The Year of Upheaval
Part 6: The Withdrawal Westward, February 11 – February 28, 1942
Withdrawals in the face of the enemy are always difficult affairs, tactically, operationally and strategically. Tactically, it is an enormous challenge to disengage from the enemies; it means leaving one’s own prepared positions and moving out into the open where an aware and capable enemy could wreak havoc in all sorts of different ways. Operationally, it means dispersing the combat strength of a division or a corps or an army in such a way as to provide safeguards against attack while at the same time moving them away from the enemy. Strategically, it means finding a new line at which to defend against the superior enemy. The Italians would face all these difficulties from February 11 through to the end of the month.
The Soviets would not let up their pressure. On the 12th of February they called off their latest offensive against Onesti, having sacrificed over twelve hundred soldiers for no real gain save the slaughter of nearly four hundred and fifty Italian defenders. At Tulcea and Artysz, however, the Soviets won: the former was an offensive Italian battle inside the pocket and the latter was a defensive Italian battle in the ring. Losses cumulatively approached four hundred on the Italian side and barely surpassed four hundred on the Soviet side. Nevertheless, the real damage was done operationally. With Artysz open, the Soviets would be able to relieve the pocket. And then the real pressure would begin, particularly from within the erstwhile encirclement. With the withdrawal beginning, Da Zara’s and Campioni’s naval aviators switched to other targets. They would, instead of interdicting Soviet ground forces, hit their logistics infrastructure. Italian warplanes would dominate the skies in the coming two weeks as they had the previous two. No bridge, no road nor rail junction in northern Dacia between Hungary and the Black Sea would be left undestroyed by the end of the month.
Italian carrier air groups hitting north Dacian infrastructure.
By the 18th of February the withdrawal was in full swing. Graziani’s very battered army was pulling back behind the cover of Bastico’s stalwart defenders. The Italian position was, with the fall of Artysz, effectively that of a terribly extended salient defended only on the northern side. It would have to be a phased withdrawal; there was no other way to try to bring out all formations intact. Bastico’s third corps, which had been operating on the interior of the pocket, was also to begin withdrawing, but only until Bastico’s corps headquarters areas. These three divisions were, however, to have a terrible time in the days to come. The Graziani’s army was able to disengage nearly easily, despite its previous heavy defeats. The Soviets did not have the operational level planning to instigate truly unrelenting deep operations. This would result in enforced delays on the Soviet side—worse than those on the Italian side, certainly—that would allow the Italians of Graziani’s army to get away.
The first stage of the withdrawal.
As the first stage of the withdrawal was beginning, the forces that had been in Thrace and around Istanbul were already passing Belgrade by. Guzzoni and Pintor had definitively escaped danger, in the first success of the massive withdrawal effort. By the 21st of March, The Italian defenders of Onesti had been assaulted by utterly overwhelming force and were forced to withdraw. Graziani’s army was very nearly out of the firing line by this stage. Bastico’s third corps, however, took the first of a series of hammer blows from Soviets in the now broken encirclement. These were undoubtedly designed to halt the Italian withdrawal long enough for the pressure from the north to break the Italian armies apart and lead to a decisive defeat of Italian arms in Dacia. The corps formations, however, refused to prolong contact, even though such refusals would further the disarray of the divisions and impede their withdrawal efforts. It was impediment, or destruction. By this point the Soviets had an overwhelming amount of divisions in the theater: at least thirty divisions, including at least four armored divisions and an independent marine brigade and this does not even begin to count the Soviet forces in Anatolia.
The withdrawal under increasingly severe pressure from the Soviets.
Trezzani, of Bastico’s third corps, again got hammered: this time at Valenii de Munte. There, two armored divisions pounced upon his withdrawing infantrymen and caused considerable havoc before Trezzani could achieve a tactical disengagement some hours later. Onesti had fallen. Only one of Bastico’s corps was now standing, right next to the Hungarian border. It was the lynchpin of the entire swing out of the salient. By the 24th, however, all formations had disengaged on a tactical level from the pursuing Soviet forces, save for Bastico’s corps by the Hungarian border, which would be the last to evacuate, and his third corps, whose individual members were now effectively the terribly embattled rearguard and just barely keeping ahead of their pursuers. Graziani’s army, however, had effectively achieved operational disengagement: there was no way now for the Soviets to reach his forces. Three out of four armies had now effectively escaped.
The withdrawal by the morning of February 24th.
Trezzani and La Ferla were assaulted yet again at Targoviste and were sent retreating toward the corps headquarters. Italian aircraft still filled the skies and it is to the brave naval aviators that, perhaps, the Italian soldiers could look to for their salvation. The sheer mass of Soviet formations in the theater completely overwhelmed their logistical network, under assault as it was by ubiquitous Italian carrier-based bombers. It was only on February 27th that Bastico’s third corps managed to finally achieve tactical disengagement. At this point, the word was finally given. Bastico’s last two corps would withdraw as quickly as possible. By the evening on the next day, operational disengagement had been achieved. All four Italian armies in the east had been withdrawn without loss of any formation.
The withdrawal was secure.
Tactically and operationally, the withdrawal had eventually been a success. At this point, it was up to Mussolini and his generals to reform a line of defense at a new string of locations and halt the Soviet juggernaut. Tactical achievement and operational skill would count for naught if they failed in this new and pressing mission. It was the creation and integrity of this new line that would engage most of Mussolini’s efforts, leaving other theaters to return to default strategies of limited liability.
As a closing note on this withdrawal, as was typical, given their dedication to their mission, Da Zara’s and Campioni’s fleets were actually the last units to leave the theater. They would only pass through the Straits on the 2nd of March, mere hours ahead of their closing by a Soviet assault into undefended Istanbul.