Advance, Australia Fair - Australia in the time of the Atom (NWO)

Hello!

I'll be whipping up the first post shortly. I was messing around with Australia in NWO and wondered about a few what-if's, and decided to pursue it. That said - this will be a largely narrative affair and light on game mechanics. In terms of events, that's not my particular forte though one or two may pop up - that is unless people want to throw in random events!

Either way, I hope you enjoy my foray down alternate history lane. It is of course, my hope, that a viable suspension of belief can be achieved with semi-decent writing . I also apologise for any obvious mistakes, being not Australian!

The separation of the world into East vs. West marked the opening moves of the "Cold War" and the marking of the period that came to define the success of Communism in Europe and Asia, particularly in respect to the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War. In Europe, the Iron Curtain as it was famously described fell across the continent. In particular, the overt assistance offered to the Communist Rebels in Greece marked a significant change in position for the Soviet Union, who, after the failure of the Berlin Blockade, were willing to up the stakes far beyond what had been initially expected.

The Greek Civil War had largely remained quiet until the late 40's - the rapid success achieved with support from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union throughout 1949, culminated with the capture of Thessaloniki and the Siege of Athens. Despite President Truman's efforts to support the Greek Government without triggering a global conflict - the Fall of Athens two months later marked the exodus of the Greek Government to Crete and the overall success of the Greek Partisans in their campaign to form a Communist State in the Greek peninsula.

Whilst most assumed the legitimate Greek Government, at least as recognized by Australia, would remain in power in absentia on Crete and the Aegean Islands, a rapid but devastating series of domestic revolts throughout the Aegean, Communist agitation in Irakleion and much of Crete marked the end of the Hellenic Republic and the entrance of the Democratic Republic of Greece as a recognised state - The Democratic Republic of Greece would ultimately become a member of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. It is in these circumstances one can understand Turkey's quick agreement to NATO Membership several years earlier and the environment in which Australia viewed events in Asia.


The Continued turmoil in the world, and that which was ongoing in China was echoed in Korea - where the two states set up by the opposing sides of the ideological conflict entered into a state of war with the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Woefully under-equipped, the Republic of Korea was pushed back to a pocket around the port of Busan within a few weeks of the opening of the conflict. With the Soviet Union blocking any UN led action, unilateral American and allied support - including a token Australian Force that arrived during the Busan Breakout managed to push North Korean forces back across the former border through the course of a year of bloody conflict.

The Resolution of the Chinese Civil war in the favour of Mao and his communists in early 1951 marked a possible end to such success, however, and the ultimate Chinese intervention in mid 1952 saw Australian Forces switched from assisting in the gruelling advance to assisting in the evacuation of Korean and Foreign Nationals from the country as below the radar Soviet Aid and overt Chinese military intervention pushed the multi-national task force all the way back to Busan in a repeat of the success achieved by North Korea although now backed by hundreds of thousands of arguably veteran Chinese troops. The withdrawl of US and allied troops marked the end of the Republic of Korea's short-lived existence and made it clear to Australian politicians that it could not rely on the efforts of its allies alone.

With low intensity conflict brewing in Vietnam, Soviet Support of Kurdistan in former Iranian territory and its refusal of withdrawl from the corridor, alongside the possible flashpoint that was the Taiwan Straits and the Success of Pakistan in the Kashmir war saw long hard looks taken at Australian military affairs.


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The British pursuit of a nuclear deterrent had been one which Australia had viewed with interest. With the United States of America less than willing to part with technical details relating to Nuclear Weaponry itself, the British Government had ultimately decided to do so unilaterally. The Australian Government had placed itself at the services of the United Kingdom for the purposes of testing a nuclear device as well as potential delivery programmes via the Woomera Facility and a new rocketry facility near Alice Springs - the latter becoming a core part of the new Australian Military Program. The popularity of such a move was, arguably, widespread amongst the Australian populace of the time, and there was no meaningful vocal opposition. In October 1952, the British tested their first nuclear weapon in Australian territory and marked their entry into the nuclear powers.

Given the "domino" effect Australia was witnessing in regards to the spread of Communism, it is not without surprise that the Australian Government under Menzies made a considered proposal to the United Kingdom regarding its own possible Nuclear Program. While the exact details of such a proposal still remain classified, the reality of the United Kingdom's acceptance of that proposal is evident. The Woomera Testing Range became the centre of Australian nuclear development - a development which was contingent on co-operative development with the United Kingdom and the success of a joint rocketry program. The Opening of the Uranium mine at Uranium Hill marked the true beginning of the Australian Nuclear Program, with its product shared between the United Kingdom, United States and Australia, the supply of such programs was secured.

It is therefore completely understandable the environment in which Australia's proposed involvement in the Dutch East Indies can be considered a logical extension of the Anglo-Australian partnership. Indonesia had been a considerable drain on Dutch resources - and it was British support that had largely ended the Indonesian independence movements that had killed thousands of Europeans and Indonesians themselves. As it was, British support was waning and the Netherlands had largely cut its losses. The Java Cheque, as it came to be known, afforded Australia the same involvement Britain had provided - and drove the Dutch East Indies, such as it remained, into the arms of Canberra.

The ultimate goal of orderly Indonesian Independence was one Australia desired, knowing in full the spectre of Communism was one which could loom out of the Islands of Indonesia if given the chance. As such, Australian military involvement was light but carefully accorded - and influenced the build up that followed. The Independence agreement devised between the Dutch East Indies, Indonesia itself, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands set up a transitional government throughout Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan and the Celebes - barring the establishment of "Fort Kangaroo" in contested territory on Kalimantan. In the case of Western New Guineau - which had arguably become the sanctuary for Dutch nationals in Indonesia - petitioned Australia for protection - and then statehood within the Commonwealth. The eventual accession of Western New Guineau saw similar protections and rights afforded to Eastern New Guineau - and ended talk of Australian "decolonization" and arguably marked the handing of the baton of the security of the British Empire come Commonwealth in Asia, with British Military power projection now dependent on Australian agreement and forces stationed in Hong Kong.

The Secret Clauses of the Java Cheque - notably - the neutralization of Communism before it manifested lies at the heart of the Indonesian Intervention and can be attributed with the success of the re-organization of the Australian Military and the expansion of its Naval Forces. It was in light of these conditions, the continued dissent of the Unions in Australia itself and the seeming accommodation of Indonesian Communists by the post-transitional Indonesian leader Sukarno that framed the position that the Australian Cabinet found itself in 1956.

As January Progressed, it became apparent in Canberra that any peaceful resolution to the vague and nebulous conditions that defined Australian involvement in Indonesia would not come to pass. The Deployment of the Australian flagship - the light carrier, HMAS Vengeance off the coast of Indonesia signalled the escalation of the matter to an outbreak of war. On paper, the commitment of over a hundred thousand troops to the Intervention, primarily Royal Australian Marines and the lions share of Australian military capacity in an era of build up, was considered extravagant and unnecessary - particularly against Indonesia, whom marshalled only 4 standing infantry divisions and a handful of aged tactical bombers, with no naval presence to speak of. In retrospect, we must consider that the Australian military fully expected to encounter civilian resistance, and given the population of Indonesia at the time had reached around eighty million, the commitment can be understood.

However, as history tells us, the Indonesian regime was unstable at best, and civilian resistance was negligible outside of Java and Kalimantan. From the Eve of the Intervention on February 11th, 1956, to halfway through the military operations in early July, Australian troops occupied Sumatra and Celebes, as well as most of Kalimantan before deploying to Java and facing Indonesian military units. With the support of the HMAS Vengeance, however, Australian troops entered Batavia - modern Jakarta - within several days and by November, Indonesia was fully occupied and had surrendered to Australia without conditions. The Success of Australian elite units and the invaluable support provided by a carrier would shape the 1960 Australian Military review and the continued low-level Australian build up.

Ongoing insurgent activity, predisposed towards communist activity in Kalimantan however provided a semblance of legitimacy to the whole endeavour. However, the events in Indonesia were largely overshadowed by events in Europe - as the Hungarian revolution spectacularly challenged and accordingly failed against Soviet might. It was thus inevitable that Australia became one of those nations to offer aid to Hungarian refugees.


This afforded tremendous freedom to Australia and its initial hastily erected occupational administration that, in some cases, relied on former Dutch colonial officials which earnt few friends. By the time of Indonesia's surrender these affairs had mostly been remedied and Australia faced only the Kalimantan insurgency as credible threats to the Occupation of Indonesia in a military capacity. The Australian government had, however, acted unilaterally and as such could expect little support in that matter from neighbouring nations or its supporters for obvious, and some less so, reasons.

The Indonesian Occupation arguably posed a challenge to Australia at the time, both logistically and militarily, as a nation of only a fair 10 million or so - though rapidly growing - the upkeep of a military force that numbered 2% of the population and was likely to approach 3 to 4 posed significant domestic problems as well, as such, the occupation of a nation eight times as populated was not an option particularly well regarded, though a number of radicals floated the idea of an occupation without end. There was significant back and forth between the primary options, that of simply dealing with the Communists once and for all and bringing Australian troops home - or occupying Kalimantan to battle the insurgency and displaying leniency elsewhere, establishing an independent but closely watched Indonesia.


The ultimate course of action can be best described by the words of General C.S. Steele;

"We occupied this place on the intent of preventing Communism from threatening Australia's security, now, by god, we aren't here to set up a new colonial administration, so lets deal with the problems we've got and let the Indonesians do their bit for the cause!"

Australian leniency only went so far, however, and as can be discovered in files that are less publicly displayed - several prominent members of Indonesia's political establishment were quietly dealt with, though, notably, Sukarno was released without charge. The new Indonesian Government was now beholden to Australia - and the manpower available greatly profited Australia's longer-term plan of dealing with the Kalimantan problem, as well as providing a more secure buffer against the advance of Communism, now secured in China and the Korean Peninsula and threatening the Vietnamese government. The growing realisation that the United Kingdom could no longer solve the worlds problems - in particular - the ongoing Suez Crisis, painted a very particularly displeasing picture for Australia.

All in all, the start of 1957 marked the emergence of Australia as one of the key players in the ideological conflicts that buffeted the latter half of the 20th Century.

I note with great irony that I said I wouldn't make many events but have gone and made a few to trigger at appropriate times, such as the two displayed so far. I'd say they wont be as prominent, but they most likely will. At some point It would be fun to get a little bit of interactivity, but for the moment I'm largely manoeuvring myself into a good position.

The Australian Nuclear Program is one rooted in a sense of partnership and assistance, as a member of the former British Empire come Commonwealth, but one more firmly positioned as a reality of Australian deterrence. If the Soviet Union and United States could deter a possible global conflict, and if the United Kingdom and, as evidenced later, France, amongst other nations, could determine such deterrence as a valuable element of national security - so too must Australia. This, primarily, was underscored by the British desire to maintain prestige in Asia, easily underwritten by a more intervention willing and militarily minded Australia. With an Australian deterrent, so too was the United Kingdom's interests secured - a mutually beneficial arrangement for all involved. The fall of the United Kingdom from Superpower to European Leader following the Suez Crisis, if nothing else, influenced elements of the British Government to pursue such a partnership and friendship policy with more vigor that had, most likely, first been intended.

The first Australian Atomic test at Maralinga performed within means - with a higher detonation than the initial British test off the coast of Western Australia, but less than similar tests conducted throughout the late 50's by Britain, and once again by Australia. It would be in the sixties that both Britain and Australia performed thermo-nuclear weapons tests, virtually in sync, that signalled the culmination of the Atomic partnership and largely signalled the end of co-operative nuclear development, though Australia and Britain would remain committed to each other in this regard.

It was on the tail of the end of the Indonesian Intervention and the reality of viable Nuclear Technology that the 1960 Australian Naval Review, perhaps notable for occurring in 1958 rather than the eponymous 1960, that marked the ascension of the Australian Navy in the Pacific. The Commission of 6 British Designed and manufactured (bar two constructed in Australia herself under license) Oberon Class Submarines - and the addition of 6 Australian designed and manufactured SSN designs came to be the underpinning of the review, noting the capability of Australian dockyard construction abilities and the viability, in the latter, of Australian design. The Australian Naval Review of 1960 (1958) placed a number of demands upon the state, noting that Australian defence, and proactive measures, such as evidenced in the Indonesian Intervention, were contingent both on a larger and more capable navy built around the abilities of Carrier's and their capabilities.

It was in such a circumstance that some of the more well known Australian ships were laid down, of note, the HMAS Captain Cook, a modern carrier design that would take 3-4 years to complete, complimented by the HMAS Carpentaria, as well as the numerous support ships and the commission of the Melbourne Class line of carrier, capable of fielding an air arm and offering Helicopter support, the new buzzword of the military. The HMAS Carpentaria is noted for, at the time, being a considerable and largely theoretical investment. While the United States was approaching the design of its first nuclear powered aircraft carrier, the Enterprise, Australia approached the applications of nuclear naval applications with similar enthusiasm. Whilst expected to take longer to build and costlier than the United States own foray, the Carpentaria was envisioned as a flagship for the Royal Australian Navy that would serve throughout the latter years of the upcoming sixties, in particular, diversifying from the standard design of the HMAS Captain Cook and the three Melbourne Class hulls laid down in 1958 and 1959. Arguably, many today consider that such a move, though unpopular at the time, contributed greatly to Australian manufacturing and research capabilities, as well as securing an Australian position as a naval power in the Pacific.


An element of continued concern in Australia was that of the ongoing Vietnamese struggle with Communist Guerilla's - despite the United States commitment to full and immediate involvement in the theatre - Australia viewed the inability of both Vietnam to secure its own borders, and that of seeming American complicity in regards to Cuba with an element of disdain. It is perhaps, understandable, that Australian relations with the United States suffered throughout the late 1950's, where despite a relatively strong military partnership and a growing economic interdependence, Australia's government saw the United States as either unwilling or seemingly incompetent, a somewhat unfair judgement, considering the threat Cuba posed was minimal and the successes in Vietnam, early on, were rapid and impressive.

If nothing else, the Anglo-Australian partnership was strengthened by this, in particular, one can attribute the continued successes at the Alice Springs Facility and the Woomera Facility as a Australian desire to do things without the involvement of the United States, arguably the pre-eminent western power, while simultaneously strengthening ties with the United Kingdom, an important trade partner and source of valuable immigration for the flourishing Australian state. It is perhaps with little surprise that the Alice Springs Facility would become home to the - at the time - largely ignored Anglo-Australian Joint Space Venture, more commonly referred to today in the context of being the forerunner of the Southern Star Space Agency.


Such good news, was overshadowed by events elsewhere in Asia, notably, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. This Crisis is noted today for a nuanced but notable break in US-Australian military co-operation, mirrored by a noted escalation in the Sino-Soviet degradation of relations and is further notable for the low level of involvement by most states in the arguably glacial conflict.


It is, one must understand, that the environment of continued Communist success around the globe was one that painted an unfortunate picture, particularly for Australia whom could, primarily only rely on agreements with the United States - and to a lesser extent a beholden Indonesia, alongside friends in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The United States, having previously signed a defensive treaty with the Republic of China, typically referred to as Taiwan, therefore seemed obligated to assist Taiwan in its defense against the aggression of the Peoples Republic of China.

This was an obligation that, by most observers own agreement, was not followed through on. With the United States pushing for a peaceful resolution its considerable naval assets and notable ground assets remained committed in Vietnam and to the defense of Japan, with material aid to Taiwan under UN Agreement only. Australia, reliant on a similar treaty with the United States, ultimately, felt a sense of betrayal in the matter, after all, if the United States would not honour a treaty with Taiwan, why would it feel obligated to do so in far less black and white situations that could threaten Australia? Many, of course, can offer a balanced and fair response to such a question with satisfactory results, however, given the world climate of the time, one can only consider with hindsight what such an environment lead the Australian Government to believe.

As 1958 turnt into 1959 with minimal outright conflict in the area however, the Australian position softened, though it did not forget. Given Australian intervention in such an area was subject to the build up born of the 1960 Naval Review - and contingent on at least a like for like increase in military spending in the according 1960 Australian Military Review over-all, coupled with continued Australian involvement in Kalimantan, it is with but with a nuanced understanding one can appreciate the delay of the Australian Official stance outside of protest to Beijing.

However, the dawn of 1960 brought not only a new decade and hope for a peaceful resolution and an end to conflict in Asia, but the accession of both Hollandia and Papua to the Commonwealth.


With the 1960 Naval Review Complete and most of its recommendations implemented and a larger and flexible naval force laid down across the dockyards of Australia, the 1960 Military Review was far less reaching. Australia's Aerial Capcities, largely focused around a handful of fighter, interceptor and naval bomber squadrons as well as the necessary transports needed by its now recruited Paratroopers would receive some attack aircraft, primarily at least one wing of tactical bombers and close air support - the touted strategic bomber deal would also be signed, in particular, however, investment would remain focused on a strategic missile deterrent which had recently born fruit.

Australia would maintain at least 9-12 Marine Divisions indefinitely, as well as several paratrooper brigades, several general purpose infantry divisions and the appropriate spending would be allotted for a possible group of Motorized Regiments, Mechanized Regiments and a smaller armoured corps, manpower permitting. The Australian Military in conjunction with the Indonesian and Australian Government would also investigate the possibility of recruitment from able and willing Indonesian citizens, contingent on a vetting and rewards scheme.

It was as such, that the foundation of the 60's were laid for Australia.


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And we're now into time where I'm actually playing and not much stuff will be happening thats purely driven by me, Huzzah!

Note: The full text of the accession event: "Western Guineau, colloquially refered to as Hollandia State after its white dutch populace and Eastern Guineau, long administered by Australia have both petitioned for statehood within Australia's federal structure. While potentially unthinkable a few years ago, considerable effort has been undertaken to make this reality. These two new states, Hollandia and Papua, now join the Commonwealth of Australia."

The Second Taiwan Straits Crisis had effectively become a low-intensity conflict. The Peoples Republic of China possessed only a small number of surface combatants and lacked the necessary projection to support an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, whilst the Kuomintang on the island remained heavily armed and fortified, but possessed no meaningful ability to effectively render the Peoples Liberation Army Navy inert. The ongoing artillery duels and minor aircraft incursions continued to make the Straits hazardous, and the United States continued push for peace had not been met with much enthusiasm.

The Manila Peace Conference of the Summer of 1960 would ultimately cause the downfall of the Menzies government, though the multi-month discussions that attempted to find a resolution to the RoC-PRC Conflict were largely conducted outside of Australian view, let alone influence - if not only due to the continuing straining of US-Australian relations, particularly in regards to the Vietnam War where greater demands on limited Australian involvement that had come to exist were resisted by the Menzies government, particularly with respect to the ongoing Kalimantan operations.

The Manila Peace Conference is notable for its failure, though largely one could argue that all the right things were said, the right motions followed through until the waning, final gruelling days of meaningful negotiation. The United States had, by and large, offered enough to make a ceasefire, if not a full on peace treaty, appealing to both the RoC and PRC - though neither were getting what they truly wanted. An offhand remark by an Australian observer that "They would get involved if those Yank's couldn't get their act together" had the unintended implication of tacit support ina comment that was not intended to be heard, let alone uttered by an individual specifically sent by the Menzies Government for their tact. Such a blunder caused a scandal in Australia - one that propelled Arthur Calwell to the position of Prime Minister, but further angered the PRC and emboldened the Kuomintang on Taiwan. However, it can truly be stated that this was not the cause of the Conference's failure.


The Soviet Union, riding the wave of prestige granted by Gagarin's successful space flight - turnt its attention back to the European theatre of ideological jockeying and positioning. Pushing the situation in the divided city of Berlin to a fever pitch, the Soviet Union pushed the American's in particular to a point where flinching would equal concession, and countering such moves risked a global conflict but would of potentially curbed the Soviet Union's ambitions in East and West Germany for the time being. As regarded by the Australian Military and Government at the time as "more than unfortunate" - Kennedy flinched.

The resulting debacle, even within NATO, is well documented. Australia, for her part, pointed out the legitimacy of her previous statements regarding the United States, who seemed to be too complacent in its seeming hegemony, and far too eager to appease rather than call even the smallest bluff. The damage, however, even in Australia, was done. The failure of the Manila Conference and the Menzies Government's association with the United States, despite the degradation of relations, would spell doom at the 1961 Australian Federal Elections.


Calwell's Labour Government was, despite a number of domestic policy differences - committed to the sea change in Australian interventionist and militaristic values, though on the latter Calwell preferred invited interventionism and the flexibility of the Navy over other options. For the most part, the Labour Government inherited a growing economy and a reasonable position in world affairs. The Cabinet, however, soon learned of the position that Australia was to find herself in. The Republic of China had, following the Manila Conference, put feelers out to test the proverbial waters with the Australian government, and primarily its military, over whether its words, if spoken out of turn, carried any weight.

The Australian military establishment was, by and large, committed only to a small involvement in Vietnam and a commitment in Kalimantan that was winding down - and given the political and world climate, were itching for a grand display of Australian values as they were now known as well as a more forceful statement on its position towards the continued march of Communism. It was from such things that, a scant few days after the Federal Elections and the Commissioning of the HMAS Melbourne and her sister ships, the Labour Cabinet found itself in a difficult position, another of histories turning points, and arguably the defining one of the generation from which all others stemmed.

One can only wonder what could of been - and can only from a position of hindsight - consider what should have been.



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What do you think? - I have not yet cleared this for any sort of interactivity, so thoughts is very much what I seek, not votes or other such things until otherwise stated . Wouldn't want me to get in trouble, would you?

Ticket Cookie said:

I assume you asked a mod for mild interactivity? I wouldn't want this splendid AAR to have problems for that.

Click to expand...

Oh yes, my mistake. I should clear that up ASAP and prevent any shenanigans.

That said, I like the feedback of peoples thoughts - Though I won't necessarily go along with the majority for fun/stories sake where appropriate.

To provide some context to the overall situation, however, I should do a quick post at some point laying out the military Australia has at its disposal. All in all right now I'm pretty disappointed at how inept the USA is being.

For Cabinet Informational Purposes,
On Behalf of the Australian Defense Department.

What follows is a brief overview of standing Australian forces of relevance to foreign power projection, including but not limited to assets inherited from the former Dutch East Indies via Hollandia and through recruitment in Indonesia.

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Australian Army;

The primary mobile element of the Australian Army, outside of Special Forces, consists of 4 Motorized Regiments, in conjunction with 4 Mechanized Regiments supported by 3 Armoured Brigades. These units as such form the primary thrust and rapid response backbone of the Royal Forces at Australia's disposal. In addition, barring the Twelve infantry divisions available for deployment, in addition to the Six infantry divisions made up of former Dutch East Indies nationals. Twelve Royal Marine Divisions remain, as policy, at Australia's disposal and arguably better defined under the Royal Australian Navy's jurisdiction. In addition, 6 Paratrooper regiments have completed their muster as outlined previously. The addition of Indonesian recruitment policies and Hollandia and Papua state and the uptake of recruitment there greatly increases the potential manpower pool, and it is likely that another twelve to eighteen divisions of infantry could be raised during war time without notable harm to the Australian state's day to day affairs.

In terms of parity, the Australian army remains the largest non-communist military in Asia, approaching a level of strength of parity with Korea and at least considerably capable of out manoeuvring the large but poorly trained Peoples Liberation Army of the PRC.

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Royal Australian Air Force:

The Royal Australian Air Force's greatest asset is its contribution to mobility, notably, the squadrons dedicated to the Paratrooper Regiments mustered prior to the recent Military Review. In Addition, the RAAF possesses Four Fighter Squadrons, Two Interceptor Squadrons, 1 CAS Squadron, as well as 3 Tactical Bomber Squadrons, two of which were inherited from Hollandia, as well as a Strategic Bomber wing obtained under the Arms and Licensing deal agreed with the British. In addition, Australia's primary asset in the air remains 3 Naval Bomber Squadrons - though it is worth noting that several RAAF squadrons are not modernised and require significant investment. However, it is in the Air Force's humble opinion that the several squadrons of modern aircraft it possesses more than matches anything utilized by our neighbours - in particular, the older Soviet designs used in Korea and the large, but notably out of date Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Air Force.

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Royal Australian Navy:

The Royal Australian Navy is the predominant method of Australian power projection, notably, as of Summer 1961, possessing 6 Oberon Class Submarines Commissioned in 1959, 6 Hedland Type SSN's Commissioned in 1960, as well as the first ships laid down in 1958 and 1959 as part of the 1960 (1958) Australian Naval Review. While a notable portion of the naval capability of the RAN lies with the HMAS Vengeance and her task force - arguably capable of resisting most pacific naval powers - and arguably challenging that deployed by the Soviet Union, the HMAS Vengeance is a older carrier commissioned in 1950 - and most of her support ships are typical of this era.

The New Primary force of the RAN currently consists of three modern Melbourne Class light carriers, the HMAS Melbourne, HMAS Cairns and HMAS Augusta. These ships are either supported by or to be supported by the end of this year, 2 Experimental Missile Corvettes, already commissioned, 7 Light Cruisers, already commissioned, as well as 2 Dedicated Large ASW Vessels - currently undergoing Sea Trials. In addition, this force also includes 7 Heavy Cruisers, most of which are commissioned, as well as Three CGN's undergoing sea trials. This force is to be picketed by 5 Modern Guided Missile Destroyers, several frigates and ASW Corvettes and 4 Battlecruisers, the latter of which will be put through trials by the end of October.

The Final element of the Australian Naval Review called for the HMAS Captain Cook, a modern carrier, as well as the HMAS Carpentaria, a venture into nuclear carrier design. The HMAS Captain Cook is to be put through trials at the end of 1961 and the HMAS Carpentaria is likely to do the same sometime later that year - to enter commission either before 1962 or during that year. The Royal Australian Navy as such has largely reached capacity - and is likely to be maintained and upgraded rather than expanded. In the coming decade, we recommend searching for buyers for the HMAS Vengeance and most of her support ships to lessen costs and recoup funds invested - and we posit that Indonesia or a amiable South American power would be viable choices.

The RAN remains more than capable of projecting Australian power in Asia and the Pacific, and is only challenged by the United States of America or a possible naval overhaul from the Soviet Union as of this time.

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Note: Whilst NWO doesnt allow one to actually have regiments/brigades et all, I thought switching it up a little was A) far more logical and B) actually within Australia's means. It is unlikely an Australia at peace would martial 10% of its population for military use, which the game in theory would allow me to do. Its most likely around 5-6% of this Australia's higher than real life population, as im trying to stay at least somewhat realistic outside of war time. That said, realism can get in the way of fun, but i'll try to keep it at least somewhat believable! .

The Australian Government ultimately decided that outright declaring a war, even through another means, was not within Australia's best interests, posing, at best, a challenge to her capabilities. The reaction in Taipei was, all the same, positive. The nature of Australian support was never fully defined, but, for the initial shipments of materiel that arrived unchallenged in the RoC, one could not argue that they were anything other than Humanitarian supplies. While the RoC had receive a great deal of this during the initial conflict's opening - it had, as the conflict lessened in severity - tapered off. The influx of consumer goods and supplies primarily for the civilian population strengthened the position of the Kuomintang and formed a basis of an unusual trade partnership, particularly as Australian military transports began shipping industrial machinery sold just above cost to the fledgling Taiwanese economy.

The reaction in the Peoples Republic of China had been measured and appropriate - they saw Australian support as meddling in the highest order - but were content to let it be provided there were no incidents and Australian "support" consisted of things not directly aiding the RoC's military efforts. It could be argued that given the Australian capacity to enforce, at least, naval superiority in the area was a key element in the PRC's decision. Their continued acceptance of the status quo could further be an element of the unlikely reality of a military solution to the Taiwan problem without significant investment in the PLAN. It is however, accepted, that this situation was part of the series of events that lead to the conflicts in Asia that started in 1962.


The advent of the Sino-Indian War marked a particular change in the People's Republic of China's attitude to Australian shipping to Taiwan. Whilst Australian ships generally avoided the strait - still home to artillery duels and perilous situations in the air - ships of the PLAN began to operate farther into the safer avenues of transport used by foreign governments and independent parties in the albeit limited trade with or supply of Taiwan. While it was not unusual, the instatement of random searches by PLAN ships of non-chinese vessels - determined by the PRC as its right in its own territorial waters, citing that Taiwan was a rogue province, not an independent state - began to pose a challenge to the safe passage of Australian ships.

The escort of Australian transports was largely undertaken by 3 of the 6 Oberon Class Submarines in the Royal Australian Navy. The tense situation following the outbreak of the Sino-Indian War and the uncharacteristic aggressiveness of the PLAN had put a great deal of stress on the escorts, and in several occasions had resulted in near open conflict between the RAN and the PLAN, though each situation seemed to resolve itself peacefully before any great mistake could be made. It was however, under such conditions, that mistakes are inevitable.


The reaction in the Peoples Republic of China was not immediate - and gave a measure of calm before the storm. Australian diplomats in Taipei convened an emergency meeting with the RoC government and military and prepared for the worst possible outcome - a state of open conflict between the PRC and Australia. There were two choices faced by the Peoples Republic of China - it was unlikely that Australia would ever do much more than cement the situation that had already come to pass - Taiwan, for now, would remain independent. They could posture, demand a trial of those responsible for the attack, demand recompense. Yet, arguably, it would weaken their position, challenged as they already were by India - the only bright light in that situation being Australia's quiet condemnation of India's provocation that lead to the conflict in the first place.

The second option open to China was that of open conflict. It would enable their air and sea units to at least interfere with Australian support to Taiwan with minimal losses, at least from a Chinese viewpoint. More importantly for the Politburo in Beijing, it would send a strong and considered message that foreign interference in its affairs and continued provocation would not be tolerated. The only obstacle to an armed conflict declared by China, was the ANZUS Treaty, but given the Australian suspension of its provisions after the Manila Conference, it was no longer a factor in policy making either in Australia or the United States, let alone Mainland China (though it should be stressed that Australia and New Zealand remained committed to each other where appropriate). As it was, the decision came from the top of the Chinese Government. There would be no more acceptance of foreign interference.


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Note: I wrote the flag into the support event to trigger an incident regarding shipping and what have you - with a 50/50 two option event for China to declare war or demand compensation/justice. Looks like they want blood.