Naval Air Doctrine history

[Easy-Kill]

And then Russia had to open up the can of worms that is large scale conventional warfare in Europe, fought the old way with artillery dominance by necessity, because neither side had the air superiority necessary to fight wars the way NATO doctrine calls for, and a lot of people are having to adjust to the fact that a war that is primarily a land war is a completely different beast.

Interestingly, I think that this demonstrates how far Russia is (was) from being a first rate military power.

Even prior to WW2, the western allies had started to realise the importance of Air-Naval power. Specifically, Air-Naval superiority gave them an advantage in operational manoeuvre. This operational advantage allowed them to select strategic objectives that would them to achieve victory, while translating tactical successes to strategic outcomes.

Manoeuvre warfare has been the cornerstone of NATO doctrine for 75 years, with air-power and precision fires taking a priority. This war has been the vindication of that thinking - mass Vs precision comes down to the consideration of density of force. It isn't that NATO calls to fight this way, it is because experience has demonstrated that this is the way that leads to victory.

 

[sam73]

Interestingly, I think that this demonstrates how far Russia is (was) from being a first rate military power.

Even prior to WW2, the western allies had started to realise the importance of Air-Naval power. Specifically, Air-Naval superiority gave them an advantage in operational manoeuvre. This operational advantage allowed them to select strategic objectives that would them to achieve victory, while translating tactical successes to strategic outcomes.

Manoeuvre warfare has been the cornerstone of NATO doctrine for 75 years, with air-power and precision fires taking a priority. This war has been the vindication of that thinking - mass Vs precision comes down to the consideration of density of force. It isn't that NATO calls to fight this way, it is because experience has demonstrated that this is the way that leads to victory.

Russia is aware of the importance of naval power since the times of Peter the Great. But geography is what it is. Not only it doesn't have good access to the oceans, it has to prioritise her long, open land borders.

What you call NATO's way of fighting, it's just the US way of fighting. A country with no risk to its land borders, unimpeded access to the oceans, and the largest economy in the world.

 

[Easy-Kill]

What you call NATO's way of fighting, it's just the US way of fighting. A country with no risk to its land borders, unimpeded access to the oceans, and the largest economy in the world.

Not really. Air-Naval power was the focus of British economic focus from 1936, and arguably before that. It's also the reason why UK and France keep their overseas territories and bases, and maintain a Bluewater Navy and still have world leading domestic production of Air-Naval.weapons systems. It's why China is desperately trying to copy this.

Also, a quick glance at UK doctrine would highlight this too. I can dig it out if you like.

 

[George Parr]

I'd hardly consider the western allies approach in the 1930s to be oh so big on realizing what sort of advantage Air-Naval power brought. It just so happens that the unique circumstances of the individual nations put them into a situation from which certain paths looked more favourable to achieve their desired goals. That wasn't some cunning foresight they had.

The United Kingdom is and was an island nation. It's main protection lay in being able to prevent anyone from landing on their home soil. This meant that having a larger fleet than anyone else, and an air-fleet which would prevent the enemy from surpressing their most valuable assets, was essentialfor survival. They also had a vast colonial Empire, which required a massive navy to keep the vital trade-lanes open. In turn, they could live with a smaller army. Part of that strategy had been age-old (the navy), so this was hardly some great wisdom they achieved, or some sign of them understanding what great operational advantage it would bring in general.

The USA, meanwhile, had nothing to fear from any land-based attacks. Neither Canada nor Mexico was in any way a threat. The USA did however, have some far-away lands/colonies to protect, and also wanted to make sure that they had enough naval assets to keep their trade-lanes open. Just like in the UK, the US-Army was rather small at this point in time, because it didn't really need to be any bigger.

France, as a colonial Empire, had some interest in a sizeable navy, but it was hardly huge, nor did they lay any focus on Naval-Air power. Their main plans were about a land-war in Europe and how to best contain a Germany that had an advantage in terms of population.

Japan was big on naval and air, because it was an island nation with far-stretching belongings.

Italy had a huge coastline and its interest mainly lay in gobbling up more land in the Mediterranean, so they obviously had an interest in a big navy (for their size). The position of Italy itself, also meant that its land and islands were enough to project airpower in the way it was necessary.

Germany after WW1 had no colonies to watch over, and was almost entirely focused on getting further land in Europe. None of this required a large navy, though they put some effort into it to be at least a bit of a threat. Their focus was on the army, and an airforce with would help the army achieve its goals. There was no expectation of ending up at a point where projecting power oversea would be necessary.

The same is true for the Soviet Union. It had no interest in colonies, most of its coastline was inaccessible or so far away from anything useful that it wasn't threatened. They had localised fleets to protect the few areas of value, but that's about it. They couldn't get out of the Black Sea, there was no point in trying to get out of the Baltic, and the Far East was largely blocked off by Japan. Their main focus lay on protecting the huge land-borders, and, if possible, to swallow up some smaller neighbours. None of which required much investment into the navy. The Army came first, and the airforce worked in conjunction with it.

A focus on air and sea hinged on the nation having significant interest in regard to the sea, It had nothing to do with anyone realizing what sort of advantage it brought, nor was it unique to a certain set of countries. Those who needed to be big in naval assets invested heavily in naval assets, those who would only ever really fight a land-war would invest mostly in the army. Airpower was developed in accordance to the needs of the nation and the available resources. Everything else just evolved from that naturally.

 

[HanSime]

Germany after WW1 had no colonies to watch over, and was almost entirely focused on getting further land in Europe. None of this required a large navy, though they put some effort into it to be at least a bit of a threat. Their focus was on the army, and an airforce with would help the army achieve its goals. There was no expectation of ending up at a point where projecting power oversea would be necessary.

This is not true, at all.

The Germans wanted a navy on par with the British, but after WWI had to surrender their remaining and aging fleet to the UK, where it was anchored in Scapa Flow, with skeleton crews on board.

The treaty of Versailles banned the Germans from building a large fleet, specifically submarines. Which they ignored under the nazis, because they recognized that the UK would be reliant on supply convoys from the USA.

As such, they were lagging behind and needed a different strategy.

Hence they build a huge submarine fleet during the war and a lot of convoy raiding ships (one of which was supposed to be the Bismarck) hoping to make the Atlantic a “no go zone”.

In violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Kriegsmarine grew rapidly during German naval rearmament in the 1930s. The 1919 treaty had limited the size of the German navy and prohibited the building of submarines.[2]

Kriegsmarine ships were deployed to the waters around Spain during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) under the guise of enforcing non-intervention, but in reality supporting the Nationalists against the Spanish Republicans.

In January 1939, Plan Z, a massive shipbuilding program, was ordered, calling for surface naval parity with the British Royal Navy by 1944. When World War II broke out in September 1939, Plan Z was shelved in favour of a crash building program for submarines (U-boats) instead of capital surface warships, and land and air forces were given priority of strategic resources.

 

[bitmapmedivh]

Not really. Air-Naval power was the focus of British economic focus from 1936, and arguably before that. It's also the reason why UK and France keep their overseas territories and bases, and maintain a Bluewater Navy and still have world leading domestic production of Air-Naval.weapons systems. It's why China is desperately trying to copy this.

Also, a quick glance at UK doctrine would highlight this too. I can dig it out if you like.

You're making his argument for him. Britain is, like the US, an island strategically.

 

[George Parr]

This is not true, at all.

The Germans wanted a navy on par with the British, but after WWI had to surrender their remaining and aging fleet to the UK, where it was anchored in Scapa Flow, with skeleton crews on board.

The treaty of Versailles banned the Germans from building a large fleet, specifically submarines. Which they ignored under the nazis, because they recognized that the UK would be reliant on supply convoys from the USA.

As such, they were lagging behind and needed a different strategy.

Hence they build a huge submarine fleet during the war and a lot of convoy raiding ships (one of which was supposed to be the Bismarck) hoping to make the Atlantic a “no go zone”.

Uh, yes, it very much is true. I was obviously refering to the time-period suggested before, the 1930s, aka Nazi Germany. Wilhelm II's vanity project of a big fleet, at a time Germany had a sizeable colonial Empire of its own, is irrelevant for that. The main goal for Germany in the 1930s was bulding up the army for a land-war to grab further land on the continent, and having an airforce to support said land-war. Raiders do not project power, they are in fact the exact opposite of that. They are used by those who are outnumbered and thus aim to go with hit-and-run tactics instead of openly challenging the opponent.

The Navy was an afterthought. It got a few capital-ships who could act as raiders, but no thought was ever given to openly challenge Britain at sea outside of vague paper's from Navy-fanboys who never got remotely close enough resources or influence to accomplish their goals. The Navy was also always the first to get cuts. In fact, war with Britain was to be avoided, if possible. Germany did not have a huge submarine fleet at the outbreak of the war. It is only after the war started that production truly ramped up, and even then did it take quite a while before Germany fielded a noteworthy amount of subs. That Germany didn't really have enough subs early on, no real planes to properly attack Britain, or generally plans on how to deal with the UK after beating France is proof enough that their focus was on something else entirely, namely a powerful land-force that could best France and take the land in the east. Germany's interests lay on the continent, just like the ones of the Soviet Union, and to a large extend those of France as well. That was the point I was making. Nations that had no reason to have larger interests at sea didn't plan for Naval power, they largely focused on the army. While nations that faced no real threat from land but had interests at seas (island nations, those with colonies or plenty of overseas trade) obviously put a big focus on that instead. The way nations were planning in that regard hinged entirely on their situation. There was no sudden realization of what an advantage Naval-Air power would bring.

 

[Herbert West]

There is also more than a bit of "the bomber will always get through" in the opening argument.

Russian doctrine is not blind to the effectiveness of air power or operational independence, hell, their doctrine calls for a lot of stand-off fires launched from inside their own air defence network (which was and is very impressive). It's just that they have encountered, somewhat, an air defence network that can challenge their own, while the US doctrine of "flatten everything with air power, waltz in with ground power, get bogged down for a decade after winning" has never encountered a peer.

When it got even a fraction close to encountering such, in Vietnam, the results were far from the one-sided roll-over one would expect.


To add to this, there is of course the immense social/economic/political pressure that an independent air force is able to exert on a nation like the USA, so the doctrine reflects not only cold hard military reality, but also, as always, the socio-economic reality of that state that came up with the doctrine. The USA didnt develop "lets bomb everything" because that is some objectively superior doctrine to everything else, it developed its doctrine because it is a nation sitting on an isolated landmass that has an extensive colonial network.

 

[Director]

Part of the difference, I think, is that Russia/The Soviet Union was able to use production for military goals and prioritize a large land army.

Like the French and German fleets, the Soviet navy was built up to interdict trade - specifically in the Soviet case to stop North American reinforcements from reaching Europe - and suffered the same fate, declining sharply when political leadership changed. For nations who must maintain large armies, large navies are expensive in resources, skilled manpower and money, and they tend to be put on the chopping block if finances or leadership changes. For nations which depend on seaborn commerce (Britain and Japan), sea control is existential. The United States is the only continental power that has ever kept a small army (relative to its size, wealth and population) and consistently supported a large navy - and the argument could be made there that geography and diplomacy have made a virtual island of the North American continent. Still, it must be said that maintaining seaborn commerce is not an existential need for the US but rather a luxury.

The United States and Great Britain have a long history of fearing the erosion of democratic government and traditionally have not kept large standing armies whose generals might become their masters. Under the mutual protection of NATO, western European nations have also not kept large standing armies. The corollary, I think, is that if you do not have a large army you must keep an effective one - and that means boosting combat power through air, naval and logistical support. That gives western (and probably Japanese) armies the ability to punch well above the weight their manpower would indicate.