Why the Graf Zeppelin?

[nwinther]

One of the many What If's of WW2 is what would happen if Germany had finished the GZ. Many of those arguments end with "not much" as the GZ had many deficiencies, the Germans lacked experience with carriers etc.

That made me wonder, why the Germans began with what amounts to a full fleet cariier? Why not begin with something smaller, like escort carrier (essentially converted merchant ships), or lighter carriers, to gain some basic experience - and ships that could be built fast?

 

[Pero Coveilha]

the GZ had many deficiencies

In before our Graf Zeppelin starts shooting forks.

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

Because bicycles shouldn't be left all over the place.

 

[Henry IX]

One of the many What If's of WW2 is what would happen if Germany had finished the GZ. Many of those arguments end with "not much" as the GZ had many deficiencies, the Germans lacked experience with carriers etc.

That made me wonder, why the Germans began with what amounts to a full fleet cariier? Why not begin with something smaller, like escort carrier (essentially converted merchant ships), or lighter carriers, to gain some basic experience - and ships that could be built fast?

The answer really has to do with the profoundly disfunctional nature of Nazi descision making.

Broadly speaking the rearamament program was designed by people who had no understanding of economics and resource contraints. It promised the armament industries far more steel than the German economy possessed, particularly because that steel was also needed for export to pay for the raw materials Germany lacked (including iron to make the steel with). As such there were a series of ad-hoc rationing plans for steel (and other raw materials). Nazis being Nazis this lead to all sorts of bureaucratic power plays with various branches of the government fighting for resources for 'their' area or industry. The navy was no exception to this and at one point had the truly delusional Plan Z for naval expansion.

As reality hit the expansion plans had to be scaled back, but the best way to hang on to some of the resources that were allocated was to build stuff that exited Hitler and Hitler liked big things. A sensible plan like "lets build a few small carriers and practise operating them first so we can build carriers later that actually perform well" is going to get its steel ration cut, whereas "We are going to build a full sized carrier that will carry a full wing of ubermench pilots, making it so there is nowhere for the RN to hide. They will come screaming out of the sky with their guns going dakka dakka dakka and their bombs going BOOM and dropping torpedoes and sinking ships and it will be AWSOME!" just might get the crucial support from Hitler to keep a steel allowance.

This is why the navy ended up with hugely expensive battleships that it didn't actually have a doctrine about how they would be used. Battelships are awsome (just like Graf Zeppelin) but gave Germany no benefit (unlike Graf Zeppelin) but 'awsome' was functionally an important factor in Nazi descision making [insert penis size joke here].

 

[pithorr]

Because bins must be locked.

 

[Director]

In my opinion the Kriegsmarine didn't do much right in the build-up to World War Two, but that's maybe a rant for another time.

The Graf Zeppelin was possibly a good idea - for a different navy, with different needs. Having air assets at sea for reconnaissance and fighter cover (and some limited strike capability) would be helpful. But the issues are many: the GZ wasn't any better designed than the other Kriegsmarine ships, and German designs were notoriously wasteful of tonnage (and had critical issues with propulsion and anti-aircraft systems, for two).

Every navy made mistakes with its first carrier designs - I give you Langley, Furious, Bearn... and Graf Zeppelin would have had a tiny air group for such a large ship.

First, once you get a carrier operational it takes most navies years or decades to work out how to manage carrier operations. You need to work out how to properly design aircraft, train pilots, train support crews, work out things like how to manage elevators, prevent aviation gasoline fires, properly ID ships from the air, and so on and so forth. Even if GZ had been completed before the war broke out, I can't see it likely that the carrier would have been of much use because the air group couldn't have been trained to any useful degree.

Second, Germany didn't have any appropriate aircraft and the Navy's chances of getting the Luftwaffe to co-operate were slim and none. At best you might get Hitler to order Goering to provide aircraft and crews... and we all know how helpful Goering would be given the demands of the French and Russian campaigns.

Third, the most immediately useful weapon, assuming they had aircraft, would be torpedoes - and Germany didn't have an aircraft torpedo in production. From what I understand, they were using an Italian design that was frankly awful.

Fourth, you have the serious issues of refueling and re-arming a carrier. Germany had some success with forward deployment of resupply ships but those were rolled up in the first year of the war. Carriers are very hungry because they steam at high speed, planes use a lot of fuel and the option of going back to port twice a month just isn't possible. At best you get one or two cruises - like Scharnhorst and Gneisenau - and then either the carrier gets penned up in port, takes bomb damage like Gneisenau or goes down at sea.

Fifth... OK, let's assume that Germany finishes the ship years early, magic's appropriate aircraft into production, gets pilots and crews trained by hand-waving and they get Graf Zeppelin to sea. So you have one operational carrier with maybe two dozen aircraft. Britain starts the war with seven: Argus; Hermes; Eagle; Courageous; Glorious; Furious and Ark Royal and has three or four more ready to come on-line. Once Britain figures out how to hunt down raiders, Graf Zeppelin is going down like Bismarck.

Sixth, carriers are fragile, especially early in the war when navies are finding out they really don't know how to manage big gasoline fires. Carriers are floating av-gas tanks covered in bombs, and the US and Japan lost multiple carriers as they tried to figure out effective damage control. Germany has one carrier... which, if it is damaged at all, likely can't get home (see also, Graf Spee and Bismarck).

TL;DR - So... you get an inefficient design, with no aircraft, pilots or air wing crews, with no suitable weapons, which either can't get to sea past British warships or if it does can't get home because a greatly-superior enemy sinks it, before or after it runs out of supplies. The concept of having air support is good but the implementation is just impossible.

If Germany had been able to build a balanced fleet of efficient ships with capital ships, carriers, cruisers and destroyers all equipped with propulsion and anti-aircraft systems that worked, with control of the design, procurement and operation of their own air assets... then they'd have been able to control the Baltic and maybe fight and lose one or two pitched battles in the North Sea. For an incomplete, unbalanced fleet forced into raiding, the Graf Zeppelin was worse than useless.

 

[Director]

@nwinther - to specifically answer your question, it is a lot harder to operate aircraft from a small platform than a large one. You need a fair bit of deck space, plus bigger ships can carry more fuel which means more air operations. Usually bigger ships can steam faster, particularly where warships are concerned. Merchant ships in WW2 could be as slow as eight or nine knots, whereas you really needed twenty to thirty knots of wind over the deck to get WW2-era aircraft aloft. (Some of that was ship speed, some of it was from heading into the wind). All of that means that, if you have a choice, you build a big carrier rather than a small one.

Japan did convert a couple of passenger liners and seaplane carriers into aircraft carriers and they worked reasonably well. The US actually converted two fast Great Lakes steamers into training carriers. Escort carriers were first converted from fast fleet oilers or fast cargo ships - which were also urgently needed to carry fuel and supplies - and later escort carriers were purpose-built to have faster-than-merchant-ship speed.

Italy and Germany did try converting ships to carriers - a cruiser and a liner for Germany and a liner or two for Italy. Those projects failed for several reasons, but here are the four principle ones. 1) Neither navy could get priority for steel and labor, 2) neither navy could get the priority for fuel to operate them, 3) neither navy had any control over air assets and neither had any co-operation from its independent air force, and 4) the war developed so quickly that it was soon apparent that even if completed the ships would be useless.

Why not escort carriers? Because Italy and Germany didn't have fast merchant ships or couldn't spare the ones they did have, and wouldn't have had aircraft, pilots, crews and fuel if they had somehow gotten the ships converted. The US and Britain needed escort carriers to haul aircraft across oceans, and to provide modest air strength for anti-submarine work, for training and to cover invasions. Germany and Italy had different strategic needs.

 

[nwinther]

Thank you for your replies.

But I was thinking more in the general preparatory stage. German cruisers and battleships were evolved over decades, but for some reason they don't apply this fact to their aircraft carrier: Begin smaller, get some experience fast with a smaller ship, instead of building a fleet carrier and THEN begin to iron out any issues.

It would be obvious that the LW wasn't playing ball and that issue could be adressed as well as who-knows what.

 

[Kovax]

Was Germany even allowed to build an aircraft carrier in the interim years? Up until around 1936(?) they were still restricted by the Versailles treaty to a small navy with undersized guns and low tonnages. If you can't build an escort carrier of little or no immediate military value unless you scrap a militarily useful ship to free up the tonnage, you're not likely to do so for "educational" purposes only.

Several pre-war and early war vessels were built in direct violation of the naval treaties (others by drastically understating their intended tonnages), after Hitler felt that nobody would dare to push the issue to its ultimate conclusion. By then, it was too late to build an escort carrier first, before designing a fleet carrier utilizing the experience from the first vessel. Basically, no time for "trial and error", so Germany jumped directly to the "error" stage.

 

[Director]

But I was thinking more in the general preparatory stage. German cruisers and battleships were evolved over decades, but for some reason they don't apply this fact to their aircraft carrier: Begin smaller, get some experience fast with a smaller ship, instead of building a fleet carrier and THEN begin to iron out any issues.

It would be obvious that the LW wasn't playing ball and that issue could be adressed as well as who-knows what.

Germany had no design experience with warships from 1917 or so up to the late 1920s. The naval architects were retired or dead. Operational officers with no design experience were driving requirements with no knowledge of what was possible or practical. You can see this effect in the terrible destroyers, awful light cruisers, grossly overblown heavy cruisers and bloated battleships.

Britain had a lot of experience designing warships and used inputs both from an engineering staff and from men with operational experience. France designed its ships almost completely by the engineering team with little input from seagoing officers (and the result shows - lots of clever designs and not much practical, workable equipment). Germany went the other way, with operational officers submitting a wish-list the engineers had to fulfill. That resulted in a lot of cool stuff (like extremely high-pressure steam engines) that was put into production before it was tested and ready. As a result the German ships looked sleek and capable but the engineering plants were band-aided and the anti-aircraft armament had serious issues.

Before 1935, Germany was living under the Versailles Treaty and was not permitted capital ships, carriers or even aircraft. After 1935, the emphasis was on big prestige ships (High Seas Fleet II, Hitler Boogaloo!). German naval strategy prioritizes the Baltic, where the Luftwaffe has bases, and raiding on the high seas. If you are going to build a balanced surface fleet to challenge Britain (and if Britain is going to sit idly by and build nothing while you do) then carriers would be useful for sea control in the North Sea.

News Flash: Britain is never, never, never going to permit a German buildup without building more than Germany can. Control of the North Sea or Atlantic will never pass to Germany while one Briton can cock a pistol and build a raft. So... why do you need a carrier? Because the 'Cool Kids' are building carriers and we want one, too. There just is not much practical justification.

It was always obvious that the Luftwaffe wasn't playing ball with anyone - that's how we get the Hermann Goering Division. But the Luftwaffe was politically active and thoroughly Nazi, while the Navy was apolitical and mostly not-Nazi. The Navy was never going to get anything from the Luftwaffe, even if that meant inefficiency and defeat.

Was Germany even allowed to build an aircraft carrier in the interim years? Up until around 1936(?) they were still restricted by the Versailles treaty to a small navy with undersized guns and low tonnages. If you can't build an escort carrier of little or no immediate military value unless you scrap a militarily useful ship to free up the tonnage, you're not likely to do so for "educational" purposes only.

Germany wasn't even permitted to have military aircraft until 1935. Yes, they had been cheating on the treaty... but there's a lot of benefit to having a large formal organization that operates legally and in the open. I think you are correct in assuming that building a carrier before 1935 would be... highly questionable. It certainly would be pointless, since there would be no aircraft for it.

We should also keep in mind that the aircraft of 1932-5 are not the aircraft of 1942-5. Biplanes are still around, engines are comparatively small and weak. Aside from a few Douhet-disciples and Mitchell-boosters, airpower is thought to be mostly useful for reconnaissance, or shooting down enemy reconnaissance.

Germany and Italy had independent air forces who would not permit their navies to control any aircraft. Britain had fought and refought that issue, eventually returning some control to the navy but absolutely sabotaging the design and production of modern, efficient naval aircraft. Only the US and Japan gave control of naval aircraft to the navy.

One last point. If Germany has a carrier, what can she use it for? The German navy was tasked with control of the Baltic, guarding convoys from Norway and raiding into the Atlantic. I've covered before why you don't take a carrier raiding, but in brief: Atlantic weather is bad for flight ops, surface ships did get within gun range of a carrier, fuel and aviation gasoline are scarce and by 1941 the life expectancy of a German warship in the Atlantic is short.

 

[Jopa79]

If Germany has a carrier, what can she use it for?

One theoretical option could have been to disrupt Allied convoy traffic in the Arctic Ocean from the Gulf of Bothnia, the northernmost arm of the Baltic Sea.

 

[Director]

One theoretical option could have been to disrupt Allied convoy traffic in the Arctic Ocean from the Gulf of Bothnia, the northernmost arm of the Baltic Sea.

The Murmansk convoy run has the advantages (for Germany) of being far from Allied bases, relatively close to German bases and offering good targets. The disadvantages include the weather, which is awful much of the time and which makes aircraft operations difficult-to-impossible even for experienced carrier crews. Also, the Royal Navy is seriously over-stretched but prioritizes defending those convoys and making ready to take down Tirpitz.

The two serious battles (Barents Sea and North Cape) were fought at night and/or in 'limited visibility' (IE in a blowing fog-and-snowstorm with visibility limited to a little above 'what did we just run into'). The actual and planned sorties of Tirpitz offered some potential use for a carrier (if it had planes, and they had weapons)... except that those convoys were escorted by one or two battleships and at least one carrier.

I don't give Graf Zeppelin much of a chance against one or two Royal Navy carriers. If they get just one torpedo hit, GZ is likely to not make it home - and if she does, she's never getting back to Germany for repairs.

 

[Jopa79]

The Murmansk convoy run has the advantages (for Germany) of being far from Allied bases, relatively close to German bases and offering good targets. The disadvantages include the weather, which is awful much of the time and which makes aircraft operations difficult-to-impossible even for experienced carrier crews. Also, the Royal Navy is seriously over-stretched but prioritizes defending those convoys and making ready to take down Tirpitz.

The two serious battles (Barents Sea and North Cape) were fought at night and/or in 'limited visibility' (IE in a blowing fog-and-snowstorm with visibility limited to a little above 'what did we just run into'). The actual and planned sorties of Tirpitz offered some potential use for a carrier (if it had planes, and they had weapons)... except that those convoys were escorted by one or two battleships and at least one carrier.

I don't give Graf Zeppelin much of a chance against one or two Royal Navy carriers. If they get just one torpedo hit, GZ is likely to not make it home - and if she does, she's never getting back to Germany for repairs.

Well, I meant, what if the GZ never went to the high seas, to the Atlantic, neither to the Arctic Ocean, but instead, would have been stationed at the Baltic Sea and the sea area between Sweden and Finland, the Gulf of Bothnia?

Baltic Sea campaigns during 1939-1945 were very limited. The German Kriegsmarine and the Finnish Navy had the upper hand. The Soviet Baltic Fleet was isolated and not actually made any significant operations in this area, until Finland's exit from the war, in September 1944.

This sea area was never a main theater in World War II. However, if the GZ had been brought to the Baltic Sea, the entire Arctic theatre could have experienced major changes. The British Royal Navy avoided the campaigns at the Baltic Sea, there actually wasn't a lot to do there, except the one operation, ultimately abandoned by mr. Churchill.

Operation Catherine was a proposed Baltic Sea offensive by United Kingdom's Royal Navy in the early WWII. It aimed to end Germany's commerence with the other Baltic Sea nations, especially, to stop the flow of Swedish iron ore to Germany and prevent Sweden from joining to the Axis powers. However, the biggest problem for the British was, how the proposed fleet would have sailed to the Baltic Sea? Churchill was aware of the many risks confronting Operation Catherine. He knew German warships, submarines, minefields, and bombers would threaten the fleet. These problems might have been solved in the end, but at that stage of the war, they did not seem to be the most important of all, but it was felt that the priorities of the war were elsewhere. Catherine was abandoned.

The Kriegsmarine was the dominant naval power in the Baltic Sea between 1939 and 1944. If the GZ would had been stationed here, there was no enemy fleet, no other threats for that carrier nearby. At least, it would have required time, from Germany's enemies, to respond for this maneuver and meanwhile, the GZ could run "wild and free" at the Baltic Sea.

Since this sea area is also in the north, the conditions are challenging for flying, sea operations, especially 80 years ago. However, the weather in the Baltic Sea is more mild than in the Arctic Ocean. In order to attack, from the Gulf of Bothnia, against the Allied shipping convoys sailing in the Arctic Ocean, the Norwegian Sea, or the Barents Sea, the German Luftwaffe would have had to fly partly through Norway, or Finland. It would have been possible.

The German Junkers Ju 87R-2 was a long range dive-bomber, intended for anti-shipping missions. This model would have been capable to operate from a carrier. It had an operational range of 1535 km (954 mi). Attacking the Allied convoys in the Arctic would had been within its range. In addition, the Stukas could have made a stopover at Finnish airfields for refueling, maintenance, resupply of ammunition, etc.

 

[Director]

@Jopa79 - I beg your problem - I completely misunderstood and I apologize.

I agree with your points... but I'm not sure what Graf Zeppelin could provide that land airbases could not.

 

[Jopa79]

@Jopa79 - I beg your problem - I completely misunderstood and I apologize.

I agree with your points... but I'm not sure what Graf Zeppelin could provide that land airbases could not.

Don't worry, it's completely fine

That's a good question: - What Graf Zeppelin could provide that (Finnish) land airbases could not?

I've been thinking the same myself. It could be, the Germans actually never utilized the full capacity, the potential of the airfields in the north, in Lapland and the Arctic region ones. The Luftwaffe could have disrupted Arctic Ocean shipping more effectively if using the northern land airbases more effectively, or if there were deficiencies in the airfields, the Germans also did not make sufficient improvements needed to increase the capability of the airbases.

However, I think, the GZ in the Baltic Sea, could provide better supply for Stukas than the-low-level-airfields. Also, it would be harder, for the Soviet Air Force, to attack the GZ than to bomb the Finnish, or Norwegian airbases.

Left: A small Stuka formation in the north, the Continuation War between Finland and the Soviet Union (August 1941). Right: This is "an airbase" on a frozen lake. Airbase maintenance personnel in the photo. Supplies are pulled by a primitive small sled on the ice of the lake. I think, the GZ could provide better readiness to supply aircraft than this northern airfield. Both pictures by SA-Kuva.

 

[olm]

European Axis realized only in 1940 that their air forces are actually fairly useless in serious naval warfare. For Germany it's low prioritization is somewhat understandable, you don't need much to dominate Baltic, and couldn't really predict in 1938 that in two years time Germany will have full control of both France and Norway. Italians super optimistically though that notoriously inaccurate high level bombing of warships will be sufficient.

 

[Jopa79]

This is a theory, created by me, how the German carrier Graf Zeppelin, with Stuka dive bombers could have disturbed the Allied Arctic convoys, the US Lend-Lease. Sorry, this draft, the image is not 100% accurate, but I think, you get a pretty good picture of my view.

The Allied shipping, which was headed for Murmansk, its route ran for the rest of the way in the sea areas north of Norway and Finland. It was a dangerous area because the surroundings were under the control of German influence.

Graf Zeppelin carrier could be stationed to the bottom of Bothnia Bay, at the Baltic Sea. Its aircraft, e.g. Stukas (Junkers Ju 87R-2) have an operational range which allows them to fly over Northern Finland and Northern Norway and dive-bomb the Allied shipping at the Arctic Ocean. Then the return flight, but not straight back to Graf Zeppelin, but the Stukas would first land for a "pitstop" at the Rovaniemi airfield and wait there until the next Stuka-wing is loaded and prepared for its sortie towards the Arctic Ocean.

Left: Eduard Dietel and Albert Speer at the Rovaniemi airfield - the main airbase of the Luftwaffe in Finland during 1941-1944 (unknown). Right: The Toppila Harbor in Oulu was a major port during the wartime. It was very important for the entire economy of northern Finland, as well as for the 200,000 German soldiers present in the Finnish Lapland (SA-Kuva).

The Graf Zeppelin's role in this theoretical plan is to be a floating and mobile airbase at sea, but it stays fairly firmly in one place in the Gulf of Bothnia. In order to keep this plan and the GZ running and being able to also feed the needs of its airfleet, the Port of Oulu (Toppila) works as an intermediate port, unloading/loading point. Cargo ships from Germany bring everything necessary across the Baltic Sea to the port of Oulu and from there to the GZ.

 

[Herbert West]

Having an airfield in Narvik is infinitely better suited for the same task.

 

[Jopa79]

Having an airfield in Narvik is infinitely better suited for the same task.

Narvik airfield is much more vulnerable for Allied countermeasures than the Graf Zeppelin in the Gulf of Bothnia.

 

[olm]

View attachment 1110199
This is a theory, created by me, how the German carrier Graf Zeppelin, with Stuka dive bombers could have disturbed the Allied Arctic convoys, the US Lend-Lease. Sorry, this draft, the image is not 100% accurate, but I think, you get a pretty good picture of my view.

The Allied shipping, which was headed for Murmansk, its route ran for the rest of the way in the sea areas north of Norway and Finland. It was a dangerous area because the surroundings were under the control of German influence.

Graf Zeppelin carrier could be stationed to the bottom of Bothnia Bay, at the Baltic Sea. Its aircraft, e.g. Stukas (Junkers Ju 87R-2) have an operational range which allows them to fly over Northern Finland and Northern Norway and dive-bomb the Allied shipping at the Arctic Ocean. Then the return flight, but not straight back to Graf Zeppelin, but the Stukas would first land for a "pitstop" at the Rovaniemi airfield and wait there until the next Stuka-wing is loaded and prepared for its sortie towards the Arctic Ocean.

View attachment 1110210
Left: Eduard Dietel and Albert Speer at the Rovaniemi airfield - the main airbase of the Luftwaffe in Finland during 1941-1944 (unknown). Right: The Toppila Harbor in Oulu was a major port during the wartime. It was very important for the entire economy of northern Finland, as well as for the 200,000 German soldiers present in the Finnish Lapland (SA-Kuva).

The Graf Zeppelin's role in this theoretical plan is to be a floating and mobile airbase at sea, but it stays fairly firmly in one place in the Gulf of Bothnia. In order to keep this plan and the GZ running and being able to also feed the needs of its airfleet, the Port of Oulu (Toppila) works as an intermediate port, unloading/loading point. Cargo ships from Germany bring everything necessary across the Baltic Sea to the port of Oulu and from there to the GZ.

This seems extremely overcomplicated. Role of Graf Zeppelin could be easily fulfilled with land based airfields which would be far cheaper and quicker to prepare, not require over 30,000 tons of steel, and would not be limited to small carrier capable aircraft.

The only scenario in which I could imagine German carrier be worth its cost, would be if it was operational in 1939, and Germans pulled off a Taranto style attack on Scapa Flow before Brits themselves do it in Mediterranean.