Kurt_Steiner said:
Oh right!
I thought you were referring to the double humped desert-dwelling creatures. Not too early in-game, though - it is just a matter of getting a large number of air units built.
-
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Oh right!
I thought you were referring to the double humped desert-dwelling creatures. Not too early in-game, though - it is just a matter of getting a large number of air units built.
Surely artillery is more important than these air contraptions on the Western front?
Allenby said:Oh right!
Not too early in-game, though - it is just a matter of getting a large number of air units built.
Gosh... large numbers again... Well, perhaps is Sir Humphrey (by the way, how is the Right Honorable James Hacker doing, sir Humphrey :rofl: ) right this time?
Sir Humphrey said:
The Germans must be attacked from all directions.
Kurt_Steiner said:
The hidden hand of Winston?
Part LXXXVII – Allied Reverses
Encouraged by progress on other fronts, Nivelle pressed on with his tumultuous offensive. Despite the absence of a breakthrough, or any significant advances at all, Nivelle did not adhere to his pledge to halt the operation after forty-eight hours. Instead, he drove his armies onward, convinced that under the combined weight of the Allied armies, the Germans would buckle. It was quickly apparent that Nivelle’s assumptions were sorely misplaced – the French Army’s casualty list grew longer; the endurance of her soldiery waned; the patience of the government grew thinner. Limited success was achieved when Nivelle narrowed the scale of his of attacks on the German line in the last days of April. By this more methodical approach, the French Army advanced four miles in some sections of the front on the Chemin des Dames, with 24,000 prisoners being taken. Yet in comparison with Nivelle’s much vaunted objectives, the gains were negligible, and the price tag attached – nearly 200,000 casualties – was outrageously high. The not unimpressive gains of the French Army since Nivelle altered the scope of his operation had come too late for many of the disgruntled infantrymen that had formed the backbone of the French war effort since 1914. By 26th April, the first instances of disobedience against higher military authority were evident.
In Istria, General Cadorna had not allowed the prospect of occupying Dalmatia obscure his strategic objective of bringing the Austro-Hungarian Army to battle for a second time in two weeks. This imperative necessitated a north-easterly axis of advance towards Laibach, around which the bulk of the Austro-Hungarian Army had settled. Cadorna was committed to moving northwards, but under pressure from the government, sanctioned an operation designed to impose Italy’s claim on the Dalmatian coast, which was left profoundly exposed as a result of the Austro-Hungarian Army’s withdrawal. Consequently, Italian marines occupied Zára and Sebenico on 27th April, whilst two infantry divisions moved southwards in a tenuous attempt to link-up with the amphibious landing. The Italian thrust towards Laibach was a much laboured affair that resulted in comprehensive defeat. With troops fatigued after their exertions of the previous fortnight and logistical difficulties curbing the movement and firepower of Italian units, the balance of favour rested with the Austro-Hungarians, who were well situated to repel Cadorna’s hastily arranged offensive. By 29th April, it was apparent that the Italian Army could make no further progress, and that Cadorna would have to remain content with the remarkable conquest of the Istrian peninsula. The termination of the Istrian offensive left both armies in an awkward predicament – the Austro-Hungarians, demoralised, were now heavily reliant on German reinforcements; the new shape of the front line also presented a challenge to the Italian Army, which was now responsible for the safeguarding of two delicately held enclaves on the Dalmatian coast, possessed for reasons of political prestige rather than military logic.
Unsuccessful Italian advance on Laibach
Whilst the Austro-Hungarian Army had been thrown into disarray by the Italian offensive, the Rumanian assault in the east had instilled it with a steely resolve in Transylvania. Although Kronstadt was lost, other sectors of the line held against the Rumanian onslaught. The push emanating from the southern Carpathians was blocked; the River Aluta was held against the Rumanian thrust in the centre. By concentrating so heavily on the drive towards Kronstadt in the centre, the Rumanian high command had stripped the flanks to a minimum in order to assure success in what they regarded as their chief objective. Rumanian intelligence was confident that the Austro-Hungarians were in sparse number on the country’s western border and assured General Prezan that they posed no threat. However, the new arrival of two Austro-Hungarian divisions went undetected, and it was these that counterattacked on 27th April, when the Rumanians least expected it. Caught by surprise, the Rumanians were forced to retreat, a great number having just disengaged from an offensive thrust further north. On 29th April, the River Jiu was crossed by the Austro-Hungarians, with the town of Craiova captured the next day. Everywhere along the front, the Rumanian Army was forced onto the defensive, wary that the recent reverse be turned into a catastrophe. Nevertheless, the Rumanians had suffered a severe setback, losing more territory in three days than it had gained during its earlier drive on Kronstadt. The monumental triumph of the Russian Army in reducing the Narew salient had exhausted both the loyal manpower that had been gathered to undertake the operation as well as the army’s logistical base.
The eastern front in May 1917
The instinct of von Hindenburg and Ludendorff was to immediately counterattack, judging correctly that the Russians were precariously situated elsewhere. Forces were rapidly redistributed and plans drawn up for two counterstrokes to be landed against the Russian flanks once it was clear that the situation in the centre had stabilised. Carried out with remarkable efficiency, the redeployment allowed the German Army to achieve local numerical superiority in both north and south. In southern Poland, Sandomir and Krasnik fell on 6th and 8th May respectively, with large numbers of Russian troops refusing to obey the orders of their officers and marching willingly into captivity. Alarmed at the recent reversals of fortune on the eastern front, the Allies in the Balkans brought forward the date of their offensive against the Bulgarians to remove pressure from the Russian and Rumanian armies. Field Marshal Putnik protested that this would upset his carefully laid plans, but an Allied delegation insisted that the date be altered. Under immense pressure, Putnik consented and hurriedly revised his operational scheme – commanding thirteen Serbian, French and British divisions, he attacked around the town of Kyustendil, near the Serbian-Bulgarian border on 18th May. In a twelve day battle, the Bulgarians surrendered little ground, and required few reinforcements to repel the Allied offensive, which cost 15,000 casualties. One Allied defeat was quickly followed by another – with Bolshevism rife among the ranks of many Russian units defending the River Memel, it was without surprise that they withered under the weight of the German assault when it was launched on 26th May. Memel itself fell two days later, and under the insistence of the Provisional Government, Brusilov relieved Generals Ruzsky and Kuropatkin of their commands. A deteriorating home front was now aggravated by a worsening military situation over which Brusilov appeared to have less and less control.
Nivelle – relieved of command on 25th May 1917
The French Army halted its offensive on 6th May. With many units refusing to attack, others declining orders to return to the front and nearly 20,000 deserting their posts, the French Army was in no fit state to attack. Some French officers noted with horror the frequency with which some poilus sung the Internationale, suggesting imminent revolution. In due course, nearly 40,000 troops would be involved in mutinous activity, aimed primarily at unsatisfactory conditions of service, deficient commanding officers and the over exuberance of Nivelle’s thrusts against the German line. Prepared to defend France, they would not attack – amidst the crisis, the French Army was operating purely on its own terms. Whilst officers blamed pacifism at home, politicians blamed the officers, and particularly Nivelle, who became a scapegoat for the French Army’s inadequacies – he was sacked on 25th May, and was replaced by the War Minister, General Lyautey, who had skilfully remained aloof from Nivelle’s flamboyant pretensions of imminent victory. An autocratic monarchist, Lyautey was no lover of the Third Republic, yet his colonial service in Morocco and Madagascar redounded to his credit, and he emerged from the Chemin des Dames fiasco as one of the few officers with his reputation intact. He appointed General Ferdinand Foch as his Chief of Staff, giving intellectual authority to the French Army’s new command arrangements. The predicament of the French Army gave credence to the proposals of General Pétain, commanding the Central Army Group, of a defensive posture whilst awaiting the arrival of the American Army. Lyautey’s strategic assessment was similar, although he regarded that defence was an expediency alone, not a virtue in itself. Unlike Pétain, Lyautey was loathe to wait for American assistance before taking up a future opportunity to grind down German strength – to that end, he still considered the French Army as an offensive tool, albeit blunted temporarily by a dissenting minority. In December 1916, with the German Army on the brink of collapse and still exposed in defence of a bulging salient, Joffre’s proposal to continue the war of attrition through the winter appeared in the circumstances of May 1917 to be a tragically missed opportunity to win the war. The month of May was an unmitigated disaster for the Allies – Russia’s triumph had been reversed; Rumania was forced onto the back foot; the Allied effort in the Balkans had stalled; the French Army left inoperable; Austria-Hungary had not collapsed. A glimmer of good news came from the headquarters of the British Third Army, where General Sir Samuel Lomax reported to Field Marshal Haig that the village of Drocourt had fallen on 30th May. The swiftness with which Lomax’s troops had overcome the Drocourt-Quéant switch line – in just twenty-four hours – encouraged Haig, who was now aware that the British Expeditionary Force would be obliged to assume a greater share of the war effort on the western front in 1917.
Lyautey – the French Army’s new commander-in-chief
Encouraged by progress on other fronts, Nivelle pressed on with his tumultuous offensive. Despite the absence of a breakthrough, or any significant advances at all, Nivelle did not adhere to his pledge to halt the operation after forty-eight hours. Instead, he drove his armies onward, convinced that under the combined weight of the Allied armies, the Germans would buckle. It was quickly apparent that Nivelle’s assumptions were sorely misplaced – the French Army’s casualty list grew longer; the endurance of her soldiery waned; the patience of the government grew thinner. Limited success was achieved when Nivelle narrowed the scale of his of attacks on the German line in the last days of April. By this more methodical approach, the French Army advanced four miles in some sections of the front on the Chemin des Dames, with 24,000 prisoners being taken. Yet in comparison with Nivelle’s much vaunted objectives, the gains were negligible, and the price tag attached – nearly 200,000 casualties – was outrageously high. The not unimpressive gains of the French Army since Nivelle altered the scope of his operation had come too late for many of the disgruntled infantrymen that had formed the backbone of the French war effort since 1914. By 26th April, the first instances of disobedience against higher military authority were evident.
In Istria, General Cadorna had not allowed the prospect of occupying Dalmatia obscure his strategic objective of bringing the Austro-Hungarian Army to battle for a second time in two weeks. This imperative necessitated a north-easterly axis of advance towards Laibach, around which the bulk of the Austro-Hungarian Army had settled. Cadorna was committed to moving northwards, but under pressure from the government, sanctioned an operation designed to impose Italy’s claim on the Dalmatian coast, which was left profoundly exposed as a result of the Austro-Hungarian Army’s withdrawal. Consequently, Italian marines occupied Zára and Sebenico on 27th April, whilst two infantry divisions moved southwards in a tenuous attempt to link-up with the amphibious landing. The Italian thrust towards Laibach was a much laboured affair that resulted in comprehensive defeat. With troops fatigued after their exertions of the previous fortnight and logistical difficulties curbing the movement and firepower of Italian units, the balance of favour rested with the Austro-Hungarians, who were well situated to repel Cadorna’s hastily arranged offensive. By 29th April, it was apparent that the Italian Army could make no further progress, and that Cadorna would have to remain content with the remarkable conquest of the Istrian peninsula. The termination of the Istrian offensive left both armies in an awkward predicament – the Austro-Hungarians, demoralised, were now heavily reliant on German reinforcements; the new shape of the front line also presented a challenge to the Italian Army, which was now responsible for the safeguarding of two delicately held enclaves on the Dalmatian coast, possessed for reasons of political prestige rather than military logic.
Unsuccessful Italian advance on Laibach
Whilst the Austro-Hungarian Army had been thrown into disarray by the Italian offensive, the Rumanian assault in the east had instilled it with a steely resolve in Transylvania. Although Kronstadt was lost, other sectors of the line held against the Rumanian onslaught. The push emanating from the southern Carpathians was blocked; the River Aluta was held against the Rumanian thrust in the centre. By concentrating so heavily on the drive towards Kronstadt in the centre, the Rumanian high command had stripped the flanks to a minimum in order to assure success in what they regarded as their chief objective. Rumanian intelligence was confident that the Austro-Hungarians were in sparse number on the country’s western border and assured General Prezan that they posed no threat. However, the new arrival of two Austro-Hungarian divisions went undetected, and it was these that counterattacked on 27th April, when the Rumanians least expected it. Caught by surprise, the Rumanians were forced to retreat, a great number having just disengaged from an offensive thrust further north. On 29th April, the River Jiu was crossed by the Austro-Hungarians, with the town of Craiova captured the next day. Everywhere along the front, the Rumanian Army was forced onto the defensive, wary that the recent reverse be turned into a catastrophe. Nevertheless, the Rumanians had suffered a severe setback, losing more territory in three days than it had gained during its earlier drive on Kronstadt. The monumental triumph of the Russian Army in reducing the Narew salient had exhausted both the loyal manpower that had been gathered to undertake the operation as well as the army’s logistical base.
The eastern front in May 1917
The instinct of von Hindenburg and Ludendorff was to immediately counterattack, judging correctly that the Russians were precariously situated elsewhere. Forces were rapidly redistributed and plans drawn up for two counterstrokes to be landed against the Russian flanks once it was clear that the situation in the centre had stabilised. Carried out with remarkable efficiency, the redeployment allowed the German Army to achieve local numerical superiority in both north and south. In southern Poland, Sandomir and Krasnik fell on 6th and 8th May respectively, with large numbers of Russian troops refusing to obey the orders of their officers and marching willingly into captivity. Alarmed at the recent reversals of fortune on the eastern front, the Allies in the Balkans brought forward the date of their offensive against the Bulgarians to remove pressure from the Russian and Rumanian armies. Field Marshal Putnik protested that this would upset his carefully laid plans, but an Allied delegation insisted that the date be altered. Under immense pressure, Putnik consented and hurriedly revised his operational scheme – commanding thirteen Serbian, French and British divisions, he attacked around the town of Kyustendil, near the Serbian-Bulgarian border on 18th May. In a twelve day battle, the Bulgarians surrendered little ground, and required few reinforcements to repel the Allied offensive, which cost 15,000 casualties. One Allied defeat was quickly followed by another – with Bolshevism rife among the ranks of many Russian units defending the River Memel, it was without surprise that they withered under the weight of the German assault when it was launched on 26th May. Memel itself fell two days later, and under the insistence of the Provisional Government, Brusilov relieved Generals Ruzsky and Kuropatkin of their commands. A deteriorating home front was now aggravated by a worsening military situation over which Brusilov appeared to have less and less control.
Nivelle – relieved of command on 25th May 1917
The French Army halted its offensive on 6th May. With many units refusing to attack, others declining orders to return to the front and nearly 20,000 deserting their posts, the French Army was in no fit state to attack. Some French officers noted with horror the frequency with which some poilus sung the Internationale, suggesting imminent revolution. In due course, nearly 40,000 troops would be involved in mutinous activity, aimed primarily at unsatisfactory conditions of service, deficient commanding officers and the over exuberance of Nivelle’s thrusts against the German line. Prepared to defend France, they would not attack – amidst the crisis, the French Army was operating purely on its own terms. Whilst officers blamed pacifism at home, politicians blamed the officers, and particularly Nivelle, who became a scapegoat for the French Army’s inadequacies – he was sacked on 25th May, and was replaced by the War Minister, General Lyautey, who had skilfully remained aloof from Nivelle’s flamboyant pretensions of imminent victory. An autocratic monarchist, Lyautey was no lover of the Third Republic, yet his colonial service in Morocco and Madagascar redounded to his credit, and he emerged from the Chemin des Dames fiasco as one of the few officers with his reputation intact. He appointed General Ferdinand Foch as his Chief of Staff, giving intellectual authority to the French Army’s new command arrangements. The predicament of the French Army gave credence to the proposals of General Pétain, commanding the Central Army Group, of a defensive posture whilst awaiting the arrival of the American Army. Lyautey’s strategic assessment was similar, although he regarded that defence was an expediency alone, not a virtue in itself. Unlike Pétain, Lyautey was loathe to wait for American assistance before taking up a future opportunity to grind down German strength – to that end, he still considered the French Army as an offensive tool, albeit blunted temporarily by a dissenting minority. In December 1916, with the German Army on the brink of collapse and still exposed in defence of a bulging salient, Joffre’s proposal to continue the war of attrition through the winter appeared in the circumstances of May 1917 to be a tragically missed opportunity to win the war. The month of May was an unmitigated disaster for the Allies – Russia’s triumph had been reversed; Rumania was forced onto the back foot; the Allied effort in the Balkans had stalled; the French Army left inoperable; Austria-Hungary had not collapsed. A glimmer of good news came from the headquarters of the British Third Army, where General Sir Samuel Lomax reported to Field Marshal Haig that the village of Drocourt had fallen on 30th May. The swiftness with which Lomax’s troops had overcome the Drocourt-Quéant switch line – in just twenty-four hours – encouraged Haig, who was now aware that the British Expeditionary Force would be obliged to assume a greater share of the war effort on the western front in 1917.
Lyautey – the French Army’s new commander-in-chief
So, it looks as if the Allies have been somewhat stalled, for now. It'll be interesting to see how Russia and the Balkans develop. I'm still dying to know what's going on in the Middle East, though.
Another excellent update, Allenby. Things are not looking quite as rosy for the Allies.
Vann
Vann
Hmmmm. Things don't look good for the Empire (British). Looks like things are going exactly as they went in real life.
Damn
Damn
Jolly nice update sir. Only to bad it was a update where most things went wrong, good to see that the BEF is doing good though, also getting rid of Nivelle wasn’t the dumbest thing the French I have done I guess. Maybe the new French command will do better
Looking forward to the next update, maybe we get to see more of the Middle East?
Looking forward to the next update, maybe we get to see more of the Middle East?
The war does appear finely balanced, yet I suspect neither side on the Western Front will be able to mount a 'knock out blow' any time soon. Unless the French do collapse which cannot be totally discounted. Lyautey should not consider the French Army even a blunted offensive tool, someone should have a quiet word with him.
As for Russia, who knows really? Things continue to get worse and I can hear destiny calling Russia towards its unfortunate and lammentable future. Unless something changes I fear it may go historically out East.
Finally, futile though it may be, I add my voice to those calling for a Middle Eastern update.
As for Russia, who knows really? Things continue to get worse and I can hear destiny calling Russia towards its unfortunate and lammentable future. Unless something changes I fear it may go historically out East.
Finally, futile though it may be, I add my voice to those calling for a Middle Eastern update.
It does indeed appear that the war will be dragging on a bit longer. And Austria-Hungary collapse? HA! What a ridiculous idea!
It's all in the balance, but what I want to know is what will happen to AH, will it hold on or will the Itlian break through finally cripple it into submission ?
What manner of forces do the Italians have in the Veneto? I do hope that they left a sufficently large guard there.
Vincent Julien said:
The Balkans are still interestingly poised - Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottomans have thus far, formed an effective counterbalance to Britain, France, Romania, Greece and Serbia, largely because of the concentration of effort put on the western front by the former two.
Next update will be on the Middle East!
Vann the Red said:
Not as rosy as the last update at least - then the Central Powers looked doomed; now they have fought back with a vengeance.
Lord_Robertus said:
The empire fares quite well if viewed in isolation - it is when put in the context of her allies that the situation is less encouraging.
Lord E said:
The French AI picked the right option, I think.
Your wish regarding the Middle East will be granted!
El Pip said:
One can disregard the chances of the French attacking in the near future - to that extent, it has assumed the role of a large home guard. Whether it will remain like that in many months' time is another matter entirely...
Hasty conclusions ought not be reached regarding Russia, however - predictions of imminent doom were offset in the last update by her Herculean offensive, were they not?
VILenin said:
She's a tough cookie, certainly. Dependent on Germany, but tough nevertheless.
blysas said:
Are you indicating that the Italian front has become the vital theatre of the war, and that the fate of the Central Powers may be invested in the survival (or not) of the Austro-Hungarian effort in that area?
Earl Uhtred said:
They are thus:
Code:
trigger = {
OR = {
atwar = yes
event = 48709 #defeat of Russia
}
dissent = 20
event = 48100 #February Revolution
NOT = {
control = { province = 602 data = RUS } #Berlin
}
}Dissent then, is the vital factor.
Vincent Julien said:
I hope that this screenshot answers your query:
If faced with an Austro-German assault, the Italians in Rijeka province may be defeated, although they would most likely be saved by the river crossing penalty.
laminustacitus said:
Sir Humphrey said:
Show no mercy.
The line in Milan looks thin, but then again there's a mountain/hill penalty for that i guess..
And when, pray tell, might we expect this next post? We are most eager to learn of the advances or reversals of the MEF.
Vann
Vann
kenneththegreat said:
Three Austro-Hungarian divisions versus two fortified Italian divisions would mean easy success for the Italians. Nothing to worry about there. Besides, if the Italians in the Trentino attack, then they're leaving their own positions open to the Italians stationed in the Veneto.
I forsee stalemate on the Italian/Croatian front for the time being. Unless either side does anything totally foolish, which I suppose cannot be ruled out, this being WW1 and all.