The Year of Preparation
Part 2: Operation Scipio 1, January 25 – January 31, 1938
January 25, the day that Italian forces first engaged Spanish forces, marked the start of the land phase of the combined arms operation, codenamed “Scipio.” Scipio had three major primary objectives: acquiring a land border with Gibraltar, capturing Cartagena and linking up the two Italian beachheads into a single one. Secondary objectives included lengthening the border with Gibraltar by conquering Montellano and generally expanding the beachhead to the furthest measures possible. The Nationalist Spanish were bound to be unhappy with whatever the Italians did on the Iberian peninsula, and any territory occupied by the Italians rather than their Spanish Fascist demi-comrades could only weaken the Nationalists. It would anger them as well, but Mussolini was confident about the capabilities of his armies as compared to those of the Nationalists if war came, though he deemed it unlikely.
The Republicans did not take kindly to Italy’s declaration of war, or to Mussolini’s obvious intent to annex considerable tracts of southern Spain. In a gallant attempt to see the Italian interlopers and invaders off, the remnants of the Republican fleet sallied out of their berths at Cartagena to attack Italian fleet and transport units in the area. The best Italian intelligence estimates placed the Republican force at two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and two squadrons of destroyers. Ghé, Iachino and Brivonesi closed to engage with their combined battle fleets, as Campioni launched bombers from his two light carriers to aide them. It is difficult to piece together what occurred, as no formal report of the battle was ever filed and Italian ship logs were sketchy on details. What seems to have transpired is that the Republican warships closed with the transports and ran amok in them, sinking two flotillas completely and damaging ships from the other two. Mussolini’s decision to provide empty transports as distractions paid off; all of Messe’s and Caracciolo di Feroleto’s soldiers gained the shore. In return for these empty victories, the battleship RM Caio Duilio sank the light cruiser ARE Canarias and the heavy cruiser ARE España. Furthermore, the battleship RM Conte di Cavour sank the light cruiser ARE Almirante Cervera; the heavy cruiser RM San Giorgio sank all the warships of the Flotilla de Torpederas No. 1; the heavy cruiser RM Bolzano sank the light cruiser ARE Libertad and, finally, her sister ship the RM Trieste sank the Flotilla de Torpederas No. 2. In sum, for two flotillas of transports, the Spanish lost one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers and two flotillas of destroyers. Only one heavy cruiser and one light cruiser escaped to fight again another day. Campioni’s aircraft seemed not to have contributed overly much to this victory; it was the triumph of the gun rather than the bomb.
The battle of the Western Algerian Coast, for which a report was never filed despite being a smashing Italian victory.
By the end of the 25th, the Italian forces were firmly ashore both west and east of Granada. Roatta immediately ordered that Scattini and Bitossi advance, one toward Montellano and the other toward Ronda. Mancinelli and Giorgis were ordered to hold position, so as not to strain what little supply lines existed in Roatta’s beachhead. The hope was that Scattini and Bitossi would be able to achieve their objectives before the limited amount of supplies transferred ashore from the transports ran out and before the Nationalists stole those objectives away from Roatta.
Roatta’s advances into the near Spanish hinterland around Gibraltar.
At the same time, the beachhead east of Granada was exploding into activity. In a calculated risk, Pintor ordered that headquarters units push forward with frontline units. with that order in mind, his own army headquarters moved to occupy Adra, just east of Granada. Gambara’s corps headquarters took upon itself to attempt the rush to link up with Roatta’s forces. He began advancing along the Guadix-Montejìcer-Alcalá la Real. Nicolosi advanced toward Lorca, and Frattini toward Macael. The most important part of the beachhead was, for obvious reasons, the very eastward point, where Caracciolo di Feroleto and Messe landed and immediately pushed toward Cartagena. Without Cartagena, the entire operation would fall apart.
Italian advances out of the eastern beachhead.
At Cartagena, Caracciolo di Feroleto and Messe together commanded four brigades, two of infantry and two of mountaineers. Against these the Republicans fielded but a single brigade, without a noteworthy commander. The Spanish attempted to use the mountains as a bulwark which they could defend and upon which they anticipated the Italians to break. The Spanish must have had an unflattering opinion of Italian combat prowess given their previous near debacle in Abyssinia and Somalia. The two Italian commanders quickly worked out a plan: Caracciolo di Feroleto would attack head on to fix Spanish attentions on his forces. Messe would utilize his mountaineers to outflank the entrenched defenders and put them to flight. After four days of combat and maneuver, the Spanish were put to flight with 450 casualties out of a full strength of 3,000. The Italians lost 43 men of 12,000.
The battle of Cartagena.
By the morning of the 30th, Messe and Caracciolo di Feroleto were advancing into Cartagena. Nicolosi had occupied Lorca and was pushing on toward Caravaca. Frattini had reached Macael and was advancing on Baza. Adra had fallen to Pintor’s headquarters, and Gambara had occupied Guadix and was marching on Montejìcer. East of Granada, everything was developing well. West of Granada, Roatta’s corps had run out of supplies and steam just short of its objectives and could only watch in frustrated helplessness as the Nationalists swooped in to occupy both Montellano and Ronda. The western beachhead had accomplished its primary objective of achieving a border with Gibraltar, but had failed to lengthen it. Roatta could now only wait and hope that Gambara was able to link up and allow the flow of supplies to begin from Cartagena.
The eastern beachhead expanding.
By the end of the next day, the end of January, both Caravaca and Baza had fallen. Cartagena was occupied as well, and Italian convoy ships began sailing. Montejìcer was taken, and Gambara was pushing onward toward Alcalá la Real with utmost speed. He had real need, as the Nationalists seemed equally determined to take that town for themselves and liberate Granada. Such a move would permanently split the two Italian beachheads and complicate logistics matters to a large extent. Gambara was so intent on his race that he had not even yet given orders to Nicolosi or Frattini to continue their respective advances upon their recent conquests.
The race to link the beachheads up, at the expense of the Nationalists.
With Cartagena fallen, the remnants of the Republican fleet that had berthed there were exiled to the sea and the waiting guns of the Italian fleet. Additionally, with the port in working condition and few Republican forces in the vicinity, the Italian eastern beachhead was set to expand at a breathtaking pace. After a discouraging beginning concerning secondary objectives, Operation Scipio was about to succeed beyond Mussolini’s wildest dreams.