The Year of Returned Hope
Part 11: The Retreat, August 31 – November 10, 1943
Retreating in the face of a superior enemy bearing down upon one’s forces is among the most difficult of military maneuvers. It can also be among the most necessary: fewer things are more wasteful in war than standing in exposed positions needlessly, and paying the price. The commander’s inner eye, his coup d’oeil, must be the judge of the moment to withdraw. There are two basic tendencies in commanders: to be aggressive, and to be defensive. The former concerns what one does to the enemy, and the latter emphasizes what the enemy can do to one’s own forces. The defensive tendency in excess means that the commander rarely manages to impose his will upon the enemy, but can prevent the enemy from imposing his will in turn. Too much aggression, while allowing for the easy imposition of will on a situation, rarely affords the commander the knowledge of boundaries. There comes a time though when even the aggressive tendencies of commanders is overpowered by the necessity of retreat.
And so the retreat began. The Italian position in the Balkans was entirely compromised. The Soviets had torn a hole in the Italian line that stretched from Belgrade to the northern frontier of Greece. Their spearheads were still largely alone and possibly easily isolate-able, however, so Mussolini threw in the reserve he had slowly built up: the new 9a Armata, under General Amedeo Duca degli Abruzzi. His army was not even fully formed yet, and comprised only a single corps of partially unready formations, but to Mussolini it was worth the gamble. They were landed in southern Illyria and began pushing forward in an attempt to get behind one advancing Soviet vanguard infantry formation. At the same time, however, Pintor and Vercellino began withdrawing southward. Vercellino had to disengage Cei’s mobile corps from the superior forces that were engaging it, and Pintor’s army had to evacuate the salient that had formed along the Greek panhandle. The way north was not barred, but unless Amadeo accomplished astonishing success then the closure of the coastal roads was only a matter of time. The two army commanders conferred with each other and with Quilicci, and began withdrawing southward, toward Athens, on the 4th of September.
Pintor and Vercellino retreating into Greece.
Within a week, by the 11th, it was obvious that Amadeo’s nascent army could not accomplish what was expected, much less hoped, of it. The Soviets managed to bring up sufficient forces in time to deny Amadeo the opportunity to do more than simply threaten the Soviet spearheads with temporary discomfort and minor, meaningless bloodshed. Amadeo’s 9a Armata thus began withdrawing northward, along with the corps and army headquarters of Graziani’s and Bastico’s armies. They were preparing for the return of their corps and armies to their old lines of defense in northern Illyria. The five Italian armies in the southeast of Europe were being split apart, with three in the northern corner and two in its southern reaches.
The retreat of various headquarters, and Amadeo’s 9a Armata, northward back up Illyria.
The real withdrawal of the northern armies began three days later, on the 14th. If the Soviets had had mobile forces in the north of the gap they had torn, and the will to use them in deep operations which would have to be assumed given their successes thus far, they could have drastically interfered with the withdrawal of the twenty-two divisions from the frontlines in Dacia. Fortunately for the Italians, these hypothetically-placed Soviet forces remained so. Despite the relatively narrow and vulnerable gap the Italians had to squeeze through, there were no Soviet forces in place to deny them transit. The Italians would pass the plausible gauntlet, and reform their armies in the north.
The retreat of the frontline units of Graziani’s and Bastico’s armies from Dacia.
In the south, the Soviets had kept up the pressure, which they had failed to do in the north. On the 12th of September, five fresh Soviet divisions, including two marine formations, attacked three Italian divisions. These Italian divisions, though in good condition, immediately disengaged and continued their withdrawal southward. Five Soviet divisions amounted to fifteen brigades, as opposed to the six that the Italians could possibly field in that fight. Soviet numbers had been dramatically demonstrated. Three days later, on the 15th, the first evacuations began from Athens: the headquarters units of Vercellino’s army. By this day, the Soviets had reached the Adriatic Sea, and thus officially cut the two armies in Greece off from those in the north. Italian transports were there, however, to rescue the two armies. In three trips, the entirety of the two armies were evacuated from Athens and transported northward to the port at Zadar.
An early trip during the evacuation of Greece.
By the 10th of October the old line in Illyria had been reformed and, unlike the first time, the Soviets had quickly closed to bump up against it. Four Italian armies were now stationed on the line, as opposed to the three at the beginning of the year. Amadeo’s army had joined the line, and his army would grow to two corps in the two months to come. The new line was now denser than the old, though this was hardly the objective of the operation. Nevertheless, Italy was possibly safer from invasion at this point than eleven months previously. The Soviets meanwhile, seemed to have bulked up their forces opposite the Italian line by the 10th of November. Perhaps they had learned that the Italians were dangerous, or perhaps Italian intelligence was imagining things, as rough comparisons with intelligence estimates in January seemed to show little change. Nevertheless, there were once again a large number of Soviet divisions a short hop away from Italy, though such a hop was less likely that before.
Back to the old line.
Vercellino’s army, however, was not included in the defensive line. It was instead sent to Taranto, on Italy’s heel. Mussolini had learned from the offensive of the year and was already laying plans for next year. All he needed was time to amass the necessary forces. With the Soviets quiescent in Illyria, this was what he hoped he would get.
