation Griff, he ordered a retreat toward Przemysl. In hindsight, this was obviously the correct decision. Many were concerned that this doomed Griff to failure, but the situation was changing hour by hour, and it was hoped something could still be salvaged.
On the 24th, the 2nd Panzer had reached Przemysl, but now, since they had previously defeated the enemy at Ozenna, and they were retreating, it appeared that there might yet be an opportunity to salvage the situation. Besides, the territory ahead of him, on the path across the spearhead toward home, were all heavily engaged, and 2nd Panzer would become involved.
Gudowius received approval to run quickly into Ozenna, moving the pocket in just enough to keep Russian units from contacting each other. But now it was a race. There were Soviet units putting pressure upon the whole operation, still, and any victory would be a near run thing.
Once there, they came under attack by the 25th Strelkovaya, which was still fighting to escape the pocket and make contact with their compatriots in the east. Units across the whole of the region were still fighting heavily to reduce the pocket, hopefully to compel a surrender.
Late on the 25th, Gen. Leeb’s 3rd Infantry had become too exhausted to continue the fight to pin or distract Soviet divisions at Tarnow. Now, their full force came to be exerted upon Gorlitz, or upon Leeb’s position at Limanowa. That position weakened and fell on 27 August, and Gen. Leeb was forced to fall back. Fortunately, even if that province fell, that did not directly threaten the escape route – it simply made it longer.
On the morning of the 27th, it seemed all might suddenly be redeemed. The Red Army forces of the pocket holding at Nowy Targ finally gave way, and Gen. Ruoff’s 23rd Infantry advanced. They could be threatening the whole, weakened, center of the pocket by the morning of the next day.
With Gen. Haase’s infantry advancing into Tyrawa Woloska, that could signal the end of the pocket, and the surrender of at least 7 Soviet divisions. The 2nd Panzer would be freed from its own frightening situation, and the whole operation could withdraw in good order with their prisoners and allow the stunned Russians to advance to rescue the ashes that remained.
But that remained but a forlorn hope. Early on the 28th another division in the confused cauldron turned up to halt the advance of the 23rd Infantry, and that fight for Nowy Targ renewed. Soviet light tanks broke through into Pruchnik before the 13th Motorized could reach Tyrawa Woloska, and Gen. Haase diverted west to preserve his force.
A decision was also reached at PanzergruppenKommando Sud, that the onrush of Soviet divisions would have to be stopped by something, and another defensive line could not realistically be formed by a collection of ragtag survivors from a failed operation. Operation Griff was officially called off, despite the 2nd Panzer’s being trapped behind the lines at Ozenna.
Gen. Gudowius’ panzers were, by then, judged to be irretrievably lost. Greater concerns must be given priority. His loss would be mourned, but the Fatherland had to be protected, and there was no other choice.
By this time – on the 29th – Gen. Rommel was already guiding the surviving units (all of them, by God’s blessed mercy) of the failed 2nd stage of Operation Brise to safety in the north. Both operations, during which Germany had hoped to demonstrate her ability to carve off and destroy elements of the Red Army, had failed, except as delaying tactics. And a German Panzer division had been lost. The Russians in the kessel had been saved.
Operation Griff, like Operation Brise, had been an operational failure. But much had been learned about relative capabilities, and operational realities. With the exception of the 2nd Panzers, the hard lesson had come without much cost. In memory of Gudowius, it was demanded that proper improvements and corrections be built from the ashes.