Chapter XIV – Politics in Motion
The new sultan was of a peaceful and, some would say, compassionate temperament. Having witnessed the revolutions of the previous years, he had resolved to change the Tunisian political system to one more adaptable to the people’s needs. But old interests had become entrenched and old traditions had entwined themselves to the national myth. Still, for all the conservatism and bloodshed, there was one particular vocal element of the population which would not be silenced, and which could succeed in swaying the rest of the population. It was women demanding the right to vote. So, when in July a Study Circle was formed in Tunis by the Suffragettes, the sultan endorsed their activity. When, in September, they marched through mud in the streets of Tunis, the sultan expressed his understanding and support. When in January of 1923 Suffragettes made a scene at the World Anti-Slavery Convention, the sultan decried the discrimination against them as silly. His words carried the weight of a ruling dynasty into every Tunisian household, and with Tunisian women becoming more assertive with this royal backing, the men had to play along.
So, by January 1924, the largest voting bloc in the upper house was the Liberals, and they succeeded in giving the vote to the poor, under a weighted system, as a first step.
The sultan, seeing the Liberal Faction come into prominence, and curious to see how they would do things differently in running the country, appointed them in the lower house in December of that same year. They immediately pursued a laissez faire economic policy, which increased the nation’s revenue while allowing for lower taxes, at a cost of marginally higher unemployment and the shutting down of a few dye factories. In January 1925 the Suffragettes redoubled their efforts, and the increased militancy helped the new government pass an amendment which gave equal voting rights to all men – not yet women, since they lacked the required majority to pass such a resolution by the slimmest possible margin.
There was still some way to go, but Tunis was visibly making progress, at least politically. The social situation, which was the people’s greatest concern, came to a crisis in July, when under special circumstances an acceptable minimum wage reform was passed summarily by the upper house.
The lack of minimum wage was the great rallying cry among communists and other anti-establishment groups, and now their greatest demand was granted, more generously than they could hope to have achieved in any other way. The sultan and his cabinet hoped that this would have been enough. A show of good will, radical political and social reforms happening in rapid succession, proof that Tunis was changing. But people’s perceptions carry much inertia, and the leaders of the crowds that had until so very recently called for armed struggle weren’t about to be sidelined so easily. Even after the law was passed, nothing appeared to have changed.
In early September, Tunisian brigades infiltrated by communist instructors rebelled against their commands and had to be disarmed by force, sometimes in battles that lasted for many days. It was a prelude to revolution, for a couple of weeks later, the great masses of the people followed.
Less than two weeks after that, the Reactionaries rose up in arms as well. Much weaker than the Communists, they nevertheless joined the latter in Turning the Tunisian Empire into a bloody battleground once more. The sultan sulked, after giving his army the authorization to quell the uprisings, killing anyone who put up a resistance. The Civil War of 1925 was less bloody than the Revolution of 1915, and didn’t last as long, but it would be remembered as the last great uprising in modern Tunisian history, a cleansing by fire of fanatical elements on both sides of the political spectrum. In January 1926, women’s suffrage was made a reality by the liberal majority in the upper house and a month later the sultan appointed the Royal Faction back at the lower house to restore some balance and help with the healing of the social fabric.
The return to state capitalism saw a small drop in unemployment, though Tunis’ short laissez faire stage was not particularly disruptive. Industry continued to bloom regardless of whether the state or the capitalists were making the decisions and so it was that in June 1926 Tunis became ranked 2nd in the world, surpassing the United States of America.
It was a proud moment, the culmination of decades of struggle and the highest pinnacle of glory Tunis could hope to achieve in this half-century. Most of the credit went to the hordes of Tunisian craftsmen who supplied the world with the majority of its fuel, airplanes, automobiles and electric gear, and much of its telephones.
Small bands of anarcho-liberals tried to ruin the festivities by staging an uprising a week after the announcement, but they were too few and too weak to be anything other than a mild annoyance. The militant anarcho-liberal movement was effectively ended.
By 1927, Tunis was once again politically stable and could afford to look outwards with little risk of uprisings. Muhhamad VI’s earlier peaceful temperament had been shocked to numbness by the revolutions, and he was willing to entertain plans laid out by his cabinet for the expansion of Tunisian power in Africa. When a casus belli presented itself against the Netherlands he was unwilling to stand up to a parliament urging for military action, and so war was declared on 23 February 1927, claiming Halaib Region (the big one just south of Egypt).
Prussia and the Ottoman Empire came to the Netherlands’ assistance, clearly outnumbering the Tunisian army on paper: 327 brigades in the Dutch army plus 237 brigades in the Ottoman army plus 64 brigades in the Prussian army against 146 brigades in the Tunisian army. But the Tunisian brigades were armed with chemical weapons, while the navy, equipped with cruisers, could ensure that the enemy were blockaded and unable to transfer new armies to Africa or the Middle East (with the exception of the Ottoman Empire).
For the first few months, the Tunisian armies acted mostly defensively, absorbing the shock of the Dutch African armies before counterattacking, while also trying to set up a front in Syria.
After half a year of operations, the Dutch armies had been eliminated in all African theatres and the Ottomans were almost expelled from Libya. However, Ottoman pressure in Lebanon was great and at one point even Beirut fell to an enemy army before being retaken days later. There was talk of adding the Libyan Coast to the wargoals in the cabinet but the United Kingdom was friendly to the Ottoman Empire and made it tacitly clear that it would intervene if the latter’s territorial integrity was threatened. So a white peace was made with the Ottomans in October, returning to them the Libyan Coast and occupied Antioch.
Next in line were the Prussians, who were fighting the war at sea. Tunisian cruisers had steamed up to the Netherlands early in the war, to blockade the enemy ports, and since then saw constant action against masses of antiquated enemy ships. Realizing that the only way to hurt Prussia would be through a blockade, the Tunisian fleet fought its way east, eventually being relieved by a second cruiser fleet when its ships had taken too much damage. The second fleet made it to the Southern Baltic in December, blockading all but one of Prussia’s ports and causing the latter to immediately accept a white peace.
After that, it was simply a matter of occupying all of the Netherlands’ fortified African provinces while blockading their home ports. The liberation of Assyut Region to Egypt had been added as a wargoal, since it would have looked bad for Tunis to take a second state from a fellow great power.
Egypt, on the other hand, would raise fewer eyebrows if it were to lose a region or two. For years, Tunisian diplomats had been working on pulling that country from the American sphere of influence, after seeing how zealously the latter defended it in the recent past. By 1928 that goal had been well and truly attained, and so it was recommended that the sultan authorize the country’s invasion with haste. As the nation was caught up in war fever, Muhammad acquiesced, and a declaration was delivered in February.
One month later, Italy decided to join in, claiming Sidi Barrani Region. That was a worrying prospect to Tunis, but Tunisian armies were better positioned to occupy Egypt before the Italians could enforce their terms.
The Egyptian army was no match for the Tunisian veterans, and their country was occupied within a few months. In September, the Netherlands agreed to Tunis’ terms, and in October Egypt did likewise. The map of Africa was redrawn, with a land link between Tunisia and the Levant.
The new borders still left in place the Italian claim in Sidi Barrani. Italy had never threatened Tunis since its unification, and relations were perfect, but Tunisians were still uneasy about Italians conquering land in Africa. It had been hoped that the Italians would drop out of the war while Sidi Barrani was occupied by Tunis, but the latter could not put off the end of its war for as long as that might have taken. It was running a tight race with the USA in industrial output and needed the peace to make up for lost momentum. However, there was still one way of preventing the Italians from taking Sidi Barrani. It meant intervening on the side of Egypt and throwing the Italians back to the sea by force of arms. Muhammad VI was reluctant to take that step, although some members of his cabinet were arguing vividly in its favour. He remained undecided to his death-day, on 11 February 1929, a circumstance that many found strangely convenient for the jingoists in the cabinet. Those people were careful not to speak their theories aloud.
Muhammad VI was succeeded by Ahmad II, son of Ali III, first Sultan of Tunis. On receiving the news of his cousin’s death, he was immediately set upon by the War Office and the Foreign Office, who requested authorization for a war with Italy. The new sultan had to make up his mind fast. But he took some hours to ponder the question before reaching his conclusion.