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I ask that all Chileans do not vote within the confines of this maneuver but instead vote against it. Considering the president has not the constitutional power to simply hold a vote that only has these two choices you are being presented with, you should treat it as any undesirable legislation and vote against it.
 
I would far prefer to settle this Chief of Staff matter in a Constitutional manner, rather than adhering to the ideas of only one man. Therefore, to definitively put the issue to rest, I call for an immediate Congressional vote of Confidence regarding the ability of General Rios to do his job.

Additionally, I would ask that President de Conti and all others who have submitted legislation concerning the issue withdraw their suggestions in favor of this simple, Constitutional route.

Senator Alejandro Ruiz de Escovedo
 
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I would far prefer to settle this Chief of Staff matter in a Constitutional manner, rather than adhering to the ideas of only one man. Therefore, to definitively put the issue to rest, I call for an immediate Congressional vote of Confidence regarding the ability of General Rios to do his job.

Senator Alejandro Ruiz de Escovedo
That is in no way constitutional, what is constitutional is the Chief of Staff assigning his generals and the President asigning his.
 
There is nothing constitutional about it, Senor Salazar. The purview of the Chief of Staff is not enshrined in the Chilean Constitution, but the Chief of Staff Act. And this act makes it very clear that army appointments must be made with the consensus of both the President and the Chief of Staff. For the Chief of Staff to unilaterally assign army positions is highly irregular, and possibly illegal.

I would have preferred to settle this issue in the traditional manner. But what can I do when the Chief of Staff has sworn against me, rejected my compromise and broken off further negotiations? If the Chief of Staff refuses to do his duty, then we are faced with two options: either a legislative solution from Congreso, or a vote of confidence in the Chief of Staff. I would like to resort to neither. But when the alternative is military anarchy, a solution must be provided to this crisis.

If you would prefer, Senor Salazar, for the Chief of Staff to do his duty as Chief of Staff, then you must speak to him and not me. It was not I who ended our correspondence. It was not I who abandoned the path of consensus in favour of the path of conflict. There may still be reconciliation, if Senor Rios returns to the table. But if he will not sit down with me, then I shall be forced to take a stand.

- President Charles Maximilien de Conti
 
I support the solution presented by the Supreme Court. Let the president and the CoS both appoint some generals, and let's get this ugly Argentinians business over with. The coup attempt by the president failed, let's leave it with that.
 
I have informed the Speaker of my Commanders and the disposition of their Armies and will await further developments.

General Rios
Chief of Staff
 
I pray only that General Rios will do his duty and appoint men of valour and ability, not his political proteges.

- President Charles Maximilien de Conti
 
I hereby announce my leave from the Communist Party of Chile. Maybe Rios is right, but I think it is best for me to stay unaffiliated for the moment.

- General Remedio Hakkihäälenin
 
I pray only that General Rios will do his duty and appoint men of valour and ability, not his political proteges.

- President Charles Maximilien de Conti

I can assure you Senor that the men I have appointed are just as capable as the men you wished to appoint. AS you once said I have appointed men blind to colour or creed. although I well remeber what happened after you said that....

General Rios
 
I'm still having a back-and-forth with Rios ((rudders10)) about this whole appointments thing, so in the meantime here's a clarification:
PMs can't be used as a basis for arresting or trying someone in the thread, but if you're plotting a coup, the publication of your schemes isn't likely to do you any favors. You'll just have to try not to PM people who are likely to expose you.

EDIT: As for what I'm waiting on, Rudders has named some generals but not which armies they're in charge of...
 
"I seek clarification from 'General' Rios on the matter of his appointments. Why is it that although the Presidente has managed to make public his appointments, the Chief of Staff has not?"

Severiano Miramontes
 
I weas unable to make my appointments as the means of communication (telegraph) kept crashing all day and I was unable to contact the people in the field :) They have now been done.
 
I dont believe the President has made his public yet although i may be mistaken on that?


Edit - Apologies, I see that he has.
They are as follows.

2nd Army of the Republic ((30 brigades (17 inf 10 art 3cav)) – General Hakkihäälenin
Metropolitan Army ((20 brigades (15 inf 3art 2cav)) – General Gonzalez

Navy - Admiral Alvarez.

This disposition of forces will protect the capital from the right reactionaries.

General Rios
 
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"Now that you have made your appointments, can you make them public?"

Severiano Miramontes

I'd be happy to.

Army of Patagonia ((18 brigades (10inf 6art 2cav))) – General Hidalgo ((MastahCheef))
1st Army of the Republic ((8 brigades (5inf 2art 1cav)) – Colonel de Porto ((Zagoroth))
2nd Army of the Republic ((30 brigades (17 inf 10 art 3cav)) – Remedio Hakkihäälenin ((Dyranum))
Metropolitan Army ((20 brigades (15 inf 3art 2cav)) – Jesus Gonzales ((yourworstnightm))
Panama Canal Garrison ((8 brigades (5inf 3art)) - Colonel Rivera ((AtomicSoda))
Navy - Admiral Alvarez ((Gloa))
Capital Guard ((12 brigades (9inf 3art))
 
"Ah ha. Having condemned de Conti for politicising the army, Rios now does the exact same. I firmly believe, based on my military experience, that the army should be united. Conti's plan is consistent. Rios' plan creates a considerable division."

Severiano Miramontes
 
The 1896 Constitutional Crisis​

President De Conti inherited a military in a state of tremendous turmoil, and his inability to exercise his powers as commander in chief immediately greatly frustrated him. The General Martin Schmidt's Coup, which continued until mid-May, tied up both the Army of the Republic and Rios' Army of the North as they encircled Schmidt. With the battle finally over and Schmidt dead, Rios' daring victory finally convinced the Congreso to appoint him over his rivals to the position of Army Chief of Staff, a move that De Conti initially supported but that he soon came to regret. In their first early June meeting regarding De Conti's plans for the appointment of a series of new generals - a meeting that ended in Rios' storming out of the room, accusing De Conti of only wishing to appoint radical reactionary officers to high positions within the military.

After consultation with the newly appointed Minister of Defense and outgoing general Matteo Saez, De Conti chose to appoint his own generals anyway, and when Rios refused to sign and deliver the commissions, De Conti ordered the Defense Ministry to relay the appropriate orders without the Chief of Staff's consent. The result was chaos. General Hidalgo received his unilateral re-appointment to the Army of Patagonia in good stead, but General Jesus Gonzales of the Reserve Army - when confronted with a presidentially appointed General Rivera - refused to stand aside on the grounds that the papers lacked the Chief of Staff's signature and retained control of the re-tasked Metropolitan Army. Rivera instead relieved the departing general Saez of the Canal Zone. Similarly, Rios himself refused to cede control of the Army of the North (to become the Army of Arica) to Ferrari on the same official grounds. The respected and honorable Admiral Eduardo Alvarez sent back his own reappointment papers to the President with his written objections. All in all, nearly two-thirds of the military establishment refused to accept the President's appointments without the consent of the Chief of Staff.

The crisis did not reach the public's attention until De Conti attempted to appoint De Porto to command the Army of the Republic, stationed just northwest of Santiago, calling De Porto a 'Colonel', not a general, in an attempt to circumvent Rios' statutory authority. The result was a split in the army: Just under half agreed to follow De Porto's orders to relocate to Mendoza, the other 3/5 of the army instead choosing to remain in Vina Del Mar in protest over the appointments. Rios arrived in Vina Del Mar with the Army of the North and joined the two armies to form the new 2nd Army of the Republic a week later.

At last, Rios was left with a decision: while he had not "appointed" either Alvarez or Gonzales, since they were already appointed and merely continuing in their previously legally assigned capacities, the 2nd Army of the Republic would require a general. Rios himself, as the Chief of Staff, could not fill that role, so he instead appointed Remedio Hakkihäälenin, a dark horse officer with known leftist tendencies.

The splitting of the Army of the Republic finally alerted the public to the growing constitutional crisis, and the Congreso met in emergency session in early July in an attempt to find a solution, but their early votes were stonewalled by confusion over the scope of the Congreso's power to allocate troops and procedural blocks from all quarters. Meanwhile, Rios - who had initially gained public sympathy from the President's perceived illegal actions - lost considerable face when General Hidalgo of the Army of Patagonia came forward with correspondence he claimed to have received from Rios, advocating the overthrow of the Republic. With the deadline for war with Argentina looming, a divided military (albeit it one still following his orders, if not taking his commissions), and rumors of coup swirling, De Conti began his term as President of the Republic.
 
This disposition of forces will protect the capital from the right reactionaries.

General Rios

I know you are afraid of the right, and we in the right are afraid of you.. but couldn't you just leave that matter be for some time, until the war with Argentina is over? Having those armies, the largest ones in the whole armed forces and the entirety of our fleet, away from the argentininan enemies but instead guarding the capital is something very ineffective for the war. I am not a tactician or a general, just a holy man, but I know that having 70% of our forces defending the capital from a unprobable coup isn't going to do this war any favours...
 
This is a travesty. The Army of the Republic split in half because two people cannot agree, half of my army no less. The problem has not even been resolved, only put on the dust burner.

General de Porto.