France vs Germany in HOI4

[bruebottom]

The British committed three full-sized and well-equipped corps (including substantial corps-level assets); a "Saar force" composed of a division, an independent armored regiment, and several machine gun and engineering battalions; and three independent armored brigades attached directly to Lord Gort's BEF headquarters. The BEF walked straight into one of the great operational ruses in modern history, but to suggest it simply turned tail and ran at the first sign of trouble is neither fair nor accurate.

I think it is fair to say the BEF withdraw from the field of battle at the first sign of trouble. It was not by poor morale or disciplanary troubles of the BEF and the withdraw was in oposition to the War Office in London. It was by Gort's own decision.

Connelly and Miller argue that the British fought with determination when leadership was present and with clear orders, and Cairns argues that there was a break in co-operation between the British and French as a result of French inability to prevent a German breakthrough.

Mark Connelly and Walter Miller:
The BEF and the Issue of Surrender on the Western Front in 1940

“This article will examine the surrenders on the Western Front in May and June 1940 and argue that to attribute them to poor morale alone is an insufficient interpretation.”

“E.A.W. Williams said, ‘there was no shortage of fighting spirit, by God there wasn’t . . . we thought we were terrific. We were pretty good too.’ When the fighting began, many men were relieved and their spirits rose as they were given the chance to fulfill a useful role.”

“German sources too confirm that the BEF showed great resilience and willingness to fight.”

“Good leadership was inextricably linked with cohesion and communication. Men who were given clear instructions and understood what was expected of them maintained their morale and fought well.”


John C. Cairns:
Great Britain and the Fall of France: A Study in Allied Disunity

“Anglo-French military co-operation in the six weeks' campaign was effective only for the briefest period, that is to say, during the first days of the battle which opened early in the morning of Friday, May 10, 1940”

“[Lord] Gort's instructions of September 3, 1939, informed him that he was to carry out loyally any orders issued by Georges (commander of the the northeast theater of operations), but added 'if any order given by him appears to you to imperil the British Field Force, it is agreed between the British and French Governments that you should be at liberty to appeal to the British Government before executing that order'”

“Before the first week's of fighting was over, British confidence in the French army was irrecoverably destroyed.”

“It would, however, be unrealistic to attach too great significance to Billotte's death. Far more fundamental to the mis-carriage of Anglo-French co-operation now was the fact that Gort was taking a line of independence which could only lead to a total breakaway from the French scheme. As early as May 19 Pownall, his chief of staff, had telephoned the war office to say that it looked as if the French were not capable of closing the German breach and that consequently Gort was forced to consider withdraw to the coast.... Gort was ordered to cease thinking of withdraw and to concentrate on co-operating with the French.”

 

[misterbean]

Adding to the previous post:

I believe that on May, 18th, there was supposed to be a combined assault on Rommel's position at Arras from both north and south. Something went wrong and only the northern attack happened. (side-note: I believe it was in this battle that Rommel used his .88s as AT-guns).
Obviously, Lord Gort's unilateral decision to withdraw must have been fueled by this lack of communication.

 

[FOARP]

Liddell Hart's alleged influence over Guderian comes from a highly controversial paragraph in the English translation—not the German!—of Panzer Leader, for which Liddell Hart wrote the foreword. We now know that Liddell Hart asked Guderian to insert that paragraph in a letter dated April 6, 1951 and even went so far as to draft the laudatory sentences that cast Guderian as a "disciple" of Liddell Hart. Guderian adopted, almost verbatim, Liddell Hart's self-promotion in the English-language version of Panzer Leader. The same pattern of dishonest manipulation can be found in his correspondence with Manstein before the publication of Lost Victories and The German Generals Talk and with Rommel's son before the publication of The Rommel Papers. Liddell Hart wrote the foreword for Lost Victories and edited the latter two volumes.

You might be interested in this book. It's a fascinating exploration of Liddell Hart's shameless efforts to resurrect his reputation after the war.

On the other hand, German generals were crediting him before the war and before they became prominent. The mere fact that Lidell-Hart asked them to put in a good word for him does not mean he had no influence - it just means he was a self-promoter.

 

[dschoen]

That is not true...

That's some useful information mursolini—thanks. I admit I've not done a great deal of study on German/French artillery pieces. You're right that the French fielded many older guns; I've heard the stories of the modernized Model 1897 howitzers being repurposed before the 1940 Campaign. Still, though, I can't help but notice that while the French may have had large stores of WWI artillery, they also had modern pieces in numbers roughly comparable to those you gave for Germany. The three marks of 105mm guns, for example, were designed between 1934 and 1936, and there were well over 500 available by 1940. The "age" of a design does not necessarily indicate its effectiveness. After all, the US military used the 155mm M2/M114 during Vietnam, and that gun was a 1942 redesign of the French 155mm gun first issued in 1917!

Lastly, it's worth noting that we're quibbling about a few hundred artillery pieces. My larger point was that France's poor performance in 1940 came down to doctrine and strategy, not technology, industrial capacity, or manpower.

I think it is fair to say the BEF withdraw from the field of battle at the first sign of trouble. It was not by poor morale or disciplanary troubles of the BEF and the withdraw was in oposition to the War Office in London. It was by Gort's own decision.

Yes, there's no question whatsoever that the cooperation between the French and the BEF was downright abysmal, and it worsened the closer the Panzer divisions got to Abbeville and the Channel coast. The whole episode was capped off by an almost comical failure to cooperate on the last-ditch counteroffensive scheduled for May 21st: the Brits thought they were supposed to attack on May 21, but the French ambiguously decreed that the attack should begin "from the 21st on." I agree completely that the BEF did not withdraw because of morale problems; in fact, that's precisely what I was arguing against.

Karl-Heinz Frieser has argued that the Allies had irrevocably lost the campaign by May 14th. As the noose tightened a week later, I'm not sure there was much more the BEF could have done to right the ship, considering their initial mal-deployment and the sorry state Anglo-French cooperation.

 

[dschoen]

On the other hand, German generals were crediting him before the war and before they became prominent. The mere fact that Lidell-Hart asked them to put in a good word for him does not mean he had no influence - it just means he was a self-promoter.

I've not seen any pre-war evidence of Liddell Hart's influence on the German generals. On the other hand, I've seen considerable evidence, thoroughly referenced to the personal correspondence of Liddell Hart and the generals in question, that show Liddell Hart did his best to manufacture this pre-war "influence" out of whole cloth. Mearsheimer goes to great pains to show both that Liddell Hart and his menagerie of theories were known only in the most general way to Wehrmacht officers before the war. Unfortunately, these fabrications became fact with the passage of time and have deflected attention away from true revolutionaries like JFC Fuller.

Maybe I'm too hard on the guy, but it's hard to come away from that book with anything but the impression that he was an unscrupulous, manipulative weasel. I don't mean to de-rail this thread further with a historiographical quip only tangentially related to the 1940 Campaign, so we can take this discussion to PM if you want.

 

[mursolini]

That's some useful information mursolini—thanks. I admit I've not done a great deal of study on German/French artillery pieces. You're right that the French fielded many older guns; I've heard the stories of the modernized Model 1897 howitzers being repurposed before the 1940 Campaign. Still, though, I can't help but notice that while the French may have had large stores of WWI artillery, they also had modern pieces in numbers roughly comparable to those you gave for Germany. The three marks of 105mm guns, for example, were designed between 1934 and 1936, and there were well over 500 available by 1940. The "age" of a design does not necessarily indicate its effectiveness. After all, the US military used the 155mm M2/M114 during Vietnam, and that gun was a 1942 redesign of the French 155mm gun first issued in 1917!

If you actually read my point, I claim that German artilery pieces were seriously superior on average, with roughtly less than 10% of French artilery being comparable to German.
I also noted that the "progress" of German guns was roughtly in 2-3 km gain in range of barage for most calibers, which is very serious advantage.

The 500 105 mm hovisers were roughtly equal to German Le-HF105, older ones, were inferior. 150mm hovisers, I did put the numbers in, Germans were roughly similar in numbers, while notably superior. Again, for 105mm long range guns, the superiority holds.

How serious is the lack of range of artilery? Well, judjing by how much problems Germans had with Russian A-19 and ML-20 which had roughtly similar range advantage to what Germans had compared to French, that is pretty serious advantage, and it did metter.

My larger point was that France's poor performance in 1940 came down to doctrine and strategy, not technology, industrial capacity, or manpower.

That statement is unfound. France built Maginot because of it`s unferiority in manpower and industry.
France didn`t attack into West wall because it didn`t want to risk having to take WW1-sized cassualties, it couldn`t maintain a 3 to 1 cassualty ratio like in 1915-1917 on wester front on WW1.
French inferiority made British far less wiling to commit big forses to France.
French couldn`t aford to re-arm their army to WW2 standard, thus it had to use a lot of WW1 equipment, thus they couldn`t really change the tactics that much.
French`s inferiority in numbers meant that standards for soldiers and officers were lower that ones for Germans.
French`s lack of resources and rather bad economical situation forced them to stick to old tactics, as they couldn`t really afford to retool their industry to build new equpment, and reorganise and retrain their army for different type of warfare.
French had to commit their resources to having a strong navy, to support their empire.

French`s poor performance had everything to do with technology, industrial capacity, georgaphy and manpower.
In hinsight, it they actually know that the war would come in 1940, they could prepare. However, French leadership couldn`t know that thus it had to be an arms race, naval against Brits&Japs, Land against Germany, and it prioritised it`s resources poorly for 1940 war.

 

[unmerged(61166)]

In HOI3 fighting off Germany as France is extremely difficult and only taken up by very experienced strategists, and even then they usually have to wait for Soviet intervention. However I've read that in real life the Battle of France was a little closer than is shown in HIO3 (where Germany usually just rolls over France). In real life was the battle between the two closer than is shown in game and should HOI4 make it a little easier to play as France?

They steamrolled over France. The only time it came "close" was during the Battle of France. Had the Allies deployed tanks and used tactics as they did during the Battle of France, the Allies may have repelled the invasion into France.

 

[misterbean]

They steamrolled over France. The only time it came "close" was during the Battle of France. Had the Allies deployed tanks and used tactics as they did during the Battle of France, the Allies may have repelled the invasion into France.

This is sounding like there is something wrong with the sentence. Perhaps a mistake in translation?

At any rate, I do know that there were at least 3 attempts to counter-attack the Germans.

1) Guderian (PzIII) vs. French Larm just after crossing the border, when Guderian wanted to turn east and cut off the Maginot line (???). Guderian won because of PzIIIs better main gun.
2) Grossdeutschland + (probably) 10. Pz.Division vs a French Char B1Bis brigade (docu's expression, not mine): failed due to lack of fuel and numbers.
3) Arras. Rommel's 7. Pz.Division vs. Mathilda IIs. Rommel was saved only by the Flak 88. Had the French gotten their tanks to their starting line in time for the southern pinxter, things might have gone dreadfully different and we might not have this game at all.

So it was closer than the myth would suggest, but overall better tank doctrine and the presence of on-board radios in the German tanks gave them the decisive edge in most combat encounters.

 

[dschoen]

If you actually read my point, I claim that German artilery pieces were seriously superior on average, with roughtly less than 10% of French artilery being comparable to German.
I also noted that the "progress" of German guns was roughtly in 2-3 km gain in range of barage for most calibers, which is very serious advantage.

I indeed read every word of your post and found it quite useful. Your post inspired me to look more deeply into French and German artillery models, and I thank you for that. Do you have some sources for your view that less than 10% of French artillery could be compared to German guns and that German guns enjoyed a 2-3 km range advantage? I'm not trying to be combative; I'd just like to do some additional reading on the topic.

What are your views on French tanks relative to their German counterparts? I'd be interested in your opinion there as well.

French`s poor performance had everything to do with technology, industrial capacity, georgaphy and manpower.
In hinsight, it they actually know that the war would come in 1940, they could prepare. However, French leadership couldn`t know that thus it had to be an arms race, naval against Brits&Japs, Land against Germany, and it prioritised it`s resources poorly for 1940 war.

After reflecting on your point for a bit, I think we are actually making two different arguments. It is true that the strategic factors you mention, especially France's low birth rate and industrial capacity vis-a-vis Germany, resulted in "Maginot thinking" and bad doctrine generally. This had disastrous consequences for the Allies. My point, though, is that the French army, as it existed in 1940, should have been able to give a far better account of itself. Even with these factors in play, a better strategy could have halted the German advance, something the German generals were well aware of. Had Gamelin not ordered his best-equipped and most experienced men to race to the Dyle—straight into the German trap and instead maintained a reasonable strategic reserve, then the Sichellschnitt may well have failed. Von Bock, commander of Heeresgruppe B, tellingly predicted that Fall Gelb "has to bog down if the French haven't taken leave of their senses" (War Diary, February 24, 1940). I'm saying that, in adopting a strictly defensive doctrinal posture, while failing to maintain a mass de manoevre, Gamelin had taken leave of his senses. The French gambled everything on a single roll of the dice; when the Germans called his bluff at Sedan, the campaign was almost over before it had even begun.

Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend (originally Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug, 1940), the best operational history I have read on the campaign, lists nine reasons for France's military collapse. They are overwhelmingly doctrinal and organizational in nature, not technological:

1. Maginot thinking: France's confinement to passive defense [doctrinal/strategic]
2. The anachronistic command system of the French army, compared to German eagerness to lead from the front [organizational]
3. The revival of operational thinking in Germany [doctrinal]
4. The removal of the taboo against breakthrough and "flank psychosis" [doctrinal]
5. German Auftragstaktik (leading through mission) [doctrinal]
6. Superior German telecommunications technology [technological]
7. The total system of the Panzer force (i.e. combined arms structure) [doctrinal/organizational]
8. The Luftwaffe's first-strike thinking [doctrinal]
9. The Luftwaffe as an operational instrument, vs. French air power as a strategic instrument for long wars [doctrinal/organizational]

That is the basis for my argument that French failings came down primarily to doctrine. Of course, doctrine always exists in conversation with strategic concerns, but there is little reason to think that a more active and imaginative French command might not have formulated a better strategy with the weapons at its disposal. Regarding technology, Frieser begins his discussion of tactics and technology with this preamble:

The Allies had the same weapon systems as the Germans, and their tanks were technically even better. The fundamental difference, however, was in the basic principles of employment. On the other hand German hand, German employment principles were long known and had been used already during earlier wars. It was only their combination with modern technology that led to something new, the blitzkrieg….It achieved its spectacular explosion at Sedan in May 1940, and its effect even surprised Guderian. Now Sickle Cut could be pulled off successfully, whereas it had failed in the spring of 1918, mainly due to the lack of a Panzer force.

The German Panzer force was superior because of its doctrine, its organization, and its radios, not because it had better tanks than its French or British opponents.

 

[Bluestreak2k5]

I indeed read every word of your post and found it quite useful. Your post inspired me to look more deeply into French and German artillery models, and I thank you for that. Do you have some sources for your view that less than 10% of French artillery could be compared to German guns and that German guns enjoyed a 2-3 km range advantage? I'm not trying to be combative; I'd just like to do some additional reading on the topic.

What are your views on French tanks relative to their German counterparts? I'd be interested in your opinion there as well.



After reflecting on your point for a bit, I think we are actually making two different arguments. It is true that the strategic factors you mention, especially France's low birth rate and industrial capacity vis-a-vis Germany, resulted in "Maginot thinking" and bad doctrine generally. This had disastrous consequences for the Allies. My point, though, is that the French army, as it existed in 1940, should have been able to give a far better account of itself. Even with these factors in play, a better strategy could have halted the German advance, something the German generals were well aware of. Had Gamelin not ordered his best-equipped and most experienced men to race to the Dyle—straight into the German trap and instead maintained a reasonable strategic reserve, then the Sichellschnitt may well have failed. Von Bock, commander of Heeresgruppe B, tellingly predicted that Fall Gelb "has to bog down if the French haven't taken leave of their senses" (War Diary, February 24, 1940). I'm saying that, in adopting a strictly defensive doctrinal posture, while failing to maintain a mass de manoevre, Gamelin had taken leave of his senses. The French gambled everything on a single roll of the dice; when the Germans called his bluff at Sedan, the campaign was almost over before it had even begun.

Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend (originally Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug, 1940), the best operational history I have read on the campaign, lists nine reasons for France's military collapse. They are overwhelmingly doctrinal and organizational in nature, not technological:

1. Maginot thinking: France's confinement to passive defense [doctrinal/strategic]
2. The anachronistic command system of the French army, compared to German eagerness to lead from the front [organizational]
3. The revival of operational thinking in Germany [doctrinal]
4. The removal of the taboo against breakthrough and "flank psychosis" [doctrinal]
5. German Auftragstaktik (leading through mission) [doctrinal]
6. Superior German telecommunications technology [technological]
7. The total system of the Panzer force (i.e. combined arms structure) [doctrinal/organizational]
8. The Luftwaffe's first-strike thinking [doctrinal]
9. The Luftwaffe as an operational instrument, vs. French air power as a strategic instrument for long wars [doctrinal/organizational]

That is the basis for my argument that French failings came down primarily to doctrine. Of course, doctrine always exists in conversation with strategic concerns, but there is little reason to think that a more active and imaginative French command might not have formulated a better strategy with the weapons at its disposal. Regarding technology, Frieser begins his discussion of tactics and technology with this preamble:



The German Panzer force was superior because of its doctrine, its organization, and its radios, not because it had better tanks than its French or British opponents.

So isn't it possible that PI is indeed solving this problem in HOI4? They said in #4 that German doctrine is FRONT Loaded with bonuses to provide bonuses early to german mobile warfare... I assume this would also include things like breakthrough, surround, etc...

Lets say that this happens from the perspective of what we know of HOI4:

German blitzkrieg doctrine provides +50% soft attack and hard attack bonus to all tanks, and +25% soft and hard attack to other mobile units. It also provides a 10% combined arms bonus to units and 10% increased chance of breakthrough and reinforcements.
French doctrine provides a 10% defensive bonus.

Now you wouldn't need to Nerf France the way they are in HOI3, because you are buffing German doctrine (which as we have discussed for multiple pages now). This provides the bonuses needed for Germany to "overrun" France the way they did historically, while still allowing France to reach historical or higher then historical army, air force, and navy sizes.

Now Since German doctrine is front loaded with bonuses, they don't really get much additional bonuses through 1945... but the American, British/French doctrines catch up by 1943 to 1944 so they are on PAR with German doctrines. Germany would basically have 50% or more of all the bonuses from doctrine in 1939, but other doctrines would only have 10% of the bonuses in 1939.

 

[bruebottom]

After reflecting on your point for a bit, I think we are actually making two different arguments. It is true that the strategic factors you mention, especially France's low birth rate and industrial capacity vis-a-vis Germany, resulted in "Maginot thinking" and bad doctrine generally. This had disastrous consequences for the Allies. My point, though, is that the French army, as it existed in 1940, should have been able to give a far better account of itself. Even with these factors in play, a better strategy could have halted the German advance, something the German generals were well aware of. Had Gamelin not ordered his best-equipped and most experienced men to race to the Dyle—straight into the German trap and instead maintained a reasonable strategic reserve, then the Sichellschnitt may well have failed. Von Bock, commander of Heeresgruppe B, tellingly predicted that Fall Gelb "has to bog down if the French haven't taken leave of their senses" (War Diary, February 24, 1940). I'm saying that, in adopting a strictly defensive doctrinal posture, while failing to maintain a mass de manoevre, Gamelin had taken leave of his senses. The French gambled everything on a single roll of the dice; when the Germans called his bluff at Sedan, the campaign was almost over before it had even begun.

Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend (originally Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug, 1940), the best operational history I have read on the campaign, lists nine reasons for France's military collapse. They are overwhelmingly doctrinal and organizational in nature, not technological:

1. Maginot thinking: France's confinement to passive defense [doctrinal/strategic]
2. The anachronistic command system of the French army, compared to German eagerness to lead from the front [organizational]
3. The revival of operational thinking in Germany [doctrinal]
4. The removal of the taboo against breakthrough and "flank psychosis" [doctrinal]
5. German Auftragstaktik (leading through mission) [doctrinal]
6. Superior German telecommunications technology [technological]
7. The total system of the Panzer force (i.e. combined arms structure) [doctrinal/organizational]
8. The Luftwaffe's first-strike thinking [doctrinal]
9. The Luftwaffe as an operational instrument, vs. French air power as a strategic instrument for long wars [doctrinal/organizational]

That is the basis for my argument that French failings came down primarily to doctrine. Of course, doctrine always exists in conversation with strategic concerns, but there is little reason to think that a more active and imaginative French command might not have formulated a better strategy with the weapons at its disposal. Regarding technology, Frieser begins his discussion of tactics and technology with this preamble:


The German Panzer force was superior because of its doctrine, its organization, and its radios, not because it had better tanks than its French or British opponents.

Gunsburg argues that poor French doctrines and strategy is a weak argument for the failure of the allies loss of France, and in his paper he contradicts some of the points made by Frieser.


Jeffery A. Gunsburg:
The Battle of Gembloux, 14-15 May 1940: The "Blitzkrieg" Checked

“Thus this battle is a legitimate test of the tactical capability of the French army of May 1940 to withstand the Blitzkrieg. Other confrontations saw overwhelming numbers of elite German troops and aircraft pitted against French second-reserve infantry (Sedan), or catching outnumbered French forces trying to install themselves on the soil of formerly neutral neighbors (the Netherlands, the Ardennes, Dinant on the Meuse River), or fighting actions flowing from the initial German success in which the enemy usually held the initiative (e.g., Stonne, Rethel).”


His conclusion on the battle of gembloux...

“Did the Allied corps de bataille of May 1940 have the weapons, the doctrine, and the motivation to confront the Blitzkrieg? The Battle of Gembloux demonstrated that the answer is yes. Here the French artillery-infantry team imposed itself handily on the German tank-plane team, despite the fact that the defense was much more improvised on open terrain than French doctrine intended, and that the German side enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. French generalship picked the terrain for the battle, accurately predicted where the enemy would make his mechanized effort, allotted enough force to stop him, and won the day despite having to divert almost all Allied airpower and most of the reserves to counter Sichelschnitt....”

“The fate of the mechanized attack on 14 and 15 May demonstrated the weaknesses of the "Blitzkrieg" tactical system, weaknesses which French doctrine intended to exploit to gain a 'first and serious advantage and an indisputable moral ascendancy.' The report of the divisional surgeon of 4th Panzer noted above confirms the accuracy of this French view; the operations officer of XVI Corps confirmed that the leadership of the Panzer troops lost faith in their ability to break through and thus failed to exploit what opportunity there was."

“Panzer officers recognized the decisive effect of French artillery and the failure of German airpower and artillery to silence it, along with the dogged resistance of the French and North African infantry, the effectiveness of French-as opposed to German-antitank weapons, the excellence of French camouflage, the effective French minefields and demolitions, the skilled use of artillery fire and small armored counterattacks to cover a retreat, and the French ability to deliver effective flanking fire on the narrow German front of attack. Interestingly, 3d Rifle Brigade credited German artillery fire with making the advance in the 3d Panzer Division zone possible. But the German commanders tended to see the French retreat as a result of the blows dealt them by the Panzers - who thus won the battle. In fact, the French First Army retreated because it was flanked from the south, as the German leadership should have understood. Some historians have credited the Wehrmacht with an unusual capacity for professional self-criticism, a key to victory. But Gembloux was a case where the German command refused to recognize the lesson of the limitations of mechanized attack against a conventional defense. Sixth Army was to relearn that lesson in the hardest of ways at Stalingrad.”

PS. if you want his paper, pm me and I will forward it by email.

 

[Lamahorse]

For balance purposes, Germany needs to steamroll Europe in order to become the last boss it ends up to be in HoI3.

 

[dschoen]

So isn't it possible that PI is indeed solving this problem in HOI4? They said in #4 that German doctrine is FRONT Loaded with bonuses to provide bonuses early to german mobile warfare... I assume this would also include things like breakthrough, surround, etc...

Yes, it is possible the new land doctrine system announced in DD #4 might go some way to solve these issues. I still like SM's ideas, though, as I have a feeling something more substantial might be needed.

Gunsburg argues that poor French doctrines and strategy is a weak argument for the failure of the allies loss of France, and in his paper he contradicts some of the points made by Frieser.
…..
PS. if you want his paper, pm me and I will forward it by email.

It sounds like an interesting paper. Thank you for your kind offer to forward it. I've sent a PM.

Gembloux is indeed an interesting example of what the French army could achieve when properly deployed. I do not doubt for a moment that the French were capable of giving as much punishment as they received—Gembloux, la Horgne, and the bloody fighting at Stonne proved that. It's worth noting, though, that even had the French stone-walled Höpner's XVI. Armeekorps at Gembloux, there was still the breakthrough at Sedan to contend with. With insufficient French reserves to stem the armored fist moving westward, it seems to me that further French success to the north would only have prolonged the inevitable. For French actions at Gembloux to have had a decisive impact on the campaign, the Allies would still have had to halt the German advance to the south, but their poor strategic deployment and archaic command structure made that nearly impossible after May 14th.

Without having read Gunsburg's paper, I can't really say more, but I don't think I would disagree with my very cursory understanding of his thesis based on the quotations you've provided.

 

[shri]

This is sounding like there is something wrong with the sentence. Perhaps a mistake in translation?

At any rate, I do know that there were at least 3 attempts to counter-attack the Germans.

1) Guderian (PzIII) vs. French Larm just after crossing the border, when Guderian wanted to turn east and cut off the Maginot line (???). Guderian won because of PzIIIs better main gun.
2) Grossdeutschland + (probably) 10. Pz.Division vs a French Char B1Bis brigade (docu's expression, not mine): failed due to lack of fuel and numbers.
3) Arras. Rommel's 7. Pz.Division vs. Mathilda IIs. Rommel was saved only by the Flak 88. Had the French gotten their tanks to their starting line in time for the southern pinxter, things might have gone dreadfully different and we might not have this game at all.

So it was closer than the myth would suggest, but overall better tank doctrine and the presence of on-board radios in the German tanks gave them the decisive edge in most combat encounters.

1. Guderian won mainly due to Luftwaffe helping him out by creating panic in the French.

2. GrobDuetschland was only a regiment strong at this time, 10th Panzer was below strength at this stage due to losses, the french lost mainly due to bad doctrine and the fact that french tanks needed more refuelling, lack of radios and ofcourse the Luftwaffe.

3. British and French did not co-ordinate the attack (North-South), only north side Franco-British army under a Brit General attacked and nearly caused a panic among German troops with their near indestructable tanks. Again, lack of co-ordination, radios, presence of Luftwaffe and ofcourse 88's helped.

 

[misterbean]

So it all boils down to one word: Gamelin? It was his OOB, his archaic and slow system. In the field, they did what they had to do.

 

[shri]

France IC should not be nerfed though the 'democracy' penalty to building units should apply (lesser usable IC and manpower pre-war) also France should be forced to build a huge navy or get massive penalties (so that this IC is not used to build a force of HARM as players do). Thirdly man-power should be better balanced for france,
But French leaders should have -25% morale and -25% org, i.e. Divisions fight at less strength than optimum and recover strength slower,
Also if Franco-British Joint Defense/Attack, immediate -25% penalty (bad co-ordination between allies).
French Army on attack/movement should also get a penalty in time (the gap between issuing order and execution must be atleast 3 days i.e. 72 hours), resulting in confusion in French army and bad attack planning as your objectives may have already been reinforced or some other place may have been attacked.
Switz and Italian and Spanish Borders need to be garrisoned always with some minimal soldiers.

This should make a Historic strong French army but which will be defeated by Germany easily using the Luftwaffe to soften the enemy and rush the panzers in to encircle them.

 

[soldier2975]

If France didn't start as part of the Allies i would join the Axis when playing as them just to avoid annihilation.

 

[Secret Master]

If France didn't start as part of allies i would join the Axis playing as them just to avoid annihilation.

You know a coup will pull you out of the Allies, right?

Oh, and I would recommend CGM as France if you want out of the Allies.

For balance purposes, Germany needs to steamroll Europe in order to become the last boss it ends up to be in HoI3.

Should a historical war game have a "boss" or a "boss fight"?

I understand why a human playing the US or Soviets might want to always see Germany defeat France, but consider that playing as France, Great Britain, or Germany is also viable. And when playing any of the three of them, there would be some real benefit to a less lopsided, more realistic portrayal of the Battle of France. I know misterbeam doesn't want it to take six months to reach Paris every time, but I think even he would want the Battle of France to have real difficulty when playing as one of the principle powers involved.

I mean, as Britain, I never bother trying to save France because it's a lost cause. In HOI3, it is much wiser for Britain to just write off France completely and focus on bombing Germany, securing convoy routes, and preparing to invade Italy or Japan (depending on what flavor of a game you want). Why bother sending even one division to France, when you are just going to watch the French fold? And why bother sending a larger force if French manpower is so low that her army is not even the historical size?

 

[misterbean]

I think even he would want the Battle of France to have real difficulty when playing as one of the principle powers involved.

Agreed.

 

[TheRomanRuler]

I have ahistorical solution how we get to historical resolution: Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Italy all flank French in south, together their strength should be enough to brake trough southern part of Maginot line, or at least force them to send more divisions to south. HOI4 will be more sandbox like any way so this should be possible, and it could give them enough experience to make them able to defeat Yougoslavia and Greece without Germany`s help, and preparing everyone for possible (sandbox, so you don`t have to do it) invasion of Soviet Union.
That way France could be stronger than Germany, on paper i mean, and with player doctorines etc would be fine, and still historical result of France getting overrun would happen.