While I won't go to the extreme that Vincent is planning, I will jump in demanding/pleading for an update! 
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I'll a write a letter to the Times, asking if they could start an update campaign. No not really, but into the fog war, one must dispell the mist!
The great part about this is even though Mett is technically done, we've all been demanding another update, and when he does update, a month later we're demanding another one "but what happens in the 60s?" "but what happens in the 70s?"
Mett never realized when he started Advantages that he had begun an Aar that he could never ever finish. He is in... the Paradox Zone.
Mett never realized when he started Advantages that he had begun an Aar that he could never ever finish. He is in... the Paradox Zone.
(At this point we hear the sound of Dan Cook saying 'More.' repeatedly for the rest of time, played over the sound of Mett screaming in a cell with only a PC in it.)
But then what happened in the 1980s and 1990s? What happened last week, in this world of the AAR tale?
Hello, don't worry, I haven't given up on completing this. I started yet another job last Monday so things have been busy. I'm hoping to get the Middle East post done sometime this week, and then followup with the other two soon. Hang in there, and thanks for the continued interest.
Bah, all these damn jobs; Mett should be employed on this.
Paradox should pay him a monthly stipend for work on his AARs.
Paradox should pay him a monthly stipend for work on his AARs.
Epilogue: The Middle East
By 1954, the entirety of the Middle Eastern colonial structure had been swept away. The Red Army had destroyed the House of Saud, had defeated the Iranian Shah, and had laid low many states in the region, including Iraq and Oman. Much of the same ground was then fought over a second time, as American forces and their Hashemite allies counterattacked and drove the Soviets northward, until by the time of the European Armistice, the front lines had moved as far north as the Caucasus Mountains. Communist Turkey survived a more serious invasion by capitulating and ceding its claims in Europe and over the Kurds. Like Spain and Italy, the country would retreat into a democracy in name only, and be therefore ignored.
The Middle East would not be governed by the London Peace. Instead, the battlefield reality would reflect the post-war structure. Most of the region, from Arabia northward to Iraq, was in possession of the Hashemite armies, which, through King Abdullah’s policy of ”aid, not intervention”, effectively excluded American forces from most of this region. This dominant position would therefore mean little opposition to Abdullah’s vision for the Middle East – his معاهدة العائلة الملكية, or Family Compact. Keeping Arabia, which was now effectively united for the first time in centuries, he restored his nephew Feisal to the Iraqi throne. A third throne, envisioned for what he named Greater Syria (called Trans-Syria in the West), would encompass the former mandates of Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. This solid alliance of three family kingdoms would ensure Hashemite domination of the Middle East and create a power bloc to potentially rival that in Europe and in the weakened Soviet Union. Abdullah proclaimed himself malik bilad-al-arab, ‘King of All Arabs’, in 1953.
The Monarchs of the ‘Family Compact’
Feisal II or Iraq and Abdullah of Arabia
There were complications, however. Abdullah had marked Damascus as the capital of Greater Syria. Unfortunately, this city was the headquarters of the U.S. Sixth Army. American troops also occupied Palestine, enjoyed strong support from King Farouk of Egypt – who was nervous of his Arabic rival – and controlled the northern portion of Feisal’s Iraq. The Rockefeller Administration was also highly interested in the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, which, like ‘Great’ Poland in Europe, was expected to be a bastion against potential rivals. Tensions between the United States and the Hashemites had emerged since the early counterattacks after the Battle of the Sinai in 1951. The decimation of Konev’s tanks had allowed the U.S. to push back into the Middle East, and had enabled Abdullah’s forces to liberate Mecca and Medina, the holiest cities in Islam. Since then, cooperation had bogged down over disputes regarding territory and equipment. The Hashemites had denied access for American troops to maneuver into northern Arabia. The Americans had refused to provide medium and heavy tanks to the Hashemite armies. The tensions grew as the forces pushed northward. Despite Abdullah’s objections, the Sixth Army had marched into Damascus and then Mosul. Over U.S. objections, Abdullah had aggressively put down a Saudi revolt and had occupied Yemen, Oman, and Qatar. Neither side seemed willing to compromise.
What emerged in the Middle East, therefore, was a divide between Abdullah’s vision and that of the United States. Mere months after the Treaty of London was signed, in September 1954, the Hashemite ‘Family Compact’ formally came into being with a series of ritual festivities in Mecca and Baghdad, celebrating the restoration of both kingdoms. Although the American ambassador, Douglas Dillon, was present at both occasions, there were clear signs of disapproval emanating from Washington. As he recorded in his memoirs, Rockefeller felt that ”the developing structure of these Arab princes will foster only future danger.” If there were no such celebrations in Damascus, it did not, for the moment, seem to mar Hashemite ambitions. For their part, though they had not planned for post-war government, U.S. troops continued to occupy Jerusalem, Damascus, Beirut, Alexandretta, and Mosul, well into 1955.
In addition to U.S. interests, the ‘Family Compact’ had to contend with the reemergence of the Iranian state. After compromise peace agreements with Axis India and the United States – which saw minor cessions in the Indus Valley as well as the forfeiture of claims in troubled Central Asia, Iran regained its independence and steadily recovered economic and military strength. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who had gone into exile to Geneva in 1949, returned to power six years later with the blessing of both powers. During the 1950s, Iran would increasingly become a rival to the Hashemites, and was in a position to gain should the U.S. have a falling out with the ‘Family Compact’.
This falling out, likely though it seemed, would be slow to develop. The two events that would trigger it, however, were quite decisive: the revival of the 1919 Feisal-Weizmann Agreement and Abdullah’s proclamation of the Caliphate. The first, which saw what the New York Times called an ”end run around our national pride”, featured the unprecedented meetings of Kings Abdullah and Feisal with one of the leading Zionists in Palestine, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi. The agreement, which provided for Jewish autonomy under the auspices of an Arab state, effectively undermined the American position in Palestine. After public demonstrations in Palestine began, the political fallout in the United States prompted a withdrawal of troops in 1957. Though unable to secure Damascus, Abdullah would defiantly install his nephew’s son Zeid as King of Greater Syria, with his “temporary” capital, in March 1958.
This move would help bring about the American dealings with the abortive ‘Hatay state’, which one noted historian called a ”figment of every imagination except that of the American President”. When that failed, the U.S. continued to defiantly support the independence of Lebanon and Syria against increasing Arab pressure as the decade closed. The ambiguous Near East Treaty Organization (NETO) would give more to more pun than power in the region, as the grouping of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Kurdistan into an American alliance became increasingly unwieldy.
It was Abdullah’s revival of the Caliphate, however, that would see the fruition of these tensions. Decades before, on March 3, 1924, the last Caliph, Abdul Mejid, was deposed and expelled by the Turkish government. Two days later, Sharif Hussein of Mecca, Abdullah’s father, staked his own claim to the title. Though few took the claim seriously, the Hashemites had not forgotten. On March 5, 1960, Abdullah revived the title, calling himself, for the first time, خليفة, or Khalifa (meaning ‘Successor’). The move electrified the region, delighting many in the Middle East who had longed for a return to religious order. The move also weakened the stability of NETO and would directly contribute to the assassination of King Farouk of Egypt later that year. His eight-year old son, Fuad II, would succeed him, but it was the Regent, Prince Mohamed Ali, who would increasingly look upon the Caliphate as a favorable buffer against nationalist radicals in his own country. Though a sizeable minority in Iran were intrigued by Abdullah’s claim, the Shah vigorously maintained his opposition, both for religious and political reasons.
The dispute between Iran and the Hashemite kingdoms would coincide with a clash over oil in the Middle East. As the U.S. continued to back Lebanese and Syrian independence, as well as rejecting Feisal’s calls for a restoration of Mosul, King Abdullah began to regard the influence of American oil companies in Arabia as a liability. The power of ARAMCO, the Arab-American Oil Company, was in decline since the Oil Scandals wracked the American political landscape in the early 1960s. Sensing the opportunity, beginning in 1962, the Arabian oil fields were completely nationalized, a move which angered the United States. In response, the enterprising Shah of Iran quickly moved to open up his country’s own oil for export. The resulting brinksmanship between Iran and the Hashemites would lead to the 1964 Mesopotamian War, a three-year conflict that saw the destruction of Feisal’s Iraqi kingdom and provided a check on Arab ambitions. Into the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a ‘cold war’ between the ‘Family Compact’ and Iran (enlarged by a swath of former Iraq), would linger on to no foreseeable resolution for many years. Continued U.S. support for Iran would lead to Arabia’s 1973 understanding with India and a perpetuation of the divisions in that region.
Wow. Always so good, never a disapointment.
I can't wait to see what East Asia will be like!
I can't wait to see what East Asia will be like!
So, in other words, even in a drastically different timeline, the Middle East is still a complete mess.
I'm not so sure. I think it's perhaps slightly better than in our timeline.
An interesting point in all of this is of course, whether this scenario, taken as a whole, is any better or worse than real life...
An interesting point in all of this is of course, whether this scenario, taken as a whole, is any better or worse than real life...
Damn fine update, Mett!
After seeing what you've done with the Middle East, I can't wait to see what you've done w/the Far East!
Oh, I agree with Vincent:
That would only be proper, considering the following his AARs have, eh?
After seeing what you've done with the Middle East, I can't wait to see what you've done w/the Far East!
Oh, I agree with Vincent:
That would only be proper, considering the following his AARs have, eh?
It seems as if the monarchs successfully managed to channel some of that post-war Arab nationalism in their favour, instead of it being fostered against them. No chances of Nuri Said getting kicked to death in the streets of Baghdad, then.
Also, it look as if the Rockefeller administration's handling of Middle Eastern affairs is done with much greater direction and clarity than under Eisenhower in actuality. A cogent update.
Also, it look as if the Rockefeller administration's handling of Middle Eastern affairs is done with much greater direction and clarity than under Eisenhower in actuality. A cogent update.
