I Ask You About the Battle of Shiloh 1862...Again

[Jopa79]

Hi,

I think, it has been about 3-4 four years since I wrote a thread about this certain battle. I surely received some good answers and opinions to fill my thirst for the information about this certain battle. But, still, I'm uncertain about the battle itself, or it's significance for the US Civil War.

I'm not going to deep into the details. I only share my knowledge and some source of data about Shiloh. I have the next information:

Shiloh turned to be a major battle, the both armies, the US and the Confederate were at least unaware about the presence of each others? And mainly the US Army? The Confederacy did not know the arriving US reinforcement, Buell's Army of Ohio?

The bad weather halted the planned Confederate attack? And while conducting the offensive, another setback was faced by the CSA while losing one of their best Generals? However, during the first day of Shiloh, the CSA forces got the Union running scattered and routing. They just didn't finish the offensive while thinking they could do that during the next day. But it was too late then as the Union reinforcements arrived.

Had the South made the final push during the first day, I have the understanding, there was a possibility to carry on the advance to the major Union cities in north, like St. Louis, etc.?

Please, can you fill the gaps in my knowledge? Thank you.

 

[Victor1234]

I'm not very knowledgeable myself, aside from knowing that it was significant and having seen this video (accuracy unknown).

If that video is accurate though, wow. I've often read that at the start of the war, the Confederates main advantage was in superior leadership and well trained officers (inheriting more of the Westpointers than the Union), but if this is how the battle really went, it really doesn't show anything close to that.

 

[Jopa79]

I'm not very knowledgeable myself, aside from knowing that it was significant and having seen this video (accuracy unknown).

If that video is accurate though, wow. I've often read that at the start of the war, the Confederates main advantage was in superior leadership and well trained officers (inheriting more of the Westpointers than the Union), but if this is how the battle really went, it really doesn't show anything close to that.

Thank you very much for supplying us with this video. I haven't seen it before.

I don't know, is it just me, or do the others also think, by winning the Battle of Shiloh, the Union made this battle "only" Union victory, countering the CSA offensive and nothing else happened. Still, I think, the battle was indeed a more decisive one. The Western Front of the US Civil War is often hindered by the events on the US Eastern Front (if that is the correct word for the main theater of the war).

If winning the Battle of Shiloh, and not making major errors after that, I think the CSA could certainly threat the whole position of the US Army on the Eastern Theater of the war.

 

[Barsoom]

Shiloh took place almost exactly one year after the start of the Civil War. Opportunities for the CSA to exploit a qualitative advantage in generalship before the Union could bring its quantitative advantage in manpower and industry to bear had pretty much gone by this time. This should be apparent from the fact that Shiloh is a battle in which the CSA attempted to block a Union strategic offensive and not vice versa.

Had the Union decisively lost Shiloh, there would of course have been a chance of a renewed CSA offensive. Surely the Union would have had to scramble to put together a substantive force to block such an offensive. But it should also be noted that Shiloh took place in southern Tennessee, the Union had already gained Kentucky and part of Tennessee which would serve as a strategic buffer. It's not very likely that a renewed CSA offensive would have both eliminated the gains of a year and made substantial inroads into the North before the Union could deploy a new force.

The significance of Shiloh in the military history of the Civil War actually doesn't lie so much in the advantages gained or lost by the battle's outcome as in the manner in which Grant fought the battle. Grant simply refused to acknowledge defeat despite losing men at a much higher rate than his opponent, knowing that his side would eventually win a war of attrition. Even if he had been defeated, it would have been a Pyrrhic victory for his opponents. Knowing this, he chose not to extricate his army from a disadvantageous position.

 

[Victor1234]

Thank you very much for supplying us with this video. I haven't seen it before.

You're very welcome. The channel seems to be the top one on youtube for this sort of thing. They have an over hour long video on the Winter War, that I'd personally be very curious to know what you think of.

Shiloh took place almost exactly one year after the start of the Civil War. Opportunities for the CSA to exploit a qualitative advantage in generalship before the Union could bring its quantitative advantage in manpower and industry to bear had pretty much gone by this time. This should be apparent from the fact that Shiloh is a battle in which the CSA attempted to block a Union strategic offensive and not vice versa.

Had the Union decisively lost Shiloh, there would of course have been a chance of a renewed CSA offensive. Surely the Union would have had to scramble to put together a substantive force to block such an offensive. But it should also be noted that Shiloh took place in southern Tennessee, the Union had already gained Kentucky and part of Tennessee which would serve as a strategic buffer. It's not very likely that a renewed CSA offensive would have both eliminated the gains of a year and made substantial inroads into the North before the Union could deploy a new force.

The significance of Shiloh in the military history of the Civil War actually doesn't lie so much in the advantages gained or lost by the battle's outcome as in the manner in which Grant fought the battle. Grant simply refused to acknowledge defeat despite losing men at a much higher rate than his opponent, knowing that his side would eventually win a war of attrition. Even if he had been defeated, it would have been a Pyrrhic victory for his opponents. Knowing this, he chose not to extricate his army from a disadvantageous position.

So in your opinion the only possible advantage of good leadership is when the other side has no advantages? I'm not sure I understand.

If generals are good, they should be able to provide that advantage continuously, not just at the beginning of a conflict.

Again, not sure how accurate the video is, but there are some pretty big CSA names shown and the sum total of their brilliance seems to be to launch frontal attacks against an entrenched enemy when even the initial plan was to try and flank from the west? The point I was trying to make is that it seems to me that perhaps the qualitative advantage and tactical brilliance of Confederate generalship is maybe overstated.

 

[Jopa79]

Shiloh took place almost exactly one year after the start of the Civil War.

Yes. We all know Fort Sumter. But, still, I dare to say, the Battle of the First Bull Run in July 1861 is often considered as the first major battle of the war I know, I know...you also knew that.

Opportunities for the CSA to exploit a qualitative advantage in generalship before the Union could bring its quantitative advantage in manpower and industry to bear had pretty much gone by this time.

This. I disagree. While being so obvious, Gettysburg, the turning point, still consider I, the South having a possibility to win the war until that point. And yet further, I have very hard difficulties to understand the absolutely desperate Pickett's Charge, I just don't get that maneuver. Aaah...surely, they could do something else than just march to be cannon fodder and being shot by Union rifles.

Okay, but by winning Shiloh, South threatens the Northern industry in the area and surroundings. The GAR must, of course, in that place, to reconsider the situation on the Eastern Theater and send more forces to west. Maryland Campaign might be more victorious for the South, Lee could win and later surround the US position in New York, Washington.

To clarify myself:

• I like peace, not war
• I like equality in everything
• I consider socialism and communism being principalities quite the ideologies of the working-class
• As being a working-class worker for two decades, and coming a boss after that, I know my talking
• I don't vote
• I'm a democrat, having the best abilities in free-mind-thinking
• I hate the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan

Yea. I think your above post as an informative one. Still, I think, one can always think harder.

 

[bz249]

So in your opinion the only possible advantage of good leadership is when the other side has no advantages? I'm not sure I understand.

If generals are good, they should be able to provide that advantage continuously, not just at the beginning of a conflict.

Again, not sure how accurate the video is, but there are some pretty big CSA names shown and the sum total of their brilliance seems to be to launch frontal attacks against an entrenched enemy when even the initial plan was to try and flank from the west? The point I was trying to make is that it seems to me that perhaps the qualitative advantage and tactical brilliance of Confederate generalship is maybe overstated.

Look at the context... the South due to its lower manpower and industrial base needed to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, since they are going to bled dry fast. For that they have to use maneuvers to get into a position which offered a significant advantage in the casualty rate.
The North on the other hand have to press for a battle, whenever they had a chance, even if the circumstances were not perfect for the same reason as above.

Now in this framework competent Union generals are "merciless brutes" while competent Confederate generals have to show finesse. From a pure aestethics point of view the Confederate side would look better.

 

[Director]

Shiloh... Oh, Shiloh. Peach blossoms, blood-filled ponds, deep woods and open fields... and one small church.

OK. Gear up and strap down - here we go.

US Grant had exploited the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, knocked out Forts Henry and Donaldson on those rivers, broke a hole in the Confederate line running from the Mississippi River to Bowling Green, KY and - not least - broke the only direct railroad between those points.

In order to counterattack, Albert Sidney Johnston had to pull back to a point on an east-west railroad line - Corinth, in northern Mississippi. He also pulled in the garrisons on the Mississippi River at Columbus, of Mobile, AL and New Orleans, LA, which took time. In the interim, Union forces under Buell took Nashville - a critical industrial, transportation and supply point (IE locomotives, iron-works and horses) and - as a result of stripping the garrison - New Orleans and Memphis would be lost.

Grant was ordered to find a point on the Tennessee River to wait for additional troops, and for Buell's Army to come up and join him. He chose Pittsburgh Landing, and decided to train his troops rather than dig fortifications.

The Confederate troops had assembled at Corinth, a tiny town quite overwhelmed by their numbers, and proceeded to march north. The units had not marched long distances, were not used to working together, and were slowed by rain and mud, so it took three days to move only about 20 to 30 miles. March discipline was non-existent and Confederate troops made a lot of noise, including firing off their muskets, but they were in position on April 5th. Johnston believed their surprise was lost, but resolved to attack anyway on the morning of April 6th.

Johnston's battle plan - to crush the Union left and drive them away from the river and into the wilderness - was sound. The operational plan, drawn up by Beauregard, was a disaster, spreading each of the three corps out over the entire length of the battlefield, one behind the other instead of alongside each other. Union troops had been patrolling, but not far enough out - some surprise was achieved but in general Union troops were able to get into line as the attack came in. Sherman (headquartered near the little Shiloh Church on the Union right) and other officers got their men into line and began conducting a fighting withdrawal toward the river. Grant had been some 20 miles away at Savannah, TN, and arrived mid-morning. Union plans went awry when Wallace's division got lost in the woods and was out of action for most of the day - had they come out as expected they would have hit the Confederates in the left flank and rear, which could have been a game-changer. Grant never forgave Wallace (author of Ben Hur), though it seems to not have been his fault.

What needs to be clear is that the battlefield is a funnel, open on the south-west, with the river on the east and almost impenetrable forest and swamp on the north and west, narrowing down to Pittsburg Landing in the northeast. So the Confederate assaults, failing to break the Union left, compacted the defenders as the attack went forward.

One key moment was Grant ordering Prentiss to hold at all costs - his division was finally overwhelmed but it bought the Union precious time. At dusk, Grant lined up the Army artillery on a ridge just short of the river. By that point AS Johnston was dead, the Confederate troops tired and disorganized, and Beauregard ordered a halt for the night rather than make a last desperate assault. I have seen Grant's final position - it is very strong, and with artillery lined up hub-to-hub the casualties in an assault would have been horrific.

Some Union officers, like Sherman, thought the Union army beaten; Grant did not ('Lick 'em tomorrow', he said). He did receive some reinforcements from Buell - about one small division overnight and a bit more during the next day - and counter-attacked on the following morning (April 7th). Confederate units resisted but Union pressure drove them back until it seemed the Confederate army would break, at which point Beauregard pulled his men out and marched back to Corinth.



Part of the shock of Shiloh was that this one battle had more casualties than all of the American Revolution, War of 1812 and Mexican War combined. Union pre-battle strength was around 45,000 men and Confederate strength about 55,000 men. From the Wiki: Union casualties were 13,047 (1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded, and 2,885 missing); Grant's army bore the brunt of the fighting over the two days, with casualties of 1,513 killed, 6,601 wounded, and 2,830 missing or captured. Confederate casualties were 10,699 (1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 missing or captured). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Shiloh


The armies - and the casualties - were much larger than Manassas, or any other action to date. The green troops either fled or fought until they died - they did not have the veteran knowledge of knowing how to take cover and how to avoid charging a prepared defender. Anti-Grant forces (like Halleck) spread false rumors that he was drunk; just about everyone criticized him for not making a pursuit, which Halleck had forbidden... but, given the situation, it is hard to criticize his handling of the battle. One unintended effect was that reports of him smoking a cigar during the battle led to people sending Grant thousands of cigars; he died of throat cancer.

Shiloh absolutely knocked down the idea that 'one hard battle' would see the North give in or the South fold up; Grant, among others, came away convinced it would be a long and hard war.

The consequences of Shiloh were numerous, and awful for the South. The army had failed to turn back the invaders despite terrible casualties; Nashville would remain in Union hands, Memphis and New Orleans would fall. The Confederate army at Corinth would waste away by disease; the evacuation of Corinth meant the main east-west Confederate railroad line was cut forever. Beauregard's career prospects were almost destroyed; Jefferson Davis never trusted him with anything but garrison duty again.


I strongly - strongly - recommend "Personal Memoirs of US Grant". It contains some of the best, clearest writing on the Civil War - factual, concise, without a lot of self-promotion or justification, and the battles he describes will be absolutely clear to you. McPherson's "Battle Cry of Freedom" is an excellent one-volume history.

 

[Jopa79]

Shiloh... Oh, Shiloh. Peach blossoms, blood-filled ponds, deep woods and open fields... and one small church.

OK. Gear up and strap down - here we go.

US Grant had exploited the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, knocked out Forts Henry and Donaldson on those rivers, broke a hole in the Confederate line running from the Mississippi River to Bowling Green, KY and - not least - broke the only direct railroad between those points.

In order to counterattack, Albert Sidney Johnston had to pull back to a point on an east-west railroad line - Corinth, in northern Mississippi. He also pulled in the garrisons on the Mississippi River at Columbus, of Mobile, AL and New Orleans, LA, which took time. In the interim, Union forces under Buell took Nashville - a critical industrial, transportation and supply point (IE locomotives, iron-works and horses) and - as a result of stripping the garrison - New Orleans and Memphis would be lost.

Grant was ordered to find a point on the Tennessee River to wait for additional troops, and for Buell's Army to come up and join him. He chose Pittsburgh Landing, and decided to train his troops rather than dig fortifications.

The Confederate troops had assembled at Corinth, a tiny town quite overwhelmed by their numbers, and proceeded to march north. The units had not marched long distances, were not used to working together, and were slowed by rain and mud, so it took three days to move only about 20 to 30 miles. March discipline was non-existent and Confederate troops made a lot of noise, including firing off their muskets, but they were in position on April 5th. Johnston believed their surprise was lost, but resolved to attack anyway on the morning of April 6th.

Johnston's battle plan - to crush the Union left and drive them away from the river and into the wilderness - was sound. The operational plan, drawn up by Beauregard, was a disaster, spreading each of the three corps out over the entire length of the battlefield, one behind the other instead of alongside each other. Union troops had been patrolling, but not far enough out - some surprise was achieved but in general Union troops were able to get into line as the attack came in. Sherman (headquartered near the little Shiloh Church on the Union right) and other officers got their men into line and began conducting a fighting withdrawal toward the river. Grant had been some 20 miles away at Savannah, TN, and arrived mid-morning. Union plans went awry when Wallace's division got lost in the woods and was out of action for most of the day - had they come out as expected they would have hit the Confederates in the left flank and rear, which could have been a game-changer. Grant never forgave Wallace (author of Ben Hur), though it seems to not have been his fault.

One key moment was Grant ordering Prentiss to hold at all costs - his division was finally overwhelmed but it bought the Union precious time. At dusk, Grant lined up the Army artillery on a ridge just short of the river. By that point AS Johnston was dead, the Confederate troops tired and disorganized, and Beauregard ordered a halt for the night rather than make a last desperate assault. I have seen Grant's final position - it is very strong, and with artillery lined up hub-to-hub the casualties in an assault would have been horrific.

Some Union officers, like Sherman, thought the Union army beaten; Grant did not ('Lick 'em tomorrow', he said). He did receive some reinforcements from Buell - about one small division overnight and a bit more during the next day - and counter-attacked on the following morning (April 7th). Confederate units resisted but Union pressure drove them back until it seemed the Confederate army would break, at which point Beauregard pulled his men out and marched back to Corinth.



Part of the shock of Shiloh was that this one battle had more casualties than all of the American Revolution, War of 1812 and Mexican War combined. Union pre-battle strength was around 45,000 men and Confederate strength about 55,000 men. From the Wiki: Union casualties were 13,047 (1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded, and 2,885 missing); Grant's army bore the brunt of the fighting over the two days, with casualties of 1,513 killed, 6,601 wounded, and 2,830 missing or captured. Confederate casualties were 10,699 (1,728 killed, 8,012 wounded, and 959 missing or captured). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Shiloh


The armies - and the casualties - were much larger than Manassas, or any other action to date. The green troops either fled or fought until they died - they did not have the veteran knowledge of knowing how to take cover and how to avoid charging a prepared defender. Anti-Grant forces (like Halleck) spread false rumors that he was drunk; just about everyone criticized him for not making a pursuit, which Halleck had forbidden... but, given the situation, it is hard to criticize his handling of the battle. One unintended effect was that reports of him smoking a cigar during the battle led to people sending Grant thousands of cigars; he died of throat cancer.

Shiloh absolutely knocked down the idea that 'one hard battle' would see the North give in or the South fold up; Grant, among others, came away convinced it would be a long and hard war.

The consequences of Shiloh were numerous, and awful for the South. The army had failed to turn back the invaders despite terrible casualties; Nashville would remain in Union hands, Memphis and New Orleans would fall. The Confederate army at Corinth would waste away by disease; the evacuation of Corinth meant the main east-west Confederate railroad line was cut forever. Beauregard's career prospects were almost destroyed; Jefferson Davis never trusted him with anything but garrison duty again.


I strongly - strongly - recommend "Personal Memoirs of US Grant". It contains some of the best, clearest writing on the Civil War - factual, concise, without a lot of self-promotion or justification, and the battles he describes will be absolutely clear to you. McPherson's "Battle Cry of Freedom" is an excellent one-volume history.

Thank You.

 

[Director]

The South wasn't interested in invading the North and really lacked the ability to do so. A victory at Shiloh - entirely possible, I think, had the Union had a lesser commander or Beauregard's battle plan been more manageable - would have let them reclaim the industry and resources of Nashville, turn back a Union invasion and perhaps extend the war by a year.

As it was the South basically lost that entire army to battle and disease, lost Nashville and Memphis - which meant Tennessee - and New Orleans, which was not only the largest port in North America and one of the largest in the world, but five times the population of the next largest Southern city.

The South was practicing a defensive/offensive strategy - let the enemy come forward until his supply lines are stretched, then counter-attack and drive him out. Unfortunately for the South, they lost the counter-attack... and the history of the Civil War in the West becomes a list of lost battles and lost territories.

 

[Director]

This. I disagree. While being so obvious, Gettysburg, the turning point, still consider I, the South having a possibility to win the war until that point. And yet further, I have very hard difficulties to understand the absolutely desperate Pickett's Charge, I just don't get that maneuver. Aaah...surely, they could do something else than just march to be cannon fodder and being shot by Union rifles.

This is an entirely different story - the armies are much more professional and capable, and the Third Day of Gettysburg was - well - the third day of a continuous struggle.

Lee didn't want to fight until his army concentrated, but when the action started at Gettysburg he let it roll, knowing he could win it or call it off. On the first day he struck at the Union right and center, driving them back through Gettysburg and failing in the dark to take Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Not complete success, but enough to roll the dice again...

On the second day he tried to strike simultaneously at the Union left and right, hoping to drive them off the Cemetery Ridge position. Both attacks narrowly failed. Not complete success, but enough to roll the dice again...

So on the third day he reasoned that, since the Union must have reinforced their left and right by thinning out the center, he would punch through the center. From his battlefield position it looked quite feasible - Cemetery Ridge is only a few feet high at that point. Unfortunately for him the Union was able to shuttle troops up and down the line, including bringing troops and artillery to the center. The ground behind Cemetery Ridge drops - so you can move troops below the ridgeline and the Confederates cannot see them.

So to use a boxing metaphor, if a hard left doesn't do it and a left-right combination doesn't knock him down, then maybe his hands are pulled out of position enough for me to move in and punch straight to the gut. It's a last-chance choice and it leaves me open, but - I can't actually lose, can I?

Plus, Lee believed his men could take any position - and he didn't have any other option but to attack or pull back; he was almost out of ammunition and couldn't forage for supplies with the Union Army on his doorstep.

 

[Jopa79]

This is an entirely different story - the armies are much more professional and capable, and the Third Day of Gettysburg was - well - the third day of a continuous struggle.

Lee didn't want to fight until his army concentrated, but when the action started at Gettysburg he let it roll, knowing he could win it or call it off. On the first day he struck at the Union right and center, driving them back through Gettysburg and failing in the dark to take Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Not complete success, but enough to roll the dice again...

On the second day he tried to strike simultaneously at the Union left and right, hoping to drive them off the Cemetery Ridge position. Both attacks narrowly failed. Not complete success, but enough to roll the dice again...

So on the third day he reasoned that, since the Union must have reinforced their left and right by thinning out the center, he would punch through the center. From his battlefield position it looked quite feasible - Cemetery Ridge is only a few feet high at that point. Unfortunately for him the Union was able to shuttle troops up and down the line, including bringing troops and artillery to the center. The ground behind Cemetery Ridge drops - so you can move troops below the ridgeline and the Confederates cannot see them.

So to use a boxing metaphor, if a hard left doesn't do it and a left-right combination doesn't knock him down, then maybe his hands are pulled out of position enough for me to move in and punch straight to the gut. It's a last-chance choice and it leaves me open, but - I can't actually lose, can I?

Plus, Lee believed his men could take any position - and he didn't have any other option but to attack or pull back; he was almost out of ammunition and couldn't forage for supplies with the Union Army on his doorstep.

Yes, I know, I'm sorry while I mixed up the things. It was only me and my mistake to talk in inconsistent way.
In principle, this should be a thread about Shiloh, not about Gettysburg.

Sorry.

 

[Barsoom]

You're very welcome. The channel seems to be the top one on youtube for this sort of thing. They have an over hour long video on the Winter War, that I'd personally be very curious to know what you think of.



So in your opinion the only possible advantage of good leadership is when the other side has no advantages? I'm not sure I understand.

If generals are good, they should be able to provide that advantage continuously, not just at the beginning of a conflict.

Again, not sure how accurate the video is, but there are some pretty big CSA names shown and the sum total of their brilliance seems to be to launch frontal attacks against an entrenched enemy when even the initial plan was to try and flank from the west? The point I was trying to make is that it seems to me that perhaps the qualitative advantage and tactical brilliance of Confederate generalship is maybe overstated.

I didn't make myself clear, let me try to rephrase. The video discussed the tactics of the battle at some length, I won't go into that, both the video makers and @Director can explain that stuff much better than I can.

My post was meant to be about the strategic situation before and after the battle. At this level military buffs both our in age and in the century after Napoleon were predisposed to look at maneuver warfare. To the extent that European generals ignored the lessons of US Civil War, it didn't fit their preconceptions and (paraphrasing their dismissive tone) it was anyway not a big interstate war in the heart of the civilized world but a messy intrastate war in a colonial backwater.

In maneuver warfare you look at how an army can exploit a victory by taking further objectives, disrupt logistics, hinder any lines of advance, etc. @Jopa79 in fact asked about this aspect in his OP. My take is that a CSA advantage in this sense would be quite limited, in part because it would mainly retake ground already lost in the previous year and in part because the Union would probably be able to put together another army before too long. Victory in maneuver warfare comes from breaking the enemy army and then occupying territory, denying resources etc. until the enemy lacks the means to fight on. I think by this point this type of victory was out of reach for the CSA. Each time they'd sweep away one Union army, another could be mobilized to block further advances. Plus there was just too much ground to cover, with many Union industries very far behind the lines along the Great Lakes.

If the CSA had wanted to win through maneuver they would have had to do so before the Union could mobilize its superior resources. They had the advantage of better generals who could train troops and put together solid operational plans quicker than the Union, so there might have been a window in the very first months of the war. Might - because I don't think it would have worked, but if they were going to try, their best chance would have been a Blitzkrieg avant la lettre.

Then again, I don't think the CSA was aiming for that kind of victory. I think their strategic plan was to keep up the fight until Union resolve wears away. Let's call that victory through exhaustion. Frustration and defeatism, and a measure of presumed disinterest of the Northern public in the internal affairs of the Southern states, would force the enemy leadership to the negotiation table. Maybe not Lincoln but someone else elected in his stead when Lincoln got the blame for continuous battlefield losses. Director's description: "The South was practicing a defensive/offensive strategy - let the enemy come forward until his supply lines are stretched, then counter-attack and drive him out" fits really well with this approach.

Grant's genius was his realization that he didn't have to beat the CSA generals, West Point's finest, with brilliant maneuvers of his own. That in fact he could achieve the same result by attrition, after all the enemy's manpower would run out long before his own and then there wouldn't be an army to stand in his way anymore. His West Point instructors taught him to withdraw when he was tactically outmaneuvered, but Grant saw that he could gain the strategic objective of freedom to maneuver by the tactical expedient of holding on stubbornly in a bad position. He would lose more men than the enemy but then he had many more in reserve than they did. It's ugly, attrition warfare always is, but it looks to me (I say cautiously, and I'm very happy to be enlightened) that is shaved months, if not years, off the war's duration. The reason is that opposing forces that are both led by maneuver geniuses tend to circle each other, each unable to get to a better position for a prospective battle, and therefore not risking one. This happened quite a bit in the eastern theater: circling, circling, dragging things out.

In short, my point is that maneuver warfare is the wrong frame for evaluating a battle like Shiloh.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Hi,

I think, it has been about 3-4 four years since I wrote a thread about this certain battle. I surely received some good answers and opinions to fill my thirst for the information about this certain battle. But, still, I'm uncertain about the battle itself, or it's significance for the US Civil War.

I'm not going to deep into the details. I only share my knowledge and some source of data about Shiloh. I have the next information:

Shiloh turned to be a major battle, the both armies, the US and the Confederate were at least unaware about the presence of each others? And mainly the US Army? The Confederacy did not know the arriving US reinforcement, Buell's Army of Ohio?

The bad weather halted the planned Confederate attack? And while conducting the offensive, another setback was faced by the CSA while losing one of their best Generals? However, during the first day of Shiloh, the CSA forces got the Union running scattered and routing. They just didn't finish the offensive while thinking they could do that during the next day. But it was too late then as the Union reinforcements arrived.

Had the South made the final push during the first day, I have the understanding, there was a possibility to carry on the advance to the major Union cities in north, like St. Louis, etc.?

Please, can you fill the gaps in my knowledge? Thank you.

The second weekend of every October, our Boy Scout troop drove to the Shiloh Battlefield. We 'Camped out' in a large warehouse kind of building on the edge of the park on Friday and Saturday nights, got meals at a nearby restaurant ready to serve a eighty kids in one fell swoop.

For seven years, the second Saturday of October, I was walking that battlefield - rain or shine. I can tell you about every part - what it looks like, smells like, and what happened. The Peach Orchard and the Hornet's Nest. The Sunken road and Ruggle's Battery. Shiloh Church and Bloody Pond.

The Union Army was unprepared for the Confederate onslaught. At a few key defensive positions, such as the Sunken Road, Union troops slowed the advance as the bulk of the army withdrew in ragged formation to the massive Indian Mounds - huge hills that run straiht up and down and are exhausting to climb - that surround Pittsburg Landing.

The Confederate command was thrown into disarray by the death of Albert Sydney Johnston. Johnston was the most highly regarded officer in the Confderate army, all the other commanders would listen when he gave orders. After Johnston, there was no clear cut command. As the Union reinforcements poured into Pittsburg Landing the only Southern commander doing active recon was Nathan Bedford Forrest. He urged immediate action but was rebuffed by more senior men.

Overnight, Union navy shelled Confederate positions as harrasment while Buell's corps was ferried over the river to join Grant. The next morning the fresh troops rolled the weary Confederates who withrew back to Corinth, Mississippi forty miles to the South.

On the battlefield lay dead men in unimagineable numbers. No American battle had ever been this bloody, and the worst was yet to come.

After Shiloh, the South never smiled again.

That is the brief overview. How may I be of service?

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

I didn't make myself clear, let me try to rephrase. The video discussed the tactics of the battle at some length, I won't go into that, both the video makers and @Director can explain that stuff much better than I can.

My post was meant to be about the strategic situation before and after the battle. At this level military buffs both our in age and in the century after Napoleon were predisposed to look at maneuver warfare. To the extent that European generals ignored the lessons of US Civil War, it didn't fit their preconceptions and (paraphrasing their dismissive tone) it was anyway not a big interstate war in the heart of the civilized world but a messy intrastate war in a colonial backwater.

In maneuver warfare you look at how an army can exploit a victory by taking further objectives, disrupt logistics, hinder any lines of advance, etc. @Jopa79 in fact asked about this aspect in his OP. My take is that a CSA advantage in this sense would be quite limited, in part because it would mainly retake ground already lost in the previous year and in part because the Union would probably be able to put together another army before too long. Victory in maneuver warfare comes from breaking the enemy army and then occupying territory, denying resources etc. until the enemy lacks the means to fight on. I think by this point this type of victory was out of reach for the CSA. Each time they'd sweep away one Union army, another could be mobilized to block further advances. Plus there was just too much ground to cover, with many Union industries very far behind the lines along the Great Lakes.

If the CSA had wanted to win through maneuver they would have had to do so before the Union could mobilize its superior resources. They had the advantage of better generals who could train troops and put together solid operational plans quicker than the Union, so there might have been a window in the very first months of the war. Might - because I don't think it would have worked, but if they were going to try, their best chance would have been a Blitzkrieg avant la lettre.

Then again, I don't think the CSA was aiming for that kind of victory. I think their strategic plan was to keep up the fight until Union resolve wears away. Let's call that victory through exhaustion. Frustration and defeatism, and a measure of presumed disinterest of the Northern public in the internal affairs of the Southern states, would force the enemy leadership to the negotiation table. Maybe not Lincoln but someone else elected in his stead when Lincoln got the blame for continuous battlefield losses. Director's description: "The South was practicing a defensive/offensive strategy - let the enemy come forward until his supply lines are stretched, then counter-attack and drive him out" fits really well with this approach.

Grant's genius was his realization that he didn't have to beat the CSA generals, West Point's finest, with brilliant maneuvers of his own. That in fact he could achieve the same result by attrition, after all the enemy's manpower would run out long before his own and then there wouldn't be an army to stand in his way anymore. His West Point instructors taught him to withdraw when he was tactically outmaneuvered, but Grant saw that he could gain the strategic objective of freedom to maneuver by the tactical expedient of holding on stubbornly in a bad position. He would lose more men than the enemy but then he had many more in reserve than they did. It's ugly, attrition warfare always is, but it looks to me (I say cautiously, and I'm very happy to be enlightened) that is shaved months, if not years, off the war's duration. The reason is that opposing forces that are both led by maneuver geniuses tend to circle each other, each unable to get to a better position for a prospective battle, and therefore not risking one. This happened quite a bit in the eastern theater: circling, circling, dragging things out.

In short, my point is that maneuver warfare is the wrong frame for evaluating a battle like Shiloh.

AS Johnston's maneuvers were moving fine until his death, after that there was no coordination and merely independent commanders operating under their own initiative for the most part.

The Union Army got rolled by the first shock of combat. There was no dignified retreat, they RAN, reformed, and tried to buy time to let the other guys get away.

The Union Army had the Union Navy behind it with all its flotillas of steamships and mortar boats. Buell's corps is on the other side of the river. As long as they could hold the port tomorrow would be a different day.

 

[Jopa79]

The second weekend of every October, our Boy Scout troop drove to the Shiloh Battlefield. We 'Camped out' in a large warehouse kind of building on the edge of the park on Friday and Saturday nights, got meals at a nearby restaurant ready to serve a eighty kids in one fell swoop.

For seven years, the second Saturday of October, I was walking that battlefield - rain or shine. I can tell you about every part - what it looks like, smells like, and what happened. The Peach Orchard and the Hornet's Nest. The Sunken road and Ruggle's Battery. Shiloh Church and Bloody Pond.

I was remembering...you're quite familiar with the Shiloh battleground. Is the whole area preserved? How about the reenactments? Is it also being customed at Shiloh? How large is the area?

About the landmarks which you mentioned, I recognize them, but the Bloody Pond, I'm not familiar with it? They were Prentiss's and Wallace's divisions at the Sunken Road, establishing a position, called the Hornet's Nest? "Buying" time for the Union troops retreating and rallying again at the Pittsburg Landing. And Ruggle's Battery, wasn't it also at the Pittsburg Landing?

I have the understanding, by winning at Shiloh, the Union stabilized the situation in the west for a while? And they could concentrate more on the Eastern Theater of the war? But would there be consequences, if the South won the battle decisively? In general, I have the belief, the year 1862, the Confederacy was still making good for the war effort and the early Southern victories over the North in the Civil War are a clear sign about, the Union should take seriously the enemy. Further, while having the above view of thinking, could it be said, the Union could win at Shiloh, even while the Confederacy was having a good phase in the war? Is there any point in my thinking, or is that just loony-talks?

On the battlefield lay dead men in unimagineable numbers. No American battle had ever been this bloody, and the worst was yet to come.

Could it be also said, Shiloh came unexpectedly? I know, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were foreshadowing a larger engagement, but no-one was expecting such a horrible disaster and a loss of human lives. And it was only few months to Antietam, the catastrophe, still being the bloodiest day in the American history.

After Shiloh, the South never smiled again.

Is there a greater significance for the South while being defeated at Shiloh? I know some talking, the defeat is occasionally affiliated with the lost cause of the Confederacy, but I'm not an expert in this matter. In the Finnish history, I cannot imagine a more devastating loss in our past, than losing the city of Vyborg for the Soviet Union during the Battle of Vyborg Bay in June-July 1944. It was a shock moment for the whole nation, the will of defend was wavering, even the-Commander-in-Chief, Mannerheim deeply doubted the Finnish survival. The Karelians knew, they would never get home back again.

That is the brief overview. How may I be of service?

Many thanks, Sir, always a pleasure to talk with you.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

If the CSA had wanted to win through maneuver they would have had to do so before the Union could mobilize its superior resources. They had the advantage of better generals who could train troops and put together solid operational plans quicker than the Union, so there might have been a window in the very first months of the war. Might - because I don't think it would have worked, but if they were going to try, their best chance would have been a Blitzkrieg avant la lettre.

Did the South really demonstrate superior generalship in the first months of the war? Even if we zip forward to Shiloh you basically have Jackson's Valley Campaign. Lee is still digging trenches around Richmond. And further, can we really expect either of these two ad-hoc amateur armies to be capable of prolonged offensive in the first months of the war? Maybe the US regular army could if it weren't parceled out, though they mostly stayed with Union.

 

[Barsoom]

AS Johnston's maneuvers were moving fine until his death, after that there was no coordination and merely independent commanders operating under their own initiative for the most part.

The Union Army got rolled by the first shock of combat. There was no dignified retreat, they RAN, reformed, and tried to buy time to let the other guys get away.

The Union Army had the Union Navy behind it with all its flotillas of steamships and mortar boats. Buell's corps is on the other side of the river. As long as they could hold the port tomorrow would be a different day.

Of course CSA generals used maneuver, as did Union generals. But that's at the operational level, I was talking about the strategic level. In a strategy of maneuver warfare, you use maneuver to bring the enemy to battle under favorable conditions so as to take it out of action, gaining freedom to move on to subsequent objectives until you've occupied or destroyed enough enemy territory to force him to concede. In a strategy of exhaustion, you also use maneuver to bring the enemy to battle under favorable conditions but you don't follow that up with attempted occupation, instead you wait for him to come at you again, inflicting another defeat, until the fighting spirit of the enemy breaks and defeatism sets in. In a strategy of attrition, the objective is to grind down his manpower, so you use maneuver to bring the enemy to battle, preferably under favorable conditions but if the enemy attempts to evade such battle you maneuver into battle even if conditions are less favorable to you.

As I already said, I don't feel qualified to discuss the tactics of a battle you are much more familiar with. But I think you're hinting that Johnston may have been able to resist Grant's attrition strategy. Of course, as Johnston happened to die in the very same battle in which Grant applied his attrition strategy for the first time, we will never know for sure. In general I will say this, that a competent general who is aware that his opponent is trying an attrition strategy will try to avoid battle while at the same time trying to deny his opponent access to his hinterland. It's a difficult balancing act, the opponent will always try to threaten important objectives so as to draw you into battle. But it's not impossible, Fabius Cunctator pulled it off against Hannibal.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

I was remembering...you're quite familiar with the Shiloh battleground. Is the whole area preserved? How about the reenactments? Is it also being customed at Shiloh? How large is the area?

About the landmarks which you mentioned, I recognize them, but the Bloody Pond, I'm not familiar with it? They were Prentiss's and Wallace's divisions at the Sunken Road, establishing a position, called the Hornet's Nest? "Buying" time for the Union troops retreating and rallying again at the Pittsburg Landing. And Ruggle's Battery, wasn't it also at the Pittsburg Landing?

I have the understanding, by winning at Shiloh, the Union stabilized the situation in the west for a while? And they could concentrate more on the Eastern Theater of the war? But would there be consequences, if the South won the battle decisively? In general, I have the belief, the year 1862, the Confederacy was still making good for the war effort and the early Southern victories over the North in the Civil War are a clear sign about, the Union should take seriously the enemy. Further, while having the above view of thinking, could it be said, the Union could win at Shiloh, even while the Confederacy was having a good phase in the war? Is there any point in my thinking, or is that just loony-talks?



Could it be also said, Shiloh came unexpectedly? I know, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were foreshadowing a larger engagement, but no-one was expecting such a horrible disaster and a loss of human lives. And it was only few months to Antietam, the catastrophe, still being the bloodiest day in the American history.



Is there a greater significance for the South while being defeated at Shiloh? I know some talking, the defeat is occasionally affiliated with the lost cause of the Confederacy, but I'm not an expert in this matter. In the Finnish history, I cannot imagine a more devastating loss in our past, than losing the city of Vyborg for the Soviet Union during the Battle of Vyborg Bay in June-July 1944. It was a shock moment for the whole nation, the will of defend was wavering, even the-Commander-in-Chief, Mannerheim deeply doubted the Finnish survival. The Karelians knew, they would never get home back again.



Many thanks, Sir, always a pleasure to talk with you.

Give me a day or two and write out a travelogue from memory of the walks.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Of course CSA generals used maneuver, as did Union generals. But that's at the operational level, I was talking about the strategic level. In a strategy of maneuver warfare, you use maneuver to bring the enemy to battle under favorable conditions so as to take it out of action, gaining freedom to move on to subsequent objectives until you've occupied or destroyed enough enemy territory to force him to concede. In a strategy of exhaustion, you also use maneuver to bring the enemy to battle under favorable conditions but you don't follow that up with attempted occupation, instead you wait for him to come at you again, inflicting another defeat, until the fighting spirit of the enemy breaks and defeatism sets in. In a strategy of attrition, the objective is to grind down his manpower, so you use maneuver to bring the enemy to battle, preferably under favorable conditions but if the enemy attempts to evade such battle you maneuver into battle even if conditions are less favorable to you.

As I already said, I don't feel qualified to discuss the tactics of a battle you are much more familiar with. But I think you're hinting that Johnston may have been able to resist Grant's attrition strategy. Of course, as Johnston happened to die in the very same battle in which Grant applied his attrition strategy for the first time, we will never know for sure. In general I will say this, that a competent general who is aware that his opponent is trying an attrition strategy will try to avoid battle while at the same time trying to deny his opponent access to his hinterland. It's a difficult balancing act, the opponent will always try to threaten important objectives so as to draw you into battle. But it's not impossible, Fabius Cunctator pulled it off against Hannibal.

One of these days you and I will have fun debating Basil Liddel Hart stating the first modern 'Blitzkreig' - Indirect Approach - was executed in Georgia by Bill Sherman, the best maneuver general of this war and the Wars of American Expansion to follow.

Grant's attrition strategy does not show up at Shiloh. It is integral to his campaigns of 1864 after he is made overall Union Commander. But Shiloh proves Grant is a battlefield commander and his ascent starts on this day. Grant's critics accuse him of being drunk on duty the night before which is why they were surprised, Lincoln just saw a battlefield commander who could take a blow and strike a harder one in return. In 1862 those were hard to come by for the North.

At Shiloh the Union army is badly surprised, soundly beaten and forced to retreat. A series of fortified strong points give the Union army essentially the afternoon to allow the body of the army to escape. From the fortified heights of the Indian Mounds surrounding Pittsburg Landing, Grant is heavily reinforced by Buell using several paddlewheel steam ships to cross the river then the Union counterattacks the next day at dawn.

The problem with the Southern desire to displace the Union Army is as long as Johnston is in control, everyone follows orders. After Johnston's death, everyone starts playing 'I'm the Captain now' and operating independent of an overall commander. Without a unified strategy overseeing the entire battlefield, maneuver is ad hoc at best.