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On the afternoon of September 2, 1939 Hauptmann Hermann Edhofer found himself standing in western Slovakia struggling to come to terms with the reality of the impending Polish invasion. Exactly eleven months before he had stood in a remarkably similar position along the Czechoslovakian border, waiting eagerly alongside the rest of Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99 for the order to invade—an order that was to never come. As it had been in Czechoslovakia there was a subdued restlessness to the atmosphere of 3. Company; however, unlike Czechoslovakia, there was also an uncanny sense of calm among the men of his company. In the days before the postponed invasion of Czechoslovakia, the men had talked of little more than glory, medals, and battle, but here few men openly concerned themselves with anything more important than their next leave. To listen in on them as he had, it seemed as though none of them truly believed they were on the path to war; few even bothered to mention the impending invasion, and those that did were chided for their naiveté and were reminded of the Czechoslovakian and Austrian ‘invasions’. To Edhofer, the men of 3. Company sounded more like a reserve unit of conscripts who would never see the front rather than the elite fighting unit they were supposed to be.
Despite his personal concerns that the reality of the invasion was not being treated with an appropriate amount of respect, Hauptmann Edhofer couldn’t fully blame them for their nonchalance either. Since the annexation of Austria less than two years earlier, this marked the third time that Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99 had been set on high alert and told to prepare for war. Even though he had been made privy to some of the more intimate details of the invasion two days earlier, it still took until 3 Company had arrived at its staging point for the reality of the invasion to set in for him too. “In the trucks, we had not comprehended the nature of our work” he would later write. “It was not until we clamoured out in a wide, steep field and Major Pohl ordered us to begin at once our 3 kilometer march to the border, that it dawned on me as it must have the others: we were finally to have our day of glory.”
In the early morning hours of September 3, after the Polish government refused to cede the Danzig corridor to Germany, Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99 moved into its position along the Polish border towards Cieszyn from Terchová in western Slovakia. At 0500 hours Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99, and all other forces under the command of Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), launched a massive surprise attack on Poland across its shared borders. Nearly 617,000 soldiers participated in the initial attack, along with another 25,000 Luftwaffe personnel and the Reserveflotte of the Kriegsmarine.
However for Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99 and the rest of 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division, it did not turn out to be the day of glory that they had been waiting for. The Polish division previously assigned to Cieszyn had been recalled to defend Katowice before 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division had even crossed the Slovakian-Polish border. In its place, a small Polish reconnaissance platoon had been left to report on the movements of the advancing German troops outside of the town. While Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99 had been tasked with clearing the crossroads at Skoczów 10km east of Cieszyn, Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 100 was assigned to lead the main attack on the Polish defenders from the town of Cieszyn itself. Unaware that their enemy had already abandoned the position, Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 100 stormed the town and engaged the small Polish reconnaissance platoon that had been left to monitor it. The short-lived engagement between Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 100 and the Polish vanguard was to prove the only reported engagement of the day for the entire division. Even though the firefight lasted less than ten minutes, 6 German and 9 Polish soldiers laid dead at its end, bearing the distinction of being among the first casualties of the war.
Unaware that their enemy had already abandoned their position, Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99 and Hauptmann Edhofer’s 3. Company continued to cautiously advance towards the crossroads east of Cieszyn. Before the invasion, intelligence had told 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division to prepare for several days of bitter fighting against “an entrenched and fervent enemy” in the form of the elite 21st Infantry Division. With those briefings in mind, many of the men found themselves brimming with a nervous anticipation that “[was] every bit more terrifying than combat.” Every hill or copse of trees the men of 3. Company passed had within it the potential to hide a bloodthirsty enemy. However, after nearly six hours of anticipating a Polish counterattack that never materialized, 3. Company reached its objective without incident and began the tedious process of preparing a blocking position north of the Skoczów crossroads.
Though the day had not lived up to the expectations of combat for Hauptmann Edhofer and 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division, 200kms north of Cieszyn, over the skies of Kalisz, the day was more than living up to the expectations of combat for I. KG-Fliegerkorps. One of the three medium bomber corps assigned to the invasion, I. Kg.-Fliegerkorps had been tasked with performing its first bombing sortie of the war on the morning of September 3, when elements of its bomber and escort wings were engaged by Polish fighters. Between 0500 and 0730, several hundred German and Polish fighter aircraft engaged in aerial combat over Kalisz in the first, and only, major aerial skirmish of the entire Polish campaign. During the engagement 48 Polish single-engine aircraft were credited as shot down or disabled, with 7./JG 71 pilot Leutnant Hein Vetter scoring three kills, the most tallies of any pilot during the Polish campaign. Though the Luftwaffe was not without its losses, they remained minimal, reporting only 8 single-engine Messerschmitt Bf-109Fs, 11 twin-engine Dornier Do-17s, and only 15 pilots and crewmembers lost in the action.
While not as large in scale as later aerial battles of the war, the Battle of Kalisz did prove to be a decisive defeat for the Polish air force. After Kalisz German bomber groups flew unmolested, as the decimated Polish air force seemed reluctant to again face the numerically and technologically superior Luftwaffe in open battle. Over the course of the first day alone, Luftwaffe records show that 972 single-engine and 648 twin-engine bombers flew more than 2,000 unopposed sorties across western Poland. Decrypted communications and local intelligence reports estimate Polish casualties from bombings between the range of 1,250 and 1,350 killed, in addition to the damage done to bridges, roads, railways and other infrastructure throughout the country. |
German Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers in action above Poland. |
By noon the air battle over Kalisz and the skirmishes that had unfolded across virtually the entire German-Polish border had reinforced OKH’s opinion of the Polish soldier as “third-rate, with little training, or desire, to fight.” Similarly senior German commanders at OKH congratulated themselves for the success of the invasion as intelligence trickled in from the front where it seemed they had achieved overwhelming surprise and put the Polish army off balance.
While the specific day and time of the attack might have come as a surprise to the Polish government, in the months and years leading up to September 3, 1939 it had been no secret in either Germany or Poland that a war was on the horizon. Intelligence gathered in Poland by the Abwehr (the German intelligence agency) suggested that the western Polish military command had knowledge of the German build-up along the border as early as March; however if the Polish western command had any indication of the plan starting in September, their defenses on the first day of battle did not show it.
In truth the plan for the invasion of Poland had been in existence in one form or another since as early as August, 1937. Originally, the plan for the invasion of Poland was to be conducted simultaneously with an invasion of Czechoslovakia; however after the First Vienna Award partitioned Czechoslovakia, the plan to invade Poland was again redrafted and resubmitted for approval to OKH. By June, 1939, after several additional revisions to accommodate the growing forces in the east (mostly from redeployed units that had been scheduled to invade Czechoslovakia) preparations for the plan were put into motion and a September launch date decided.
Codenamed ‘Fall Weiß’ (Case White), the final plan proposed to use “maximum effective force” that would aim to cause the unconditional surrender of the Polish government within two weeks, a timetable that was deemed vital for the success of the operation. If the German army became embroiled in a prolonged campaign in the east, the British and French armies would be able to mount an offensive against the weakly defended German western front; however if Poland could be neutralized quickly the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact signed in June guaranteed a neutral Soviet-German border, allowing the German army to comfortably redeploy the bulk of its army to the west to launch offensive operations of its own.
In order to achieve the rapid victory proposed in the plan, the invasion was organized into three main thrusts:
Firstly, 1. Panzerarmee, under General Von Knochenhauer, was to advance northeast from Breslau with the objective of penetrating deep into Polish territory, and capturing Lodz and Warszawa within the first week. VI. Panzerkorps and Kavallerie-Kommando Insterburg would meanwhile provide support for I. Panzerarmee from Prussia by securing the vital defensive network at Modlin, north of Warszawa, and crossings on the Vistula and Bug rivers respectively. |
The main advance for OKH, with 1. Panzerarmee advancing on Warszawa; in the west two pockets are expected at Poznan (west) and Kalisz (south); in the north 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division is expected to land at Torun. |
| Secondly, in the Danzig corridor, I. Armeekorps would cross the river Vistula at Tczew, linking up with II. Armeekorps and encircling Danzig. To support the attack, XXII. Armeekorps was to attack south from Königsberg towards Wloclavek, with support from 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division, which was to capture the airfield at Torun. This attack by XXII. Armeekorps would cut off any Polish divisions retreating from the Danzig corridor and trap them in a pocket of resistance at Chelmno. Meanwhile, from the Meseritz Line in Germany, IV. Panzerkorps in the north and I. Panzerkorps in the south were to exploit openings north and south of Poznan; linking up at the Warta River, they would encircle the westernmost Polish divisions in a pocket at Poznan, while also sealing off the Danzig corridor from the rest of Poland. 2. Armee and 4. Armee would then sweep eastward from the Meseritz Line to pressure the pocket around Poznan until it collapsed. |
The planned advance for the encirclement of Danzig. In yellow: the planned pocket at Danzig (north), and Chelmno (center). |
Lastly, Heeresgruppe C was to capture Krakow and Lwów. 7. Armee would attack through Katowice and then move to secure the area north of Krakow; III. Panzerkorps would simultaneously attack Krakow directly, trapping any divisions south of Katowice in a pocket at Cesky Tesin and Cieszyn. Meanwhile, 6. Armee was to advance north from eastern Slovakia towards Debica; upon arrival, XII. Armeekorps would advance east and capture Lwów while VII. Armeekorps continued north to capture the industrial center of Lublin.
By the end of the first week, the German army was expected to have captured Warszawa and Lublin at which point 1. Panzerarmee would wheel east and link up with 6. Armee along the Bug river, trapping any Polish divisions remaining in southwestern Poland between 1. Panzerarmee in the northwest, 7. Armee in the south, 3. Armee in the west and 6. Armee in the east. |
The planned advance for Heeresgruppe C. The yellow line represents the planned pocket, while the green line in the northwest is to be held by 1. Panzerarmee on their route to capture to Warszawa; in the east the blue represents 6. Armee’s objectives at the Bug river; note also 6. Armee is erroneously referred to as 7. Armee (two aides have since been fired). |
The plan was ambitious for its timetable, more than its outcome. German military intelligence regarded the German army as vastly outnumbering the Polish army in the west; as well, the average Polish division was regarded as being equipped with dated equipment, which “[would] result in a sure German victory”. What German military intelligence couldn’t predict, however, was how quickly that victory would be achieved. If Polish forces could not be adequately contained in pockets away from the main German objectives, but were instead allowed to retreat and prepare defensive lines around Warszawa and the Vistula river, German military planners estimated that a war in Poland could last as long as three months, which would be enough time for the British and French armies in the west to organize and launch a counterattack of their own. From the first hours of the invasion, however, it seemed that the Polish army had little hope of lasting to the end of the week, let alone the month.
By 1800 hours on September 3 the northwestern Polish front around Rogozno had collapsed. North of Rogozno, Model’s 10. Panzer-Division had completed a stunning breakthrough against the Polish 15th Infantry Division in Wiecbork, and in doing so had created an opening for the rest of IV. Panzerkorps. With forward elements of the Polish division initially outmanoeuvered and surrounded by 10. Panzer-Division, the Polish infantry managed to offer only lackluster resistance against the surging panzers. With the help of their newly minted Wz. 35 anti-tank rifle, which proved to be effective against even the heavier PzKpfw.IIIs, the Polish division was able to hold its ground long enough for the encircled Polish regiment to fight through its encirclement and rejoin its division. By 1430 hours, however, the situation around Wiecbork had become hopeless for the Poles and the division was forced to retreat in the face of mounting casualties at the hands of Model’s 10. Panzer-Division. Though the 59th Infantry Regiment had managed to escape encirclement it, and the rest of the 15th Infantry Division, had paid the high price of 635 dead for a single day of fighting. Among those, the 59th Infantry Regiment totalled the most casualties at 464 dead, the highest of any Polish regiment for that day.
Model’s 10. Panzer-Division, alternatively, proved overwhelmingly successful during engagements throughout the day, losing only 4 tanks and counting 73 men wounded and 45 killed. Though the escape of 59th Infantry Regiment was a bitter end to the day’s fighting, 10. Panzer-Division had still managed to achieve its objective of opening an avenue of advance through the Polish defences. As well, in order to avoid being encircled by the advance of IV. Panzerkorps, the Polish 24th and 30th Infantry Divisions were forced to withdraw from their engagements at Wronki and Rogozno.
By day’s end the Wehrmacht had made gains on all fronts, and met determined resistance during only a few; however, and most importantly for the campaign, all attacking Panzerkorps had won their objectives for the day. While 10. Panzer-Division had opened up the flank northwest of Poznan, 1. Panzer-Division had smashed through Krotoszyn in the southeast threatening to close the Poznan pocket; 1. SS-Standarte ‘Deutschland’ and 68. Infanterie-Division (mot) had meanwhile forced a Polish retreat from Krepice, opening an avenue of attack towards Warszawa. Including 10. Panzer-Division’s attack on Wiecbork, German Panzer and motorized divisions had suffered only 288 casualties for the day (104 killed and 184 wounded), plus 17 Panzers knocked out of action, while inflicting an estimated 1,630 killed on the Polish defenders.
Though, despite their wide ranging successes of the day, it had not been all glory for the Wehrmacht. 3. Armee, among which 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division counted itself, had advanced on its objectives in the early morning of September 3, only to find that the bulk of the Polish divisions had already pulled back to defend other objectives, with the only exception being the 27th Infantry Division who was engaged in heavy fighting with the 2. and 3. Gebirgsjäger-Divisions at Cesky Tesin. For 3. Company and the rest of 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division, however, the prevailing notion was that they had again been cheated of battle. As the Gebirgsjägers waited for a battle that was seemingly forever out of their reach, a small part of Hauptmann Edhofer couldn’t help but wonder if 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division was being purposely given assignments of the lowest priority as a penance.
While 3. Company uneventfully consolidated its position throughout the night of September 3-4, 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division was making history. At approximately 0210 hours the first elements of 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division, led by Student, performed the first combat jump in history. Landing north of Torun, the paratroopers would deny the Polish army access to the region’s strategic airfield and screen the advance of XXII. Armeekorps. The airfield, undefended and unused by the Polish air force, proved to be an easy objective for the division and by dawn on September 4, the paratroopers were able to secure their objectives without incident. |
German Fallschirmjägers of 1. Fallschirmjäger-Division landing outside of Torun. |
As the night of September 3-4 proved another loss for the Polish with the surrender of Torun, by dawn on September 4 the Polish army had begun to rally across the western front. Commanders were ordered to launch local counteroffensives where possible to halt the German advance, and to hold their ground. In southern Poland, along the Slovakian-Polish border, German 7. Armee had already made substantial gains against the Polish garrison inside the city of Katowice and was threatening to push the Polish division from its streets. Losing Katowice threatened to cut off 27th Infantry Division who was already tangled in a losing engagement at Cesky Tesin. Emboldened by the orders of the day to counterattack, 12th Infantry Division launched an offensive towards its former position at Cieszyn. The attack, it was hoped, would provide an escape route for 27th Infantry Division and allow both divisions to escape the encirclement in the south.
At approximately 0800 hours Hauptmann Edhofer and 3. Company came under heavy small arms and mortar fire at their position north of the crossroads at Skoczów. Vital for both the Gebirgsjägers and the Polish divisions, the crossroads provided a route to Bielsko Biala, which in turn provided a route to Krakow and out of the German pocket. 3. Company and the rest of I. Battalion had been sent north to form a defensive line in the hills overlooking the crossroads. Anchoring the battalion’s left flank along a sparsely wooded ridge, Hauptmann Edhofer and 3. Company found themselves exposed to the brunt of the Polish attack. Normal German defensive doctrine was to form a defensive line in depth instead of length, so as to avoid leaving any company exposed as 3. Company was now; however Major Pohl, commander of I. Battalion had decided the terrain and various avenues of attack towards the crossroads made defending in-depth impractical.
Despite their exposed position, the Polish attack that hit 3. Company was repulsed with ease. Though the entire battalion was under attack across its length, by “an enemy of unknown strength”, 3. Company was the first to repulse their attack. Hauptmann Edhofer had found himself to “[be] proud of 3. Company’s performance and poise in defeating their first enemy attack with a professional disposition.” Though the main attack had been quickly blunted by 3. Company, German and Polish positions continued to exchange fire and mortar rounds as the Poles continued to apply pressure on the Gebirgsjägers. Sensing an opportunity as the Polish opposition slackened, Hauptmann Edhofer quickly organized a platoon to counterattack towards the Polish lines. Having had nearly 24 hours to study the terrain ahead of him and perform reconnaissance of the area, Edhofer was confident that he had a sufficient enough lay of the land to lead an attack through it.
At 0930, as the Polish attack had whittled to only sporadic sniper fire from both sides, Hauptmann Edhofer ordered the platoon to advance through the hilly terrain ahead of them. So unexpected was the counterattack that the German platoon had pushed deep into the Polish lines by 1000 hours and had come into contact with a relatively undefended Polish battalion headquarters. The Poles, caught unaware by the sudden appearance of some 40 armed Germans, surrendered to the Gebirgsjäger after only a short firefight. An hour later, Edhofer’s 3. Company had returned to their defensive line with 34 prisoners in tow, 12 of who were officers, including the Polish battalion commander. For his role in the counterattack on September 4 Hauptmann Edhofer was awarded the Order of the Iron Cross, 2nd Class. After Edhofer’s counterattack, the Polish attack at Skoczów fell into disarray, which allowed Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99 to organize itself for a regiment-wide counterattack. Attempting to outflank the Polish division on the right, Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99 would cut off the escape of the 12th division and trap them in the pocket at Cesky Tesin.
With the Polish in disarray and offering no more attacks on the battalion’s lines, Hauptmann Edhofer took the time between attacks to assess the strength of his company’s position. Checking in with his platoons, Edhofer was surprised at just how little damage the Poles had inflicted on the Gebirgsjägers. They had lost no equipment in either the attack or counterattack, and only counted three men wounded. Though they may have seemed hardly prepared for combat two days earlier, the successes of those initial engagements was enough to renew any lost faith Hauptmann Edhofer may have had in his men. |
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