April 1954: London II: The New Europe
Within a week after the political and international fanfare marking the arrival of the delegates from around the world, the London Conference settled down into the hard business of negotiation, as the circumstances of the end of the war in Europe were translated into the firm numbers of peace. In addition to broaching the concepts of a future European order, there was the discussion of the fate of Europe’s countries, as Rockefeller and Zhukov, joined by a myriad of leaders, hammered out the historical Treaty of London.
In December 1945, the parties at the Orleans Conference promulgated the Four Principles, the policies of
demilitarization, namely the then conversion of the German economy to non-military use,
denazification, ridding the then German and Austrian societies of the vestiges of the Nazi regime,
democratization, the transition to less authoritarian governments, and
decartelization, the transition from an economy of large businesses to a free market. By 1954, the issues still retained a measure of relevance, though denazification had translated into what some termed “debolshevization”, or the more popular term,
decommunization. No longer were these terms merely an instrument of reform for Germany and Austria but rather were now applied to the complete spectra of Europe, especially those Vienna Pact nations. The London Conference began with an updating and reiterating of these principles, as the framework of peace.
Of the four principles, perhaps the easiest to implement was democratization, a popular concept amongst the delegates. Most Vienna Pact countries had already succumbed to OTO forces and many, including Spain and Italy, had elected less communist, if still leftist, governments. In exchange for their military capitulation, their internal affairs were mostly left alone. In either country, the Communist Party was quietly renamed to more mundane labels, and a few token reforms were made to a market economy. Yet the legacy of Soviet rule did not completely disappear. Some nations, such as the Low Countries, Germany, Austria, and Hungary, were suppressed by military incursion and campaigning, and therefore their Communist power blocs were generally dismantled. In Germany and Austria, they were almost non-existent by 1954, and in Hungary, the first post-war elections would see a leftist coalition gaining less than fifteen percent of the vote. Other countries, however, such as Yugoslavia, and the Balkan states, would emulate the examples of Italy and Spain, earning the epithet of
token democracies. The democratization effort saw the emergence of two realities, the first being that the major signatories favored peace above true reform. Unlike President Lindbergh in 1950, who sought the true expulsion of communism from Europe, Rockefeller was more pragmatic, and consented to what the New York Times dubbed,
”democracy in name”. The second reality, which above all else influenced the post-war order, was that the Four Principles did not apply to the Soviet Union. In a quiet, perhaps unvoiced exchange, Zhukov would trade internal control over his country for the capitulation and withdrawal of the Red Army from Europe.
The weakness of democratization also extended to its counterpart of decommunization. Though the war itself had somewhat effected this change, the system of
token democracy ensured that this principle, as well, would not be carried through to an effective conclusion. One of the reasons is illustrated in the fate of Germany. The fall of Pieck’s Communist regime a couple years earlier, coupled with the expectation of territorial loss in the coming peace, meant that the greater fear in some German circles was the resurgence of a fascist element rather than more leftist opponents. The prominence of Von Saucken’s
Pionierkorps raised the specter of the “brownshirts” from the 1930s, or the old
Freikorps. Fear of the right and left in the political spectrum meant that the post-war governments in Germany and Austria especially, became centrist in philosophy. The rise of Adenauer’s Free Christian Union (FCU) is a prime example of this.
As the
”token democracy” contributed to the weakness of decommunization, or
”central dynamism” as it would be known, so too did this undermine the true demilitarization of Europe. Fears of extremist reactions would contribute to the strengthening of national militaries, in some cases with the blessings of the major signatories, such as France and the Netherlands, and the United States and Germany. Territorial changes would also foster enmity between nations, though none of this seemed to be evident in London in 1954. No great empires were being dismantled as in 1919, and no new nations were being brought into the international family. It was thought that a system of
”territorial adjustment” rather than a true overhaul of borders, would reduce post-war tensions. Scarcely any adjustments were to be made in Western Europe, mostly centering around the restoration and guarantee of the 1939 borders. In Eastern Europe, most changes involved the borders of the Soviet Union, as well as the controversial arrangements over the Banat and Bessarbia, and DeGaulle’s proposals for a “Great Poland” which could hold its own in that region. There were also questions regarding the revival of Finland, which was less about diplomatic arrangements than an outright military war for independence. The reduction of “Big Bulgaria’ also to be dealt with, in addition to the fate of Communist Turkey, which had not been militarily suppressed but which many wished to punish with territorial loss.
Of the Four Principles, however, which marked the opening portion of the London negotiations, it was decartelization which was to hold the greatest promise. The reduction of Europe’s economies, maintained barely under the auspices of the “Churchill Plan”, had contributed to a true appraisal of the post-war order. Churchill’s ‘United States of Europe’, at least its economic aspects, were brought under consideration, as several nations, particularly France, Spain, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, considered the question of reduced tariffs, commercial exchanges, and incorporated markets. The Treaty of London, primarily as a result of these discussions, would include provisions for the future discussion of a Common Market, and would set the stage for post-war conferences in Paris and Brussels. Specifics were generally lacking yet the treaty, in effect, would give its blessings to such economic cooperation. Despite his work in bringing the idea into consideration, Churchill would echo what he deemed to be the reluctance of Britain, and the concept would be less well received in centrist Germany. Yet much of this remained in the future, and there was a sense of economic optimism during these initial negotiations.
For better or worse, the attempts to promulgate high statements of policy reflected the expectation of millions for a final peace. Its muddled success, however, was in keeping with unsettled realities. A war, begun in absolute principle, was rapidly brought to conclusion by compromise and expediency. This opening phase of the London Treaty mirrored this quite accurately, with the more controversial discussions of territory still in the coming months.
What terrifying world you've created Mettermrck! 
