The High Court

[Voshkod]

The High Court of Eutopia sits in a majestic building on a low hill at the edge of Governmental core. In these marble halls, Chief Justice Anastasia Bartlett Clay and Deputy Chief Justice Joseph Dredd preside over the other five justices of the Court. Cases relating to relating to high crimes or misdemeanors by members of the Executive or Legislative Branches, or matters relating to the powers of those Branches, may be brought directly to this Court. Those that wish to be heard before this court must file a brief detailing their complaint and their requested relief.

Procedure for Suits Before the High Court​

​

I. Pleading and Briefs. All suits shall be initiated by a brief, filed by the petitioner. In this brief, petitioner shall detail their complaint, including relevant law, and their requested relief.

A. Once Petitioner has filed their brief and the Court has granted Certiorari, the defending party (hereinafter "Respondent") shall be permitted to file a rebuttal brief. The court will also accept Amicus Curiae briefs at this time, that is briefs filed by persons who are not party to the case, but have a stated interest in the outcome. These briefs may present and discuss any aspect of law or public policy, whether or not it is considered by Petitioner or Respondent in their briefs.

B. Following Respondent's rebuttal, Petitioner is permitted one additional brief to rebut any arguments Respondent raises in their rebuttal. Petitioner must limit this brief exclusively to arguments raised by Respondent, and may not introduce new material or re-introduce material not considered by Respondent.

C. The Court shall decide, after receiving both briefs by Petitioner and rebuttal by Respondent, as well as any Amici, whether or not to grant oral arguments. If the Court decides not to hear arguments, an opinion will be issued at the end of the briefing stage.

II. Oral Argument. Should the Court grant oral argument, the Petitioner and Respondent shall be summoned to the High Courthouse. Petitioner will present his argument before the High Court, who will use the allotted time to question Petitioner on his case. Respondent will then have an equal amount of time to argue their case, and shall in turn be questioned by the Court. Following these arguments, Petitioner shall have a brief period of time in which to rebut Respondent's arguments, where the Court shall reserve the right to continue to question them. Petitioner may not address any new material at this time, but shall limit their comments to arguments raised by Respondent. The Court will deliberate and render an opinion after oral arguments.

III. Additional Rules.

A. The Court reserves the right to revise these rules at any time, for any purpose, without notice.

B. Any party whose opponent violates these rules may file a motion under this section for dismissal of their case.

C. In all cases, unless otherwise stated, the Petitioner shall bear the burden of proof. That is to say, that unless the Petitioner can establish their case by a preponderance of the evidence, no relief shall be granted. The Respondent bears no such burden, and need only defeat Petitioner's attempts to carry their own.

 

[Craig Ashley]

Petition before the High Court

The plantiff, Colin Leary, holds that Speaker Lundgren violated the Constitution and the democratic ideals of Eutopia when he:

1) Refused to hold a vote of any ammendments that "are radically different from the presidents proposal without the ENP stating its their choice and the president has changed his viewpoint on an issue." Claiming essentially, a defacto veto power for the office of the Speaker.

2) Expelled GA Colin Leary for protesting this attempt to claim defacto veto power, thereby acting to weaken the numerical strength of the oppposition.

3) Suspended all discussion and called for an immediate vote of Per Colin's entire proposal.

.....

The Constituion outlines the Speaker's powers.

4. The General Assembly shall elect from among their number a Speaker to head that body. That person shall dictate the nature and length of debate on proposals before that body, and shall act as Vice President of the nation.

The Speaker is clearly intended to serve as a director of debate, keeping things orderly and focused. Such an office is unquestionably necessary in a hundren seat body. However, no where the Consititution give the Speaker power of veto or even imply such powers. The framers of the Constitution decided to give such powers to the President and only to the President, so it can be inferred that they had no intention of granting it to a lesser office, such as Speaker.

Further more, Eutopia's legislative tradition shows that once a bill is introduced and seconded, it must - at some point - be held to a vote unless time constraints of the term do not permit it. The plantiff can produce examples of the this tradition ad nauseum, but we will simply include the General Assembly archives which can be researched at the court's leisure. Should the court desire specific examples, the plantiff would be more than willing to provide them.

The Defendant has argued that such traditions are not enshrined in the Constitution, and therefor can be adopted or ignored as he see fit. Instead he argues that the Speaker can "allow" or disallow a vote at his own discretion, with no accountability to any other office. This is a defacto veto, allowing the speaker to kill proposals before any vote is taken. Furthermore, even the Speaker's chair must abide by the precedent set by over 30 years of legislative history, in which the proposal/second is sufficient to require a vote once sufficient discussion has taken place.

.......

While, the Plantiff would agree that the Speaker is enpowered to remove disruptive individuals from the General Assembly floor, he must do so with good cause. Objecting to a unconstitutional power grab is not just cause for removal and served only to further Speaker Lundgren's partisan agenda of forcing President Per Leary's removal was without just cause and amounted to political censorship.

......

Per Leary's proposed changes were not seconded as a group, but merely the first portion pertaining to the Presidential portfolio. This portion was being discussed before Per Lundgren attempted to halt the debate. In an blatant effort to kill the entire proposal, Speaker Lundgren suspended all discussion and put the entire amendment, which had not been properly seconded, up for a vote. This court has ruled in the past, in both Langley v. Glasser and Langley v. Williamson, that sufficient debate must be allowed before a vote can be taken.

The Defendant may claim that Per Leary attempted to force an immediate vote on his proposal, but a close examination of the GA transcript will show that Per Leary made no such demands. Instead, he only inisted that a vote be taken some time in the future. Per Leary was actually in the process of debating and altering his own proposals when Speaker Lundgren stepped in and made it clear he would not allow a vote on any measures that were "radically different from the presidents proposal".

Speaker Lundgren's motion to hold the entire amendment for a vote, despite the fact that it lacked a formal second, shows again his belief that the Speaker can simply and arbitrarily hold votes or surpress votes to serve his agenda. For the good of the state, the Speaker's chair must be used in a non partisan manner. While the Speaker can and must debate and vote on bills in a manner reflecting both is personal beliefs and his constituency, he cannot be allowed to use his Constitutional powers to "dictate the nature and length of debate" solely to further a partisan agenda. Such actions result in defacto censorship of the opposition and are in gross violation of the ideals and principles of democracy.

The Plantiff seeks an injunction reinstating him to the GA floor, allowing a vote on the properly seconded amendment once sufficient debate has occurred, and an official censure of Speaker Lundgren for his gross violation of the Constitution and the spirit of democracy.

 

[jacob-Lundgren]

Response to allegations

I completely deny guilt in the accusations by Mr. Leary.

First off I am going to address expelling Mr. Leary. He claims that he was expelled to "weaken the numerical strenght of the opposition." Now this is completely wrong. First off there is simply no motive for me to remove him as far as opposition goes, his party can't pass or prevent passing of anything by solely their actions. There is no opposition that would require any kind of negotiating or that is strong enough to block a nay vote so that accusation is simply completely false and insulting to my character. Mr. Leary was expelled because he was getting too angry in his actions and was begining to throw the assembly into chaos. He showed no respect to the position of speaker, he tried to interupt official assembly business with a petition rather then try such an action on private time and he was in dire need of a few hours to calm down. He was allowed back in not long later once he had the time to lower his anger level.


Now then, regarding the first charge against me, Mr. Leary shows a complete lack of ability to tell the difference between when I act as the speaker and when I am acting as a representative of my party. A perfect example is the following exchange:

We should as I said earlier focus on a few small changes to make certain we get a budget passed.

We should avoid spending 1/2 the term going over each and every section again and again until we wear ourselves out. We have a proposal by the president, we should take the spirit of it and moderate its changes.

Now this is clearly opinion, there is nothing in here that could be understood as any official action by the speaker, however Mr. Leary's response shows he is clearly acting in a defensive manor, obviously thinking I have issued some sort of decree in his eyes.

Per Speaker, I do not think limiting our discussion to "small changes" for the sake of passing a budget only to say we did so, is wise or the proper role for this body. I for one will not vote for a budget unless I find it to be a wise and responsible allocation of our nation's resources. I hope I speak for everyone in this body when I say that. I also feel no compulsion to abide by the nebulous "spirit" of the President's proposal. While I agree with some of the changes he has presented, there are others that I oppose and I will do so until the matter is resolved.

I clearly give opinion about my views on making a budget without great alterations and Mr. Leary, unable to tell the difference between my powers as speaker and my rights as a member of the general assembly, thinks i am trying to limit discussion.

The quote he has of me, refusing to allow a vote was taken totaly out of context. The whole mini-speach I did there was in an attempt to get discussion back on the pros and cons of the original proposal which was submitted by the president.

The president has proposed a budget, we will act on and discuss that proposal, not write a new proposal either in full or section by section.

You can clearly see, while I admit this is a little forceful, that I am trying to steer discussion away from rewritting the entire proposal by the president. Mr. Leary showed a lack of connection to reality when he did not understand the president had a veto, you can clearly see that in his press conference where he says "The ENP and the President do not hold some sort of veto over the GA" he has clearly lumped the ENP and the office of the presidency together, he did not say neither nor did he say or, he lumped them together and claimed they lacked a veto. Now if he had said the ENP lacks a veto even then he is only right in a strict legal sense, a party can't take political action, it is like a corporation, however the mebership of the ENP has a veto, because the president is from that party. He is clearly trying to say there is no veto power available.


Now point number three, his claim of me suspending discussion. Obviously no discussion was ended sense discussion never stopped and is ongoing right now. I had accidently put the entire proposal of Mr. Leary up for vote instead of the section that had been seconded. I made a mistake due to the distraction of dealing with Mr. Learys desire to spread chaos. A mistake which has already been corrected.


Mr. Leary was clearly not ready to serve in this assembly. He acted in a most confused manner with regard to how the government works and caused much distraction and confusion, especialy when he disrupted the assembly by trying to work on a petition. The assembly has only one prime task right now, the budget, and disrupting the official time we are meeting and working on the budget by trying to get votes for a petition clearly shows he was trying to act in a most partisan way. He did not go on private time when the assembly was not in session working on the budget and caused many problems by his actions of chaos.

 

[Craig Ashley]

On the expulsion of Per Leary:

Before the expulsion of Per Leary, the Defendant stated:

now unless the next words out of your mouth are in direct discussion of the budget you will be removed from this building.

Per Leary replied by again bringing forth his budget proposals which the Speaker had refused to discuss and bring to a vote. Clearly a budget proposal relates to the budget, but the Speaker still expelled Per Leary and offered this explanation.

Mr. Leary you have shown no respect for the position of the speaker! You have thrown this assembly into a minor crisis and have caused a total breakdown of discussion. Your party is not the majority nor are you part of a coalition that holds the majority, you are attempting a dictatorship of the minority and I will not allow you to wreck the start of this new term!

Respecting the Speaker's chair was never mentioned above, nor was the so called "minor crisis". It could be argued, rather persuasively, that is was the Speaker, not Per Leary, that created the crisis by refusing to allow a vote on a properly seconded proposal. This gross violation of democratic ideals and Eutopian common law is what lead to a crisis, though the Plantiff would dispute the use of the adjective "minor".

Since Per Lundgren's reasoning for expelling Per Leary shifted in the course of a few seconds, and is clearly faulty, the Plantiff would argue that he held another agenda. While the Defendant is correct in saying the opposition could not pass its own version of a budget over the concerns of the Speaker's coalition, removing Per Leary removed a passionate and powerful voice advocating a different vision. Removing such a voice clearly weakens the state of the opposition in its ability to possibly persuade other members of the General Assembly. Unlike the Defendant, the Plantiff believes that the individual members of the General Assembly decide the issues, not monolithic voting blocs that blindly follow the lead of their Senior Legislator. After all, if that was the case, why not just have the Senior Legislator's cast the votes for everyone and simplify the whole system? Per Lundgren's actions, both before the expulsion and afterwards, clearly indicate a partisan agenda. By removing Per Leary, he hoped to silence the opposition and move forward with forcing his coalition's budget proposal without sufficient debate.

Another possible explanation for Per Leary's expulsion could be a simple personal vendetta. The Plantiff is not prepared to present arguments for such a motive at this point, but clearly it too would be highly inconsistend with the proper role of the Speaker.

The Defendant also claims that he allowed Per Leary to return "once he had the time to lower his anger level." However, this is a false statement. Per Leary will gladly testify that his anger levels were still quite high and the Speaker had made no effort to inquire about them.

Furhtermore, the Speaker allowed Per Leary to return only in the face of intense criticism from both the opposition and from his own party.

From a unidentified PoL backbencer:

So this is it? We've exchanged Levarge for Lundgren? If someone doesn't agree with you, drag them away? Shame! Shame! Shame!

This statement was followed by a demonstration of the PoL members, which including repeating the phrase "Shame! Shame! Shame!" and turning their backs on the speaker.

From Jerome Vandelft, PoL member:

Mr. Lundgren, you accuse the honourable Mr. Leary of disrespecting the office of the Speaker; in fact, it is you who does dishonour not only to the office of Speaker, but to this Assembly. Let me make this very plain, because you seem unable to grasp some fundamentals: the General Assembly is the representative of the people. We are charged with guarding the people's interests and ensuring its welfare. We are *not* charged with simply waving through whatever the President, or anyone else, happens to see fit.

Likewise, *every single* member of this Assembly has been elected *by* the people to speak *for* the people. *Every* member, Mr. Lundgren, not just those of the ENP and MRP. You may personally disagree with amendments proposed by individual MGAs, but your attempt to prevent members from other parties from voicing their opinion and *fulfilling their duties to the people* is not only insufferably partisan, it is an utter disgrace and a blatant abuse of your office. No, the PL doesn't happen to be part of your little coalition; I wasn't aware that we had to be in order to be allowed to carry out the responsibilities the *people* have entrusted us with.

Until you decide to respect the democratic process, these so-called debates are a farce. Don't bother having your goons show me out; I know the way.

Per Vandelft left following this statement, as a protest of Per Leary's expulsion.

From Rev. Woodrow Park, of the ECL (as a point of order):

That the speaker permit Colin Leary to return to the floor.

From President Amric Al'Aeshir of the MRP:

So I submit, Mr. Speaker that we allow Mr. Leary to return to the chambers, having already been publically chastened here in the assembly. I also believe Jerome should be called back and we get back to business.

Only after this dramatic and large scale show of support for Per Leary did the Speaker relent. His reasons were clearly political, not in the interest of good government.

On the Speaker's refusal to call a vote on a seconded proposal:

The Speaker's claim he was speaking as a legislator and not as Speaker is, to use a highly technical legal phrase, hogwash. Here is the entire text of Per Lundgren's speech so that there can be no claims of misrepresentation:

Look Mr. Leary, I can see what you are saying and understand it HOWEVER your party is not in power here, the president did not come from your party and propose this budget and you are not the speaker.

We will not spend 1/2 this term debating the budget, we have a proposal, the president has shown us the areas he wants increases and the areas he wants decreases and has stated an interest in establishing a small surplus. I will not allow to vote any suggestions on the budget that are radically different from the presidents proposal without the ENP stating its their choice and the president has changed his viewpoint on an issue. The president has proposed a budget, we will act on and discuss that proposal, not write a new proposal either in full or section by section.

The highlighted portions of the text are undeniably spoken from the role of Speaker. Per Lundgren does several things in this statement:

1. He asserts his position as Speaker - ... you are not the speaker.
2. He outlines how he feels the budget should be discussed and debated - We will not spend 1/2 this term debating the budget,
3. He states, in no uncertain terms, that he will not allow a vote on alternate budget proposals without the approval of his political allies - I will not allow to vote any suggestions on the budget that are radically different from the presidents proposal without the ENP stating its their choice and the president has changed his viewpoint on an issue.
4. He speaks for the entire body, stating that a new budget proposal will be debated and the GA will not be make significant alterations, in full or in sections - we will act on and discuss that proposal, not write a new proposal either in full or section by section.

If Per Lundgren did not speak as the Speaker but intead as a lowly legislator, why did he assert his position as Speaker? Why did he issue decrees as the nature of the debate and discussion, what will be voted on, and what actions the GA can take? Now legislators occassionally may discuss such matters, but their words are opinion and states as such, usually including phrases such as "in my opinion", "I think we should ...", "it would be prudent", ect. Individual legislators do not issue authoritative decrees on such issues, because they have no legal authority over such matters. Had Per Lundgren been speaking as a legislator and merely offering opinion, his phrasing would not have be so absolute and authoritarian.

However, even if Per Lundgren was speaking as a legislator, he still is the speaker and his opinion on matters concerning the nature of debate, what proposals are allowable, and what will or will not be called to a vote is the opinion of the Speaker. Whenever he speaks on such matters he is speaking as the General Assembly Speaker.

The Defendant has brought up Per Leary's statements regarding veto power. Per Leary issued a statement clarifying his intentions and and apologized if his wording was unclear. However, this statement is entirely irrelevent to the case at hand, and we ask the court strike it from the record.

On the suspension of discussion:

Per Lundgren has taken the entire proposal off the voting block and is now dealing with the sections as they are seconded. However, his attempt to hide behind the claim that it was a mistake, is not valid. If a person absent mindedly blows a red light, will the officer accept the exuse "oh it was a mistake, I was distracted"? No, violating the law of the land, be it traffic law or Eutopian common law dealing with parlimentary procedure, is not excusable by simply saying "my bad".

Furthermore, given the context of Per Lundgren's actions, the Plantiff would argue that the action was not a absent minded mistake, which may be understandable if not forgivable, but they were a part of a clear, partisan agenda to stifle debate on the budget proposal.

The Speaker knew that once the proposal was voted down as one measure, he could solicit his political allies for a quick second of the original budget proposal and then bring it to a vote with minimal debate. If he had desired to hold the vote as on the proposal as a whole, that may have been within his jurisidiction to do so, but that fact that he did it when 3 of the 4 sections had recieved no time for debate, shows that he was clearly intend on putting the issue to rest with no concern for parlimentary procedure.

 

[jacob-Lundgren]

In order to further prove my case I shall start at the end. Mr. Leary even when writing to the High Court shows once more his lack of both understanding in the government and his lack of ability to seperate between speaker and legislator.

Per Lundgren has taken the entire proposal off the voting block and is now dealing with the sections as they are seconded. However, his attempt to hide behind the claim that it was a mistake, is not valid. If a person absent mindedly blows a red light, will the officer accept the exuse "oh it was a mistake, I was distracted"? No, violating the law of the land, be it traffic law or Eutopian common law dealing with parlimentary procedure, is not excusable by simply saying "my bad".

Furthermore, given the context of Per Lundgren's actions, the Plantiff would argue that the action was not a absent minded mistake, which may be understandable if not forgivable, but they were a part of a clear, partisan agenda to stifle debate on the budget proposal.

The Speaker knew that once the proposal was voted down as one measure, he could solicit his political allies for a quick second of the original budget proposal and then bring it to a vote with minimal debate. If he had desired to hold the vote as on the proposal as a whole, that may have been within his jurisidiction to do so, but that fact that he did it when 3 of the 4 sections had recieved no time for debate, shows that he was clearly intend on putting the issue to rest with no concern for parlimentary procedure.

These paragraphs clearly shows that Mr. Leary is a partisan hack and is generaly just trying to slander my name. First he goes to say that it is an unforgivable crime that I accidently put his entire proposal up for vote rather then the one section. He then immediatly after says that such a mistake could be both understandable and forgiven. Mr. Leary shows time and again a disconnect with reality. He also tries to point out that part of my partisan plan was to create a situation where one of my political allies could second the original budget proposal. Here he shows lack of ability to seperate me from legislator and speaker, at any time I could have seconded the original proposal, something he believes I cannot do. I have been trying to avoid minimal debate on issues, which is exactly why his prized amendment was not immediatly put up for vote.


He continues to insist I tried to veto a bill, which is a total lie.

Look Mr. Leary, I can see what you are saying and understand it HOWEVER your party is not in power here, the president did not come from your party and propose this budget and you are not the speaker.

We will not spend 1/2 this term debating the budget, we have a proposal, the president has shown us the areas he wants increases and the areas he wants decreases and has stated an interest in establishing a small surplus. I will not allow to vote any suggestions on the budget that are radically different from the presidents proposal without the ENP stating its their choice and the president has changed his viewpoint on an issue. The president has proposed a budget, we will act on and discuss that proposal, not write a new proposal either in full or section by section.

Now lets analyze this through non-partisan eyes. My first words are choosen to try and convence Mr. Leary that he needs to consider trying to gather support of others before getting a vote in. I then go on to clearly state my intentions, of which I am currently AND legally fulfiling. Working together with the ENP, the MRP is voting down at attempt to radically change a section of the presidents original proposal. I have done just what I stated I would do, prevent a budget from coming to pass that is radicaly different from the original proposal.


Regarding the explusion of Mr. Leary, he brings in several peoples opinions. one of which, William Wymond Jerome Vandelft should be dismissed as being with extreme bias. Jerome was angry with me over the issue of an invocation and he also was angry over my slip up on begining discussion at the terms start. This partisan man choose not to say a word when one Francis von Hapsburg did the exact same mistake as me. Clearly he holds a personal vendetta against me and should not be allowed directly or indirectly to influence this courts decision. Rev. Woodrow showed support for bringing Mr. Leary back, which I can understand. The Reverend is a man of peace and desires to avoid conflicts, very admirable. Former president Amric then stated desire to allow Mr. Leary back, The former president is a very wise man and I agreed that Mr. Leary had been publically chastened and provided time to cool his heart. There was no hidden reason to expell Mr. Leary, it was done to remove him as a chaotic factor, there is no hidden agenda behind it.

 

[Voshkod]

Deep within the chambers of the High Court, Deputy Chief Justice Dredd sighed as he finished reading the complaints, responses, counter-responses, and counter-counter-responses. "Any chance we can issue a writ of 'play nice, children?," he growled.

Chief Justice Clay grimaced. "Only if we can dress it up in Latin," she muttered.

Justice Onazaker, the fabled and aging "swing vote" on the Court, smiled. "Lay-pay ice-nay, hildren-cay," she said and laughed. The laughter quickly turned into a deep, rasping cough. The other Justices watched in concern as she doubled over, sunked eyes screwed shut in pain.

That is not the sound of lung cancer in remission, Clay thought to herself sadly.

 

[Craig Ashley]

The defendant continues to bring up secondary issues to cloud the main point of the suit. That being that he acted in an unconstitutional manner when he attempted to surpress a vote on a duly seconded proposal, expelled Per Leary without just cause, and attempted to put Per Leary's entire proposal up for a vote without allowing for a proper second or for sufficient debate of the entire proposal.

Issues such as whether or not Per Vandelft has a personal distates for Per Lundgren, and if Per Park's status as a reverand makes him prone to seek peaceful resolutions are irrelevant. Per Vandelf raised to legitimate concerns regarding the Speaker's behavior, this does not constitute a personal vendetta. And while Per Park has displayed a calm and diplomatic nature, that does not mean he would support Per Leary's return if he believed the Speaker acted properly. The Plantiff has used the words and actions of these men, and others to demonstrate their opinions on the matter. The Defense has used faulty assumptions and unsubstaniated claims in an attempt to negate these opinions. If the Defense wishes to bring in members of the GA for sworn testimony so that they can clearly state their opinions for the court, the Plantiff would not object. We would only ask for a proper amount of time to prepare and gather our own witnesses.

The Defense also claims that any claim that Speaker Lundgren tried to veto the proposal is false. Speaker Lundgren through his own words "I will not allow to vote any suggestions on the budget that are radically different from the presidents proposal without the ENP stating its their choice and the president has changed his viewpoint on an issue." clearly stated that he would not allow proposal which veered too far away from the President's proposal to be voted on by the General Assembly. This amounts to one man imposing his will to kill a properly introduced and seconded proposal. This is a defacto veto, and it precisely what Per Lundgren attempted to do.

The Defense also makes the statement, "at any time I could have seconded the original proposal, something he believes I cannot do." The Plantiff certainly recognizes that Per Lundgren was physically capable of seconding the original motion at any time. The fact remains that he did not. The Plantiff has no intention of exploring why he did not, since this is not the appropriate venue to debate Per Lundgren's comptence as a legislator.

The Defense also states, "I have been trying to avoid minimal debate on issues, which is exactly why his prized amendment was not immediatly put up for vote." And again, this statement attempts to cloud the issue and imply that Per Leary demanded an immediate vote on his amendment. Per Leary never demanded an immediate vote to anything, nor has did he ever make a motion for a vote. Per Leary's complaint and this suit are regarding the fact that Speaker Lundgren said very plainly that he would not allow a vote on proposals that did not fit the political agenda of his coalition.

The Defense also attempts to spin the Speaker's statement into some sort of vow to vote down such proposals. If the Speaker had said, "I will vote against any suggestions on the budget that are radically different from the presidents proposal without the ENP stating its their choice and the president has changed his viewpoint on an issue." then that would be consist with his claims that his vote and the vote of MRP are a reflection of his statement. However, he said he would not allow a vote. This is speaking about parlimentary procedure and when speaking about procedure, Per Lundgren speaks as the Speaker. This is basis of our first complaint. The Speaker not allowing a vote to take place on a properly introduced and seconded proposal amounts to a defacto veto since one man is then empowered to overrule the will of the General Assembly. The Defense has yet to address this issue, instead attempting to twist the Speaker's very clear words into some nebulous call for legislative action.

The Defense's arguments can be summed up by them saying that Per Lundgren's words do not match his intentions. However, when looking at Per Lundgren's words and actions, there is a clear partisan agenda. The court must consider Per Lundgren's words and actions as they occurred, not as Per Lundgren later claims was his "true meaning".

1. Per Lundgren asserted his position as Speaker and then clearly stated what debate he would allow and a what type of measures he would allow to be voted on.
2. Upon being questioned by Per Leary, Per Lundgren reaffirms his ruling by stating, "Mr. Leary I suggest you read the constitution again, there is nothing in there about a bill being seconded and as such we will vote on either the presidents original proposal or we will continue in the manner which I have prescribed." Again he speaks of voting procedure, and when speaking in such a manner he speaks as Speaker and not a mere legislator.
3. Per Leary continues to protest the Speaker's actions and Per Lundgren responds by threatening to eject Per Leary.
4. Per Leary, acting on the Speaker's demand that the discussion be limited to the budget, reintroduces his proposal and requests the GA be allowed to debate and vote on his proposal.
5. Per Lundgren ejects Per Leary, citing a lack of respect for the Speaker's chair. He also begins attempting to cloud the issue by implying that Per Leary demanded an immediate vote.
6. Per Lundgren takes the entire proposal, which had not been properly seconded in its complete form and which only 1/4 of it had recieved any debate at all, and puts it up for an immediate vote.

At this point, opposition began to grow to Lundgren's heavy handed tactics, both from the opposition parties and from within his own party. Per Lundgren continued to advance the claim that Per Leary demanded some sort of immediate vote or tried to dictate when the vote would occur or even demanded that debate end and the vote be taken. Enclosed are a copy of the GA minutes. At no point did Per Leary make any statement that can even vaguely be construed in such a manner. The Defense has not even bothered to attempt to show such a statement from Per Leary, because it simply does not exist.

When Per Lundgren's actions and words are looked at as a whole with objective eyes, it is clear he consistently acted to undermine the voice of the minority parties and to further the agenda of his political allies. His immediate and subsequent attempts to explain his actions are not consistent with those actions.

 

[unmerged(33865)]

A message arrives from Woodrow Park, a ELP legislator.

To: Justices of the High Court

Re:the matter between Colin Leary and Michael Lundgren

In response to the request for amicus curiae briefs, I do submit the following for your consideration:

Please dismiss the plantiff's petition as he failed to use an existing remedy provided by the legislative process and reverted to the court without exhausting the customary means of resolving the matter. After Mr. Leary was removed from the Assembly, I raised a point of order that he be allowed to return. After some brief discussion, the speaker accepted that point of order and permitted him to return. Even if he hadn't, I would have called for a division of the house and we would have voted on the matter. As Mr. Leary failed to await the outcome of those processes before filing, he was premature in his approach to this court. I would like to hope the legislature could be more successful in self regulation in the future.

Respectfully,

 

[Craig Ashley]

Further argument that Speaker Lundgren violated the Constitution through his recent actions:

1. Violation by refusing to allow a vote on a properly introduced and seconded motion:

The High Court ruled in Langley et al. v. Williamson that the leader of a legislative body "cannot, however, decide on the constitutionality of a proposed bill." While, Per Lundgren did not make any claim that the proposal was unconstititional, the ruling still applies because it establishes that legislative leaders cannot decide on a whim what will and will not be voted upon.

The High Court also ruled in Langley v. Glasser the Speaker held limited powers. "His own power being limited by the approval of the Assembly, and the rules of the Assembly. In this way, the legislative branch controls its own destiny."

The rules of the Assembly and Eutopian common law have long held that a motion once seconded must be brought to a vote baring significant time constraints such as the end of a legislative session. Traditionally, bills that were seconded at the end of a term and lacked enough time to be properly debated and voted upon were reintroduced as the first order of business upon electing a new speaker in the subsquent term.

Per Lundgren violated the rules of the Assembly and did so without the approval of the body. In doing so, he violated the ruling of the High Court and breached the Constitution.

Furthermore, his efforts amount to a defacto veto. Veto is defined by Webster's Dictionary as, "The vested power or constitutional right of one branch or department of government to refuse approval of measures proposed by another department, especially the power of a chief executive to reject a bill passed by the legislature and thus prevent or delay its enactment into law."

Per Lundgren's refusal to allow a vote served to "prevent or delay its enactment into law." This amounts to a defacto veto for the Speaker over the entire legislative body, powers not given to the Speaker in the Constitution.

Article b, under section 1, under II. The Federal Executive of our Constitution explicitly gives the the office of the President the power of veto over the General Assembly.

... Any bill passed by the assembly must be signed into law by the president, or otherwise vetoed. A vote in the assembly of two-thirds majority shall override a presidential veto.

Section 4 under III. The Legislature clearly define the office of Speaker.

4. The General Assembly shall elect from among their number a Speaker to head that body. That person shall dictate the nature and length of debate on proposals before that body, and shall act as Vice President of the nation.

No where is there mention or even implication of veto power.

Per Lundgren violated the law when he:
1. Violated the rules of the Assembly (and the Court's ruling in Langley v. Williamson) by refusing to allow a vote on a properly introduced and seconded motion.
2. Claimed a defacto veto over proposed legislation when such powers are expressly give only to the President's office.

Violation by ejecting Per Leary without just cause:

The Speaker is responsible for organizing the debate and maintaining order in the legislative body. The Plantiff does not dispute that the Speaker has the authority to eject disuprtive members in the name of order. However, the Assembly rules do not allow the Speaker to eject individuals on a whim. To eject a member simply because his view is different amounts to political censorship, of not only the Assembly member in question, but of the voters who supported him. Such actions were allowable under General Levarge's reign, but not in a democratic state.

Article 7 of the Charter of Rights clearly outlines the freedom of expression and speech.

All persons shall have the right - in public or in private - to free speech, expression, thought, and conscience.

Article 8 confirms the right to vote.

The right of citizens who have attained the age of eighteen to vote in bona fide elections shall not be denied, except in the case of convicted felons, and then only under such circumstances as the Federal Parliament may designate.

By ejecting Per Leary without just cause, Per Lundgren created a defacto disenfranchisement of the voters who elected Per Leary to be their voice in government.

The question remains, did Per Lundgren have just cause to eject Per Leary? The answer is certainly subjective, but a standard must apply. Per Leary began to use Assembly time to solicit signatures for a petition to bring before this Court. In the heat of the moment, he felt it a wise course of action, but after reflecting upon it, realizes it was not the proper time or place. Per Lundgren demanded that Per Leary cease, stating, "Unless you want to be thrown out of this building you will refrain from any other activities that do not directly relate with the budget."

Per Leary did in fact cease his actions adn addressed the Speaker. "And so the tyrant once again seeks to silence the voice of the people! Mr. Speaker, my actions have been about the budget. The President fullfilled his constitutional duty by presenting a budget. It is now our constitutional duty to debate that budget and ammend it as we see fit. You however, seem to prefer we shirk that duty and become a rubber stamp for your coalition partner. I can only wonder what other plans you and the ENP have for the government?"

"If you wish to have me forcibly removed for opposing your efforts to create a new tyranny with you at the head, then by all means do so. I will not hesitate to add it to my list of grievances presented to the High Court. However, I will not cease in advocating the Eutopia be a democracy, in practice and in proclomation!"

While his statement was combative, Per Leary did not express any intent to continue to solicit signatures, but did state that he would continue to oppose Per Lundgren's unconstitutional actions.

Per Lundgren responded: "You are trying to start a petition here Mr. Leary, a petition is not a budget, an arguement on political traditions is not a budget and threating high court intervention is not a budget, now unless the next words out of your mouth are in direct discussion of the budget you will be removed from this building."

Per Leary replied: "Does this pertain to the budget, oh high and mighty speaker?" He then reintroduced his proposal regarding the budget, and then added, "In case you can't recognize it, its a proposed amendment to the budget presented by the President. Or in your eyes, does "pertaining to the budget" only include a yes vote for your coalition partner?

You have squelched the attempts by me and other members of this body to debate the budget. You refuse to call to a vote a motion - REGARDING THE BUDGET - that has been introduced and seconded, by claiming some sort of implied constitutional veto for the office of Speaker. You refuse to even allow an orderly and responsible discussion of budget. You insist that we cannot violate the "spirit" of the President's proposal, which apparently means to you we must become a rubber stamp for the President.

So Per Speaker, allow us to debate the budget and proposed changes, and I will happily do so, but do not expect me to sit here quietly while debate and democracy are silenced in the name of partisan politics."

Please note Per Leary ended his statement with a plea for the speaker to allow free debate on all proposals. The Speaker, by limiting the type of proposals he would allow to come to a vote, was not allowing a free debate. Per Leary would have gladly ended his protest and would have never filed this suit if the Speaker had relented at this moment and allowed the debate to move forward and promised to schedule a vote on the motion at a proper time. The Speaker responded by ejecting Per Leary and citing several reasons.

1. Lack of respect for the Speaker's position. The speaker himself brought on this lack of respect when he violated the democratic ideals of Eutopia by attempting to defeat the opposition's proposals without a vote. Furthermore, the Assembly rules do not require that the members respect each other. We will not debate that an enviroment of mutual respect is more conducive to positive results, but such is not always possible and cannot be mandated by law.

2. Throwing the assembly into a minor crisis. Per Leary did not violate the Constitution and this Court's rulings. He did not create the crisis, he simply spoke out against illegal actions. Per Lundgren's actions and his refusal to relent created the crisis.

3. Creating a total breakdown of discussion. Per Lundgren was the one who again broke down discussion by refusing to allow certain bills that did not fit his personal agenda to be voted upon. There is no point in holding a discussion if the ideas being discussed will not recieve a fair hearing, or in this case a vote.

Per Leary's tone was combative and his manner excited, but at no point did he create a major disruption. The only point he could have been ejected for, soliciting signitures on the floor, he ceased when ordered to do so.

Violation by prematurely bringing Per Leary's entire proposal to a vote.

Per Park seconded a portion of Per Leary's proposal when he stated, "I second Legislator Leary's amendment to the Presidential Budget for the President's portfolio." This was clearly not a second of the entire proposal, since Per Park and Per Leary discussed this before hand and it is also a matter of public record, and Per Park specified it to the President's Portfolio section of the budget.

When the Speaker did relent, he placed the entire comprehensive proposal up for a vote. He stated, "The vote on the proposed amendment to the budget shall now commence. Here is the new proposed budget." And proceded to introduce the entire document. The High Court's ruling in Langley v. Glasser established that, "Bills must have 'sufficient debate' before being voted upon."

No debate was allowed on any section of the proposal with the exception of the Presidential portfolio.

Remedies sought by the Plantiff

The Plantiff originally sought injuctions to allow a vote on Per Leary's seconded proposal, to reinstate Per Leary, and remove the unseconded, undebate portion of Per Leary's proposal from the vote Per Lundgren initiated. Per Lundgren has, in the face of heavy criticism from all sides, relented in these matters and as such the point is moot.

However, the Plantiff still seeks a ruling establishing that Per Lundgren's actions were unconstitutional to establish further precedent on the matter. The Plantiff also seeks an official censure or reprimand of Per Lundgren for his actions. As to the severity of this matter, the issue of motive becomes important. If Per Lundgren did act out of ignorance or misunderstanding, as he has claimed several times, then the need for a reprimand is lessened. However, if Per Lundgren acted knowingly and out of a partisan agenda, then his offenses take on a much more ominious and menacing tone.

The Plantiff's previous briefs have gone a long way towards establishing Per Lundgren's motives. Furthermore, a simple question can be asked. If Per Lundgren's words were misconstrued, or if he acted out of ignorance and confusion, why did he not simply relent and adopt a method consistent with the Constitution? Why did he continue to insist his actions were justified and only chose to relent in the face of criticism from his own party? Immediately admitting his fault and then rectifying the situation would be consistent with his claims. Yet, waiting until his position was no longer politically expidient strongly suggests his motives were political.

As such, we request the court to issue the most severe and forceful reprimand available to it.

 

[Craig Ashley]

Amendum to Relief Requested

Upon further investigation, the Plantiff no longer asserts that Per Lundgren acted out of a hostile, partisan agenda. Instead, the Plantiff now believes that Per Lundgren acted in the heat of a stressed moment, and his actions were compounded as the moment became increasingly confrontational. Due to this new belief in Per Lundgren's motives, the Plantiff no longer seeks official censure or reprimand of Per Lundgren. His actions were still clearly unconstitutional, and the Plantiff seeks a court ruling affirming this, but since they were done out of confusion and stress, rather than malice and a perversion of power, The Plantiff no longer feels the need to such formal punitive measures.

The Plantiff now only seeks a High Court ruling confirming the Constitutional limitations on the office of Speaker, as outlined in our previous briefs to the court.

 

[The_Hawk]

Leary v. Lundgren​

CLAY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on the submission of Per Leary, who, as a representative to the General Assembly of the Party of Liberty, was expelled from the GA floor by Speaker Lundgren during the discussions of the Term’s budget. Per Leary initially sought to enjoin Per Lundgren from three specific acts: 1) refusing to permit discussion of any budget amendments that lacked Presidential approval; 2) allegedly suspending discussion arbitrarily and forcing a vote; and 3) expelling Per Leary from the GA floor. Further developments made injunctions on these matters moot, but Per Leary went on to request that the matter be heard as a matter of overarching constitutional law, rather than one necessitating immediate action. He further requested a formalized censure, a request since rescinded. At the outset, the Court wishes to express its concern on issuing what is, in essence, an advisory opinion in this case; the issue in controversy has been resolved without this Court’s intercession. (Our concern does not go as far as that of our brother Justice Onazaker’s, however.) Nonetheless, we consider it an opportunity to restate the Court’s earlier case law on the subject of the Speaker’s role.

Let us first dispense with a small matter, which is nevertheless central to the greater question. The question of Per Leary’s removal from the GA floor is clearly moot. Even so, we agree with Per Leary’s assertion that “the Speaker is empowered to remove disruptive individuals from the General Assembly floor.” But Per Leary miscasts the question as one of free speech. Free speech, as everyone who has heard the phrase “shouting fire in a crowded movie theatre” knows, has limits. As Per Leary acknowledges, the ability of the Speaker to remove those who would upset the smooth functioning of the political process is a necessary part of the Speaker’s power to regulate debate. It is more proper to cast the question as one of due process – when does the removal of an MGA violate the Constitutional right to political representation and replace it with political repression?

We reject the notion that any bright-line test can be established to answer that question. What in one situation might amount to political repression might in another simply serve to terminate a discussion that has grown stale, irrelevant or pointless. Obviously, when the Speaker ejects a MGA for any reason, or terminates debate on a bill, he is taking a calculated risk of disapproval. The people’s representatives, the General Assembly as a whole, may stand against the Speaker and remove him by impeachment as outlined in the Constitution; or the people themselves may remove the offending Speaker by not voting for the party he represents.

This is reaffirmed by our past precedent. As Per Leary points out, this Court has previously held that “the Speaker has every right to limit and encourage debate as he sees conducive, including enforcing or limiting the participation of any given author within the limits of his power; his own power being limited by the approval of the Assembly, and the rules of the Assembly. In this way, the legislative branch controls its own destiny.” (Langley v. Glasser.) It is apparent, then, that while the Speaker possesses broad powers in regulating debate, he is ultimately responsible to the General Assembly as a whole, which may establish rules of procedure limiting the Speaker’s power as it sees fit. However, it is crucial that the Assembly make such determinations, not the Court. For this reason, had it not been withdrawn, Per Leary’s suggestion that the Court might censure Per Lundgren would have been out of order. Like impeachment, censure remains a political question, to be utilized in circumstances determined by, and under rules formulated by, the political branches (in this case, the legislative.)

The lesson, then, is that the General Assembly can and should create its own rules of procedure governing what the Speaker can and cannot do to regulate, limit, or terminate debate; but, absent any such rules (as in the instant case), Article III.4 governs, granting that the Speaker “shall dictate the nature and length of debate on proposals.” But this right cannot be an unfettered one, or the Speaker is granted a veto power greater than that guaranteed to the President. The ultimate question is whether the Speaker's action violates the right to due process. The Court feels confident that in this case, Speaker Lundgren violated the right to due process. The Constitution grants to the President only the power to propose the budget to the GA, which shall then “considered by that body” – not by the President himself. (Art. VI.) This is the rule of Langley v. Glasser – that the President may only propose the initial budget, and thereafter may only address the Assembly with the agreement of the Assembly itself. By refusing to consider bills not expressly approved by the President, Speaker Lundgren created an expanded, “right-of-first-refusal” veto, greater than that allowed to the President by the Constitution. This is impermissible.

About forcing Per Leary’s amendment to a vote, we need only say a few words. Though our current constitutional text does not contain the exact phrase, it is well-established that sufficient debate must transpire before a bill can be voted upon; to do less is a disservice to the electorate. How much debate is “sufficient” again depends on the situation, but the right to speak for one’s constituents is paramount. The party from which a given legislator might come, or their relative strength in the Assembly, is of no moment when it comes to the right to be heard. To rule otherwise would establish a tyranny of the majority, which we will not do. But conversely, we cannot go so far as to require that every bill which is properly introduced and seconded be heard, debated, and voted on. We must acknowledge that there are times when legislative expediency might recommend one bill be heard rather than another, or when a bill has so little popular support that it will never pass, or when multiple similar bills have been introduced and a preferred version must be selected. The exact circumstances we leave to the Assembly to determine should they so choose, but again, the most significant test is whether any such strictures on debate work a denial of the due process rights of the legislator and his or her constituents. We have no qualms about ruling that Speaker Lundgren denied the rights of Per Leary and those who voted for his party in this case by forcing his amendment to come to a vote prior to adequate debate.

We therefore hold that Per Lundgren acted unconstitutionally in this case, though as the moment is past, we are restrained from taking action. The Court would, however, recommend that the General Assembly produce rules and procedures for their own governance so as to avoid further judicial involvement in that body's operation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

[von Streusser]

Leary v. Lundgren​

Onazaker, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part.

That I must be called upon to write this opinion in the first place is troubling. Not only has the majority seen fit to issue an advisory opinion, but it has done so on an issue brought prematurely to this Court, and one which even if brought in a timely fashion would be improper for this Court to rule upon. Though I agree in principle with the majority's holding, I must nonetheless dissent.

My brothers in the majority assert that the Speaker's conduct is bound only by the rules laid down by the legislative branch and the principle of Due Process. I cannot and do not deny the wisdom of this assertion, as the precedent is clear. Langley v. Williamson established that "[t]he Speaker can organize internal Senate business as he sees fit in accordance with his duties. He cannot, however, decide on the constitutionality of a proposed bill". Langley v. Glasser also held that "the Speaker has every right to limit and encourage debate as he sees condusive, including enforcing or limiting the participation of any given author within the limits of his power; his own power being limited by the approval of the Assembly, and the rules of the Assembly. In this way, the legislative branch controls its own destiny." Therefore, clearly, this Court has established that, with the exception of those powers clearly granted or restricted him in the Constitution, the Speaker has whatever powers the General Assembly sees fit to grant. Thus, it is not the province of this Court to declare what those additional powers or restrictions must be. This is a determination that must be made by the Legislature, and is improperly before this Court.

Were that my only concern, I would simply stifle my indignance and join the majority. However, petitioner here showed an inexcusable exuberance to race to the Courthouse, highlighted by his initially asking this Court to wave a disapproving finger at Per Lundgren. Between the filing of briefs and the publishing of this opinion, Pers Leary and Lundgren managed to work out their differences without the aid of the judicial system; in fact, they did so with striking ease and speed. The Court's function is not that of parent or babysitter, instead it is the final arbitrator in matters of constitutionality. I cannot and will not condone the filing of suit as the first recourse of parties who disagree on any given topic. Appeal to this Court should be the last resort, when no possibility of reconciliation outside of the Courthouse is possible. In the case at bar, petitioner did not even attempt an extrajudicial solution before filing; had he done so, we would not need to rule on the issue today. Publishing an opinion in this case only encourages further behavior, which will continue to clog the judicial system and waste the time of our justices. While I cannot disagree with the opinion the learned majority wrote, I do disagree with its writing.

Finally, this entire case should have been dismissed as moot. This Court does not rest here waiting to rule on the wisdom or constitutionality of any given situation which may or may not occur. Regardless of Per Lundgren's threats, no case or controversy truly arose. The legislation at issue was allowed, properly debated, voted upon, and unless I am incorrect, passed. Per Leary was allowed to re-join the Assembly. All has ended well, primarily because after the initial footrace to the Courthouse, Pers Leary and Lundgren sat down and talked about what could be done to solve the problem. Lo and behold, this innovative strategy proved successful. Much like a civil case at a lower court, the parties have settled, and we should therefore decline to state our opinion on a non-issue.

In sum, I must voice my continued displeasure with the High Court's practice of issuing advisory opinions on moot topics. While I concur in the majority's reasoning and opinion that the General Assembly must decide for itself what powers and restrictions its Speaker should bear (and I hope that they do so quickly, so we do not see another debacle of this nature), I contend that this case should be dismissed as moot. We should refrain from issuing opinions when there is no real case or controversy; especially where, like here, to do so would invade the province of the Legislature; and we must refrain from encouraging races to the Courthouse such as the one we saw here, instead demanding that parties before this Court first attempt all possible extrajudicial avenues of resolution.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 

[aussieboy]

Petition before the Court:

The Plaintiff, Franz von Hapsburg und von Lothringen, holds that John O’Floinn, host of Eutopia Tonight! has committed slander against the plaintiff and the Eutopian Nationalist Party when he committed these acts:

1) Said the following in his broadcast:

"Conscription is the single most ridiculous proposal we've seen this term. If the esteemed members of the ENP can provide just one good reason to reinstate conscription, I'll retract everything I'm saying, but as far as I can tell, there's no threat to Eutopia even remotely serious enough to discuss any kind of draft. We've had conscription, and we got rid of it for a reason.

"Of course, why am I complaining? The bill will be defeated, and at this rate, the ENP will follow suite next election."

2) Willfully knew that this bill has not at all been submitted to the Office of the Speaker, and was only considered for an Economic Impact Report.

The Constitution of Eutopia , in Article II in its Charter of Rights, states that “The freedom of the press shall not be denied.” However, when the press makes statements that are held to be untrue, it is not lawful, for it inherently unjustifiably destroys the reputation of the person where the slander is directed.

…………………………………………….

The fact is that no such proposal was posted at the Office of the Speaker of the General Assembly, and merely submitted to the Central Bank for a report on its possible economic impact.

……………………………………………

The Plaintiff therefore seeks an injuction seeking for the Defendant to recant his statement, and to pay the Plaintiff, Franz von Hapsburg a sum not under or exceeding five hundred thousand dollars for unnecessary damages to reputation.

 

[The_Hawk]

Dismissed, with prejudice. Per O'Floinn has as much right to opine on matters of public concern as any other citizen. That a bill has not formally been proposed in the Assembly is irrelevant.

Per von Hapsburg is admonished not to abuse the Court's time again.

-A. B. Clay, C.J., for the Court

 

[Hyzhenhok]

The President submits that the Minstries of the Interior and Finance are vacant due to disappearance of the respective ministers, requesting a confirmation by the court so replacement can occur.

 

[von Streusser]

The High Court finds that the President's petition is in line with Constitution Article II, section 2(a), and that the offices of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Interior are indeed vacant due to the absence of the Ministers. Lawful proceedings to replace the absent Ministers may begin immediately.

-Deputy Chief Justice Dredd, per curia.

 

[Craig Ashley]

Petition Before the High Court: al'Sahwari v. Park

Abdelkader al'Sahwari petitions the court that then Minister of Finance, Woodrow Park, acted unconstitutionally when he imposed new registration fees upon limousines. As Minister of Finace, the registration of vehicles is not within his constitutional jurisidiction, and so his actions in those matters are illegal and unconstitutional. Enclosed are a copy of Minister Park's Road/Highway Vehicle Category Definitions and Supplemental Registation Fees.

Per Park has argued that the area of vehicle registration is not specifically granted to any one ministry, so it is in play. He has further justified his actions by tying them to the affect of such vehicles on traffic and interprovincial commerce, which is constitutionally mandated as the jurisidiction of the MoF. His reasoning is faulty on both counts, and we shall outline it as such.

1. Per Park's claim that the registration and regulation of vehicles are not specifically granted to any ministry, thereby implying that any number of ministries can claim jurisdiction over them.

The Constitution outlines the respective portfolios and jurisdiction of the executive ministries. The MoF is granted the following responsibilities:

e. The Finance Minister shall regulate the industry, labor relations, domestic and foreign commerce of the nation, including customs; the natural resources of the nation, including forestry, mining, and fisheries; and Federal government finances, such as taxes.

By way of comparison, the Ministry of the Interior is given the following.

f. The Interior Minister shall have charge over the lands and waters of Eutopia and the infrastructure necessary for the prosperity of the people, to include roads and railways, airports and seaports, the Coast Guard, environmental protection and national parks, including the Rangers, the postal service, and print and electronic media.

Per Park is correct that vehicle regulation and registration are not specifically mentioned in either portfolio, or the portfolio of any other executive office. However, the Minister of the Interior is clearly given jurisdiction over roadways, along with other specifically mentioned forms of infrastructure. By granting the minister this jurisdiction, the Constitution grants him authority over all things reasonably pertaining to them. The intrinsict link between automobiles and roadways need not be argued. Therefore when granting the MoI authority over infrastructure, the Constitution granted the MoI authority over the regulation of the users of the infrastructure in question, in this case roadways.

To say otherwise, would be akin to saying tha even though the Constitution grants MoI authority over the postal service, he does not have authority over stamps. Or his authority over national parks does not extend to the wildlife within those parks. Such interpretations would leave all of the ministries severely restricted in the possible actions they coudl take, and are not in keeping with the idea of an exectutive branch empowered to carry out the law over its portfolio.

2. Per Park's claim that the affect limousines have on traffic, and thereby commerce, grants him authority and jurisdiction in this matter.

Per Park has made this claim, but has not produced any figures to support it. Limousines make up a tiny fraction of traffic patterns as a whole. In order for them to affect traffic to the degree he asserts, their impact would have to be many times greater than their numbers. Furthermore, he must demonstrate that they affect the "commerce of the nation", not merely cause a local traffic jam on occassion. We cannot simply take the minister at his word, he must produce verifiable research to suport his claims regarding the extent limousines affect traffic and thereby commerce.

It can be reasonably argued that due to their small numbers relative to the total number of vehicles on the roadways each day, the alledged negative commercial impact of limousines is so minimal that is not even woth mentioning. Also, Per Park takes a very broad definition of his jurisdicition over commerce but takes a much narrower view of his fellow minister's Constitutional authority. Per Park's interpretation of his authority over commerce is so broad, that if it is accepted, he can claim authority over virtually all of the MoI's portfolio, as postal service, enviromental regualtions, infrastructure, and media all indirectly affect commerce in one manner or another. Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended for the offices to be distinct and for the MoF to focus on matters directly pertaining to commerce.

Relief sought

The Plantiff seeks to have the MoF's regulations and fees regarding vehicles overturned and declared unconstitutional. He seeks to have any fees paid returned immediately, plus appropriate interest.

 

[von Streusser]

Certiorari denied, with leave to amend granted. As Per Park is clearly being sued in his capacity as Minister of Finance, a post which he no longer holds, the proper defendant is Per Park's successor in interest, the new Minister of Finance. The relief plaintiff seeks cannot be granted by private citizen Park. Though the subject matter of this suit is a proper topic for this Court's consideration, certiorari cannot be granted to this suit as it stands.

Additionally, if this Court discovers that Per Leary has again resorted to the Courts without any attempt at extrajudicial resolution, it will be sorely disappointed.

- Marcos, J., per curia.

 

[Craig Ashley]

The petition returns with the necessary amendments naming the current MoF as the defendant. There is also a note attached.

Per Leary is not a party to this suit. It is true Per Leary's party, the PoL has paid for Per al'Sahwari's legal expenses, but the case is being argued by bar approved lawyers.

-C. Frederick Howell, lead counsel for the plantiff.

OOC: Hawk gave me permission to use a lawyer drone character for the case, since no court would allow a non lawyer like Leary to argue law before them in a case that he has no standing for.

 

[von Streusser]

Certiorari granted. Counsel for both parties are encouraged to brush up on the rules of procedure (available in the first post of this thread) before continuing.

Alan Jones is named as the new Respondent to this case, amended as Al'Sahwari v. Jones. Counsel for Respondent may now file their rebuttal brief, and the Court will receive any Amicus Curiae briefs.

- Marcos, J., per curia.