Every Man Draws Water for His Own Field
Every Man Draws Water for His Own Field
November 15, 1940. With the surrender of the last Sinkiang warlord, the war with China was finally over (except for the odd nationalistic insurgent terrorists). The formal establishment of the New Order of East Asia demanded a special celebration, and some enterprising historian came up with an excuse: this year marked the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan, and so a nationwide holiday was declared. The emperor reviewed the fleet, a most impressive display clearly visible from the parks in Yokohama, 600,000 tons of ships and hundreds of aircraft; the Combined Fleet, the third largest in the world, and the largest to be massed in one ocean. That evening an imperial celebration was held in Hibiya Park. Their Imperial Majesties, the emperor and the empress came out of the Palace to attend the celebration in the outer garden. Fifty thousand notable persons were invited inside the sacred enclosure, and army and navy bands played stirring music. Their Majesties sat down to
bento lunches. The emperor read an Imperial Rescript:
It is Our earnest hope that peace in this world will be restored soon and that We may share with all countries happiness and prosperity, albeit the world is now in the midst of great turmoil.
No one paid any attention. That was what an emperor was supposed to say on such an occasion. Everybody in Japan knew that a great day was dawning for the nation. Japan was on the road.
Hakko ichiu!
Admiral Yamamoto, certain that “those idiots” of the army were now embarked on a course that must take Japan to war with the United States, was beginning to consider a war plan that would violate all the rules of the Imperial Navy’s traditional plans for a Pacific war. It would involve a preemptive strike, of the sort that Admiral Togo had launched against the Russians at Port Arthur. It would mean the use of up to half a dozen aircraft carriers in a fashion never before consider in naval warfare. It was to be a do or die operation. The outcome was hoped to be decided on the first day. When Yamamoto showed his plan to Admiral Ohnishi, chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, Ohnishi thought he was mad. So did others, who talked enough among themselves that by January US ambassador Grew had the rumor and reported it to Washington. Admiral Stark, the chief of naval operations, reported it to Admiral Kimmel, the commander of the Pacific fleet; but appended it with a remark that he believed the report to be incredible. Naval battles were simply not fought that way. The battleship was still king. Some admirals doubted the viability of aircraft carriers for naval warfare. So why should they believe so ridiculous a story?
As 1941 opened, the military mission to Berlin sent a report to gladden the hearts of the militarists:
It is now absolutely impossible for Britain to defeat the Reich. Not only that, but the end of British resistance is merely a question of time. The United States at present is not prepared militarily enough to fight Japan, Germany, and Italy simultaneously, and the United States’ preparedness will not be completed before 1944.
The mission was greeted with full ceremonial honors. General Yamashita was received by Adolf Hitler, and reported after the audience that Hitler had pledged that the Germans would bind themselves eternally to the Japanese spirit, which made good reading back in Japan. Privately, Yamashita thought Hitler looked and behaved like a clerk. The meetings with Nazi officials were full of hearty cordiality. The promises to show all equipment was meaningless, however. The mission asked specifically about radar, but the Germans turned the questions aside.
What Hitler wanted from Japan was an immediate declaration of war against Britain, and especially against the United States. But Yamashita offered him little hope. Japan, he said, had only just absorbed China and was so fearful of attack by Russia that she was not going to attack anyone. The Japanese were in Berlin to improve their defenses, not their offensive capability. While all this was going on, Foreign Minister Matsuoka was also in Berlin, cementing relations with Hitler and putting his official signature on the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo pact. Matsuoka then stopped in Moscow on his way home and secured a neutrality treaty with the USSR which would run for the next five years. When the treaty was signed and Matsuoka was ready to go home to Tokyo, Stalin entertained him and they stoked up on vodka for so long that Matsuoka’s train had to be held for him. Stalin took the blowsy Japanese foreign minister to the station, gave him an immense bear hug, and announced his blessing:
"We are both Asiatics, Japan can now move south."
South and not north into Siberia, he meant. For that he had guaranteed Russia’s non-intervention in Asia. The way for Japan to move now in Asia certainly had become clear.
The Tripartite Treaty with Germany was specifically aimed at the United States in article three:
The…signatories…are bound…to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War.
There was only one such power in the world: The United States of America. Thus, the last year had set the stage for conquest of Southeast Asia. When the news of the pact came out, President Roosevelt had been considering aggressive action by American warships in the Atlantic against the U-boats, He dropped the idea for the time being, considering that the new developments had created too much danger in the Pacific.
Following the military mission’s six month visit to Germany, the Japanese flew to Italy to meet Mussolini. The Italian trip was cut short by a demand from Adolf Hitler that they return immediately. When they arrived in Berlin, Hitler told him he was expecting “to be attacked by Russia” in a few days and that the Japanese had best get on the Trans-Siberian Railway and get home. When the party were traveling up near the Polish-Russian frontier they could see the ammunition dumps, fields filled with tanks and trucks, and all the temporary military camps in the area. It was apparent that Hitler was getting ready to attack Russia. Across the Soviet border there was little to be seen of Soviet defense efforts except the building of antitank ditches. When the party reached Moscow, the party was met by General Zhukov. They lunched at the Kremlin but did not see Stalin. Then they left that night for Siberia. They did not talk to the Russians about the German war plans, and the Russians asked them no questions.
Three days later, when the party reached Irkutsk, they learned that Hitler had invaded Russia. As Yamashita and his party neared Japan he held a meeting and warned all that they must be very careful. He had noted that the Germans were not doing well. The members of the mission should not give anyone ammunition if they wanted Japan to declare war on Britain or the United States. They had all seen how modern war machines were built, and they must know that it would take Japan years to rebuild her defenses properly.
In the summer of 1941 the decision to go to war was inherent in everything being discussed by the military authorities in Tokyo. The only question was: which way to go? Now that Hitler invaded Russia they were afraid to ignore the Axis pact. What if Hitler won without their assistance? Then they would have the Germans on their northern border. What if Hitler also occupied England? Then they would have to deal with Hitler over the British colonies in Asia.
The Germans, failing to “blitz” the Soviets, now demanded with increasing shrillness that Japan attack Siberia. The Foreign Ministry favored this course, but the army wanted to occupy South-east Asia. Prime Minister Kiichiro sided with the army. The next step was to secure approval of the War Council. The council would then approach the emperor and persuade him to its point of view. Matsuoka played his last cards: he warned that to get involved in the south would lead to serious consequences with the United States, while to attack the USSR might not mean anything to the United States. The generals said they must go south to guarantee a supply of rubber. The navy said they could be prepared to invade Malaysia. The plan would be to move first into Malaysia, and then the Netherlands East Indies, step by step, hoping that Japan could swallow these chunks of territory without arousing the sleeping eagle.
In late September, another Imperial Conference was called, and the emperor considered it so important that he appeared to hear the discussion of the document “Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation.” The policy was the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The method: preparation for war against the United States and Britain. The immediate new move: investment of Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies.
Privy Council President Yoshimichi Hara said he was worried about war with the United States. Matsuoka said that a war with the United States and Britain was unlikely if the military proceeded with great caution.
Matsuoka: “The trouble is that the officers in the front line are aggressive, convinced that we will use force. Of course I have sanctioned the aggressive behavior of the officers, trusting in the wisdom of the Supreme Command.”
Hara: “What I want to make clear is whether the United States would go to war if Japan took action against the Dutch Indies.”
Matsuoka: “I cannot exclude the possibility.”
General Sugiyama: “Our occupation of the Indies will certainly provoke Britain and the United States. At this juncture, Japan must resolutely carry out the policy she now has in mind: this policy is absolutely necessary in order to stamp out the intrigues of Great Britain and the United States. I do not believe that the United States will go to war if Japan moves into the Dutch Indies. Of course, we wish to do this peacefully. We also with to take action in Thailand but that might have serious consequences since Thailand is near Malaya. We will be careful in sending our troops, since this will greatly influence our policy with regard to the south.”
Hara: “I now understand and agree.”
And so that vital Imperial Conference became history with the final assent of the emperor to a policy he knew very well was going to lead to war with the United States and Britain. Whatever the emperor’s feelings before this time, the stark replies of the army to all questions showed that there was no turning back short of an imperial demand that they do so. By this time, such a demand could very easily have been met with army insurrection. The army was talking about proceeding slowly, but with no indication that anything could occur to make them stop their expansion of Japan’s empire. The rapid change in the fortunes of war in Europe had brought a feeling to Tokyo that if the Japanese did not move now to secure more empire, it might be lost to them. The generals were overwhelmed by the speed of German victories in the European war, and afraid of missing the bus.
Not everyone was as excited about the possibilities as the army. Admiral Nagano made a last appeal to reason:
As for war with the United States, although there is now a chance of achieving victory, the chances will diminish as time goes on. By the later half of next year it will already be difficult for us to cope with the United States; after that, the situation will become increasingly worse. The United States will probably prolong the matter until her defenses have been built up and then try to settle it. Accordingly as time goes by, the Empire will be put at a disadvantage. If we could settle things without war, there would be nothing better. But if we conclude that conflict can not ultimately be avoided, then I would like you to understand that as time goes by we will be in a disadvantageous position. Moreover, if we occupy the Philippines, it will be easier, from the navy’s point of view, to carry on the war.
The juggernaut, however, was moving; and no one at this point had the temerity to try to stop it. When Yamamoto learned of the move to be made in the south, he quit hoping for peace. “There’s nothing we can do now.” He then went back to the fleet to consider the best method of crippling the American fleet before it could get started in the war that was most certainly going to begin in a few months.
