I intend to raid these islands. Raid as in the sense that I do not intend to occupy them for any prolonged period. Get in, get out, that's it. I do not know how I can possibly make myself any more clear.
A strategic decision has to be made - should we postpone the invasion of Sumatra and Java, prepare for a counter-strike and rush to aid the defenders of Hawaii or should we proceed with the current plan in order not to give the Commonwealth forces too much time for reorganisation?
Hard to say, but we estimate that our SAGs and transports will need more than two weeks to get there and this estimate may actually be too optimistic. CTFs can get there faster than SAGs, but they would also have a long way to go from Singapore to Midway or Honolulu.What is the estimated travel time for out (slowest)fleet to Hawaii?
This sounds very risky, especially considering the fact that the CW forces had some time to repair their ships or rebase them to other ports.My immediate intuition is to make a quick strike at the CW base to harvest the damaged ships and then turn on the US.
It may be less decisive than you may think, Admiral. If the Americans choose to land their troops to the west of Honolulu, the bulk of their naval force may then be able to withdraw to the West Coast without even giving our fleets a chance to make a decisive counter-strike. We may soon be forced to transfer our troops to the eastern parts of our defence perimeter.Make no mistake, this battle will be decisive, whatever the outcome. If we prevail, the enemy will lose all hope of defeating us, dramatically changing public opinion on their home front and the upcoming elections. If we fail here, the enemy will think that the fortunes of war have turned and we are as good as done. We can not fail, for failure will inevitably spell doom upon our homes."
It may be less decisive than you may think, Admiral. If the Americans choose to land their troops to the west of Honolulu, the bulk of their naval force may then be able to withdraw to the West Coast without even giving our fleets a chance to make a decisive counter-strike. We may soon be forced to transfer our troops to the eastern parts of our defence perimeter.
You may be correct, although we do not know what is the size of the landing force. If it is sizeable, our garrison troops may not be able to hold the enemy for more than a week.Would the enemy land forces on Hawaii just to leave them to fight and die? I very much doubt that.
We need to send our fleets towards nearby (relative to Hawaii) ports and have them strike at the enemy. We might miss both, the RN and the USN forces, but we surely can not allow Hawaii to be left in the enemies hands.
Yes, our fighters engaged the enemy, but we also believe that not all of the US CAGs had the opportunity to be replenished fully.- Have our air units engaged the enemy already? Some of the enemy CAGs seem to be under-strength.
- Can we move the south-eastern garrison division to Honolulu in time to reinforce the garrison there (as per my request in the last meeting)?
- Can our air wings reach Honolulu's waters from Midway and / or other airbases?
We have to commit our fleets to this battle and without the fleets, the plans for Sumatra and Java will have to wait. Continuing such operations without a naval cover force is uselss. In a best case, we'll lose transports and merchants to the enemy, in a worst case, the whole force involved might be lost.By the time we have reorganised the fleets, and marine corps to sail for Hawaii the battle will have already been concluded more likely than not to whoever s favour. Hence a knee jerk reaction to drop all our other plans would be unwise, since if our garrison does not hold out, then we more than likely will be having to re-invade anyhow.
Men on Hawaii are doing their duty. It's our duty to make the most of their deaths as possible. Fate of individuals is irrelevant when the fate of our whole nation is at stake here.The idea of sacrificing the men on Hawaii is anathema to all what makes us warriors. Furthermore, if we didn't intend to defend them, why did we send them there in the first place?
Or lose ours.At Saipan, we came late, but this time, we might get a chance to bite off the serpents head.
Several islands, including Wake and Midway, would be threatened.Hawaiian Islands are of less importance than one would think - USA can always share ports that belongs to the Commonwealth. It's more important to check out what islands would be in range of the American fleets should Hawaii fall into the hands of the USN.
*Quote from the latest "Influence levels":- How, in detail, are our forces deployed across Pacific?
Pacific Defence Perimeter
Most of our GARs divs are composed of 2 GAR brigades, with the exception of GARs stationed in Japan, on Taiwan and on Truk.
Japan - 10 GAR divs (8 have support brigades - either ARTs or AAs)
The Philippines - 5 GAR divs
The Hawaiian Islands - 4 GAR divs
Phoenix Island - 2 GAR divs
Other islands - 1 GAR div per island
Correction: they may have already dispersed their fleets.As the administration said, the UK dispersed their damaged fleets already
Battleships and transports would need ~2 weeks to get to Midway, but carriers and battlecruisers could get there faster. All in all, if we want to concentrate our forces, then we will need more than 2 weeks to organise a counter-strike, which would postpone the operations in the South Pacific by a month and a half in practice (movement, reorganisation, transportation, repairs etc.). On the other hand, if we postpone the counter-strike, then we will give the Americans time to secure the Hawaiian Islands and reorganise their forces there...There could be the possibility to have our battlefleets sail for Truk and Saipan, then onto Hawaii to see off the American fleets. But the administration would have to advise on time-scales
Needlessly? They'll buy us time we need to finish current operations and reorganize our fleets so we can fight the enemy back. I'd rather ask to follow Sun Tzu code rather than Bushido - to be flexible and know when to give ground and when to strike.I can not believe that you are suggesting that we should needlessly sacrifice the men on Hawaii. They swore and oath to fight for the emperor and die if neccessary. Their fate is not sealed yet and giving in to this percieved fate is not the way of bushido.
I am well aware of that, Admiral.We fight for the survival of our nation here.
If conquest of Sumatra and Java was purposeless then we wouldn't prepare such operation at all.As the administration said, the UK dispersed their damaged fleets already, so the conquest of Sumatra and Java does not serve much of a purpose right now. The fight around Hawaii does serve a purpose however.
Can you guarantee that the Admirality Board will be able to rally fleets in time to sink the US Navy without crippling losses? Can you guarantee that our fleet will win in time to save Hawaii? If answer to any of these question is "I can't" then I see this conversation as void. Lost ground can be recaptured. Sunk ships will not be as easy to replacement. You want to save Hawaii, I want to preserve might of our fleet so it can still defend Japan and the Emperor. Successful defense of Hawaii is meaningless if we lose our navy in the process.We are withnessing a great moment in our history. If you want shrink from it and instead concentrate on sideshow battles, that's your choice. I will not. With the permission of the Emperor, the battlefleets will sail on their own if the other arms choose not to support our men on Hawaii.
It's still dishonorable, both for us to act in such a way and for our nation to leave it's sons alone to die in a meaningless fight. Yes, it's meaningless since we could as well have not garrisoned these islands at all. This will just be a waste of valuable time and resources, both of which we can ill afford.Needlessly? They'll buy us time we need to finish current operations and reorganize our fleets so we can fight the enemy back. I'd rather ask to follow Sun Tzu code rather than Bushido - to be flexible and know when to give ground and when to strike.
Clearly you didn't bother reading the briefings, otherwise you would know why the operation was planned in the first place.If conquest of Sumatra and Java was purposeless then we wouldn't prepare such operation at all.
Strange that the army should come forward and ask for guarantees. How long have we been bogged down in China now? You generals envisaged a relatively short war and yet we're still stick in the midst of it. If your plans had worked in the first place, we would have had the resources to create a much larger fleet. Now, thanks to your poor planning, we are stuck with what we have and I intend to follow the doctrine we have been following for so long now. Engage the enemy elements one after another. Chances are that we will be able to inflict more losses on the enemy as his forces will either be preoccupied with the landings or with the post battle operations.Can you guarantee that the Admirality Board will be able to rally fleets in time to sink the US Navy without crippling losses? Can you guarantee that our fleet will win in time to safe Hawaii? If answer to any of these question is "I can't" then I see this conversation as void.
Garrisons weren't stationed there to repel the attacker as they were too weak for that. Their purpose was to delay the attacker and give the Imperial Japanese Navy time to reorganize and strike back. By the time we'll do so these men will be most likely dead or captured already, so spare me the drama, Admiral. In war such as ours one can't take comfort in morality or honor. We do what we have to.It's still dishonorable, both for us to act in such a way and for our nation to leave it's sons alone to die in a meaningless fight. Yes, it's meaningless since we could as well have not garrisoned these islands at all. This will just be a waste of valuable time and resources, both of which we can ill afford.
Fine. Cancel the operation. But that still doesn't change the fate of Hawaii and sailing there unprepared won't change it either.Clearly you didn't bother reading the briefings, otherwise you would know why the operation was planned in the first place.
I can't be held responsible for plans I didn't made or agreed on.Strange that the army should come forward and ask for guarantees. How long have we been bogged down in China now? [...]
Sheer size of the enemy's fleet. You make Hawaii very important to stability of Japan while - in fact - defeat there will be nothing more than a temporary setback. Setback that'll be easy to correct. It'll make other islands vulnerable for a time being, yes, but I doubt the Americans will conduct another naval invasion so soon and if we plug the breach in time defeat at Hawaii won't matter at all. The point is not to save Hawaii. It's to deal the blow to the USN, then the fate of Hawaii will be sealed regardless if our garrisons will hold.Your assumption that we would lose our fleet is based on... what exactly?
Garrisons weren't stationed there to repel the attacker as they were too weak for that. Their purpose was to delay the attacker and give the Imperial Japanese Navy time to reorganize and strike back. By the time we'll do so these men will be most likely dead or captured already, so spare me the drama, Admiral. In war such as ours one can't take comfort in morality or honor. We do what we have to.
But that still doesn't change the fate of Hawaii and sailing there unprepared won't change it either.
The point is not to save Hawaii. It's to deal the blow to the USN, then the fate of Hawaii will be sealed regardless if our garrisons will hold.
*Everything will be described in the report. I never say what the final plan is before the update is postedGeneral Surts diary on the eve of the awaited US invasion of Hawaii.
Dear Diary, I wonder what the final plan was, today's meeting was a bit chaotic to say the least.