Mr. Speaker,
I have read the pieces of legislation that the Foreign Minister has presented before the House. Just like most others in the House I saw the immensity of these documents in comparison to the brevity of the Prime Minister's legislation. I am well aware that many members of this House have probably not bothered to read and understand the minutia of all of these documents, and I do not blame them. The Government wishes to drown the people in legislation it seems. And do not laugh, because you know it to be true. No person will be able to sit down and read this legislation at the dinner table. No, no. These are practically novels in comparison to the Prime Minister's works. They are filled to the brim with tiny details that many ordinary folk sometimes scratch their head over it, and I understand fully. I have taken it upon myself to argue against this leviathan, for it seems that no one else will.
I shall begin with the Cyprus Autonomy Act and finish with the Treaty of Guarantee which concerns Cyprus. And I must say, that the government will be established as a result of this act is a monstrosity of meaningless quotas and is an affront to self-determination. It is hilarious that the Labour Party prides itself on being the party of independence for the colonies when we see that they are completely denying many rights to the Cypriot people. The most fundamental of these rights is the right to self-determination. One of the most important parts of self-determination is the ability for a nation of people to choose their own political status without the interference of foreign powers. Now, Mr. Speaker, if the Foreign Minister believes that the Cypriot people are ready for independence then why does she not think them ready for full self-determination?
For those who are wondering where this Act violates self-determination, I will point it out to you. Enosis, the Greek word for "union," is a very popular movement in Cyprus. The movement, specifically the movement in Cyprus, wishes for Cyprus to achieve a political union with Greece. A union which they think to be truly representative of their Greek culture. The Treaty of Guarantee and the Cyprus Autonomy Act make it explicitly clear that Enosis shall not be an option, thereby restricting the Cypriot right to self-determination. This is only one of the many flaws with these documents. I shall go through the entirety of the Cyprus Autonomy Act and the Treaty of Guarantee.
Let us start with Article 4. Section a of Article 4 establishes that the Presidential candidates shall be from the "Hellenic Cypriot community" and the Vice-Presidential candidates shall be from the "Turkish Cypriot community." This is the first instance of this weird, unjustified, and nonsensical quotas and pseudo-segregation. It establishes immediately that the political and economic interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are inherently different. It also makes it quite clear that the Turkish are junior partners in this ethnic coalition. Instead of being called a Co-President the Turkish executive is the Vice-President. Why should the Cypriot not be allowed to vote for whomever they want? What if a Turkish Cypriot would make a better President than the Greek candidates would? What if people want both the President and Vice-President to be two brilliant politicians who happen to both be Greek? They can't. What makes this situation even more of an affront to democracy is section b of Article 4 which states that "the incumbent President and Vice-President shall rotate their offices between them every six months." This means that whoever was elected Vice-President is essentially going to be President for four of the eight years in which they are in office. A term of eight years is, by the way, rather absurd. I see that the idea is the President and Vice-President's rotation throughout these eight years will each give them four years as President, but I do not see why the people should have such a large amount of time between elections/ What if, after four years, the people think either or both the President and Vice-President to be highly incompetent and unfit for office? They will have to wait another four years before being able to make a new decision. People change a lot in 8 years. In eight years, one can go from learning how to multiply numbers to studying calculus at Oxford. Why, then, should we not afford the people with these same rights? Elections ought to be held four years, and the best candidate no matter their ethnicity shall be elected by the people. Article 4 has seldom ever been used in practice, and little to no countries practice it. The United States does not force the people to elect a Protestant President and a Catholic Vice-President, for that would be silly.
Let us move onto Article 5 which establishes the Council of Ministers, a useless government organ that appears to be there solely to satisfy quotas. The President and Vice-President "shall appoint the Council of Minister, which shall be composed of seven Minister from the Hellenic Cypriot community and three Ministers from the Turkish Cypriot community." These appointments are "approved by the Chamber of Deputies by an absolute majority." What shall be the purpose of the Council of Ministers? The Cyprus Autonomy is vague and ambigous about this, actually, vague and ambigous is too kind. The Act offers no idea as to what this Council does. It simply makes "decisions" by an "absolute majority" and these decisions shall be "promulgated immediatley by the President and Vice-President by publication in the official gazette." With the amount of vagueness one would think that Council is very powerful, but it is not. For the President and Vice-President shall "seperately and conjointly have the right of final veto and may override any decision of the Council of Ministers." What? The decisions of the Council are subject to vetoes by either the President or Vice-President. Meaning the even if all 10 members of the Council agree on the decision and so does the President. The Vice-President can veto it and there is no way for this veto to be overriden. This is quite ridiculous. There is no purpose in having this Council of Ministers as it seems to merely be a Cabinet with less power and more quotas.
Now, onto Article 6 concerning the Legislative authority. Subsection i of section a once again produces another obstructive quota, this time limiting the amount of Turkish Cypriots in the House to 30 percent of its capacity. This means, that no matter if we have to fill that 30 percent with incompetent Turks or we have to prevent competent Turkish candidates from serving. It once again says that the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots inherently have opposing interests. Next, the Act goes onto says that the Senate shall have 50 per cent allocated to the Hellenic Cypriot community and 30% to the Turkish Cypriot community. This seems horribly arbitrary. Why does the Senate have an even lower quota for Greek Cypriots? We don't seem to know why.
However, this is not the worst part of Article 6. Not by a long shot. The Chamber and Senate shall approve or return the budget proposed by the Council of Ministers (keeping in mind that the President and Vice-President separately hold the right to veto this budget immediately). In an example, the Chamber and the Senate both approve of the budget. The President and Vice-President may then veto the budget, and remember that the both hold this right of veto separately and conjointly which seems to mean that the Vice-President can veto this budget even if The Council of Ministers, the Chamber, the Senate, AND the President supports this. Now here's the kicker. If say, the President and the Vice-President conjointly exercise their veto power on a budget approved by the Chamber and the Senate which had previously been created by the Council of Ministers and approved by both the President and Vice-President. Then the Chamber and the Senate have the right of appeal "separately and conjointly" to the "Supreme Constitutional Court, which may uphold or annul the law, decision, or initiative in question." The implication that an unelected body has the ability to simply overturn a veto is not only out of place because the Supreme Constitutional Court does not hold the right to overturn the veto on legislation by solely the budget, and it's simply nonsensical. On what grounds would the Court overturn this veto of the budget? It seems that it only depends if the Court likes the budget. I struggle to think of any modern nation which employs such a silly system.
Moving onto Article 7. Article 7 establishes that each Community shall have its "Communal Council." It's not really defined what a community is exactly. One can assume it to be talking about the "Hellenic community" and the "Turkish community" which the Act so often references, but there is no definition for what a community is. How many communities are there? What are the communities? We do not know, and I doubt that the Foreign Minister has an answer for us on this. But, I must take issue with section c, subsection i. Which states that the Councils shall exercise authority in the following matters "Religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions of personal status." Now, assuming that when the Act talks about Communal Councils it is referring to the Turkish and Greek Cypriot Communities, then this is going to breed ethnic conflict. The Greeks shall teach their children their side of the story, and the Turks shall teach their children their side of the story. Now you have two seperate historical narratives which these children shall grow up with. These children will see the other community as the enemy, and war will be inevitable.
Onto Article 8, where we are finally informed about the Supreme Constitutional Court which "shall be established to uphold the Constitution." The Court itself is composed of a panel of five judges. Two of which are nominated "from the Hellenic Cypriot Community" and two of which shall be appointed "from the Turkish Cypriot community" and these Judges shall be appointed "jointly by the President and the Vice-President." The fifth judge, and the "President of the Court" is "appointed by the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations." This is a complete insult to the sovereignty of the Cypriot nation. Their laws are interpreted by the rest of the world, by an intergovernmental organization. This is saying to the Cypriot people that they cannot settle their own disputes and that they require a third party to step in and ensure fairness. It breeds division, and when the President of the Court makes a ruling unfavorable to one community then some in that community might shout cries of favoritism and even 'imperialism.' It will give justification to the Cypriot to rebel and it will justification to the communities to eradicate the other.
Mr. Speaker, I must yield for now. All this speaking has gotten me quite tired and I think it better to break up my criticisms into two parts.
- Alexander Cochrane, Independent MP for Isle of Thanet
As the gentleman yielded, Sylvia Leighton rose to respond for the Government...
Mr Speaker,
I can assure the Hon Member for the Isle of Thanet that the length of the documents presented to the House is not, as he appears to imply, some manner of conspiracy to 'drown' the membership. Rather, these documents are addressing complex international questions which have been centuries in the making. They deserved a comprehensive response. I apologise if the Gentleman regarded the reading of the legislation as a Herculean effort, but then that is what the people of Thanet have elected him to do.
I shall now respond to the Hon Member's queries regarding the legislation in full. I apologise if I appear to be
harping on, but I believe it is necessary to address every area of concern for clarity and reassurance.
The Government supports the principle of self-determination. But there is also the personal right to life, liberty and security, and the protection of such rights regardless of race, sex or creed. These rights are so essential and inalienable that they are enshrined in the Universal Declaration - which, notably, does not incorporate any right to self-determination. This country has signed the Declaration; we have bound ourselves to the cause of upholding human rights.
There is indeed a current of opinion in the Hellenic community of Cyprus that favours the annexation of that territory to the Kingdom of Greece. But there is a countervailing opinion expressed near-unanimously by the Turkish community against such annexation, as it would jeopardise their position. They have good reason to be concerned. When previously the territory of Crete was annexed by Greece, the ultimate outcome was that their co-religionists there were uprooted and dispersed. Even in the best case scenario, the Cypriot Turks would be a numerical minority, entirely at the mercy of the Hellenic majority, which might easily traduce their religious independence, appropriate their land or even expel them. Self-determination for one national community should not come at the expense of another. We have witnessed in the horrors of the Second World War what occurs when a minority is deprived of its rights and liberties, and even their lives.
That is why the constitutional framework for Cyprus has been designed in such a manner as to guarantee the autonomy and well-being of the Turkish Cypriot community, to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island, and to foster inter-communal consensus as a basic necessity of government. Were the Westminster model simply to be reproduced exactly in Cyprus, the Cypriot Turks would be hapless to frustrate legislation which discriminated against their community. They would swiftly become disenchanted with democracy, and conflict would resume. In this, they would have an eager backer in the Republic of Turkey.
Hence, the collegiate executive. The distribution of the offices of President and Vice-President between the communities of Cyprus - which, contrary to the Gentleman's snide insinuation, I do understand as being the Hellenic and Turkish communities, and which shall be explicitly identified as such in the actual Constitution of Cyprus - ensures equal representation. The rotation of those offices avoids any feeling of inferior status on the part of either community. The Gentleman assumes that a winner-takes-all model is not only somehow appropriate for the contentious territory of Cyprus, but also without alternative. In Switzerland, the government operates on a similarly conciliary basis, with the Federal Council consisting of all the parties represented in parliament, and the office of President regularly rotating between them. It is my understanding that the Swiss do not believe themselves to be bereft of democracy or self-determination.
As per the principle of equality, both the President and the Vice-President enjoy the right of veto. This is only sensible. If an act injurious to either community was approved by the legislature, then it could not be guaranteed that the President and Vice-President would agree to override it. Therefore, the partible veto ensures that each community shall be defended from injury, so that both the President and the Vice-President and the legislature shall have to co-operate and reach consensus.
Regarding the executive, I do not believe that the Council of Ministers is some 'useless organ' fit only for 'ethnic quotas'. At first, the Hon Member suggests that the legislation is too comprehensive; later, he complains that it is not exhaustive enough! I believe we can fully understand what the Council is: the executive cabinet responsible for collective decision-making and direct departmental administration. Does the Hon Member for the Isle of Thanet mean to imply that the entirety of the government should be vested in and exercised by two people? Likewise, the distribution of these ministerial offices on communal lines is to ensure, again, fair representation of the communities. Would the Turkish Community be content to accept an entire government composed solely of Cypriot Greeks? Would they feel that this government represented them and their legitimate national interests? No. They would feel strangers in their own land, and their resentment would catalyse inter-communal tensions to devastating effect.
On a similar basis, there is a communal distribution of parliamentary representation. The Chamber of Deputies, which most approximates this House, shall be allowed a Hellenic majority, but with significant representation for Turkish Cypriots. The Senate is essentially the safeguard of the constitutional balance. By dividing the senatorial seats equally between the communities, any amendment to the Constitution must obtain support from both communities in order to be achieved. This prevents any subversion of the careful system of checks and balances without the mutual consent of the communities. On a minor aside, I apologise for a typographical error regarding the demographic distribution of the Senate; I have asked the Clerk to correct this.
As for the Communal Councils, it appears that the Hon Member has lost the thread of his criticism, for having once upheld the principle of self-determination, he forsakes it in attacking the communal legislative bodies. The Turkish Cypriots have a right to regulate their own affairs, just as the Hellenic Cypriots do. They may well represent themselves at variance with one another - but it is their right to do so. If we were to attempt to impose some arbitrary consensus from above, the result would be resentment and rebellion. It is far better that the communities learn to co-operate together, on a mutually-beneficial basis, than to enforce such co-operation.
We turn now to the Supreme Constitutional Court. Here I am surprised, for even as the Hon Member's colleagues in the House accuse us of abandoning the Empire, we are now vilified for maintaining even the barest constitutional association with Cyprus. The Constitutional Court must have an uneven number of judges so as to ensure that it can deliver a majority opinion. If five of these judges were Greek and the other four Turks, the latter would cry foul; if the situation was reversed, the former. The only alternative to judicial paralysis is the appointment of an impartial president who may mediate between the judges. The Government believes that it is only suitable that such an appointment derived from the Commonwealth, of which Cyprus shall be a member. If the Hon Member desires to table an amendment suggesting an alternative body, then the House may consider it. But if he simply wishes to abolish the impartial presidency and let the Court descend into incapacity, then the Government must vehemently disagree.
Finally, on the question of the budget, and by extension the entire process of judicial review, the Court would consider the appeal on the same basis as any other legislation: was the veto made with a clear statement of reasons, in accordance with proper procedure, and were these reasons compatible with the Constitution? If, for example, the President had withheld approval of the budget because, hypothetically, they were embezzling funds from the State and did not wish their activities to be discovered, the Court could naturally annul the veto as illegitimate. But that is not a decision for the consideration of the House, and I do not wish to further bore the Members with a protracted analysis of Cypriot civil law...
I shall freely admit the complexity of the political system envisioned for Cyprus, with its many interlocking and oppositional mechanisms. But it is only complex by necessity. The situation in Cyprus is precarious indeed. This is a territory which has experienced multiple insurrections in the past two decades. Any political settlement must be tailored to the conditions on the ground. We cannot simply duplicate our own political system and implant it in Cyprus. In time, the Cypriot peoples may desire to reform the Constitution and divest the mechanisms once they are no longer necessary or practicable. But for now, complexity is the price for peace.
Rt. Hon. Sylvia Leighton PC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Member for Sutton and Cheam
