Strategies for Germany and Japan

[Derek Pullem]

A few points to Mike's reply.

1. Economy - Germany did have an economic problem. They could not effectively use the economic structures of the day (borrow from the USA ) for obvious reasons that they were at war with most of the economic blocks. Their economy was pretty much run on pillaging resources and bartering with "friendly" minors (Sweden and Switzerland spring to mind). Sure if they tried to build up their surface fleet before the war the Amercians might have lent them some money but as the USA showed against Japan, they would and did play their economic cards (e.g. oil sanction) if their trade partners were getting out of hand

2. Barges and specialised equipment - D-Day took a year to prepare and there were tanks in the first wave. Just not very many of them. The only beach where most of the amphib tanks sunk on their way in was Omaha and that didn't go too well. There was no time after Dunkirk for a hasty invasion to be anything other than a larger scale version of Dieppe. Germans did not have the amphib equipment ready to roll.

3. RN involvement - this is the one thing that would stop the invasion 100%. if the British were prepared to lose half their surface fleet in return for killing the invasion barges. Since they did do something similar at Crete I do believe that the UK would have thrown their battle fleet at the invasion and lost many ships but would have blown it out of the water

4. Population - don't forget the Empire. There were many Indian, South African and ANZAC divisions that could have been pulled back if the situation seemed as desperate as you say

 

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Originally posted by mikej

River barges were a part of the picture. Actually much of the transport to be used was going to be shipping they captured in French, Belgian and Dutch ports.

To get the first wave across, the Germans gathered barges and tugs, totally disrupting their trade in the Baltic. Eventually, 170 cargo ships, 1277 barges, and 471 tugs were gathered. These were, inevitably, bombed by the RAF (about 10% being sunk before they dispersed again). The barges were mainly those designed for use on the Rhine, with a shallow freeboard. They sink in anything above Sea State 2. The wash from a fast-moving destroyer would swamp and sink the barge. (Correct: the RN could sink the lot without firing a shot).

The situation with regard to mariners for the barges with experience of the sea was even worse. When used as a landing craft, the barges, tugs and motorboats required extra crew. In total, the Kriegsmarine estimated that a minimum of 20,000 extra crew would be needed. That's 20,000 extra crew at least knowledgable of matters maritime. By stripping its ships to the minimum (which doesn't bode well for the Kriegsmarine if it is required to fight a fleet action), the Kriegsmarine was able to supply 4,000 men. The Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe transferred 3,000 men who had been sailors in civilian life, and an in-depth trawl of the reserves and the factories and the drafts brought forward another 9,000 men. After digging through the entire manpower cupboard, the barges were still 4,000 men short of the minimum required.

Nothing could alter this, and the Kriegsmarine came to the reluctant conclusion that the barges would have to sail in an undermanned condition.

Finally, the barges were under-powered for open water operations, and required towing. The basic unit was a tug towing two barges, and travelling at 2-3 knots, in the Channel, which has tides of 5 knots. Given that the distance that the far left of the invasion had to cross, a minimum of 85 miles, the poor bloody soldiers would be wallowing for a minimum of 30 hours in an open boat, and expected to carry out an opposed amphibious landing at the end of it.

The most comical element of the plan, however, was that for manoeuvring the flotilla. The plan was that this huge mass of towed barges would proceed in column until reaching a point ten miles from the landing beach, then wheel and steer parallel to the coast. When this was complete, the vessels would make a 90 degree turn at the same time, and advance in line towards the coast. This was to be carried out at night, and controlled and co-ordinated by loud hailers. There had been no chance to practise the operation, and there was less than one skilled sailor per vessel.

Right, and at this point in time they amounted to... let's see... a bunch of troops, many of whom abandoned even their small arms, with virtually no heavy weaponry and with no air support in the face of an enemy who can field upwards of 2000 medium bombers? (the pre-requisite to Sealion being air superiority for the Germans)

In the immediate area of Romney Marshes, where the bulk of 9 divisons the Germans wanted to land (The Allies used only 5 in D-Day btw), the British had

2 Territorial Divisions
1 Brigade from India
1 Brigade from new Zealand
1 Armoured Division
1 Canadian Division
1 Army Tank Brigade

Within 30 minutes of the Romney Marshes, the British had no less than 100 pieces of artillery, while the Germans would have none, as they couldn't be brought across with the initial wave. Also just to make matters worse, no engineers were included in the first wave, and no equipment to deal with obstacles, such as the Martello Towers and the Royal Military Canal, which is 60 feet wide.. Both obsticals are antiquated and easily passible with with the proper equiment of the time. But the Germans would have none of the proper equipment or the men who knew how to use it.

What you forget is that if the Brits abandon their Southern bases they suddenly have to fly hours to reach the beaches. When you consider RAF radar coverage, there would be NO time for planes taking off in the North to intercept bombers before they dropped their payload and were already heading home (assuming the bombers are hitting beaches and targets near the coast). The RAF being defeated was a very real possibility.. but it didn't happen... of course.. the discussion about Sealion is purely hypothetical as well so I see no reason to assume the RAF could have been pushed out of the South, or even totally annihilated. If the Germans ever got free reign over the air you can bet Kesselring and Goering would not have held back bombers like they did (prefering to send massive fighter cover for a small amount of bombers). If there was no effective RAF resistance the Royal Navy would be in trouble to say nothing of the industrial and military targets in England. The home fleet could not station itself at Scapa Flow without putting up effective resistance.

The strength of the Luftwaffe at the point of Sealion was about 750 bombers and 600 Me109 fighters. The Germans estimated the strength of Fighter Command at 300 planes, of which 100 were not available to the RAF.

In fact, 11 Fighter Group had 672 planes, of which 570 were Spitfires and Hurricanes.

The Luftwaffe, with its resources, was expected to do all of the following:

-Act as artillery for the landing forces
-Keep the RN out of the Channel
-Win total air superiority
-Prevent British Army reinforcements from getting to the zone by bombing railway lines
-Make a mass attack on London to force the population to flee the city and choke the surrounding roads

Now, we actually have a pretty fair idea of how the RAF would have reacted if the southern airfields had been made untenable. Dowding had made preparations to pull 11 Fighter Group back to the Midlands in order to preserve an effective fighter opposition to an invasion proper.

This would have placed the RAF fighters out of the range of the German fighters. Given the disasters that the Luftwaffe bombers suffered when they undertook unescorted daylight missions, we can see that while Kent and Sussex could have had a lot of bombs dropped on them, the industrial heartlands and the RAF and the RN ports and the British Army concentrations would have been pretty much untouched.

So what happens if the Luftwaffe go after the airfields more effectively? 11 Group pulls back to the Midlands. The Luftwaffe pounds Kent and Sussex for a while, achieving diminishing returns (although the hop fields, and hence the output of beer, will be reduced noticeably).

When Sealion starts, 11 Group has had chance to rest and recover and build up its strength, while the Luftwaffe have had to carry out a lot of sorties. On Sealion, 11 Group, in addition to 10 and 12 Group can re-enter the fray. They won't have so long over the area of operations, but against that, they have a huge number of potential targets - barges and landing beaches and transport aircraft. The Luftwaffe fighters have equally limited time over target, and they have a huge number of things they have to protect. If any target is damaged severely, Sealion is made unworkable. Thus the RAF need to succeed only once, while the Luftwaffe need to succeed everywhere and every time.

Meanwhile, RAF's bomber command has just been presented with a massive, unmissable target in the form of the barge fleet. If the Germans are flying fighter cover over the barges, then these fighters are not flying as escort for the German bombers. If they are not escorting the bombers, then the bombers are unprotected against RAF fighters. In this case, the Luftwaffe will be ineffective at keeping the RN Home Fleet at bay. In essence, if the RAF doesn't get the barges, then the RN does.

It is worth reiterating the key figures, that of fighters. At the time in question, the fighters available were 600 for the Luftwaffe, and 670 for the RAF.

Britain was outproducing Germany in planes, so the proportions are steadily moving in Britain's favour.

Another key element was the number of trained pilots. Again, Britain has a massive tactical advantage. A British pilot who survived being shot down could quickly be returned to operational status. A German pilot who survived being shot down became a prisoner of war, and removed from the battle.

IIRC the only usage of Uboats being planned was to form a picket to block the RN after they left port to interdict/slow down the home fleet.

Easily dealt with by the RN... maybe if they were on open seas... remember the plan was to drop a dense concentration of mines to effectively cut off the channel in one area.. then the RN has to deal with the fact that they're going to be bombed and hit as a priority target by the luftwaffe. This "ease" you talk about is a mere pipe dream. It's possible they could have broken through and done serious damage - but to act like it's nothing for the RN to do that is just ignoring basic logic.

The Ju-88 was the primary German anti-shipping aircraft throughout the war. So saying the Stuka isn't great in anti-shipping (which it's not because of it's speed) doesn't count for a whole lot. Of course, if you want to say the Ju-88 sucks in anti-shipping too then you just have to ignore PQ convoy losses, Crete and other documented instances when the luftwaffe did heeavy damage to warships and merchant shipping alike.

The German plan for the crossing consisted of this-

-Block the west end of the Channel with U-Boats (operating in shallow, confined waters and required to stop, with 100% effectiveness, fast-moving warships rather than slow-moving merchantmen).

-Block the east end of the Channel with mines and 14 torpedo boats (with 20 enemy destroyers immediately to face).


-The main surface fleet of the Kriegsmarine was to "Break out into the Atlantic and draw the Home Fleet into following it."


Even if this exercise in wishful thinking worked perfectly, there was a problem. The RN had, based within the limits proposed, 3 light cruisers and 17 destroyers. However, the Kriegsmarine had thought of this, and decided that the barges would be adequately protected if the soldiers on the barges (travelling at night) "Fired at unidentified ships". Ohhhkay!

The Luftwaffe of the period had a pathetic record against warships. 39 RN destroyers took part in the Dunkirk evacuation. This operation required manoeuvring in a small harbour, with periods stationary while embarking troops. The Luftwaffe had command of the air for long periods. In these ideal conditions, the Luftwaffe managed to put out of commission a grand total of 4 destroyers. 4 out of 39 does not bode well for the Luftwaffe's chances.

Well moot since nobody suggested delaying the invasion. I think if the Germans began preparing immediately after Dunkirk instead of waiting several months it would have been hard for the ALlies to field any sort of coherent opposition. Handing men rifles and throwing them in a ditch doesn't work.. the Russians proved that over and over again.

The German capacity for doing this is lower in July, which is when Dunkirk happend, the odds are more heavily stacked against them then the orginally invasion time frame of September.

Firstly, the Kriegsmarine is weaker, as a result of unrepaired battle damage from the Norway campaign.

Secondly, the German forces haven't had chance to gather transports. Without the efforts of bringing up the Rhine barges and scavenging and scrounging to the extent that took place, the Germans have the capacity to lift less than one infantry division.

Thirdly, according to the precise timing, the Germans are either turning their backs on the French army before the Armistice with France, and allowing the French army to recover and reorganise; or the Germans beat France and immediately turn towards Britain, without taking time to rest their pilots and Panzer crews, and without taking time to repair battle damage to their planes and tanks.

Fourthly, the Luftwaffe is not being allowed any time to inflict attrition on the RAF. Much to the disgust of the French, Britain had retained 24 fighter squadrons as Home Reserve. These squadrons were rested, maintained and ready. The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, have been flying a lot of sorties. The British Radar chain is undamaged, as is the command and control; in short, one is re-running the Battle of Britain, but giving the Luftwaffe tired crews and machines in need of repair, giving the RAF peak efficiency, while ensuring that the Luftwaffe have even more essential tasks to carry out than in a September Sealion.

Now, I admit that saying 'Never' when it comes to just about anything is somewhat silly. But I think it's rather obvious that the Germans couldn't have successfully invaded Britian in the timeframe of the orginal Sealion. Which is why the Germans didn't try it.

 

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A few points to Mike's reply.

1. Economy - Germany did have an economic problem. They could not effectively use the economic structures of the day (borrow from the USA ) for obvious reasons that they were at war with most of the economic blocks. Their economy was pretty much run on pillaging resources and bartering with "friendly" minors (Sweden and Switzerland spring to mind). Sure if they tried to build up their surface fleet before the war the Amercians might have lent them some money but as the USA showed against Japan, they would and did play their economic cards (e.g. oil sanction) if their trade partners were getting out of hand

Not to mention the USSR, who was acquiring goods from the USA and selling them to the Germans. Granted, you're right there isn't a USA out there to lend the Germans money, but they never ran a real wartime economy (in the sense of total war Soviet Union style) until 1943.

In terms of surface fleet (which is where it originally came up) it's not like Germany had access to enough shipyards to speed up surface fleet production significantly even if they wanted to...

2. Barges and specialised equipment - D-Day took a year to prepare and there were tanks in the first wave. Just not very many of them. The only beach where most of the amphib tanks sunk on their way in was Omaha and that didn't go too well. There was no time after Dunkirk for a hasty invasion to be anything other than a larger scale version of Dieppe. Germans did not have the amphib equipment ready to roll.

Landing auxillary amphibious tanks (what was it, like 30-40 to a beachhead?) does not make it an armored division. I was responding to the "no blitzkrieg off the beaches" comment made and likewise there was no Allied blitzkrieg off the beaches.

3. RN involvement - this is the one thing that would stop the invasion 100%. if the British were prepared to lose half their surface fleet in return for killing the invasion barges. Since they did do something similar at Crete I do believe that the UK would have thrown their battle fleet at the invasion and lost many ships but would have blown it out of the water.

Maybe - but the thing to remember about Crete... it was an island that could be approached from all sides - the channel only leaves east and west - second, the Germans commited around 450-500 planes to crete I believe (not counting the Ju-52 transports to ferry the paratroops and mountain troops across)... considering the bulk of those are regulated to tactical bombing and air superiority the fact that the British naval squadrons took heavy losses leaves some questions about how they would do if they (the navy) became the priority target.

4. Population - don't forget the Empire. There were many Indian, South African and ANZAC divisions that could have been pulled back if the situation seemed as desperate as you say

Yeah, but this was in response to the contention that the Brits had a small land army (relatively speaking) because they pumped most of their manpower into the navy... which just doesn't do it any justice when you consider their population was much smaller than Germany.

Originally posted by Ivan the Mellow


To get the first wave across, the Germans gathered barges and tugs, totally disrupting their trade in the Baltic. Eventually, 170 cargo ships, 1277 barges, and 471 tugs were gathered. These were, inevitably, bombed by the RAF (about 10% being sunk before they dispersed again). The barges were mainly those designed for use on the Rhine, with a shallow freeboard. They sink in anything above Sea State 2. The wash from a fast-moving destroyer would swamp and sink the barge. (Correct: the RN could sink the lot without firing a shot).

The situation with regard to mariners for the barges with experience of the sea was even worse. When used as a landing craft, the barges, tugs and motorboats required extra crew. In total, the Kriegsmarine estimated that a minimum of 20,000 extra crew would be needed. That's 20,000 extra crew at least knowledgable of matters maritime. By stripping its ships to the minimum (which doesn't bode well for the Kriegsmarine if it is required to fight a fleet action), the Kriegsmarine was able to supply 4,000 men. The Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe transferred 3,000 men who had been sailors in civilian life, and an in-depth trawl of the reserves and the factories and the drafts brought forward another 9,000 men. After digging through the entire manpower cupboard, the barges were still 4,000 men short of the minimum required.

I'm no sailor so I have to take your word for most of this - but saying they were more likely to flip themselves during the crossing is making the assumption that the Germans were 100% incompetent. They were not about to sail in the middle of bad weather - even the Allies delayed overlord for weather. Supplies could have been problematic if they hit a bad spell of weather... being dependant on mostly these same barges and air transport... but the entire German logistic legacy of the Russian campaign was one of undersupply and in some cases no supply. They did well, all things considered. As long as they didn't get month long storms (and weather never being definite as it is) you can't possibly rule out an invasion due to that.

Nothing could alter this, and the Kriegsmarine came to the reluctant conclusion that the barges would have to sail in an undermanned condition.

Finally, the barges were under-powered for open water operations, and required towing. The basic unit was a tug towing two barges, and travelling at 2-3 knots, in the Channel, which has tides of 5 knots. Given that the distance that the far left of the invasion had to cross, a minimum of 85 miles, the poor bloody soldiers would be wallowing for a minimum of 30 hours in an open boat, and expected to carry out an opposed amphibious landing at the end of it.

Again, I'm no sailor so I'll take your word that the tugs would be that slow. Would suck for sure.. but the Germans were under worse conditions on the Eastern front. Again though, this doesn't preclude success, nor even make it that unlikely (just considering this one point).

The most comical element of the plan, however, was that for manoeuvring the flotilla. The plan was that this huge mass of towed barges would proceed in column until reaching a point ten miles from the landing beach, then wheel and steer parallel to the coast. When this was complete, the vessels would make a 90 degree turn at the same time, and advance in line towards the coast. This was to be carried out at night, and controlled and co-ordinated by loud hailers. There had been no chance to practise the operation, and there was less than one skilled sailor per vessel.

As above.

In the immediate area of Romney Marshes, where the bulk of 9 divisons the Germans wanted to land (The Allies used only 5 in D-Day btw), the British had

2 Territorial Divisions
1 Brigade from India
1 Brigade from new Zealand
1 Armoured Division
1 Canadian Division
1 Army Tank Brigade

Within 30 minutes of the Romney Marshes, the British had no less than 100 pieces of artillery, while the Germans would have none, as they couldn't be brought across with the initial wave. Also just to make matters worse, no engineers were included in the first wave, and no equipment to deal with obstacles, such as the Martello Towers and the Royal Military Canal, which is 60 feet wide.. Both obsticals are antiquated and easily passible with with the proper equiment of the time. But the Germans would have none of the proper equipment or the men who knew how to use it.

On artillery - luftwaffe. Second - I believe the 9 divisions were to land in two waves. Third - are you working on the assumption that the Germans were going to drop off the first load of troops then leave them there to fend for themselves?

You do realize that rivers such as the Meuse (significance in picking this) are wider than the RMC? Btw the RMC is apparently 30 FT wide, but I guess that depends what your source is. What you're saying assumes the Germans are going to walk up and say "oh shit, canal - time to go home chaps!". Ok, maybe a German born in England who moves back to Germany before war breaks out .

The strength of the Luftwaffe at the point of Sealion was about 750 bombers and 600 Me109 fighters. The Germans estimated the strength of Fighter Command at 300 planes, of which 100 were not available to the RAF.

Luftflotte 2, 3, 5 is what you are quoting there (or perhaps less, depending on your source). There were plenty more aircraft to draw on from Luftflotte 1 and 4 IF necessary - but considering German doctrine it didn't matter - they were generally not willing to send bombers without enough fighter cover (except during night raids of course). And the fighter cover they did send they squandered anyways.

In fact, 11 Fighter Group had 672 planes, of which 570 were Spitfires and Hurricanes.

And again our hypothetical scenario is assuming Germans win air superiority before Sealion - thus their losses would have been lighter for one rather than trying to obliterate London which is rather big.

The Luftwaffe, with its resources, was expected to do all of the following:

-Act as artillery for the landing forces
-Keep the RN out of the Channel
-Win total air superiority
-Prevent British Army reinforcements from getting to the zone by bombing railway lines
-Make a mass attack on London to force the population to flee the city and choke the surrounding roads

3 of those things are typically things done BEFORE an invasion takes place, the other 2 occur DURING the invasion. Interdiction is also a gradual process.. it's never 100%. More is better obviously, but I'm sure they were competent enough to prioritize - though you'd never know it by some of the stuff I've read here.

Now, we actually have a pretty fair idea of how the RAF would have reacted if the southern airfields had been made untenable. Dowding had made preparations to pull 11 Fighter Group back to the Midlands in order to preserve an effective fighter opposition to an invasion proper.

If he had done that, then he would have given the Germans free will over the entire of South England. Probably best call in the situation, but all those things you listed above now become a question of how many sorties to fly.

This would have placed the RAF fighters out of the range of the German fighters. Given the disasters that the Luftwaffe bombers suffered when they undertook unescorted daylight missions, we can see that while Kent and Sussex could have had a lot of bombs dropped on them, the industrial heartlands and the RAF and the RN ports and the British Army concentrations would have been pretty much untouched.

Ok, so what happens when the Brits want to take off and interdict the invasion fleet? Oh yeah, they're back in range of the Bf109s _and_ to further disadvantage them they can't make full use of their radar as they need to spend many hours just flying TO and FROM the war zone. The biggest drawback of both the Spitfire and the Bf109, which are remarkly similar in performance, is that they both have short legs. Small fuel tanks. Now the disadvantage the German fighter pilots suffered throughout all of BoB over England is shared by the RAF... the fact that the RAF bases were right in the vicinity of the targets made that a major force multiplier - they would no longer enjoy that edge either. So really this kind of backfires of the RAF.. it's obviously an unenviable thing to do and would only be done out of necessity (else why didn't the RAF pull back earlier when it was on the verge of collapse? because it's a disadvantage to do so.. a major one at that).

So what happens if the Luftwaffe go after the airfields more effectively? 11 Group pulls back to the Midlands. The Luftwaffe pounds Kent and Sussex for a while, achieving diminishing returns (although the hop fields, and hence the output of beer, will be reduced noticeably).

It means the English no longer have a force multiplier, no longer are able to make effective use of their radar - they have less flying time because of the Spitfire's short legs, it means their shipping is more exposed, it means all their defensive positions along the coast and ports and any infrastructure in Southern England has a "bomb me" sign on it.

When Sealion starts, 11 Group has had chance to rest and recover and build up its strength, while the Luftwaffe have had to carry out a lot of sorties. On Sealion, 11 Group, in addition to 10 and 12 Group can re-enter the fray. They won't have so long over the area of operations, but against that, they have a huge number of potential targets - barges and landing beaches and transport aircraft. The Luftwaffe fighters have equally limited time over target, and they have a huge number of things they have to protect. If any target is damaged severely, Sealion is made unworkable. Thus the RAF need to succeed only once, while the Luftwaffe need to succeed everywhere and every time.

The RAF would never pull back to the Midlands unless severely weakened to the point where they could not longer put up effective resistance and defense to their southern aerodromes. So while the Luftwaffe does have a lot to protect, they get to choose when and where those assets move, they get to choose what to hit, while the RAF has to react - and the already weakened RAF's reaction ability is really reduced by the fact that they no longer have the force multiplier of radar/taking off and engaging the enemy minutes later, that they've been enjoying. An already weakened RAF is going to have trouble interdicting the ships.... RAF anti-shipping interdiction means getting bombers to the Channel. The spit/hurricane didn't have the range to do that from the Midlands. The alternative is to fit the spit and hurricane as fighter bombers, which hurts their fighter performance should they run into any opposition. If they don't then they are no longer fighter assets as long as they're en route with a payload lessening whatever "credible" opposition Fighter Command intended to put up in the first place.

Meanwhile, RAF's bomber command has just been presented with a massive, unmissable target in the form of the barge fleet. If the Germans are flying fighter cover over the barges, then these fighters are not flying as escort for the German bombers. If they are not escorting the bombers, then the bombers are unprotected against RAF fighters. In this case, the Luftwaffe will be ineffective at keeping the RN Home Fleet at bay. In essence, if the RAF doesn't get the barges, then the RN does.

1) They won't need massive fighter cover for the barges. It's going to be anti-ship aircraft (read bombers) that are going to take off and hit the RN. Remember, these aren't the open seas.. the Germans have plenty of time to take off and bomb the RN before they get to the invasion fleet.. and it's hardly likely the RN is going to be able to "sneak" around.. a fleet that size, even at night, trying to enter a constricted channel unnoticed.. not going to happen. They won't even need fighter cover for the bombers.. no spitfires or hurricanes are going to be able to provide cover for the RN. They could provide spot cover... but they'd need to stagger a whole lot of fighters to give the RN continual coverage...

It is worth reiterating the key figures, that of fighters. At the time in question, the fighters available were 600 for the Luftwaffe, and 670 for the RAF.

It's worth reiterating that the key point that's been reiterated many times before your post - air supremacy is the pre-requisite to a Sealion. ANd because it was very possible the Germans could have acquired air supremacy it's worth talking what-ifs about Sealion. It was mentioned earlier in the thread, I reiterated it in my last post, and really because of that it makes much of the responses moot. But it's interesting to see your logic in some cases, so I'll keep playing along even though we all know even Hitler wasn't stupid enough to launch Sealion because the luftwaffe did NOT have air supremacy. Ironically it makes most of your response and mine right now moot. But I like talking about these things so I'll keep going .

Britain was outproducing Germany in planes, so the proportions are steadily moving in Britain's favour.

Planes weren't a problem really. It was trained pilots.

Another key element was the number of trained pilots. Again, Britain has a massive tactical advantage. A British pilot who survived being shot down could quickly be returned to operational status. A German pilot who survived being shot down became a prisoner of war, and removed from the battle.

Oops, guess you pointed it out yourself.

Is it a massive tactical advantage if Germany starts with many more pilots and has higher capacity for producing them? Although I think the training schools in the Empire (namely Canada) might have tipped it into the Brits favor, but that was definately not the case before the air campaign over Britain started.

The German plan for the crossing consisted of this-

-Block the west end of the Channel with U-Boats (operating in shallow, confined waters and required to stop, with 100% effectiveness, fast-moving warships rather than slow-moving merchantmen).

-Block the east end of the Channel with mines and 14 torpedo boats (with 20 enemy destroyers immediately to face).


-The main surface fleet of the Kriegsmarine was to "Break out into the Atlantic and draw the Home Fleet into following it."


Even if this exercise in wishful thinking worked perfectly, there was a problem. The RN had, based within the limits proposed, 3 light cruisers and 17 destroyers. However, the Kriegsmarine had thought of this, and decided that the barges would be adequately protected if the soldiers on the barges (travelling at night) "Fired at unidentified ships". Ohhhkay!

I'm not sure what your source is, but can you quote it? What I've read only coincides with one of what you mentioned above. The rest I have much different accounts from..

The Luftwaffe of the period had a pathetic record against warships. 39 RN destroyers took part in the Dunkirk evacuation. This operation required manoeuvring in a small harbour, with periods stationary while embarking troops. The Luftwaffe had command of the air for long periods. In these ideal conditions, the Luftwaffe managed to put out of commission a grand total of 4 destroyers. 4 out of 39 does not bode well for the Luftwaffe's chances.

The German capacity for doing this is lower in July, which is when Dunkirk happend, the odds are more heavily stacked against them then the orginally invasion time frame of September.

It's funny that 39 destroyers was a very small fraction of the total ships that took part in dunkirk. Not to mention the bulk of the Luftwaffe was still engaged with the advance on the rest of France.

850 ships took part in total. 270 or so were destroyed.

The luftwaffe lost 130 aircraft at dunkirk. The british 106. The RAF was also heavily engaged at Dunkirk, flying from airfields directly across the channel. Luxuries they will not have having pulled 'back" with the remnants of whatever is left at that point.

Firstly, the Kriegsmarine is weaker, as a result of unrepaired battle damage from the Norway campaign.

Secondly, the German forces haven't had chance to gather transports. Without the efforts of bringing up the Rhine barges and scavenging and scrounging to the extent that took place, the Germans have the capacity to lift less than one infantry division.

Thirdly, according to the precise timing, the Germans are either turning their backs on the French army before the Armistice with France, and allowing the French army to recover and reorganise; or the Germans beat France and immediately turn towards Britain, without taking time to rest their pilots and Panzer crews, and without taking time to repair battle damage to their planes and tanks.

On the first and second, when I say preparations I don't mean invading right away. I mean preparing right away. Hitler wasted well over a month trying to coerce Britain into surrendering... not to mention no thought or preparation or training took place until the battle of france ended. That's a few months of wasted time.. granted air superiority still had to be obtained.. but then again - had the Luftwaffe not reverted from airbase attacks they could have possibly launched Sealion sooner. Sooner is better when you consider the state of the 340,000 some odd troops rescued. How many of those would have even the basic infantry equipment replaced?

Fourthly, the Luftwaffe is not being allowed any time to inflict attrition on the RAF. Much to the disgust of the French, Britain had retained 24 fighter squadrons as Home Reserve. These squadrons were rested, maintained and ready. The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, have been flying a lot of sorties. The British Radar chain is undamaged, as is the command and control; in short, one is re-running the Battle of Britain, but giving the Luftwaffe tired crews and machines in need of repair, giving the RAF peak efficiency, while ensuring that the Luftwaffe have even more essential tasks to carry out than in a September Sealion.

Actually there was a major air battle during the Dunkirk evacuation. The RAF lost 100 airplanes, including the pilots. Not a huge figure but they are inflicting "attrition" as you claimed was not true.

Now, I admit that saying 'Never' when it comes to just about anything is somewhat silly. But I think it's rather obvious that the Germans couldn't have successfully invaded Britian in the timeframe of the orginal Sealion. Which is why the Germans didn't try it.

Well, considering you're drawing from essays or articles or whatever it is that have the German plan to foil the RN as the infantry on the barges firing their rifles at the ships, I'm not surprised you think it's obvious.

It's not obvious - very difficult yes.. but then the Germans did the "impossible" more than a few times early in the war.

In the end, you've just shown me a bunch of things (where correct at least) that make a German invasion difficult (duh) but not impossible. Nor even unthinkable. Although, even if it were "unthinkable", like I said, the Germans did the "unthinkable" a couple times already. Can't rule it out.

 

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Originally posted by The Federalist
If Hitler had also concentrated on building U-boats in addition to a large surface fleet, the U-boats would have torn the British fleet in half. Remember that the British, and later the Americans, had no answer to the U-boats for the first couple of years of the war. . .

That equates to August 1941 for example, 145.000 people were working in the U-Boat programme while only 44.000 were working on the panzer programme. This was because the Ostfront was thought to be won, and that the reduction of UK(if they fail to accept the favourable peace offer prepared), by air and sea would be the next priority, as well as having the dual ability of keeping US at arms length if they should become a belligerant.

Hanny

 

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Sealion, this just wont go away as a topic.

http://www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm
http://gateway.alternatehistory.com/essays/Sealion.html
http://www.fortunecity.co.uk/underworld/kick/495/sealion.htm

Seem to be the current contenders, along with 3 past visits in the history forum.

http://www.onwar.com/ubb/Forum1/HTML/001653.html
its even back on another site im keen on.

Sealion, could have happened, just wish it had been attempted, it would have been an opurtunity to dig deep into the german ability to prosecute the war long term, and prevented a 41 invasion of the SU.

Hanny

 

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Isn't it nowadays regarded as a safe assumption that the Germans wouldn't have been able to land in the UK due to the British naval dominance and the German lack of decent landing craft?

 

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Originally quoted by Mikej:
There were 40 (? I don't have a full OOB for what they had in the East... so I'll run with your 40) in total, of which 7 came West.

Early September: 21st
Late September: 26th
Early October: 32nd, 93rd
Late October: 65th
Early November: 78th, 92nd

Siberian division order of battle for 1941 (those that were sent west and fought). . .

Stalin was not about to send his entire eastern army to the west. Despite the non-agression pact with Japan Stalin was probably not naive enough to think they would never break it.. even though he did receive intelligence from his spies that Japan was not going to attack the USSR... if he opened the door and moved most of his Eastern troops away he would just be tempting Japan to walk into the region and occupy it.

Stalin was fully aware of Japanese intentions via the Far East through his spies and contacts in the Japanese cabinet and through "Lucy" in Switzerland. Once Stalin was convinced that Japan intended to move south into the Pacific, he then decided to move many of those Siberian divisions west.

According to Alan Clark in his monumental work Barbarossa, he gives the following numbers of Siberian units that were transferred to Moscow in the winter of 1941 [p.170]:

* 1700 tanks
* 1500 aircraft

UNITS:

Transbaikalia: seven rifle, two cavalry divisions, two tank brigades
Outer Mongolia: two rifle divisions, two tank brigades
Amur: two rifle divisions, one tank brigade
Ussur: five rifle, one cavalry division, three tank brigades

So if we include the 7 divisions that you mention that were moved west before Dec 1941, plus the 20 divisions transferred to Moscow in the winter of 1941, we come to a figure of about 27 fresh, experienced and fully equipped divisions as part of a Soviet counter-offensive that faced the Germans. . .

So the real question is simply this: did the Siberian divisions indeed save Moscow or did the Germans and General Winter save Moscow? My contention is that while the Siberian divisions were definately better than their Western red army counterparts, the Germans were slowed more by the fact that their tanks wouldn't start, they were low on every kind of necessity, the infantry was in summer clothing, bogged in the mud etc by the time they were nearing Moscow when the Siberian divisions arrived. The Germans were already at the end of their tenure and I'm guessing one of the infamous adhoc divisions the Red Army threw at the Germans the entire way could have done the same job.. if less effectively.

I guess the number of Soviet units transferred from Siberia speak for themeselves. I agree that the winter played a major role in the German offensive grinding to a halt, as well as the German command delays in Sept and Oct of 1941, but those fresh Siberian units (20 divisions) also played a major role in driving the Germans back. . .

Cheers!