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By Order of the High Court

Per Al'Sahwari, petitioner in the case Al'Sahwari v. Minister of Finance, has secured his own counsel and is prepared to proceed. Per Florian's statements notwithstanding, it is the High Court and not the Minister of Finance which is the arbiter of that which is and is not constitutional. Due to the risk of future re-occurance unless the High Court constitutionally defines the term "commerce", and because extenuating circumstances would clearly make oral argument a vain exercise, this case shall move to judgment.

- Marcos, J. per curia.
 
As Specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constiution Minister Ian Asre is hereby removed from his position as Attorney General due to incapacity.

/s/Dr. Jonathan Glasser
President of Eutopia
 
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As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution Minister Saul Florian is hereby removed from his position as Finance Minister due to abscense.

/s/Dr. Jonathan Glasser
President of Eutopia
 
The High Court, by this opinion, finds that the removal of Pers Asre and Florian are in accordance with Article 2 Section 2 Subsection a. of the Constitution.

- Clay, C.J., per curia.
 
al’Sahwari v. Minister of Finance

CLAY, C.J. delivered the opinion of the Court.

This storied case has been before the Court for some time, and has repeatedly risked dismissal. We opine on it because of the importance of determining the meaning of “commerce” within the description of the duties of the Minister of Finance under the Republic’s Third Constitution.

Facts​

This matter first developed last term, when Interim Minister of Finance Park promulgated two sets of regulations; one, entitled “Road/Highway Vehicle Category Definitions and Supplemental Registation Fees” is directly at issue here, but we mention the other, “Supplementary Seatbelt Regulations”, as it will also be affected by our holding. Despite the elaborate verbiage of the former regulations, the only category of vehicle affected by the supplemental registration fee the regulations require is the super-stretch limousine. Per Park seems to be aware of this specific impact, and the Court has no reason to suspect that this was not the intent of the regulations.

Petitioner Al’Sahwari, a super-stretch limousine operator, instituted suit challenging the regulations as an unconstitutional overreaching on the part of the Finance Minister. It is asserted that the Ministry of the Interior, having jurisdiction over roads, should also have jurisdiction over traffic regulations such as those in dispute here. The respondent has argued instead that traffic impacts commerce, and that therefore this matter falls under the Finance portfolio. The Ministry of Finance has changed ministers several times since the institution of this action; we also should note that the current Minister, Saul Florian, has rescinded the regulations. We nevertheless rule on the case, as it is extremely likely that the precise meaning of “commerce” will come before this Court again.

Analysis​

Petitioner Al’Sahwari has made out a prima facie case of an uncompensated taking, and there is no serious dispute as to the injury suffered, present and continuing. Normally, a member of the executive acting within his or her lawful capacity might institute a regulation such as the one at issue here by showing a rational relationship between the regulation and a legitimate governmental purpose. Under our constitutional order, however, there must be some nexus between the executive office passing the regulation and the powers given over to that office by the Constitution. Our Constitution creates no executive with plenary or residual power who might institute any regulation they feel is necessary.

The respondent has advanced two theories to justify the institution of the regulation at issue here; we deal with them in turn.

Traffic​

Respondent’s first and primary argument is that super-stretch limousines affect traffic, traffic impacts commerce, and commerce is within the bailiwick of the Minister of Finance. We must admit that individually these are reasonable enough leaps of logic. Taken as a whole, however, we cannot help but wonder what is not within the power of the Minister of Finance to regulate. Drunk drivers cause accidents, and accidents affect traffic, and traffic impacts commerce; should the Minister of Finance thus be able to institute regulations increasing the penalties for drunk driving because of the effect the behavior has on commerce? Illegal immigrants clearly have a substantial impact on the national commerce; should the Minister of Finance be able, therefore, to regulate immigration? We think the answers to these and similar questions are a clear no. We are not in disagreement with Justice Marcos’ statements suggesting that more than one Ministry might have jurisdiction over a given area, and for this reason we must evaluate these questions on a case-by-case basis; nevertheless, the respondent would have us go further, and adopt the broadest possible reading of the word “commerce”. Not only would this take the powers of the Finance Minister well beyond what is commonly thought of as commerce, but it would upset our constitutional order, making the Minister of Finance clearly dominant over the rest of the Cabinet in what is intended to be a balanced system of cooperating, and sometimes competing, executives.

Pollution​

Respondent also cites pollution concerns as justifying the regulations. It is asserted that super-stretch limousines create an amount of pollution disproportionate to the number of passengers they carry. While this is a novel justification for preventing an individual from doing an otherwise lawful and profitable activity, we need not address whether this is in and of itself unconstitutional. We do not disagree that any Minister may consider what environmental impact the regulations he or she passes might have, but pollution control itself is clearly within the bailiwick of the Minister of the Interior. Combating pollution alone cannot provide adequate grounds to uphold this regulation.

Judgment​

We hold, for the reasons above, that a narrow reading of commerce should be adopted, one that is within the layperson’s understanding of the meaning of the word. In the instant case, regulating super-stretch limousines to reduce traffic jams to prevent their interference with commerce is well beyond this definition. Pollution control cannot justify the regulation by itself. Thus, we hold that the area of traffic control is outside of the Ministry of Finance, as is the related area of traffic safety. Thus, both the Road/Highway Vehicle Category Definitions and Supplemental Registation Fees and the Supplementary Seatbelt Regulations are held unconstitutional.

As stated above, however, there is no executive office in our system given plenary power. Thus, any given power of government must either vest in one of the executive offices, or in the provinces. If not in the Finance Minister, where, then, does traffic regulation fall? We have no difficulty, in this situation, assigning that power to the Minister of the Interior. Reverend Park’s amicus brief asserting that infrastructure refers merely to the roads themselves is certainly accurate, but the regulation of vehicles traveling on those roads is expressly assigned to no Ministry. Its presence must therefore be extrapolated. We need go through fewer constitutional contortions to find a nexus between “infrastructure” and traffic than between “commerce” and traffic. After all, a traffic problem is precisely the sort of thing that might require the Ministry of the Interior to construct new highways or other pieces of infrastructure, which he unarguably may do. While we find the Finance Ministry’s effort to reduce traffic and pollution laudable, in this situation, they must cooperate with the Ministry of the Interior if they wish to regulate in the fashion at issue here.

We hold, therefore, that the regulations in question are within the ambit of the Minister of the Interior, and therefore unconstitutional as promulgated by the Minister of Finance. Unless the Minister of the Interior wishes to maintain them, we order them invalidated, and any fees collected under them returned to the payor.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Three documents are submitted to the High Court. There are spaces on each one for additional signgatures.
As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, Dr. Jonathan Glasser is hereby removed from his position as President due to absence.

/s/The Reverend Dr. Woodrow Park, J.D., M.B.A
Finance Minister

_______________________________________
Cabinet Member ________________________


_______________________________________
Cabinet Member _______________or Vice President (delete as appropriate)
As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, John O'Floinn is hereby removed from his position as Attorney General due to absence.

/s/The Reverend Dr. Woodrow Park, J.D., M.B.A
Finance Minister

_______________________________________
Cabinet Member ________________________


_______________________________________
Cabinet Member _______________or Vice President (delete as appropriate)

As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, Major Edward Braxton is hereby removed from his position as Social Services Minister due to absence.

/s/The Reverend Dr. Woodrow Park, J.D., M.B.A
Finance Minister

_______________________________________
Cabinet Member ________________________


_______________________________________
Cabinet Member _______________or Vice President (delete as appropriate)
"I expect the Interior Minister to be along shortly to affix his signature to these documents. It is possible that Major Braxton can be located, in which case the third one should be withdrawn, if not, we will either have to get the VP to act or the GA to find him absent and elect a new one." Woody explains, probably unneccessarily, to the court clerk.
 
The following findings are supported by the Interior Minister:

As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, Dr. Jonathan Glasser is hereby removed from his position as President due to absence.

/s/The Reverend Dr. Woodrow Park, J.D., M.B.A
Finance Minister

/s/J. R. Zhokhyen
Interior Minister

As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, Major Edward Braxton is hereby removed from his position as Social Services Minister due to absence.

/s/The Reverend Dr. Woodrow Park, J.D., M.B.A
Finance Minister

/s/J. R. Zhokhyen
Interior Minister

_______________________________________
Cabinet Member _______________or Vice President (delete as appropriate)
 
Woody returns and speaks to the clerk.
"Attorney General O'Floinn has reappeared. I wish to withdraw the finding concerning him. Is this verbal notice sufficient? I imagine it won't be signed by anyone else anyway, so it might not matter, but I would do whatever is usual to formally revoke it."
 
The clerk rifles quickly through a file folder, withdrawing the petition for O'Floinn's removal. She crumples it up and tosses it into a wastepaper bin. "Done, sir" she says with a quick smile before returning to the mounds of paperwork and writing she still has to attend to.
 
O'Floinn enters and adds his signature to both petitions.

As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, Dr. Jonathan Glasser is hereby removed from his position as President due to absence.

/s/The Reverend Dr. Woodrow Park, J.D., M.B.A
Finance Minister

/s/J. R. Zhokhyen
Interior Minister

/s/John O'Floinn
Attorney General

As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, Major Edward Braxton is hereby removed from his position as Social Services Minister due to absence.

/s/The Reverend Dr. Woodrow Park, J.D., M.B.A
Finance Minister

/s/J. R. Zhokhyen
Interior Minister

/s/John O'Floinn
Attorney General
 
The High Court, by this opinion, finds that the removal of Pers Glasser and Braxton are in accordance with Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution.

- Marcos, J., per curia.
 
This document is sent to the High Court:


As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, Jerome Van Delft is hereby removed from his position as President due to absence.

/s/Cmdr. (Ret.) Francisco Cojuanco y O’Rourke
Minister of Social Services

_______________________________________
Cabinet Member ________________________


_______________________________________
Cabinet Member _______________or Vice President (delete as appropriate)
 
Woody, learning that the Minister of Social Services wasn't willing to let the time pass until the deadline, affixes his signature as well.
As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, Jerome Van Delft is hereby removed from his position as President due to absence.

/s/Cmdr. (Ret.) Francisco Cojuanco y O’Rourke
Minister of Social Services

/s/ Rev. Dr. Woodow Park, JD, MBA
Finance Minister


_______________________________________
Cabinet Member _______________or Vice President (delete as appropriate)
 
As needed, I have signed.

As specified under Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution, Jerome Van Delft is hereby removed from his position as President due to absence.

/s/Cmdr. (Ret.) Francisco Cojuanco y O’Rourke
Minister of Social Services

/s/ Rev. Dr. Woodow Park, JD, MBA
Finance Minister

/s/ Alastar Cain
Vice President
 
The High Court, by this opinion, finds that the removal of Per Vandelft is in accordance with Article 2 Section 2 of the Constitution. By operation of law, Alastair Cain is elevated to the office of President of the Republic.

- Clay, C.J., per curia.