Velky Volhv Spytko of the Gryfita Empire - The Bellicose (1251-1255)
Velky Volhv Spytko of the Gryfita Empire - The Bellicose (1251-1255)
'Komárom, Komárom, ne'er had such blood be spilled.
Komárom, Komárom, where Death drank his fill.' - Exerpt from a poem, circulated around England around the year 1256.
News of a fresh crusade soon spread like wildfire across the Gryfita Empire. In equal measure to those pledging support for the Pope, letters of support flooded to Spytko throughout the remainder of 1251 and well into 1252.
As mentioned, the Catholic forces had been taken aback by the speed at which Hungary had fallen, yet the support and supplies gathered had not gone to waste. What hadn’t already been funnelled in through Croatia to fuel rebellion was now put towards funding the Crusade. The crusaders also had the advantage of hindsight, for they knew what it meant to underestimate the Gryfita Empire - pagans knocking at the Pope’s door. A more coordinated invasion was guaranteed.
An interesting aside, the man that would lead this propaganda campaign at the end of 1251 was Spytko’s uncle and the King of Pomerania, Snowid. If you recall, this was the same person who had been a vocal political opponent during Spytko’s regency and threatening rebellion. To see that same person not only on the Elder Council but now singing his nephew’s praises must have been a powerful propaganda boost.
Spytko was also at the height of his popularity at this period. Throughout 1252 and into 1253, men and money flooded into the capital in a show of support for their temporal and spiritual liege. Many would have memories or at least heard of the glorious defence that Wojslawa had mustered, with many more thinking Spytko as her equal. It makes you wonder how different things would have been if Gniewomir had not had a disagreement with his meal and then had to contend with the crusaders.
It promised to be the glorious struggle that Spytko had wished for.
Although, in the final months before the Sixth Crusade began in earnest, his court would be rocked by a scandal.
Preparing for the crusade had meant Spytko spent most of the last two years away from the capital and his wife. The two had enjoyed a strong relationship, with Esin herself proving popular, but this relationship had clearly frayed at some point. In June 1253, the Empress was caught in the middle of a ‘compromising’ position with another vassal - Chieftess Pereyaslava.
I, alongside many others, will wax lyrical about how the Slavic Faith was relatively tolerant towards women and afforded them more rights than many in Europe. However, the term ‘relatively’ is used for a reason. Adultery was itself a grave sin, as was homosexuality. In a display of classical double-standards, aided by the concept of fraternity and masculinity associated with the Champions of Perun, male adultery and homosexuality was seen as far more permissive than the female equivalent.
For the wife of the Velky Vohlv to be caught having an affair and worse, with another woman, was beyond humiliating. It was a crime that warranted divorce at the least and the death of both parties at most, but Spytko could not act. The crusade was nearly upon him and every resource, even that of an adulterous chieftess, was needed. We know that Spytko himself was heartbroken at the news, though did not have the time to dwell on it. He spent the last couple of months camped outside of Plock, taking no immediate action on the matter.
According to our sources, the messenger who gave this evidence saw tears weeping from under his Emperor’s mask.
There would be no time for such displays of emotion, however justified. On 28 July, 1253, the Sixth Crusade officially began - and the martialled forces of the Catholic world set their sights on the Gryfita Empire once more.
The Sixth Crusade would prove to be bloodier and busier than the Fifth Crusade by a considerable degree. Both sides now knew what the other could offer and so the number of men arrayed for the conflict was greater than what was seen in Wojslawa’s time. We will focus on the key battles and a general overview, as a complete dive into every battle of the Sixth Crusade is unnecessary and overly detailed for our purposes.
Spytko knew of the increased scale and had adjusted for it. His plan had been to conduct a four-point defence. Through his impressive rallying campaign, along with the gradual centralisation of the empire, Spytko had raised an estimated 40,000 men to be under his personal control, which shows how far the empire had come.
He had assumed that with such a large landmass he had to cover, the crusaders would attempt to divert his attention from Hungary by pressuring the core regions of the Gryfita Empire. Pomerania could do little to defend from a seaborne invasion and Plock itself was decidedly close to the coast. Housing the imperial family, along with the now most important religious building of the Slavic Faith, made Plock both a high-value target and a county that could not be allowed to fall.
To combat this, he had divided his men in four 10,000 strong groups. Two contingents would march to the aid of Hungary and conduct what defence they could muster, almost certainly being outnumbered to start with. The other two would remain posted within the core land of the empire and act as an interception force for any invasions.
Once said invaders had been dealt with, the remainder would reform and carry out the next stage of Spytko’s plan. One 10,000 strong unit would then march to Hungary to reinforce the defence, while the other would board awaiting ships to conduct the strategy that had served his ancestor so well. The Heathen Fleet would sail once more.
A stroke of luck aided Spytko in this. Not only was his relationship with Konstantinos XIII strong, but his friend’s attempts to centralise his government had led to rebellion. There would be no unified response to a fleet of pagans sailing through the Bosporus Strait or a bribe required to do so, as they would be too busy fighting amongst one another to challenge any crossing..
It was a violation of trust and risked betraying his friendship and a potentially powerful ally, though Spytko had seemingly decided it was better to ask for forgiveness than permission.
Spytko’s strategy proved sound. In October 1253, the first wave of crusaders entered into Hungary. These initial armies served the same purpose as those initial attackers of the Fifth Crusade - to scout and secure areas to encamp for further forces. It was with some surprise that they found 28,000 men prepared to meet them. While Spytko had the majority of the defensive force under his direct control, those of his vassals and importantly the Warriors of Perun, would reinforce all of his contingents over the Sixth Crusade.
The Velky Vohlv, as he often did, was at the head of one of the armies in Hungary, consisting of the most veteran troops the empire could muster. The still newly conquered lands would see the heaviest fighting, so he had chosen to put himself in the thick of danger for both morale and likely to seek glory.
The opening battles were minor, as Spytko saw to sweeping away the scouting forces with little trouble. These were still small-scale battles and very one-sided, though they were merely a portent of things to come. He would have known this and when not in battle, he was seeing to the deployment of men to the defence with characteristic vigour. While he had shown more interest in administration, he was taking to battle equally as well.
The first serious move of the Sixth Crusade came in late November 1253, where two large crusader armies, each numbering around 12,000 men, landed in Lithuania and began to invade into the Gryfita Empire proper. Spytko had chosen his strategy well, as while the larger of the two armies stayed to secure a beachhead in Scalovia, the smaller and more mobile made a forced march towards Plock. The crusaders had intended to mimic Wojslawa’s tactic of putting a blade to the heart of a religious organisation.
They did not realise that Spytko had anticipated this. On 1 February, 1254, the crusaders were taken by surprise as now 16,000 pagans descended upon them. They had been in the middle of preparing siege equipment and had little time to organise, turning the battle into a disorganised defence and later an organised retreat. The crusaders did not allow themselves to be bogged down and quickly fled back to the larger force securing a place of operations in the north. The Slavic forces pursued, but did not risk engagement of a larger force.
Spytko had given his commanders a great deal of autonomy in their decision making, which was a necessity as he would be hundreds of miles away. While this allowed for a more elastic defence, it also meant that glory-hounds were free to seek glory. The contingent destined for Rome had sailed ahead of schedule, leaving only a single army to defend much of the mainland. No exact reason is ever given, though most agree it was a foolhardy mistake.
In Hungary, the main forces arrayed by the crusaders began the earnest push to seize land. They had an advantage in that the patchwork lands which Croatia owned within Hungary made travel for Spytko’s forces more difficult, while making supply easier for themselves.
Spytko, much like Wojslawa, would have been aware that in a war of attrition he would lose. Therefore, he had to pick battles carefully and could not afford to lose men marching through hostile lands. This made movement difficult and sluggish, frustrating his efforts to no small end. His decision to blink first after his initial success and not conquer the remainder of Hungary had come back to bite him.
A slow pace was a severe danger, as armies flooded into Hungary. By late February 1254, sources suggest almost 40,000 crusaders were in the region, compared to Spytko’s 30,000. Worse still, this was still mostly only a vanguard of the closest princes of the HRE, with the main papal army besieging in the west and coordinating further attacks as they did. Compared to the Fifth Crusade, there was a greater deal of coordination and organisation, with few willing to repeat their mistakes in underestimating the pagan empire.
Despite this disparity in numbers, Spytko was keen to secure victories and confine the crusaders to the west, while awaiting news from those sailing to Rome. Unlike when defending Pomerania, there was no strong local opposition towards the crusaders. The Slavic Faith had been resisted fiercely and it was likely that the catholic invaders had a large degree of support in the local area. This meant that attrition and harassment was not in Spytko’s advantage, yet he could also not risk losing too much for no gain.
In March 1254, scouts learned of three crusader armies, totalling 30,000 men of the 40,000 present, were a few days' march of one another. Spytko decided to force a risky engagement to break the back of this initial invasion.
To do this, he arranged for a sort of delayed attack. He took the force under his command, having now grown to around 15,000 men from reinforcement and engaged the smallest of the crusader armies at Csorna. His plan was to create enough noise so the other forces would be compelled to rally to the defence of their smaller ally. The critical part of the move was to ensure that the addition of more manpower would have no effect on the outcome of the battle, in order to draw the crusaders into a proverbial meat-grinder. At the same time, the second band of men under Spytko’s command would reinforce them and swarm the crusaders.
It was an aggressive strategy, though one that worked to a degree. The Battle of Csorna drew in 30,000 men on each side and ended in a victory for Spytko. It saw 14,000 crusaders killed compared to 5,000 pagans. While a great victory in itself, the tactical benefits were limited as the crusaders were not wiped out and were allowed to regroup. While a fierce attack, the issue of manpower must have made Spytko hesitant to attempt any kind of pursuit.
In May 1254, news finally came from those sent to Rome and it was not all entirely good.
The crusaders had learned lessons from their defeat in the Fifth Crusade. Since then, the defences of Rome had been reinforced to make seaborne invasion difficult. Ostia itself had been rebuilt and was no longer an easy point to land. After the long journey and a contested landing, the pagans had managed to put Ostia to siege, then had to withdraw after only a month. An army from the HRE had been sent to secure Rome just in case of such a move, which meant Wojslawa’s tactic to force surrender would not work.
Those in charge of the mission, while seeking glory, sensibly did not seek death. They did the logical and fell back to their boats before they could be engaged by ground forces, leaving Rome unmolested.
A few months later in August, more crusading armies began to take to the field, with some originating from as far as England. The papal force acting as the operation nexus for troop organisation had withdrawn back into HRE’s borders and although they had lost many at Csorna, there were still plenty of men willing to take up the Cross.
Another 30,000 men swamped into Hungary, some bypassing Spytko in an effort to ensnare him.
We are not sure when, but at some point Spykto had taken himself and a dozen riders to fall back to the core lands of his empire. However he accomplished, he did so with staggering speed. This is because we jump from sources saying he is encamped in Hungary, to sources saying he is at the head of 20,000 men undertaking a forced march from the Crownland.
This was made up of the last 10,000 contingent of his forces and another 10,000 mercenaries which must have come at an astronomical cost. You’ll find that mercenaries are often attracted to areas of conflict where they can drive a hard bargain for their swords - and there is no greater area of conflict than in crusades. That Spytko undertook this action underpins just how the current fighting was on a knife-edge. It left the Crownland and the capital totally defenceless aside from garrison, though the armies that had landed there at the start of the Sixth Crusade had been beaten back. It was a desperate gamble.
And then came Komárom.
Situated in the province of Esztergom, it was one of the counties under the control of Croatia. As such, it would be a disadvantageous battlefield for the Slavic men arrayed in the area.
Alas, the battle found them.
Spytko had, in his haste, left very little in the way of a chain of command. It had been his plans and his fights that had seen to the so far mostly successful defence of Hungary. With his flight, local commanders were robbed off much needed talent. That is not to say they were without skilled commanders, for many veterans had found themselves appointed to positions of power in preparation for the Sixth Crusade. However, they were dealing with warfare on a grander scale than many would have ever dealt with - not to mention the dangers of decentralised command.
I can think of few other reasons other than tactical blunder as to how they found themselves surrounded and forced to form battle lines on that field outside Komárom.
Evidence from the Catholic sources suggest they fell for one of their own tricks - that of a feigned retreat, only to find 50,000 men - most of the currently arrayed crusader forces plus extra - enveloping them.
This was all on flat plains by the way - so exactly how they were able to ambush with that many men devoid of cover is a question frustrating military historians to this day.
It did not change the facts - they were surrounded, 33,000 men to 55,000. It was already pitched to be one of the largest battles in medieval history and it was a battle that seemed destined to go only one way.
An offer of surrender from the Catholics was promptly refused and so battle was prepared. To their credit, it was a substantial show of both bravado and bravery to refuse. Defeat meant the loss of over half the Slavic manpower on the field and likely victory of the Catholics in the Sixth Crusade.
It is then that we see a case of the unsung hero, so common in history and yet so rare to see it documented.
A lone scout found a way to sneak through the crusader’s encirclement, sneaking through in the dead of night. This lone man would then find Spytko at the head of an army that had just entered the borders of Hungary. They had marched at an incredible pace night and day, with Spytko in the middle of encamping and preparing to rest. When the scout told him of the encirclement, the Velky Vohlv gave immediate orders to break camp and march.
'Desperation at Komárom' - published in 1922 by Richard Canton. Many assume the Slavic forces were pushed into the river before sallying, though no evidence has been found of this.
When they did arrive at Komárom on the 1 January, 1255, they came across a desperate defence. The commanders of the Slavic forces had, again to their credit, managed to break the encirclement and put a river to their backs, but it meant there was no option to fall back. It was a last stand and casualties were mounting.
The crusaders were pushing hard and had committed everything to break the pagans. They had not been expecting an army of 20,000 men to be at their backs, though these men were by now dead on their feet after being afforded little rest.
As the story goes, Spytko gave the order to charge - and a tense moment of silence followed. No one moved. Morale was low and few were in the mood to fight - Spytko risked mutiny as well as defeat.
Then the same scout who had delivered the message to Spytko, rode forwards and turned to the arrayed men. According to Spytko himself, he then shouted:
“Stay then, cowards! And watch your brothers be slaughtered along with myself. Watch your plunder be lost and your ancestors shamed! I shall do as my Emperor commands.”
He then rode off by himself charging as if he had an entire army by his side. This shamed even the veterans of the army, who then began their advance.
It’s a nice little human touch that reminds us just how thoroughly some could believe in a cause.
'The Lone Scout Leads On' - A watercolour painted in the 70's. Note that no likeness has ever been described to the scout, not even his appearance. Thus artistry featuring him can vary widely.
For what happened next was inhuman.
The crusaders had overcommitted to the battle. They were pressing hard against the lines and the pagans had dug in. This had led to the entire array of what the crusaders had to offer being committed. In any other situation, the Slavic men would have broken first and achieved decisive victory.
Yet that did not happen. Spytko, having himself been outdone by a lone scout, led the charge of cavalry which crashed into the exposed rear of the crusaders. Most of these were light horses that were as exhausted as their riders, however the shock of the charge reverberated throughout the crusaders. Suddenly they had an army at their rear and however anaemic and exhausted, they had cut off their escape.
Panic began to spread as the infantry assailed their backs. The defending pagans, seeing their chance at survival, rallied and began to push from their end. The rear charge was loose, with Spytko ordering the cavalry to the flanks and the infantry to the centre. Disorganised as it was, it resulted in the collapse of the catholic flanks and the encirclement of the crusaders.
With their escape cut off, the crusaders were enclosed in a pocket and systematically massacred. As the outer ranks were cut down, the men were forced to huddle closer together, panic turning to hysteria. They were all killed where they stood.
According to a colleague and military historian, David Vincent, an estimated 500 men were cut down every minute. To equate, this meant it took two hours of non-stop slaughter to achieve.
There were no survivors.
'The Slaughter of the Crusaders at Komárom' - An engraving by Charles Oliver in 1823. The king depicted was King Henry II of England, who was killed as the Crusaders were surrounded and the men around him hacked to pieces.
The Battle of Komárom saw the complete destruction of the crusader presence in Hungary and a tonal shift in the direction of the Sixth Crusade. The entire 55,000 strong army had been killed to the man, either due to the cruelty or frustration of Spytko, or the battle fervour overtaking his men, depending on the source. With the 8000 men lost from his own side, 63,000 men lay dead after a single battle. It would be the bloodiest battle in European medieval history.
Although many suggest Komárom marked another tonal shift. Spytko had been chasing glory after all, being almost disappointed at the speed of his conquest of Hungary. The Sixth Crusade promised a far greater challenge and had delivered. It had been a combination of his tactical planning, speed of action and the tenacity of a lone scout (whom we believe was killed in the fighting) which allowed him victory. He had risked mutiny and pushed himself and his men to the point of exhaustion and yet, he had masterminded a victory unlike even Havel had achieved.
Yet there is no celebration. Not even after the Sixth Crusade, as Spytko would never speak of Komárom. We only know as much as we do in thanks to the writings of those he brought with him.
One such man, a shaman, would speak to Spytko as their forces regrouped and resupplied. He was watching the mercenaries looting the dead. When asked of his thoughts on how he felt after the battle, he muttered a single word:
“Wydrążony.”
Hollow.
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