The Year of Development
Part 2: The Generals’ War III, January 1 – February 20, 1937
His imposed reorganization on the Armata dell’AOI and the wider Tarabulus headquarters complete, Mussolini returned to the policy he had agreed upon with Grazioli. Mussolini withdrew from intervening and simply watched events unfold, busying himself with guiding Italy toward the strategic vision he wanted to become a reality. Thus, the war in East Africa reverted to the command of the generals. They had let it slide into defeat and humiliation but they also had the potential, galvanized by the reorganization, of clawing their way back out of the hole they had stumbled into.
For the first month, Grossi merely sat and waited. For thirty-one days, it was as if nothing had changed despite the decrease in numbers and the change of leadership at the top. Mussolini had allowed limited newspaper coverage of the theater on the explicit agreement that not the disaster in Somalia, nor the length of the war be mentioned nor the failures of the previous commanders be mentioned. The press was thus ready to trumpet the victorious march into Adis Abeba, but this did not happen and soon there were muted grumbles in the newspapers. Grossi was not worried, nor was Grazioli or Mussolini. They understood that logistics took time to correct. On January 24th, Grossi sent off a report to Rome that, by his judgment, the logistical situation was good enough to warrant major offensive action.
Logistics were adequately if not fully supplying all frontline units.
In the same report, he submitted his intelligence estimates. He believed that the Abyssinian forces in front of him had approximately a third of the combat strength he commanded. While he suggested that a squadron of tactical bombers and four regiments of armor would be appreciated, he knew that this was merely ritual. No reinforcements would be forthcoming, he would have to make do with what he had. His objective was Adis Abeba, and he was going to attack toward it. It was not anticipated to be a reckless thrust, though given the minor distances involved by this stage it was not out of the question even for the most cautious commander. Instead, he aimed to give the troops under his command some more combat experience, reports of which would be very useful to the army staff research teams in Rome.
Grossi’s intelligence estimates, final objective and offensive stance.
Finally, on February 2, the dam broke. Six Italian divisions, six-sevenths of the entire Armata dell’AOI, attacked the Abyssinian forces that were deployed around Debre Markos. Coordinated by Gonzago del Vodice, with Major General Nicolosi as the senior general on the frontline, the greater part of Gonzago’s corps attacked with the other divisions supporting. The Abyssinian resistance comprised a single division, albeit one of trained infantry. The Abyssinians made the most of the mountainous terrain and the river in their defense, and the Italian logistics system was hard pressed to deliver the ammunition required for heavy combat. Nonetheless the Abyssinians were driven back in the space of a week, losing nearly a thousand soldiers. The Italians lost a third of the men the Abyssinians did.
The battle of Debre Markos, heralding the new Italian offensive!
By February 12th, Debre Markos had fallen to the Italians. The Abyssinians were retreating toward Nek’emte. Gonzago quickly shifted his forces, sending one division toward Nek’emte, under the command of Silvestri, two toward the town of Gedo, under Nicolosi and Barbasetti di Prun, and two to Fiche to join Tellera’s mountaineers. These last two were under the command of Gandin and Castellano. The Abyssinians put up a short fight for Nek’emte, not lasting longer than two days, before withdrawing further toward Jima. The fight for Gedo was more difficult as the Abyssinian forces there were fresh and considerable, deploying one division of trained infantry and a division of militia as well. Three Italian divisions attacked Gedo: the two from Debre Markos, which were supported by Tellera from Fiche.
Pursuing toward Nek’emte, fighting toward Gedo and marching toward Fiche.
Thus by the 20th of February, Grossi’s right flank had advanced several hundred kilometers from their start line by Bahir Dar. Debre Markos had fallen in ten days, Nek’emte in a further eight. Gedo was under attack. Though Grossi had decided against direct thrust toward Adis Abeba, this evidently did not mean that he was going to move slowly. Grossi swept through western Abyssinia at an astounding rate. Long the silent portion of the front, even when Grazioli was still pushing forward his thrusts were directly toward Adis Abeba rather than to its west, the Abyssinians were unprepared for the storm that Grossi unleashed upon them despite their two trained infantry divisions being in the region.
The situation by the 20th of February.
Grossi’s offensive took not only the Abyssinians by surprise but the rest of the world as well. Talk in the backrooms of London quickly turned from wondering when the Abyssinians would march into Ed and Asmara to speculating on how quickly Abis Abeba would fall to the Italians. Italian newspapers hailed these victories to the heavens and, in compliance with their agreement with Mussolini, did not dig deeper to the question of why the war was still going. This suited Mussolini’s plans, as he did not want any distractions from pushing forward with his strategic ideas.
