I'd hardly consider the western allies approach in the 1930s to be oh so big on realizing what sort of advantage Air-Naval power brought. It just so happens that the unique circumstances of the individual nations put them into a situation from which certain paths looked more favourable to achieve their desired goals. That wasn't some cunning foresight they had.
The United Kingdom is and was an island nation. It's main protection lay in being able to prevent anyone from landing on their home soil. This meant that having a larger fleet than anyone else, and an air-fleet which would prevent the enemy from surpressing their most valuable assets, was essentialfor survival. They also had a vast colonial Empire, which required a massive navy to keep the vital trade-lanes open. In turn, they could live with a smaller army. Part of that strategy had been age-old (the navy), so this was hardly some great wisdom they achieved, or some sign of them understanding what great operational advantage it would bring in general.
The USA, meanwhile, had nothing to fear from any land-based attacks. Neither Canada nor Mexico was in any way a threat. The USA did however, have some far-away lands/colonies to protect, and also wanted to make sure that they had enough naval assets to keep their trade-lanes open. Just like in the UK, the US-Army was rather small at this point in time, because it didn't really need to be any bigger.
France, as a colonial Empire, had some interest in a sizeable navy, but it was hardly huge, nor did they lay any focus on Naval-Air power. Their main plans were about a land-war in Europe and how to best contain a Germany that had an advantage in terms of population.
Japan was big on naval and air, because it was an island nation with far-stretching belongings.
Italy had a huge coastline and its interest mainly lay in gobbling up more land in the Mediterranean, so they obviously had an interest in a big navy (for their size). The position of Italy itself, also meant that its land and islands were enough to project airpower in the way it was necessary.
Germany after WW1 had no colonies to watch over, and was almost entirely focused on getting further land in Europe. None of this required a large navy, though they put some effort into it to be at least a bit of a threat. Their focus was on the army, and an airforce with would help the army achieve its goals. There was no expectation of ending up at a point where projecting power oversea would be necessary.
The same is true for the Soviet Union. It had no interest in colonies, most of its coastline was inaccessible or so far away from anything useful that it wasn't threatened. They had localised fleets to protect the few areas of value, but that's about it. They couldn't get out of the Black Sea, there was no point in trying to get out of the Baltic, and the Far East was largely blocked off by Japan. Their main focus lay on protecting the huge land-borders, and, if possible, to swallow up some smaller neighbours. None of which required much investment into the navy. The Army came first, and the airforce worked in conjunction with it.
A focus on air and sea hinged on the nation having significant interest in regard to the sea, It had nothing to do with anyone realizing what sort of advantage it brought, nor was it unique to a certain set of countries. Those who needed to be big in naval assets invested heavily in naval assets, those who would only ever really fight a land-war would invest mostly in the army. Airpower was developed in accordance to the needs of the nation and the available resources. Everything else just evolved from that naturally.