The Portuguese Caribbean
The Caribbean as of 1600. Note that the Portuguese held, through their alliances with the tribes of the Caribbean islands, nearly all of the approaches to the Gulf of Mexico. However this indirect rule was especially fragile, as evinced by the encroachment of French influence into the Bahamas starting in 1590
Ever since Christobal Colombus landed on what became Cuba in 1496, the Caribbean had been the center of European colonial wealth. Sugar, coffee, liquor and gold flowed from this small island chain into the courts of the Kings of Europe. By 1580, money from Hispaniola alone had accounted for more than a third of Portugal’s treasury, making it a more profitable colony by far than Brasilia or the Kingdom itself. But Hispaniola wasn’t the only Portuguese colony in the Caribbean at the time; in fact it was the center of a veritable empire by 1600, an empire that was on the verge of collapse. This section will discuss the growth of the Portuguese empire in the Caribbean, as well as the factors that led to the colony’s loss in the War of Hispaniola.
Portugual’s colonization of the New World started with the Treaty of Algarve between Spain and Portugal (the two leading naval powers of the time), which divided the Latin American continent into two halves—the Eastern half would be colonized by Portugal, the Western half would be colonized by Spain. This affected Portugal’s early colonization in two key ways:
1. The Caribbean, excluded from the treaty, became the focus of Portuguese efforts in the late 16
th century.
2. This colony, as well as the Brasilia colony, was created in the context of a complete lack of military competition from other great powers.
The Caribbean islands were a huge temptation for any colonizing power—its islands were small, rich, and easy to dominate with garrisons; its natives were less militaristic than the native tribes of North America or the kingdoms of the East, and the sea’s position at the mouth of the trans-Atlantic trade routes made it easily accessed from Europe. These factors made the Caribbean the stomping ground of the great colonial powers in the 17
th century, but it also made the region easy pickings for the Portuguese colonial empire.
A map of the Brasilia colony, circa 1570. Brazil was largely ignored until the Treaty of Trinidad, after which the colony became the main driver of the ailing Portuguese economy
Growth
The Portuguese model of colonialism was very different than the French, English, or even Spanish model. Unlike the French and the Spanish, the Portuguese deployed relatively few military assets to her colonies—the largest troop concentrations were a 600 man garrison on the tip of northern Brazil and a 1,000 man army deployed in the Caribbean—and unlike the English, who made great pains to homogenize her colonies (leading to a long and arduous war against the Cherokee and Iroquois), the Portuguese were content with using native American forces to do most of the ‘heavy lifting’ of the colonies while the white settlers remained at the head of a complicated administrative hierarchy.
These natives weren’t forced into the Catholic faith, they weren’t asked to learn Portuguese or put into schools. The Portuguese system was a relatively simple one: they traded their manufactured goods for the valuable goods of the New World, and taught the Indians several technological processes (the process of distilling liquor, or of creating molasses, spread rapidly through South America after European contact).
This system worked very well for what it was—Portuguese merchants soon traded across the whole of the West Indies, and this trade system grew into a system of political interdependence once the Portuguese started trading arms to the natives. Best yet, the system required very little actual colonization and imposed few administrative costs—the only actual Portuguese settlements by 1600 in the West Indies were in Hispaniola and Puerto Rico. But from Hispaniola and Maranhao, a network of Portuguese traders, administrators, and plantation owners controlled an area which was larger than Portugal by multiple magnitudes.
Overreach
The Battle of Tunis. In 1590 the largess of the Portuguese treasury had convinced king Manuel IV to embark on a crusade against the Ottoman viceroy in Tunisia. The war was won, but its effects led to Portugal’s massive loss in the West Indies
While the Portuguese system worked well for what it was—a mercantile empire designed with cost effectiveness in mind—its swift success soon overwhelmed the minds of the royal bureaucrats looking west from Lisbon. Letters to Manuel IV and the King’s speeches themselves indicated an increasing level of imperial arrogance, with the widespread belief that Portugal’s trade dominance over the West Indies could be turned into a military dominance, putting Portugal in an advantaged position over Spain, and the thought that wealth from the New World could be used to fund imperial adventures in the Old World.
This imperial arrogance also came from Portugal’s secluded position in the corner of Europe. Without sizable Protestant minorities or any real part to play in Germany’s wars of religion, Manuel IV had spent most of his time growing rich, sending colonists and merchants to the new world, and offering highly profitable loans to the Spaniards. But Manuel was not content with this; he saw that his country was the richest in the known world but that it had little to show for it: its culture was not lauded, its soldiers not prideful, its territories languished in obscurity. So, in 1602, Manuel decided to spend the money gained from the West Indies to fund a massive fleet of galleys and light transports, and he reorganized his soldiers into Legiones, who fought in the Swiss style, and with this massive new military, Manuel declared war on the Turk with the aim of the conquest of Tunis.
Manuel IV was an otherwise sensible and levelheaded man who was seduced by the glory that his wealth could give him. Paulo Machiavelli, who was Italy’s ambassador to France at the time, was known to call him “the slave of fortune”
The war went well at first. Portuguese galleys and galleons were growing to be more advanced than their Ottoman rivals, and several Italian states joined the war, worried at what capital they would lose should Manuel fail. Francisco Erno, grand admiral of the Venetian republic, became the commander in chief of the operation. This was for the best, as the Venetian navy was easily one of the most experienced navies in the world at the time, and Erno was an old hand, trained under fire in the use of mixed operations during his wars with Barbary pirates. But Erno was also, most importantly, not Portuguese, and he had no loyalty to the arrogant king of Portugal. So he used the Portuguese navy as bait, sending them to fight the Turks and then retreat to the Alboran Sea, where the Turkish fleet would then be pincered between the fleets of Portugal and a coalition of Italian states which included the Duchy of Modena and the Republic of Venice.
The naval plans for the War of the League of Sardinia. Dark green denotes Portugal and her holdings, light green the Ottoman holdings, light blue represents the members of the Italian coalition while dark blue represents members of the Italian League who also joined the coalition. Solid lines indicate the first stage of the plan, dotted lines represent the second stage.
The plan went perfectly, helped along by Erno’s knowledge of the commander of the Turkish fleet, the Greco Bey, who was overeager and undercautious. But being used as a rapidly moving anvil weakened the Portuguese fleet drastically—battles fought first on the coast of Algiers and then all along the Western Mediterranean led to hundreds of galleys and several capital ships being lost to attrition, storms, and the attacks of quick Turkish raiders. So though the Battle of Granada led to the sinking of much of the Ottoman naval presence west of Malta, it also annihilated the Portuguese treasury, which needed to be used to rebuild the fleet. It also crippled the transport fleet, which led to the war dragging out for 7 whole years. By the Treaty of Sardinia (in 1610), which gave Manuel IV the cities of Malta and Tunis, Portugal was deep in the pocket of Italian bankers.
Fall
We have every indication that this was done purposefully—Erno boasted many times that he had defeated two enemies with one battle at Granada—but it had ripple effects which hit the whole world. To pay off his debts, Manuel IV had to find revenue somewhere. This somewhere, argued his advisers, could be the West Indies. Manuel had never levied a tariff on the region’s trade, even though Portugal controlled every entrance to the Gulf of Mexico. With that tariff, argued his advisers, he could recoup his losses and look strong in the eyes of the world.
This tariff may have been possible in the 1580s or even the 1590s, but it was not possible in 1600. The late 16
th century featured multiple battles between the French and the Spanish across Germany, with especially intense fighting occurring in Switzerland, with France supporting the Protestant cantons and Spain supporting the Catholic ones. The only reason these battles didn’t turn into a full fledged war was the constant toil of d’Estrees and the Spanish ambassador Montecello. But in 1608, the Treaty of Bearn occurred and signaled the exit of Spain from the wars of religion and renewed friendship between the French and Spanish kingdoms. Without a war to fight in Germany and without an enemy on the other side of the Pyrenees, king Charles III started looking back to his colonies to provide the gold required to pay off his debts and pay for public works projects. The Portuguese Tariff only reminded him that his weak neighbor threatened to cut him off from the entirety of his New World territories.
There were two other reason that the Portuguese tariff was highly unwise: firstly, Portugal simply did not control the whole of the Caribbean anymore. Bishop Biard had seen the colonies in the South, led by a Catholic King who chose not to convert his subjects to the true faith, as a center of blasphemy, and thus started sending missionaries to the Caribbean starting in the late 1590s. These missionaries eventually signed treaties that linked tribes in the northern Bahamas and in the Antilles to Canada, and French Jesuits and soldiers were well aware of Hispaniola and had had some contact with the tribes there.
Jean Claver, who was born in 1560 and assigned as the vicar general of the West Indies in 1606 (well before France or the Jesuits had any influence in the region) soon surpassed his capacity as a preacher to become an advocate for insurrection by the Taino Indians against their Portuguese masters
Lastly, the Portuguese West Indies was not a militarized colony, capable of sustaining a war. Its captains were untrained, its supply depots were empty, its links to the tribes easily broken. The Portuguese fleet had been traditionally seen as a home defense fleet, and as such only 4 squadrons of light transports were assigned to the area. The Viceroy of the West Indies, Rao Estobal, had never been tried in combat. But he was just as arrogant as his superior.
Estobal saw the Jesuit missions (which were primarily staffed with French and Canadian Jesuits) as an infringement on his territory, and made repeated attempts to push them out of the Viceroyality of the West Indies. But his attempts were failing--the Jesuits were increasingly entrenched in their bases in the northern Bahamas and used that base to send missions to Hispaniola and other islands in the Viceroyality. Estobal decided that he needed to eject the Jesuits somehow. So on the night of the 14th of February, 1610, Estobal sent a group of Portuguese soldiers, dressed as pirates, to burn the mission of Thaumond down. But the soldiers didn't expect the level of resistance they faced. A garrison of 15 Frenchmen guarded the mission, and the battle between the garrison and the Portuguese raiders went through the night. As dawn came, Thaumond was burned to the ground, but 3 men of the garrison survived and made the trip to Cuba. There, the Viceroy of New Spain was told of the actions of the Portuguese, and news quickly got to France. The declaration of war by the Spanish and French kings was the first unified act by the two kingdoms since 1575, and was soon met by a declaration of war by England against the new Franco-Spanish bloc.
A storm was coming to the West Indies. A storm which would destroy the old order.