British Army in ww2 - it doesn´t make sense to me

[Keyser Pacha]

"Second rate" doesn't mean "pathetic". It just means "clearly inferior to those who are first rate". It's not just about population, industrial output, or martial prowess. It also has to do with how much weight France could throw around and how freely it could act in the international scene. In both cases, France had some big problems, most noteably that it wasn't capable of acting independently in any major conflict, military or diplomatic; it just wasn't strong enough, and its leaders knew it.

In addition to being dwarfed by Germany and the UK (and the USSR and US) in almost every facet of industrial output and demographics, France was weak enough that it couldn't act against the designs of any other "Great Power" without the support of another. Its foreign policy was tied to that of Great Britain's; it was incapable of acting independently. If it wanted to stand up to Germany, it needed British support. Without that support, it couldn't do anything.

France's leaders knew this; the post-Versailles settlements it pushed for were designed to hobble Germany as much as possible, because France knew they couldn't stand up to Germany on their own, and so wanted to buy as much time as possible and to create as many new allies as it could, to act as a counterweight to Germany. The push for the creation of a Greater Poland, an independent Czechoslovakia, and a separate Austria were all following this very strong political and military need to keep Germany surrounded and as small as they could manage.

Even then, French military and political leaders believed that Germany would attack them again, and their interwar policies were tied towards securing British assistance in the case of any future German aggression, no matter what. One reason* the Maginot Line was created and not extended to the sea was because France knew that if Germany attacked them again, they'd have to go through Belgium in order to go around the border defenses. And by going through Belgium, they'd be guaranteeing British intervention, same as in the last war. Long before 1939, French leaders counted on a German attack into Belgium.

* - Yes, there were other reasons, such as a French desire to fight the war in Belgium instead of in France, but this reason is nonetheless important as far as foreign policy is concerned.

France needed British support in any major war. They needed British resources, British industry, a Royal Navy blockade of Germany, and British armies. After WWI, it was clear that France didn't have the luxury of standing on its own in any major conflict. Their interwar policies regarding their alliances with Central Europe, appeasement, and the military strategies they drew up interwar all followed one line - keep Britain on our side. This kind of diplomatic, economic, and military dependence, more than anything else, is what reduces France in my eyes from a first-rate power to a second-rate. And if you include hindsight, and what that tells us about the true strengths of the US and Soviet Union (which certainly wasn't fully appreciated at the time), France might as well join Japan among the third-rate powers.

Again, I am not using these terms perjoratively. But even in the 1930s, it should have been clear that France was not the France of the 19th century; it wasn't even the France of 1914. It was clearly smaller and weaker than both Germany and the UK, ever fearful of the former and, in any future conflict, completely dependent on the latter. You don't even have to bring its modest (and, compared to most other countries, shrinking) share of the world's industry or its low birthrate, or "the hollow years", or its instability, or its outdated tactics into account. France had the world's 3rd-to-5th strongest navy, but could do nothing against the Royal Navy, one of the more impressive(-looking) armies, but knew they couldn't stand up against Germany on its own, and the 5th-largest economy (but only half the size of Germany's, and probably 2/3s that of Britain). But it could not oppose Germany without British assistance, and, largely due to this, it couldn't afford to oppose Britain at all. It was stuck between its two stronger neighbors. A regional power. Not a Great one.

Despite the commonwealth and it's navy, the same can be said of the UK.
They were more safe on their island behind their navy than France, so more independant diplomaticaly (not that much in fact, since they couldn't do something else than fight germany and be allied with france), but in the end they couldn't really do anything (against germany, or even the USSR if they had wanted) without France and they knew it too.
When they were alone against germany, despite the brillant north africa campaign against the italian, they did nothing else of note. And couldn't.

I am not sure the security of being an island and having a far stronger navy than germany is sufficient to make it a "first rate" power compared to say France.
That the uk was comparatively stronger, yes we agree on that, the help of the nations of the commonwealth, population, industry (although not by that much when you look at the mobilisation of french industrial ressources, who while being a bit chaotic was efficient in the end), but in my opinion they played in the same league nonetheless.

In the same way, Germany since its unification and the demographical decline of France was far stronger, the french leadership knew it perfectly well as you said, they already knew it in 1914. But France could hope to tie germany almost by herself in case of war, winning alone (especially without the blockading power of the Royal navy), well not really, it's true.
But considering this point anyway, i am not sure they really are in a different league either.
After all, in truth, without its conquests and alliance with almost all of europe germany couldn't hope to take on either the USSR or the USA.

So were they really in the same league in 1940 ?

Really, it's not some hurted patriotic feelings that are making me react, just that i feel the way the world looked at Yalta and Postdam is somehow altering the view about France in 1940 as if it was doomed to fail because it was so inferior to the "big 3" (or 4 if you count the bad guys too).

 

[unmerged(56754)]

Despite the commonwealth and it's navy, the same can be said of the UK.
They were more safe on their island behind their navy than France, so more independant diplomaticaly (not that much in fact, since they couldn't do something else than fight germany and be allied with france), but in the end they couldn't really do anything (against germany, or even the USSR if they had wanted) without France and they knew it too.
When they were alone against germany, despite the brillant north africa campaign against the italian, they did nothing else of note. And couldn't.

I am not sure the security of being an island and having a far stronger navy than germany is sufficient to make it a "first rate" power compared to say France.
That the uk was comparatively stronger, yes we agree on that, the help of the nations of the commonwealth, population, industry (although not by that much when you look at the mobilisation of french industrial ressources, who while being a bit chaotic was efficient in the end), but in my opinion they played in the same league nonetheless.

In the same way, Germany since its unification and the demographical decline of France was far stronger, the french leadership knew it perfectly well as you said, they already knew it in 1914. But France could hope to tie germany almost by herself in case of war, winning alone (especially without the blockading power of the Royal navy), well not really, it's true.
But considering this point anyway, i am not sure they really are in a different league either.
After all, in truth, without its conquests and alliance with almost all of europe germany couldn't hope to take on either the USSR or the USA.

So were they really in the same league in 1940 ?

Really, it's not some hurted patriotic feelings that are making me react, just that i feel the way the world looked at Yalta and Postdam is somehow altering the view about France in 1940 as if it was doomed to fail because it was so inferior to the "big 3" (or 4 if you count the bad guys too).

You make it seem like Britian created a Navy to defend its Empire, the Empire was actually created the Navy.

Saying Britian would just hide behind the Navy is wrong. That was the whole point of the British military, the Navy.

The spent their economy on the Navy, France on its army. Does that mean France was stronger the the UK? No. The UK was doing exactly what it was designed to do.

 

[Keyser Pacha]

No.
That's not what i am saying.

I am just saying that despite its navy (and others advantages over France), the UK alone was just as useless as France against Germany (or the USSR (and lets not speak of the USA, although the navy would have been more important there)).
So what makes it "first rate" compared to France ?
The security given by the channel and the navy ?

And Germany too.

Sure it was (far) stronger than France, but Germany couldn't take on the USSR alone (and/or with the ressources of prewar-germany alone)
So, is it really a power in the same league than the USSR or the USA ?

Even the victory against France, while doable and certainly possible theorically wasn't a given in 1940.
So, really a "first rate power" too ?

I don't get the logic.

No, while France was certainly the weakest of the main power of the era, i think it's an exageration to class it in another league, probably based on the weak performance of France in 1940 rather than on its possibility.

Especially given the real possibilities of some of the other "power".

In the same way, i am not sure Japan should be considered as a "third rate" power either.
Not able to win against the USA (let alone all the allies combined), of course, but "third rate" ?
I am not sure.

 

[StephenT]

Well, yes, but this is just reasoning backwards to the original problem, to wit, why weren't democracies able to field more than that? It's not as though Britain was relying on volunteers, or a completely free market.

I think you need to pause here, and consider what those percentages actually mean.

Germany mobilised 23% of its population.

Since the Germans didn't allow women into the army to any great extent, that means that Germany put 46% of its male population into the armed forces. Almost one in two. If you set aside young children, then it's over half. There's no way any country can sustain that for long; who is operating the factories? Who is paying the taxes or buying the war bonds that contribute to the solders' wages?

No, the only way Germany managed to sustain those figures is firstly, because they used extensive foreign slave labour in their factories; and secondly, because in the winter of 1944-45 they were driven to such desperation that anyone capable of carrying a gun was put into uniform. (Anyone male, that is. Nazi ideology said that a woman's place was in the home, not the battlefield).

Britain, like the USA and France or, for that matter, Japan, mobilised about half the percentage of their population than Germany did. But that's still one man in four. (There are no accurate figures available for the USSR, but it's likely that they were closer to the Germans than to the Western Allies.)

The Germans also suffered much higher casualties during the war, which forced them to recruit more men:

Britain - 3.8 million in the army, 0.18 million killed (4.7%)
USA - 8.6 million in the army and marines, 0.19 million killed (2.2%)
Germany - 13 million in the army, 1.62 million killed (12.5%)

(The USSR suffered about 11 million military casualties out of a total force engaged of 30 million, which is 33%)

***

A final point: looking at the number of divisions instead of the number of men isn't really useful except as a rough approximation. A British infantry division had a strength of about 18,000 men, and was kept at that strength by constant replacements. A late-war German infantry division only had a nominal strength of 12,000 - 50% less - and even so, they were allowed to dwindle to a small fraction of their authorised size.

The Germans preferred to create new divisions rather than replace damaged ones: partly because they were worried adding inexperienced men would dilute the morale of the veterans, partly because they had a much bigger front line to cover in the East an so needed lots of smaller formations instead of a few big ones... and partly because Hitler liked looking at situation reports saying that he had 300 divisions under his command, despite the fact that some of them only had 3 - 4,000 men in them and should really have been reclassified as brigades.

 

[unmerged(62241)]

No, the only way Germany managed to sustain those figures is firstly, because they used extensive foreign slave labour in their factories; and secondly, because in the winter of 1944-45 they were driven to such desperation that anyone capable of carrying a gun was put into uniform. (Anyone male, that is. Nazi ideology said that a woman's place was in the home, not the battlefield).

Didn't they start putting decent amounts women in uniform as the war dragged on-in AA units or in logistical positions? I know this might be isolated, but I recall seeing a photo of three captured German women in uniform-I think they might have been truck drivers.

 

[Aetius]

The Germans didn't even allow the women to do much labour in the factories until late in the war. I doubt any of the women were used in the military in any form of fighting role.

 

[unmerged(62241)]

Not sure how valid this is, but check this out:

http://books.google.com/books?id=6z...=X&oi=book_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPA50,M1

stephen T's point stands, I just seemd to recall reading that the #s of women weren't negligible.

 

[Zebedee]

The Germans didn't even allow the women to do much labour in the factories until late in the war. I doubt any of the women were used in the military in any form of fighting role.

This just really isn't true. Pre-war, Germany had a far higher percentage of women in work, so any war mobilisation would have very limited impact upon this. The vast majority of women, while they could be classed as homemakers, were in fact farmworkers too. Yet even in factories in the large cities, there were women at work in larger percentile numbers than eg Britain long before WW2 began. By summer 1941, Germany had not a lot in the way of manpower reserves other than the 800 000 young men who reached 18 every year. So women were increasingly expected not only to work during the day but also man AA positions at night. As were children. This isn't really ideal and I'm sure played a part in making foreign labour so attractive to German businesses.

Sauer, effectively head of the labour force, commented that even with the power of Stalin he'd only be able to find a few hundred thousand women to move into factories. It was a drop in the ocean compared to the millions of workers Germany needed, and indeed found with its use of slave labour and imported workers.

--

re. Divisions - Germany used a system of recruiting divisions from regional areas. Hence the idea of pulling them out of the line and refitting totally. The British had a similar set-up with their regiments, albeit the Great War had taught them to mix battallions from different regiments within divisional set-ups to prevent small areas having all their men-folk killed in the same battle. The US fed troops into its existing divisions and was one of the causes of the high casualty rate. The Soviets used a system which was a mix of all of the above depending on need and availability - late-war SU divisions were so short of replacements, newly freed POWs went straight from their labour camps to the frontline.

One also has to bear in mind that in late 1941, the Heer had started to recruit extensively from amongst the populations of Eastern Europe for manpower just as Sauer was for labour for factories etc. Unlike, say Britain and the Empire forces, no-one sat down and did a systematic count of just how many Ukrainians did find themselves with a German army ration card. One also has to remember that post-42, the Germans effectively demobilised huge sections of the LW and KM to feed those men into the Heer or land combat units under Heer operational control.

 

[Aetius]

How many of the German women were working in industry?

I have always thought that the British were far more successful in mobilizing women for production. But it looks like I might be mistaken.

 

[StephenT]

In 1940 the total working population of Britain was 15.1 million men and 5.6 million women. By 1944 the figures were 14.9 million men and 7.1 million women. Conscription was introduced for all single women aged 20-30 in December 1941, and gradually extended: women served as nurses, auxiliaries, and in civil defence units.

In 1939 the total working population of Germany was 24.5 million men and 14.6 million women. By 1944 the figures were 14.1 million men and 14.5 million women, plus 7.8 million foreign slaves. The number of women in the workforce actually dropped, and this decrease was most significant in the industrial sector. Where the British government was first encouraging and by 1941 compelling women to work in the war industries, the German government was offering generous financial compensation for women to stay home and raise children. They did pass laws giving them the right to conscript women and direct them into war work, but these were never seriously or consistently enforced, unlike in Britain.

In other words, the Germans did employ women in war work, but they were ideologically opposed to it and the government did little to encouirage it. The British government, on the other hand, used both propaganda and later compulsion to push as many women as possible into war work. Also, women in the German armed forces (the Helferinnen) were mostly restricted to clerical and menial jobs that didn't attract a high calibre of applicant, unlike their equivalents in the British women's forces. (But both countries employed women in civil defence and anti-aircraft units, which was a responsible and varied job).

The only major power to employ women in actual combat roles extensively was the USSR, with 800,000 women serving (about 8% of their army). Russian women drove tanks, fought as snipers and flew aircraft - the 588th Women's Night Bomber Regiment (the 'Night Witches') was even awarded Guards status.

 

[theusje]

re. Divisions - Germany used a system of recruiting divisions from regional areas. Hence the idea of pulling them out of the line and refitting totally. The British had a similar set-up with their regiments, albeit the Great War had taught them to mix battallions from different regiments within divisional set-ups to prevent small areas having all their men-folk killed in the same battle. The US fed troops into its existing divisions and was one of the causes of the high casualty rate. The Soviets used a system which was a mix of all of the above depending on need and availability - late-war SU divisions were so short of replacements, newly freed POWs went straight from their labour camps to the frontline and afther the war back to a labour camp.

just added something ...

So what would be the best way to reinforce a division?

 

[unmerged(62241)]

Have some sort of intermediary depot where decent NCOs from the division could meet and integrate the new troops.

 

[King of Men]

(Long explanation)

Ok, this is a reasonable explanation: Germany fielded that many divisions by conscripting slave labour to run the factories. Britain couldn't do that because it hadn't conquered half of Europe. So now we understand why Germany had a higher per cap mobilisation than Britain. But it is not clear that Britain's mobilisation was the maximum possible. For example, it seems to me that France had a higher amount of men mobilised per cap. How did they do it, and why didn't Britain?

 

[StephenT]

For example, it seems to me that France had a higher amount of men mobilised per cap.

No they didn't.

France: 42 million population, 4 million in the armed services.
Britain: 48 million population, 6 million in the armed services.

Of course, France surrendered in 1940, and the Free French forces only numbered a few hundred thousands. Britain fought all through the war, and didn't complete full mobilisation until near the end.

 

[Zebedee]

@Stephen T - the explanation for the fall off in women in industrial work is that young single women returned to the family farm as brothers etc were called up to the Wehrmacht. The financial incentives, IIRC, were to encourage that as part of the whole 'return to the land and get ready for Lebensraum' policy. It also helped to maintain German food production which was a very thorny issue given even the pre-war reliance on gastarbeiter to harvest.

---

re. British mobilisation. cf Bevan boys.

 

[unmerged(24857)]

Wouldn't the decline of German labor numbers also be connected to the Allied bomber campaign?
I won't say that allied bombers killed 500.000 of Germany's working women, but they probably killed couple of thousands...

 

[Gil galad]

The number of divisions raised by Britain was quite substantial. Offcourse not all of them saw combat and several were disbanded or served as garrison commands. Numbers are from Orders of battle, second world war 1939-1945, prepared by lieut-col HF Joslen.


11 Armoured divisions.
1 Cavalry division(later converted to armour, and counted in number of AD)
43 Infantry Divisions
2 airborne divisions
10 county divisions(static formations commanding Independent infantry brigades(home))
5 colonial divisions (all african)

Add to this tank brigades and other independent brigades not to mention corps/army/army group/ and area commands which all had their manpower needs I think it's quite substantial.

 

[Swamp Rat]

No they didn't.

France: 42 million population, 4 million in the armed services.
Britain: 48 million population, 6 million in the armed services.

Of course, France surrendered in 1940, and the Free French forces only numbered a few hundred thousands. Britain fought all through the war, and didn't complete full mobilisation until near the end.

As you point out yourself, those two numbers are not actually comparable, as the situation of the two countries were so different. The only comparable figures would be the number at the start of the war for both countries. And that would not actually reflect the mobilization numbers, as you point out that UK didnt reach full mobilization until the end.

The interesting factor seems to me to be the number of commonwealth and colonial men in the armed forces, and how those numbers would be compared to Germany in the duration of the war.

Also when comparing workforces, one must suspect that a lot of the work that could only be done in Germany, could have been delegated to the colonies and commonwealth countries in the case of UK, thereby upsetting the actual comparable numbers in the workforce between Germany and UK as well?

 

[King of Men]

No they didn't.

France: 42 million population, 4 million in the armed services.
Britain: 48 million population, 6 million in the armed services.

I am a little wary of this sort of overall number. Does that include Home Guard and colonial militias? I would like to see a breakdown at least into first-line and support/garrison echelons.

 

[Zebedee]

I am a little wary of this sort of overall number. Does that include Home Guard and colonial militias? I would like to see a breakdown at least into first-line and support/garrison echelons.

Does the French figure include those men mobilised to work in factories?