The Mediterranean Option, 1940-1941
In November 1940 the RN completed its 'island-hopping' mopping up with the conquest of Sardinia. Once more, a mixed force of regular Italian infantry and Fascist militias, surrounded by ocean and under bombardment from naval guns, provided scant resistance to an amphibious assault.
It is often claimed that it was the remarkable success against Italian troops which led Churchill to embark on the so-called 'Italian strategy'. As we shall see, this is only part of the picture.
By the end of 1940, Axis expansion was at a pause. British naval dominance ensured that both North Sea and Mediterranean were unsuitable for Axis offensives. The only dishes on the Axis menu were in Southern and Eastern Europe, where Hitler had carefully been building a system of alliances. Conquest and subjugation of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and then Turkey would present a very real threat of German ground troops threatening the Middle East; unless Hitler felt the gamble orf war wit hte Soviet Union worthwhile.
While the Axis's offensive options were limited, those for the Allies were even more so. Intelligence estimates suggested the Germans possessed 150 divisions (including 10 Panzer divisions), the Italians 50 and Hungary and Romania 50 between them. If Japan entered the war then another 150 divisions could be added, even if most of those troops were committed on the Chinese mainland.
By comparison, the Allies' total land forces were less than 100 divisions, 60 of which were British. While the Axis possessed the virtue of geographic concentration, Allied recruiting grounds and the interests they protected were strung out across the globe.
It would take years before the Allied war machines could gear up to take the Germans head-on. In the meantime, extending the alliance and tipping the hand of Russia towards the Allied cause was the most effective strategy.
Churchill came to the conclusion that there was no more effective method of undermining the Axis than the removal of the secondary player. If only the surrender of Italy could be achieved then the Axis bubble would be burst, and the USSR might join the Allies in demolishing German power.
The conquest of Italy would be no easy trick: as yet, no-one had taken on the Axis on mainland Europe and won. It also introduced the risk of a land war in Europe which the Allies were unprepared for.
However, Italy played to every British advantage - and every German disadvantage.
German success was based on mobile warfare: encirclement of enemy units by tanks. Italy presented an extremely narrow front, making armoured encirclement difficult: particularly as the rugged terrain is not best suited for Panzers, unlike France or Poland. Furthermore, British naval superiority meant that any armoured breakthrough could itself be encircled by an amphibious landing to the rear!
Allied planners were confident that the Italian front could be held against German counterattacks, at either the Alps or in the Apennine hills. An anti-Mussolini government would be set up calling for a struggle of national liberation.
In December 1940, the decision to go ahead with this ambitious plan was made and the stage set for Operation Double-Barrel, the Allied invasion of Italy.
In November 1940 the RN completed its 'island-hopping' mopping up with the conquest of Sardinia. Once more, a mixed force of regular Italian infantry and Fascist militias, surrounded by ocean and under bombardment from naval guns, provided scant resistance to an amphibious assault.
It is often claimed that it was the remarkable success against Italian troops which led Churchill to embark on the so-called 'Italian strategy'. As we shall see, this is only part of the picture.
By the end of 1940, Axis expansion was at a pause. British naval dominance ensured that both North Sea and Mediterranean were unsuitable for Axis offensives. The only dishes on the Axis menu were in Southern and Eastern Europe, where Hitler had carefully been building a system of alliances. Conquest and subjugation of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and then Turkey would present a very real threat of German ground troops threatening the Middle East; unless Hitler felt the gamble orf war wit hte Soviet Union worthwhile.
While the Axis's offensive options were limited, those for the Allies were even more so. Intelligence estimates suggested the Germans possessed 150 divisions (including 10 Panzer divisions), the Italians 50 and Hungary and Romania 50 between them. If Japan entered the war then another 150 divisions could be added, even if most of those troops were committed on the Chinese mainland.
By comparison, the Allies' total land forces were less than 100 divisions, 60 of which were British. While the Axis possessed the virtue of geographic concentration, Allied recruiting grounds and the interests they protected were strung out across the globe.
It would take years before the Allied war machines could gear up to take the Germans head-on. In the meantime, extending the alliance and tipping the hand of Russia towards the Allied cause was the most effective strategy.
Churchill came to the conclusion that there was no more effective method of undermining the Axis than the removal of the secondary player. If only the surrender of Italy could be achieved then the Axis bubble would be burst, and the USSR might join the Allies in demolishing German power.
The conquest of Italy would be no easy trick: as yet, no-one had taken on the Axis on mainland Europe and won. It also introduced the risk of a land war in Europe which the Allies were unprepared for.
However, Italy played to every British advantage - and every German disadvantage.
German success was based on mobile warfare: encirclement of enemy units by tanks. Italy presented an extremely narrow front, making armoured encirclement difficult: particularly as the rugged terrain is not best suited for Panzers, unlike France or Poland. Furthermore, British naval superiority meant that any armoured breakthrough could itself be encircled by an amphibious landing to the rear!
Allied planners were confident that the Italian front could be held against German counterattacks, at either the Alps or in the Apennine hills. An anti-Mussolini government would be set up calling for a struggle of national liberation.
In December 1940, the decision to go ahead with this ambitious plan was made and the stage set for Operation Double-Barrel, the Allied invasion of Italy.
