the History Channel version laced with a bit of French/British apologism (really, the French and Brits tried very hard to make it as though the Germans were so superior in 1940. In reality, it was discovered by the Americans in 1944 that the French and Brits had completely lied about the Order of Battle of 1940, and the French/British actually had more tanks than the Germans).
Almost there. There was also delay in mobilizing for war that really cost the French in with troop training for their tanks and the production of modern equipment in sufficient quantities in a short period of time. How this works needs some considerable investigation. As you will quickly find out depending on your source (I used Zaloga for example) that the actual modern tanks the French had was about near parity to what the Germans had produced to date. If you include the FT-17 and other essentially older models this is where the figures get a bit misplaced and thus looks like the French had armor superiority. Near parity is probably accurate.
Compounding the French Planning was the lack of foresight in the problems of doing too many things at once even if it appears they had several months to prepare before the attack on the West. When French industry marks a tank as "complete" it merely means most of the tank has been built. This does not mean that the tank itself is ready to be driven to the front right from the factory! There are some essential configuration that were entirely missing once the manufacture completed the core of the tank and that was usually missing weapons or other things the manufacturer had no control over. In other cases turrets were missing. In their case the contract was "done". The only reliable number for a ready tank are those in the tank pool the Army had ensure were ready to be used by field units.
In addition to this, other than a few specifically trained units that acted something like a Panzer Division, most of the newly recruited French Army were simply conscripts. We take for granted that modern equipment made in these days generally should not have as many automotive problems right from the equipment park. Early war tanks frequently broke down, had a number of glaring defects, and otherwise required the crew to know a lot more about their tank than just pretend to being experts on day 1. So what happens is with a fresh conscript army, as soon as that tank breaks down they don't know how to trouble-shoot and fix the vehicle to continue the battle. Instead of having the vehicle fall into enemy hands the tanks usually were sabotage or blown up with the crew walking back. This is also mirrored on the Eastern Front as Soviet conscripts also could not repair and blew up their tanks in the largest tank battle of the war in the Brody-Dubno area. The Soviet Union had time to correct this training gap and we see the turn around in the winter of '42-43 where the tank crews have enough training to not waste such precious war material just because their tanks broke down and they could not get it back into running condition.
The Wehrmacht in comparison have a wealth of experience and training that far out weighted the amount of conscript armies in the minds of the French military had in mind or looking at the paper strength. After all, for inventing the swarm theory with legions of FT-17s in the First World War, there was not too much taken into account the learning needed for new equipment for this conscript army that managed to lose many tanks and ended up fighting in a penny packet manner, without infantry support in many cases. Also, the Wehrmacht had enough support personal and sufficiently trained crew so that many of the loses they had could be recovered so long as the vehicle was not totally destroyed and thus a complete write-off. After all, the mobilization of the Austrian Anchluss or the Czech integration also gave enough experience to the crews in terms of breakdown and maintenance required so they can tweak the amount of support required from such large armored formations blitzing in these countries with hilly terrain. The French had ZERO experience of that scale prior to the outbreak of war for the rest of the Army to catch up.
NOW, what the Wehrmacht learned from the French Campaign, besides the inadequate gun of the 37mm AT gun (also used in the Mark 3), was that they dedicated TOO MUCH ARMOR to a handful of their panzer divisions and not enough armored defense spread out through out the rest of the essentially horse-drawn divisions that could stop an armored counter attack when they ocurred. After all, the majority of the non-Panzer divisions had to make due with Flak 88s as the door knocker 37mm wasn't up to the task if they were hit with a French tanks supporting their infantry units. To facilitate a better flexible mix to any situation on the battlefield, this gap was rectified, as best they could, prior to the start of Barbarossa on an attempt to standardize the Panzer Arm with the removal of the Panzer I, replacing the divisions with the up-gunned Panzer IIIs, and trying to produce many 50mm AT guns (which the infantry still largely had the 37mm guns). The TO&E in Barbarossa had an essentially better equipped army than it did in the French campaign removing the chief obsolete vehicle, the Panzer I, from most frontline duty. The stop-gap Panzer II filled a niche supporting the more numerous Panzer IIIs, IVs, and Pz38s and did hold a good account of itself in recce role in the early part of the Eastern Campaign being adequate against the BTs and T-26s. Now there was a lot more infantry to support the amount of tanks in the division so it achieved the goal of being a very mobile and effective strike force able to seize an objective and hold it.
