Japan, Nationalist China, and the Road to War
Alright, it seems I've found the right place
Hopefully I can toss in a few comments, as I did a fair bit of reading on the events leading to WWII in the Far East, as a History/East Asian Studies concentrator. Unfortunately I haven't used any of my Japanese in a few years, so it's a bit rusty
The Nomonhan modelling looks really cool. Some comments and thoughts about other things that have been mentioned:
North vs. South - The question of whether Japan would drive North (into Siberia and the so called "Northern Resource Area") or South (into the Dutch East Indies and the British held areas) dominated prewar Japanese thinking, and was a result of an interservice rivalry between the Army (backing the North plan) and Navy (backing the South plan). Nomonhan largely settled this matter, (even if the Army kept using it to try and secure budget funds) because it had become apparent that the mechanized Soviets far outclassed the IJA. So, maybe this question figures into it somewhat?
I think also a lot of how it affects things would play out in research priorities and build strategies. Getting some of the Army/Navy rivalry into play would be cool though.
On to Japan becoming fascist and joining the Axis:
Right now, the way HoI seems to model this is by Japan picking "choose right" in the 1937 election. It can then DoW NatChina, or whomever it wants to. Joining the Axis is a matter of choice.
I tend to find this fairly lacking, myself. As has been discussed previously in this thread, it wasn't the Japanese Government that was pushing towards war so much as the predominantly ultranationalist mid-ranking officers (roughly major to colonel). This was in part made possible by the Japanese Constitution, which left the Army and Navy Ministers answerable only to the Emperor, not the Prime Minister. In effect, either one could essentially veto the policy of the Prime Minister, and cause the government to fall.
If I had to pinpoint the spot where Japan edges over from Liberal Democrat to Paternal Autocrat, I'd say roughly Sept 1941, when Tojo is made Prime Minister after the failure of Konoe's attempts to negotiate with the USA. Up until then, you still have an ostensibly democratic cabinet/PM, just with a runaway military.
Rather than having Japan go Fascist in '37, I'd like to see a "Marco Polo Bridge Incident" event for 1937 (the exact date I don't have with me, but it wouldn't be hard to get - we'd probably want to offset it some anyway). This event would allow Japan to choose between (A) using the incident as an excuse for war with China, or (B) backing off and punishing/reprimanding the officers involved (at the cost of dissent?). (B) might then lead to a purge of the officer corps, with the risk of a pro-fascist military coup occuring if a purge isn't done. Other events, such as the abandonment of Manchuria/Manchukuo might also enable this coup event (like an alliance with England, for instance - I found it was far too easy as Japan to wait until England was at war with Germany, offer alliance, then just DoW the Dutch and Chinese (who became fascist) all the while being ignored by the USA
I also can't imagine that the Japanese military planners who dreamed of replacing the British as the predominant power in East Asia would have gone for this.)
Back to Tojo and Fascism:
Tojo was considered to be the only man capable of making peace *and* getting the Japanese military to accept the terms. However, it ended up being decided that the USA was asking too much, and with the Oil Embargo there was little choice but to fight now, or not be able to fight at all once strangled of oil.
Getting into the negotiations between Japan and the USA leading up to the war, two things were the predominant issues.
1) The Japanese War in China.
2) The Japanese Occupation of Indochina.
The China Lobby (pro-Chinese lobbyists and statesmen) in the USA was incredibly strong and influential, and is probably the single biggest reason why the USA came to become Pro-China and Anti-Japan. Pre-WWI era attitudes in the USA tended to view the Japanese as being much more civilized, and friendly to American interests in keeping China open to trade and under stable western-friendly control (helping put down the Boxer Rebellion, etc). Chiang Kai-Shek's wife in particular was the darling of many Washington political elites, addressing Congress, etc. As such, Japan attacking China, or any form of Japanese Aggression/Control of China should be part of the cause of the American push for war with Japan. Almost all the diplomacy between Japan and the USA in the year or two leading up to Pearl Harbor dealt with the Japanese war on China.
Incidentally, in the rare case China DoW's a Democratic Japan, there should be some kind of way to sleep all these events. If this had happened, the China Lobby would have been at least weakened.
The War on China was the big issue, but it was the Occupation of Indochina that sealed the issue in the minds of many Americans. Up until that point, a lot of people were willing to accept Japan's professed statements that this wasn't a war of conquest, but a dispute over rights in China, and that Japan didn't intend to stay in China (aside perhaps from trade rights and the extension of spheres of influence, etc, as the European powers had done in the past). The Occupation of Indochina made all of those claims look like a big load of lies, and the USA was pretty adamant about Japan having to leave Indochina as part of any settlement. Japan was likewise adamant about not doing so, for fear that the Army/Navy would revolt (as mentioned above).
So, somewhere in here we have an event chain that starts up the road to war.
I'd suggest that Japan either be at war with (or puppeted) China & own at least 1 province in Indochina, or have conquered China, or have taken Indochina/Madagascar, or be at war with the British.
This then triggers the Threat of a US Oil Embargo Event for the USA, who can choose to issue it or ignore Japan and the Far East (causing dissent?)
Issuing it gives Japan a choice of backing off from the war(s), abandoning most of China and all of Indochina, etc, or of suffering the embargo. Backing down causes considerable dissent & chance for a coup, of course.
Suffering the Embargo would then maybe lead to a Tojo takes over (Japan = Paternal Autocrat/Fascist), and ultimately to a Pearl Harbor event(s): (War Japan vs US, US dissent drops, US loses a couple of BBs maybe?)
As far as the Tripartite Pact goes, I'm hesitant to really say we could implement that with HoI as is - I don't want to force Japan into always going to war with the USSR when trying to follow the "historical" path. Maybe Joining Tripartite doesn't give an alliance, it just causes US WE to increase and gives some other benefits to Japan/Germany without signing an HoI alliance, while declining it causes dissent in Japan and maybe negative US WE?
