The Year of Strategic Crisis
Part 12: Technology and Deployment I, January – June, 1941
Even as all these crises and operations were underway, Mussolini was not overly distracted from the larger picture. While he may have been given to temporary excesses of enthusiasm, as when he authorized Graziani’s crusade, in terms of technological and doctrinal research he remained firmly committed to his vision of Italy’s maritime strategy.
In early February, Italian light artillery finally gained a brand new cannon to call its own and Mussolini continued this vein of infantry improvement by ordering the development of further advanced infantry support weapons. By the first of March, the general staff had in its turn published another study concerning central planning, and informed Mussolini that it had developed a sufficient body of thought to develop a vague concept they referred to as the grand battle plan. Mussolini was intrigued by this information but in the end preferred another study on central planning. Soon after, another study was published by the general staff, concerning mass assaults. Mussolini decided to discontinue this line of inquiry for the moment in favor of the development of a human wave concept, which in his mind did not seem as vulgar and bloody as it may to our minds today. By late March the air staff had distributed two studies of its own, one concerning tactics for striking at ports, and the other tactics for naval strikes. Mussolini ordered sequels to these two studies. By mid-April, the Spanish crisis had largely wound down but Graziani was about to launch his crusade, and just in time for it the general staff published another study, this one on large fronts. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Mussolini then authorized a study on guerrilla warfare.
The publication of another study concerning large fronts, which was a very great concern given the war with the Soviet Union.
Directly after this study, the air staff published yet another study, this on naval air targeting, as distinct from the tactics of naval strikes. Mussolini not only continued this line of inquiry but ordered further resources devoted to research, and authorized another two projects: further development on an air-launched torpedo as well as on light bombs. Italy now had seventeen major research projects going. Mussolini, faced with the ineffectualness of his intelligence services outside of Italian territory, was winding down its funding to some extent and decided upon reinforcing Italian research. By the end of April, Italian arms industry had developed greater anti-tank weaponry, and Mussolini immediately put in an order for one that was even more advanced. By late May, the naval staff was beginning to publish another wave of studies: first came carrier group doctrine, and then carrier crew training, light cruiser escort role and naval underway replenishment manuals. All these projects were continued.
The second quarter of the year saw the publication o many updated naval doctrinal and training manuals.
The wave of naval publications continued with a new work on radar training in early June, and a light cruiser crew training manual three days later. The latter was continued by the naval staff, but the former was temporarily discontinued in favor of a general staff study on special forces. With Italian marines finally in action by this time, improving their doctrine became a higher priority. These were the last technological and doctrinal developments of the first half year, but the period was capped off with the first new deployments of Italian troops besides the nascent marine corps. A new corps was activated in southern Dacia with two divisions, destined for the front northward. What made this corps special, however, was that it was nearly as strong as any one four-division corps already up there, though less flexible. For, though it comprised only two divisions, these were Italy’s first triangular divisions.
Italy’s first deployment of triangular divisions.
This period of six months continued the trend of previous years: a large focus on naval matters, though it was certainly no longer the lion’s share of research. Indeed, specifically naval matters, as opposed to aeronautical and naval aeronautical matters, not to mention army matters, were declining relative to the total number of projects. The army had the single largest set of projects, as its tasks were expanding at an alarming rate, particularly once it was committed to fending off the predations of the Soviet Union. The air force remained the neglected arm yet again, though even it was getting more attention than previously: both of the new projects that Mussolini had authorized concerned the air force primarily, albeit in relation to its efficiency against naval targets. Nonetheless, this continued to seem permissible given the lack of a major air power challenging Italy and forcing it to utilize its own undernourished fighter arm to fight for the skies.