Johan,
Everything detailed in the diary is excellent. I do hope WE, even if the same function, is significantly more severe, with commensurate WS pressures in favor of quick peaces for the loser. It would also be nice to see some dynamism in the WE and (closely related) WS systems-colonial wars; suspension of WE gain (or even a WE fall) with no own-provinces occupied, no troops on foreign soil, no foreign troops on own-soil; gradual WS gain for occupation of claimed province (preferably scaled to WE), etc. It would also be nice to see variable-length truces, at least in MP between humans, or even two distinct options-a truce, which leaves occupied provinces occupied but ends hostilities and lowers WE for a variable length, and a treaty, which works as truce does now.
But overall, and considering a lot of that is for the diplomatic system, very pleased.
What worries me is the two line reference to the military system. Obviously, that'll get its own DD someday, but I figure I might as well start the pleading (again) now
:
1. Navies-I don't necessarily infer what others have (that naval reinforcement will drawn down manpower), but in case they're right, I hope the naval draw on manpower isn't as simple as all that. The new trade system seems to aim at one of EU II/III's greatest flaws, that fleets are basically giant floating armies suffering (in EU II) less attrition as they grow larger, always concentrated, and coming cheap. Instead of linking the navy to manpower, why not a separate Naval Infrastructure system that requires investments of power, money, tech, ideas, manpower, and buildings to fund? Sailors and soldiers are not fungible, and particularly in the latter portion of the game sailors were vastly more valuable one-to-one than all but the most specialized soldiers (artillery, veteran cavalry in some armies). Likewise, and perhaps to an even greater degree, naval officers were more valuable than army officers of equivalent rank. Sailors and naval officers were more difficult to recruit, required much longer and more expensive training, and were commensurately more difficult to replace. One of the reasons, indeed the primary reason, the French navy lost the Napoleonic Wars while the French army was winning was that Napoleon could not create a new navy as he could a new army. The experienced sailors were disproportionately royalist, and the naval officers overwhelmingly turned emigre (or died) during the Terror. New sailors, new officers, and bottom-of-the-barrel commanders lacked the experience, or, in the latter case, the talent, no matter how many tons the navy displaced. There was not, and could not be, an Admiral Jean Lannes; indeed, there was not, because there could not be, an Admiral Napoleon, even if the man himself strapped on a cutlass.
Simply drawing down manpower ignores all of this and does nothing more than better balance naval power against land when choosing how to allocate resources. Well, yes, that ought to be done, but much better, I think, to require sustained, significant investment in naval power that can be lost in naval disasters (i.e., a Naval Manpower pool, smaller and much slower replenishing).
2. As for naval reinforcement, I hope this is limited to ships in home ports. And speaking of, I hope the number of harbors capable of sheltering large ships/squadrons is greatly reduced and ports, to repair and build ships, expensive province improvements.
3. On land reinforcement and attrition, WE should obviously affect both, but it's not very useful if 1) attrition remains relatively flat (mostly the same between provinces and seasons, and capped at 5%-the attrition rate in armies until the end of the 18th century was vastly higher than this and largely absorbed reinforcements all on its own) and 2) reinforcements continue to reach armies over vast distances with no meaningful supply lines (especially over sea).
Everything detailed in the diary is excellent. I do hope WE, even if the same function, is significantly more severe, with commensurate WS pressures in favor of quick peaces for the loser. It would also be nice to see some dynamism in the WE and (closely related) WS systems-colonial wars; suspension of WE gain (or even a WE fall) with no own-provinces occupied, no troops on foreign soil, no foreign troops on own-soil; gradual WS gain for occupation of claimed province (preferably scaled to WE), etc. It would also be nice to see variable-length truces, at least in MP between humans, or even two distinct options-a truce, which leaves occupied provinces occupied but ends hostilities and lowers WE for a variable length, and a treaty, which works as truce does now.
But overall, and considering a lot of that is for the diplomatic system, very pleased.
What worries me is the two line reference to the military system. Obviously, that'll get its own DD someday, but I figure I might as well start the pleading (again) now
:1. Navies-I don't necessarily infer what others have (that naval reinforcement will drawn down manpower), but in case they're right, I hope the naval draw on manpower isn't as simple as all that. The new trade system seems to aim at one of EU II/III's greatest flaws, that fleets are basically giant floating armies suffering (in EU II) less attrition as they grow larger, always concentrated, and coming cheap. Instead of linking the navy to manpower, why not a separate Naval Infrastructure system that requires investments of power, money, tech, ideas, manpower, and buildings to fund? Sailors and soldiers are not fungible, and particularly in the latter portion of the game sailors were vastly more valuable one-to-one than all but the most specialized soldiers (artillery, veteran cavalry in some armies). Likewise, and perhaps to an even greater degree, naval officers were more valuable than army officers of equivalent rank. Sailors and naval officers were more difficult to recruit, required much longer and more expensive training, and were commensurately more difficult to replace. One of the reasons, indeed the primary reason, the French navy lost the Napoleonic Wars while the French army was winning was that Napoleon could not create a new navy as he could a new army. The experienced sailors were disproportionately royalist, and the naval officers overwhelmingly turned emigre (or died) during the Terror. New sailors, new officers, and bottom-of-the-barrel commanders lacked the experience, or, in the latter case, the talent, no matter how many tons the navy displaced. There was not, and could not be, an Admiral Jean Lannes; indeed, there was not, because there could not be, an Admiral Napoleon, even if the man himself strapped on a cutlass.
Simply drawing down manpower ignores all of this and does nothing more than better balance naval power against land when choosing how to allocate resources. Well, yes, that ought to be done, but much better, I think, to require sustained, significant investment in naval power that can be lost in naval disasters (i.e., a Naval Manpower pool, smaller and much slower replenishing).
2. As for naval reinforcement, I hope this is limited to ships in home ports. And speaking of, I hope the number of harbors capable of sheltering large ships/squadrons is greatly reduced and ports, to repair and build ships, expensive province improvements.
3. On land reinforcement and attrition, WE should obviously affect both, but it's not very useful if 1) attrition remains relatively flat (mostly the same between provinces and seasons, and capped at 5%-the attrition rate in armies until the end of the 18th century was vastly higher than this and largely absorbed reinforcements all on its own) and 2) reinforcements continue to reach armies over vast distances with no meaningful supply lines (especially over sea).
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