I Ask You About the Battle of Shiloh 1862...Again

[Director]

I don't know if Napoleon was studied at West Point as such - but translations of Jomini (not Clausewitz) were the bibles of what little military instruction the cadets received. The instruction the cadets did get was concerned with moving and drilling troops - with tactics - with some touches on artillery, supply and logistics. McClellan was part of a commission sent to the Crimean War, and they reviewed the French army of Napoleon III - especially his 12-pounder cannon and French rifled muskets - very favorably. France was still seen as the pre-eminent land power in the world, so the American army had a distinct Francophile lean, right down to its slouch forage caps.

West Point was primarily an engineering school and graduates were eagerly sought after for civilian jobs. That is why so many Civil War officers spent the years between the Mexican and Civil Wars engineering railroads, running waterworks and building lighthouses (as three examples).

The great example that every West Point man wanted to emulate was that of Winfield Scott, the man the Duke of Wellington called, 'the greatest soldier of the age'. Scott's Mexican campaign was remarkable for getting the most out of militia soldiers and political generals, for unexpected movements, for excellent use of artillery and horse (or flying) artillery, mild treatment of civilians and for splendid battle victories culminating in the taking of the capital, which prompted immediate Mexican surrender.

We can see all of these things being tried in the Civil War; the American armies and officer corps were built in Scott's image. Many officers had fought under Scott in Mexico and had him as a mentor.


I agree that the border states were absolutely crucial factors in how the war played out. Maryland and Kentucky were the most pivotal, with Missouri next. Tennessee was the least fervid of the states that did actually go South ("Last out and first back in"), and North Carolina was at best lukewarm until the war actually started. West Virginia was an area of strong Union support, created for and by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in order to guard its tracks. There were strong Unionist areas in Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, strong Confederate sympathies in Illinois, Indiana and Ohio. In short, the country, the states and the people were divided.

Lyon may almost singlehandedly have preserved Missouri for the Union by keeping control of the St Louis Arsenal and by leaning on Unionist German sentiment for recruits. He was also unusual among Union officers in that he was not afraid to act, and act boldly, while the rebels were gathering. Interestingly, most of Southern sentiment was in the northern part of the state and Northern sentiment in the southern... Missouri remained a battleground for much of the war, unlike Maryland and Kentucky which quickly settled down.

California had sent a bill to Congress asking to be broken into two states, since one half was full of southerners and the other half Yankees. It would almost certainly have passed, but the outbreak of war meant it was never acted on.

The most interesting border case was Kentucky, where the governor favored one side and the legislature the other. They declared neutrality but a lot of their citizens went to fight for one side or the other (splitting families in some cases). The South had the most to gain - half their border with the North didn't have to be defended if Kentucky was off-limits - but their General Leonidas Polk, Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, broke the truce by advancing north to Columbus, KY, the 'Gibraltar of the Mississippi', and threw the whole state to the Union. That let Grant seize Paducah and move up the rivers.

 

[Director]

A most interesting counter-factual, or alternate history, is this:

Franklin Pierce is elected President as a 'dark horse' candidate precisely because people know and don't like the other candidates. On his way to the inauguration, Pierce is in a train wreck - his wife is injured and his son, killed. His wife remains an invalid and Pierce begins to drink himself to death.

Pierce's vice-president was critically ill and is in fact the only vice-president to be sworn in outside the country (William RD King was in Cuba for his health). King died almost immediately. The Constitution at that time did not provide for replacing a vice-president, so if Pierce had died (he did die shortly after the end of his one and only term) then, under the rules of the day, the President Pro Tem of the Senate would have become President.

The President Pro Tem of the Senate for most of Bright's term (it switched around some for political reasons) was Senator Jesse Bright of Indiana.

So far all of this is just factual. But...

If Pierce dies in office, Bright likely becomes President and would probably have been a 'sympathy' candidate in the 1856 election, winning a term of his own (instead of Buchanan). So when Lincoln or some other Republican is poised to win, and Southern states begin to secede, Bright is President.

Jesse Bright was expelled from the Senate in 1862 for his strong pro-Southern views, specifically that the South should have been permitted to go its own way in peace and for addressing Jefferson Davis as the President of an independent Confederacy. Had he been President and replaced Buchanan's dithering incompetence with pro-Southern, pro-secession policies - like handing over all forts without a fight... then you get an independent Confederacy and, potentially, no Civil War.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

A most interesting counter-factual, or alternate history, is this:

Franklin Pierce is elected President as a 'dark horse' candidate precisely because people know and don't like the other candidates. On his way to the inauguration, Pierce is in a train wreck - his wife is injured and his son, killed. His wife remains an invalid and Pierce begins to drink himself to death.

Pierce's vice-president was critically ill and is in fact the only vice-president to be sworn in outside the country (William RD King was in Cuba for his health). King died almost immediately. The Constitution at that time did not provide for replacing a vice-president, so if Pierce had died (he did die shortly after the end of his one and only term) then, under the rules of the day, the President Pro Tem of the Senate would have become President.

The President Pro Tem of the Senate for most of Bright's term (it switched around some for political reasons) was Senator Jesse Bright of Indiana.

So far all of this is just factual. But...

If Pierce dies in office, Bright likely becomes President and would probably have been a 'sympathy' candidate in the 1856 election, winning a term of his own (instead of Buchanan). So when Lincoln or some other Republican is poised to win, and Southern states begin to secede, Bright is President.

Jesse Bright was expelled from the Senate in 1862 for his strong pro-Southern views, specifically that the South should have been permitted to go its own way in peace and for addressing Jefferson Davis as the President of an independent Confederacy. Had he been President and replaced Buchanan's dithering incompetence with pro-Southern, pro-secession policies - like handing over all forts without a fight... then you get an independent Confederacy and, potentially, no Civil War.

Which is why I loathe alternate history. It just muddies the water and confuses the weak minded.

Edit: not remotely referring to you as weak of mind, D.

 

[Director]

Battlefield Trust video of Shiloh - provides a lot of context.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Battlefield Trust video of Shiloh - provides a lot of context.

Thank you, I enjoyed this walk down memory lane.

And I agree with your point that this is an enjoyable group of individuals with which to have a discussion/argument/multi-year chat.

 

[Rustrider]

Yes. Napoleon Bonaparte. He is very popular at this time. George McClellan will adopt the moniker ‘little Napoleon’ before his fall into disgrace.

West Point, the US military academy that produces a large number of generals found in the War of the Rebellion, taught Napoleonic strategy and tactics to its students.

‘Elements of Military Art and Science’ is the primary military textbook used at West Point, which is essentially a translation of Jomini’s works on Napoleonic tactics.

The early part of the war sees a lot of men die because modern weaponry ranges made Napoleonic maneuvers deadly.

Over the years there were several book recommodations in this forum. Recently i have read "the bloody crucible of courage" from bernt nosworthy, who paints a slightly different picture.
it claims that from the 1840s on there were a number of tactical systems divised in response to the new weapons, which were noted by knowlegable militarymen in the US. In the late 50 Napoleon III returned to traditional doctrine that emphasized the importance of bayonet charges at the expanse of long-range aimed fire. (he himself was artillary officer and had astonished success with this charges, morale breaker etc) This doctrine was referred as Napoleonic tactics, which confused generations of civil war historians.

Only quite shortly before start of the war the army settled upon Jomini's more conservative grand tactical system....

This implies to me, that there was a very conservative mindset in the higher ranks of the military, but that new ideas were known and discussed.

When we discuss the weapons and tactics used we cannot comprehend why people charged with bayonets and didnt shoot with rifles (we dont know anylonger, that aiming was very complicated with the rifles and because of the terror of the battlefield the theoretical use of this weapons were rarly achieved (beside specialists like snipers). Did the modern rifles really made war in the early part more deadly? it looks for me, the really deadly battles were later in the war...
as far as i see the battle of shiloh was in the middle of forest and swamp, not the ideal terrain for long range weapons

 

[Ming]

One of the first novels I ever read was a YA novel from my school library about a teenager who joins a texas infrantry regiment and manages to roam all over the battle of Shiloh, even being a witness when ASJ dies. Weirdly, it's a battle whose details I am familiar with more than any other save Gettysburg thanks to that book.

In the late 50 Napoleon III returned to traditional doctrine that emphasized the importance of bayonet charges at the expanse of long-range aimed fire. (he himself was artillary officer and had astonished success with this charges, morale breaker etc) This doctrine was referred as Napoleonic tactics, which confused generations of civil war historians.

Interesting how misunderstanding becomes 'truth'. For this armchair historian at least, I did not learn *until this thread* that the 'Napoleonic tactics' of the early Civil war referred to Napoleon the third.

Likewise, I just looked up and learned that the smoothbore guns whose shorthand was referred to as 'napoleons' were *also* referencing Napoleon III. I had always assumed they were a relic of the napoleonic wars, on their way to being replaced by rifled guns but pressed into service because nothing else was available and retained because they could deliver canister shot. (A view reinforced by the excellent game Sid Meier's Gettysburg, where Napoleons are almost useless at long range, but devastating at short.)

I now wonder if the reports of private citizens who wrote to the war department offering strategic advice at the start of the conflict saying they had 'studied napoleon' and so on were referencing the Corsican Corporal or his nephew.

 

[Director]

I concur that Nosworthy's 'Bloody Crucible' is invaluable.

In brief:

1) Muskets were effective at short ranges but wildly inaccurate, hence no-one tried to teach soldiers how to hit a specific target.
2) Rifles were effective at long ranges and could hit specific targets, but were very slow to reload, hence best used from cover.
3) The Minie-type rifled musket seemed to combine the best features of both, hence the belief in the 1850's (Crimean War period) that long-ranged rifled-musket fire would devastate an enemy and prevent him from closing.
4) The RM (rifled-musket) had one serious defect - the rifling reduced power, which made it drop over distance (like an artillery piece). That meant using it effectively required training in range-finding, so mostly soldiers just waited to shorter ranges and blazed away.
5) Much of the South was wooded or had underbrush, which reduced visual range and meant the RM couldn't be used at full range anyway.
6) The effect of a bayonet charge is decided before the units collide. Either the attackers break or the defenders rout - but actual bayonet wounds were rare.

In Grant's 'Personal Memoirs' (strong recommendation) he says that he studied the textbooks on tactics and then worked out how much to throw out; he says, 'I never had any difficulty getting the men to do as I wanted'. Officers may have studied the campaigns of Napoleon I, the writings of Jomini and read Hardee's 'Tactics' but in the end I think they improvised a lot. The troops learned to march and form line; some, in time, were pretty well drilled, but in the early years they were raw.

Given the bloody results of the French Crimean campaign and Napoleon III's Italian campaign, any admirers probably referred to Napoleon I. His nephew (III) made a lot of improvements in arms, uniforms, Zouave tactics and so forth, but was not a general and did not direct the forces in the field.

 

[Victor1234]

Over the years there were several book recommodations in this forum. Recently i have read "the bloody crucible of courage" from bernt nosworthy, who paints a slightly different picture.
it claims that from the 1840s on there were a number of tactical systems divised in response to the new weapons, which were noted by knowlegable militarymen in the US. In the late 50 Napoleon III returned to traditional doctrine that emphasized the importance of bayonet charges at the expanse of long-range aimed fire. (he himself was artillary officer and had astonished success with this charges, morale breaker etc) This doctrine was referred as Napoleonic tactics, which confused generations of civil war historians.

Only quite shortly before start of the war the army settled upon Jomini's more conservative grand tactical system....

This implies to me, that there was a very conservative mindset in the higher ranks of the military, but that new ideas were known and discussed.

When we discuss the weapons and tactics used we cannot comprehend why people charged with bayonets and didnt shoot with rifles (we dont know anylonger, that aiming was very complicated with the rifles and because of the terror of the battlefield the theoretical use of this weapons were rarly achieved (beside specialists like snipers). Did the modern rifles really made war in the early part more deadly? it looks for me, the really deadly battles were later in the war...
as far as i see the battle of shiloh was in the middle of forest and swamp, not the ideal terrain for long range weapons

This is a bit confusing. Napoleon Bonaparte I's background is well known. He was a trained artillery officer whose mastery of defeat in detail (combining his own forces quickly to achieve local superiority in numbers before the enemy can combine their forces) likely influenced the strategy taught at West Point. It's hard not to see parallels between the 1796 Italian campaign and Jackson's Valley campaign of 1862, of course the scale of forces involved being much different.

By contrast, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte III was the nephew of Napoleon I. He was born in 1808 and in accordance with the law of 1816 banning all Bonapartes from French territory, grew up abroad. In Switzerland he became a cadet at the Federal Military Academy of Thun in 1830, a noted instructor of his being General Dufour, engineer and cartographer.

His education doesn't have been his primary focus at this time, because in 1831, thanks to lobbying by his family, they received a legal exemption to return to France and he used this opportunity to start intriguing with French politicians. In 1832, with the death of Napoleon I's only legal son, Louis Napoleon became the Napoleonic pretender heir and the intrigues multiplied.

He became a Swiss citizen in 1832, and to capitalize on his new importance as the pretender and link with his great uncle, wrote an artillery manual for the Swiss army that he made sure was lauded by the French press. As a result of his hereto hidden but now obviously recognized talents (and certainly not his new importance as the Napoleonic pretender), he was promoted to Captain in the artillery regiment of Bern. He continued to build his legend and conspire until 1836, when he gathered his cronies to take over the city of Strasbourg, with a view to emulating his uncle's 1815 return from Elba, hoping that the garrison will defect to him and any soldiers sent to arrest him would swell his numbers until he reached Paris and assumed power.

Amongst the garrison at Strasbourg and Louis Napoleon's chief ally/conspirator, was a Colonel Claude-Nicolas Vaudrey, who had been a Captain of horse artillery under Napoleon I and won the Legion of Honor at Dresden in 1813. He rallied to Napoleon I during his return and as gratitude for taking part in the Battle of Waterloo, the new regime placed him on severely reduced pay in 1815. Following yet another new regime, he was somewhat rehabilitated and enjoyed promotions starting in 1826 until becoming Colonel in 1830. Unfortunately, he decided to politicize again, running in the 1831 legislative election as a liberal. He lost and as a result was exiled to Corsica. He managed to receive command of the 4th regiment of artillery in Strasbourg in July 1836.

Vaudrey snuck across the border to Offenburg in the Grand Duchy of Baden to finalize plans with Louis Napoleon and on the morning of October 30, 1836, the coup was launched. Unfortunately, Louis Napoleon had vastly overestimated his popularity and General Theophile Voirol, garrison commander of Strasbourg, who had been made a general by Napoleon I in 1814 after having fought in Spain, Russia and commanded the defense of Strasbourg in 1814, remained loyal.

Without Voirol's support, the conspirators were quickly arrested by the garrison and locked in the guardhouse. Vaudrey and a dozen others were judged in January 1837 and barely avoided prison but were forced to retire. He eventually moved to London.

Louis Napoleon was sent to Paris and eventually sentenced to exile in America. He arrived in Norfolk, Virginia in March 1837 and then moved to New York. He didn't stay long and by 1840, was again conspiring in Europe. With the ever growing amount of pro-Napoleonic propaganda he was churning out (including his own version of what really happened in Strasbourg in 1836) and the return of Napoleon I's ashes from Saint Helena, he judged the time was right to cross from England to begin another coup attempt. He landed in Boulogne-sur-Mer (where Napoleon I had famously quartered his invasion army meant for England) on the night of August 5, 1840 and tried to subvert the 42nd line infantry regiment with more cronies and another bitter ex-Napoleonic officer. This time went even worse and the garrison fired on his party, killing several and injuring Louis Napoleon himself. He was once again packed off for trial and this time got 6 years in prison, where once again, he did nothing but write propaganda about how amazing it would be if he was in charge.

The third time was the charm however and in 1848, he was elected President of the French Republic, followed by his coronation as Emperor Napoleon III in 1852. He took the field during the war against Austria on behalf of Italy in 1859, personally commanding (or at least present) at the Battles of Magenta and Solferino (opposite Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria, who would reign until 1916). He was reported to have been shocked by the high number of French losses in both battles.

By 1863, his health was failing quite badly and would continue until his end, the only time afterwards he took the field personally was in 1870, when he led an army from Paris to Metz, to free the besieged army under Marshal Bazaine. He himself would become surrounded and captured at Sedan before able to do so.

In short, no, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte III did not have any astonishing success personally as a military leader, artillery or otherwise.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

Likewise, I just looked up and learned that the smoothbore guns whose shorthand was referred to as 'napoleons' were *also* referencing Napoleon III. I had always assumed they were a relic of the napoleonic wars, on their way to being replaced by rifled guns but pressed into service because nothing else was available and retained because they could deliver canister shot. (A view reinforced by the excellent game Sid Meier's Gettysburg, where Napoleons are almost useless at long range, but devastating at short.)

In a sense the Napoleons were relic of Napoleonic wars. The carriage was based on French adaptation of a British Napoleonic war era carriage (as were all US carriages), and the ammunition they were issued were chiefly round shot and shrapnel (also known as spherical case), both widely used by British field guns in latter stages of Napoleonic wars. The "innovation" in it was that it was searching for sweet spot between firepower and weight and seems to have been quite successful in that. And unlike Napoleonic field guns it was also issued time fused explosive shells, which allowed killing the separate howitzers (previous US field battery was 4 6-pounder field guns and 2 12-pounder howitzers).

I don't think they were merely pressed into service though, they were quite successful to the degree that continued success of bronze smoothbores attracted international attention as this was transitional time in Europe too. And for Confederates who struggled to make good fuses the reliable round shot would be attractive.

The third time was the charm however and in 1848, he was elected President of the French Republic, followed by his coronation as Emperor Napoleon III in 1852. He took the field during the war against Austria on behalf of Italy in 1859, personally commanding (or at least present) at the Battles of Magenta and Solferino (opposite Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria, who would reign until 1916). He was reported to have been shocked by the high number of French losses in both battles.

It does check out in the sense that during the Italian wars the French used rapid charges to take Austrian infantry off-balance while the Austrians struggled to hit the fast advancing French due to the unfamiliar parabolic trajectory of the new minie-rifles. That being said there is not lot of time to apply those lessons back to US, and Hardee's Tactics for example was written some years before.

 

[Victor1234]

It does check out in the sense that during the Italian wars the French used rapid charges to take Austrian infantry off-balance while the Austrians struggled to hit the fast advancing French due to the unfamiliar parabolic trajectory of the new minie-rifles. That being said there is not lot of time to apply those lessons back to US, and Hardee's Tactics for example was written some years before.

I would agree that the lessons of that war were too late to benefit the Americans, but I would distinguish between

Strategy/Warfare: Clearly there was a Napoleon I influence and an early 1800's model of warfare that had reached American military leaders. There was absolutely nothing to learn from Napoleon III here.

Technical Innovations: The US, like everyone, surely incorporated French army technical innovations, from Crimea especially, that were conducted under Napoleon III, including things like saddles, artillery, etc.

It's just historians/contemporaries labeling both of these as 'Napoleonic' that causes the confusion.

 

[Director]

The value of the 12-pdr Napoleon was that it could be used as a cannon (or gun) and as a howitzer - for either direct fire or elevated for 'drop-down' fire. I don't say for indirect fire because that wasn't really a thing yet.

Howitzer - a short gun for firing shells on high trajectories at low velocities.

Prior to this, artillery batteries would contain (perhaps) four cannon and two howitzers; after the introduction of the Napoleon a battery could have a uniform armament.


Infantry tactics went back-and-forth in this period, with heavy reliance on assault (bayonet) replaced with long-range fire from rifle-muskets replaced with shorter aimed fire from rifle-muskets replaced with emphasis on the bayonet again... some of this was 'We got beat by X, so let's do that too' only to realize the enemy had moved on to y; some of it was the expense of re-equipping a national army versus the speed of advancement of weapon technology.

Hardee's Tactics was a direct translation of French manuals; he got stuck with the job because he spoke French. (I think I got that from Nosworthy's 'Bloody Crucible' but any verification (or disputation) would be welcome.) In the meantime the French were developing Zouave tactics - open order drill, rapid movement and faster, less-formal ways to get from column and line (along with firing from cover or while lying down).

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

The value of the 12-pdr Napoleon was that it could be used as a cannon (or gun) and as a howitzer - for either direct fire or elevated for 'drop-down' fire. I don't say for indirect fire because that wasn't really a thing yet.

Howitzer - a short gun for firing shells on high trajectories at low velocities.

Prior to this, artillery batteries would contain (perhaps) four cannon and two howitzers; after the introduction of the Napoleon a battery could have a uniform armament.


Infantry tactics went back-and-forth in this period, with heavy reliance on assault (bayonet) replaced with long-range fire from rifle-muskets replaced with shorter aimed fire from rifle-muskets replaced with emphasis on the bayonet again... some of this was 'We got beat by X, so let's do that too' only to realize the enemy had moved on to y; some of it was the expense of re-equipping a national army versus the speed of advancement of weapon technology.

Hardee's Tactics was a direct translation of French manuals; he got stuck with the job because he spoke French. (I think I got that from Nosworthy's 'Bloody Crucible' but any verification (or disputation) would be welcome.) In the meantime the French were developing Zouave tactics - open order drill, rapid movement and faster, less-formal ways to get from column and line (along with firing from cover or while lying down).

Yes. Well said as always.

And yet another example set by @Victor1234 weaving Napoleon's name back into the conversation again where it appears constantly in a myriad of different ways.

What became a great countering tactic to this was Union cavalry transformed from melee to dragoons armed with rapid firing rifles and perhaps a battery or two of regimental horse guns. A few men could strategically gallop into position, absorb the initial impact of a Southern advance, and delay while the main force is marched into position.

Sherman's spearhead across Georgia is the US Volunteer 1st Alabama Cavalry Regiment as he went marching to the sea. Sheridan burned down the entire Shenandoah Valley with dragoons given an order 'any man caught with a saber will be court martialed'.

Sheridan's tactics of mounted cavalry armed with repeaters as a force multiplier will have great impact in the Indian Wars in the years to come.

 

[Jopa79]

6) The effect of a bayonet charge is decided before the units collide. Either the attackers break or the defenders rout - but actual bayonet wounds were rare.

Well, not saying that you’re wrong, but doesn’t it happen so in many similiar maneuvers? Either the attack or the defense fails? I have a view, the effect of everything is decided before it actually occurs. But the final result is not decided before the happenings and the effect or the result may be affected during a conflict, let’s say for instance during a bayonet charge or a melee.

I give an example:

The Battle of Vyborg in 1944. The Finnish army had been running scattered and routing for 10 days, since the beginning of the Soviet Summer Offensive. The city was nearly left without any defenders as the panicked Finns just ran through the city shooting the officers whom tried to stop them. At the last moment, the Finnish reinforcements, 5 000 men reached the city, a day before the actual battle, to encounter the enemy of 40 000 Soviet men of two different Soviet Armies.

The result of the battle was pretty obvious already, but the events before, during and even after the battle affected largely to the final effect and result, being a Finnish disaster. An insidious factor, the fear and panic from the retreating friendly troops catched also the 5 000 new-comers in the city during the night while waiting the coming Soviet assault to the city. At the dawn hours, circa 4:00 am, the Soviets instigated more uncertainty to the Finnish morale while playing their records, the International and their agitators spoke through the speakers.

A great concern, to affect to the battle itself, was the Finnish supply. Because the reinforcements were sent in a rush to the city, by a train around the great Lake Ladoga, the supply was left behind, at least two days behind. The Finnish small-arm ammunition was nearly depleted amongst the city defenders, artillery was not present, only some mortars, about twenty grenades to each. There was a large Finnish ammo depo nearby, three times men were sent to the depo, to pick up the ammunition, but the guard refused the two first pick up attemps as there was no proper, or correct authorization for the pickup. On the last attempt, the ammo retrievers rised their submachine-guns, pushed the guard aside and took what they needed, but it was already too late to affect anymore to the ongoing battle in the city.

The defensive line was already wavering after the first Soviet probing-attacks and the line collapsed partly during the morning hours. It was affected by a false Finnish retreatment order which spread among the men and resulted an over 100 meters-empty-gap in the line. A counter-attack was organized, however, the leading-officers drugged themselves with strong stimulants and it didn’t go unnoticed from the men, creating more disbelief. The counter-attacking force dwindled as the front line approached. Finally, only the drugged officers made it trough, to the trenches, which were, surprisingly left empty for about two hours, there was no enemy in the trenches.

The full line collapsed until the noon and the city was practically lost as no other defensive line couldn’t be organized near the city center. Battle of Vyborg lasted only a few hours. Like you noticed, ”the bayonet wounds”, they were quite minimal as the Finns lost less than 100 men as dead. However, the already existing panic among the retreating forces spread and losing the 2nd important city is considered as the greatest disaster in the Finnish military history.

There still is one, a very important factor, effecting to the scale of this disaster. It occured already during the final phases of the battle and remained for two, or three days. While the Soviet tanks were still running on the narrow city streets and the Soviet soldiers were assaulting to the city buildings, there still were dozens of scattered and lost Finnish soldiers, hiding and finding a way out from the city. These soldiers reported later about eyewitnessing, the attacking Soviet soldiers climbed up, to the roofs of the city buildings, dancing and celebrating there naked, drinking vodka heavily. This party lasted a few days, and it was most crucial to the Finns. As there was no defensive line after losing Vyborg. And there was a short time-window, the road to Helsinki was wide open about a day or two. But the Soviet party gave time to organize the Finnish defenses again at Tienhaara - the Crossroads and while the Soviets carried on their offensive, they were countered at the Battle of Tienhaara which resulted a Finnish victory.

So, in short, my saying is, yes, the effect of a bayonet charge may be decided before, it probably is either, or. But however, still the final scale of the effect is not decided before, but during the combat and maybe still, after it also.

 

[Director]

Well, not saying that you’re wrong, but doesn’t it happen so in many similiar maneuvers? Either the attack or the defense fails? I have a view, the effect of everything is decided before it actually occurs. But the final result is not decided before the happenings and the effect or the result may be affected during a conflict, let’s say for instance during a bayonet charge or a melee.

I based that assessment on a medical study done - I think - after the Napoleonic wars. The doctor(s) concluded that the relative scarcity of bayonet wounds, coupled with the frequency of reported bayonet attacks, meant that contact - and hence a bayonet wound - was very rare. It is the same effect as horses charging pikes or an infantry square - the horses won't actually run up on the pole arms, though they may accidentally fall into the 'hedgehog'.

In the Civil War there were a lot of long, inconclusive fire-fights that caused a lot of casualties but didn't deliver a result. Infantry charges get scarcer as the war goes on: experienced officers and men just wouldn't make them, or would proceed very carefully.

I apologize if I was unclear, but I was trying to keep it short. My intent was to say that there is a moment during a bayonet charge where either the defenders flinch and retreat or the attackers balk and fall back. Contrary to what we might expect, actual melee contact with bayonets is rare.

Sherman's spearhead across Georgia is the US Volunteer 1st Alabama Cavalry Regiment as he went marching to the sea. Sheridan burned down the entire Shenandoah Valley with dragoons given an order 'any man caught with a saber will be court martialed'.

Yes - the US didn't have real, actual cavalry units on the European model until the Civil War: the two pre-war cavalry regiments were actually dragoons. Confederate cavalry succeeded early in the war because they had good horsemen, good horses and an operational method of working in relatively large units (either brigades, like Forrest, or an entire division or corps, like Stuart). US cavalry did not perform well in part because they were not well-drilled and in part because they operated in 'penny-packets'. Hooker combined them into distinct cavalry formations and - hey, presto! - two US cavalry divisions descended onto Stuart at Brandy Station and fought them to a draw. The same happened a bit later when Custer and the Michigan Wolverines fought Stuart to a draw on Gettysburg's third day - as significant, I think, as the failure of Pickett's Charge.

Confederate cavalry were trained mostly on small arms like shotguns, and later trained on sabers and carbines. Union cavalry were, by 1863, very well drilled on using carbines as dragoons, but also on using sabers 'en masse'. Ask the Confederate cavalry at Brandy Station, the Cavlary Field, Yellow Tavern and other actions just how powerful that massed saber charge could be.

After 1863, the US cavalry were every bit as good as the Confederate, and maybe good by European standards.

Thank you for pointing out how the use of fast dragoon or mounted infantry units, especially if armed with repeating carbines, could be effective far out of proportion to their size. I give you Rosecrans' masterful campaign marching south from Nashville to Chattanooga, with Wilder's Lightning Brigade working like and armored unit in a blitzkrieg, as an example. Over and over that brigade would appear on the enemy flank and rear, dig in and force the enemy back because conventional infantry attacks could not dislodge the brigade before reinforcements came up.

 

[Jopa79]

I based that assessment on a medical study done - I think - after the Napoleonic wars. The doctor(s) concluded that the relative scarcity of bayonet wounds, coupled with the frequency of reported bayonet attacks, meant that contact - and hence a bayonet wound - was very rare. It is the same effect as horses charging pikes or an infantry square - the horses won't actually run up on the pole arms, though they may accidentally fall into the 'hedgehog'.

In the Civil War there were a lot of long, inconclusive fire-fights that caused a lot of casualties but didn't deliver a result. Infantry charges get scarcer as the war goes on: experienced officers and men just wouldn't make them, or would proceed very carefully.

I apologize if I was unclear, but I was trying to keep it short. My intent was to say that there is a moment during a bayonet charge where either the defenders flinch and retreat or the attackers balk and fall back. Contrary to what we might expect, actual melee contact with bayonets is rare.

Oh, now I see it more better. I first thought, that you meant, in a bayonet charge, the combat only lasts such a short time until the other, the attacker, or the defender loses its morale and routs, hence the bayonet wounds were rare. But I got your point now, thanks.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

The same happened a bit later when Custer and the Michigan Wolverines fought Stuart to a draw on Gettysburg's third day - as significant, I think, as the failure of Pickett's Charge.

JEB Stuart's cavalry rounded the Confederate flank at Gettysburg, pulled up into position, firing an artillery blast to allow Lee to know he was in position and undetected, prepared to attack the Union artillery from behind while Pickett ignored the wood rail fence his men had to climb over and begin their walk. (Should have destroyed the fence in advance!!!!!)

George Armstrong Custer is appointed brigadier general of cavalry at the age of 23 because he is a West Point grad who understands aggressive cavalry tactics and will lead from the front in the most audacious way possible. He becomes general in June of '63, the battle of Gettysburg will occur the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of July.

Custer THROWS his men into the battle, accepts losses, but is instrumental in blocking Stuart's repeated attempts to break through to the artillery positions behind the Union cavalry.

Pickett's Charge fails in large part BECAUSE of Custer using his cavalry not as dragoons but in the mold of his hero, Joachim Murat, 'King of Hussars'. (Because Napoleon casts a large shadow over this war, again)

Proof?

Wilmer McClean was a grocer who owned a small farm near Bull Run and the first battle of the war was fought on his property. McClean moved his family to Appomatox Courthouse a month later to keep them safe from hostilities. McClean's house in Appomatox Courthouse will be where RE Lee surrenders to US Grant. The war will literally begin, and end, at his home.

Phil Sheridan will pay McClean several gold coins and walks out with the table on which the surrender was signed. Sheridan will give that table to Custer's wife as a gift, stating that 'few men did more to win this war than your husband'. Following Little Big Horn, Custer's widow will donate the table and a portion of the white surrender flag placed in her keeping to the Smithstonian where it was reunited with Wilmer McClean's chair in which Lee and Grant sat and it remains there to this day.

Regardless of Custer's infamous demise 'Out West', that is one bad man.

 

[Rubidium]

Getting back to Shiloh: an important point is that, even if the Union loses, you still have Buell's army in the general vicinity. Combined with the survivors of Grant's army (probably most of them, as actually destroying an army in the field was virtually impossible in the Civil War unless you were able to trap them and force them to surrender), and the Union likely has enough troops in the area to contain any further Confederate offensives (especially given that the Confederate army is likely to be heavily mauled as well). It's worth remembering that Shiloh is in the extreme southern end of Tennessee.

If you want an underappreciated Western Theater turning point, I'd actually point more towards the Battle of Pea Ridge. It was one of the few times that the Confederates outnumbered the Union army in a major battle, it featured a Union army in danger of being cut off from its supply lines, there were serious issues with the Union chain of command (though not as bad as with the Confederate chain of command), and yet the Union won. It effectively ended any Confederate threat to Missouri, and left most of northern Arkansas open for the Union advance. If the Confederates had won, they likely can push back into Missouri (giving them both more depth and access to easier recruitment), and the Union advance down the Mississippi is much more difficult (as the Confederates can control much of the western bank).

It still wouldn't result in the South winning the war, but it would likely have had more general long term effects than Shiloh (which mainly would have had the result of ending Grant's frontline career, admittedly a significant loss).

 

[Director]

To my knowledge, the only army destroyed in the field during the Civil War was Hood's Army of Tennessee at Nashville., General George 'Rock of Chickamauga' Thomas' underappreciated masterpiece.

Pea Ridge (I think it is also called Elkhorn Tavern) was certainly influential beyond its size, and it served as a caution for commanders who wanted to try great Napoleonic movements in the southern forests.

Also important was Earl Van Dorn's battle at Corinth - it ended Van Dorn's career as a general, made Rosecrans famous and put a halt to Confederate recruitment in the TransMississippi. Taking Corinth would not have rebuilt the rail line for the South but losing Corinth would have greatly complicated matters in the West for the Union.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Pea Ridge? An Arkansas Battlefield I am very familiar with. Our German and European friends, perhaps, would like to know the story of Franz Sigel. . .

Franz Sigel was a German national who graduated from Karlsruhe Military Academy in 1843 and had a brief military career then moves to America as one of the many 'Forty-Eighters'. He moves to America and becomes an educator; he moves to St. Louis as a professor of the German-American Academy but is soon elected head of the public schools in St. Louis.

He is very popular with German-Americans and a staunch Unionist. When the war breaks out he is commissioned a colonel in the Missouri militia and Lincoln soon makes him a brigadier general in the Union Army.

Sigel is given command of a corps comprised of two divisions assigned to the Army of the Southwest and he had no finer military campaign than the march through Springfield, MO into NW Arkansas to the Battle of Pea Ridge / Elkhorn Tavern. Sigel will bring Ordnung to the battlefield, lead from the front, and will personally direct the artillery barrage that breaks the Confederate positions on the second day of the battle.

Sigel is then redeployed to the Shenandoah Valley where Stonewall Jackson spins him around and sends him running.

In the Army of the Potomac, Sigel will command the XI Corps comprised mostly of German speaking immigrants who can say little in English other than proudly boasting: "I fights mit Sigel". This phrase is so well known it becomes a song that endures to this day.

The later years of the war proved Sigel to be a second rate general, but his ability to recruit and motivate German nationals made him too valuable to cast aside.

Fun Fact:

A general on the other side of the Pea Ridge / Elkhorn Tavern battlefield, in charge of Native American regiments of light cavalry, is the infamous Albert Pike and originator in America of the Scottish Rite of Freemasonry. Pike's influence on Arkansas, btw, should never be underestimated.