Adm. Yammamoto: Guam
Counter-Invasion of Saipan:
Let me draw a map of what me and the captains think;
Red is the operational area for the blockade, green, the area to deploy a broad net of screens, and tan for the second battlefleet. The Black squares represent our extreme sub pickets, after wake, midway and Hawaii have had scouts allocated to them.
At all times our Subhunter fleets will be in operation with the rest of our fleet, and as such greatly supported. I might remind Adm.Baltersar, that his outlays for those fleets had them in operation without battlefleet support in mind, but here they do have battlefleet support. Hence the danger to them is much mitigated since they are not really meant to be taking part in the blockade, rather screening our TPs against a sub attack.
This is highly likely given that Saipan, unlike the Philippines is within range of US subbases in the pacific, and that it is going to take some time to get our troops ashore, unlike the Philippines. We must accept the fact the battle may rage on for a couple of weeks here, the entire time our troopships will be vulnerable if we cannot put up an adequate screen to keep a wide intelligence net, and ability to keep US subs off our TPs.
It would be an utter travesty for the entire campaign if we lost a TP with a division of marines aboard. This is why we cannot take chances here.
It is a similar reason why we cannot take chances that the US don't have aircover. We might have taken out the USS Enterprise and her CAGs, but Saipan has an airbase. One that is in enemy hands! It is one which is in range of their other bases so they can very easily rebase additional air assets there at a moments notice up until we invade. The situation is that we don't have any knowledge of what enemy air assets might be here. Hence it is far more prudent to work with the assumption that the US are going to bring aircraft to the battle, which our land based fighters rebased from China to Guam on an exchange principle can deal with.
The few torpedo bombers of the carrier fleet shall be reserved for naval action only.
In terms of naval action, subs or light screens will not be as effective as actually putting down a fleet to intercept incoming convoys*, and given the US have both a fleet at dock, and 28,000 men to feed, they are going to require daily shipments to keep at fighting strength, and we already know that they have been fighting without supply for the last month.
Therefore all we need to do is prevent the US marines from being resupplied, and we have significantly reduced their fighting effectiveness. We both want a short resolution to this battle, and this is the way to get us the shortest victory.
Hopefully the weeks the battle could be drawn on for if we allow resupply, will be cut down to days, if we can keep the US supply lines cut. In this instance, delaying to fight a hungry, demoralised enemy may gain us days on starting the attack early. Remember, the more US marines we kill, the more food and ammo goes round for those still left alive. The US numbers are working against them here...
* Although given the number of ASW fleets, and comparable overlapping areas of operation, probably one of those ASW fleets could also go convoy raiding.
Medium Term:
I totally reject the notion of returning to ports in Japan for the rest of the year.
We have seen already how effective the US are at destroying our merchant shipping. Returning to Japan and port will leave the 9 or so pacific islands we do have vulnerable to unrestricted submarrine warfare totally! This will mean we shall take massive losses in our merchant shipping, and those islands with garrisons become an enormous liability to us. Either we 'build to replace', at which point the US is strategically bleeding us of IC. Or we let the islands become besieged, and then we shall have to deel with many invasions just like at Saipan where the Americans take out our unsupplied garrisons.
Hence returning to port hands the battle over to the Americans. We can't let that happen.
Our pacific islands are a liability because the Americans can reach them from their other island bases in the pacific. These bases surround our main shipping line from Tokyo which we already know from the administration confirming it, that it is this that is being raided.
Wargames point to the fact that the US subs that will be attacking these lines are primarally based at Wake and Midway. However once we take those islands, it is likely that they will be rebased to Phoenix so they can still attack the Bikinni atolls, Truk and Ponape.
However taking Wake and Midway out significantly reduces the area of water needed to be patrolled to defend our convoys. With those islands taken we can either use Saipan/Guam or Truk as a base for antisubmarine warfare if we wanted to stop there.
Antisubmarine warfare in this context is really patrolling the entire groups of islands with both escorts, and battlefleets because the Americans can reach the area with main battlefleets from Hawaii. This is why the capture of Hawaii is so important to winning the battle. With Hawaii taken, our battlefleets don't have to patrol the entire Pacific, they can concentrate on the area surrounding Hawaii, and it is highly likely the Americans will want to stage an attempt to reclaim those islands.
If we can stop that attempt, then the Americans will have at least two failed landings on the books, as well as a loss of face and prestige at having their pacific assets taken from them. This should be enough in the long term (if this status quo is maintained) to have them see the sense in giving up the fight. A long term aim.
Overall we cannot afford the months needed to repair the entire fleet while we loose valuable shipping, and the Americans are just allowed to replace their losses. They have the bigger economic potential, and can very easily replace everything that we have just destroyed
and more with a more modern fleet in the next two years.
There is a countdown ticking now, we have to beat it to the Hawaiian prize.
I estimate about 1/3rd of the current operational US fleet is down on the bottom, by the time we get to Hawaii, that might be more like 1/2th the US fleet, and if we can keep all new American fleets 'suppressed' or 'under control' by dominating airpower at Hawaii to insure carrier fleets can't act, which then in turn allows our torpedo bombers free range, and the guns of the fleet the intelligence to pick their encounters. Then we can make Hawaii the rock that the American fleets will break upon, no matter their economic advantages.
If we can secure this, then operations in Panama or Alaska can be considered if the Americans aren't looking like they want to give up the fight.
But for now, we need to get to Hawaii, and this invasion at Saipan has slowed our schedule down.
Geopolitically:
The Philippines is
already part of the Empire now, and it stays that way. Same with the parts of mainland China we shall have conquered. Empires are not built by giving lands away! China will take awhile to Japanize and become civilised, the Filipinos are arealy fairly civilised but lack the technology, and investment capital for industrialisation since they have been living under American imperialism.
Japan can offer far more to Asia by the direct integration of these peoples, afterall the Chinese are just brutal savages with their warlords and no sense of bushio. That will need to change if Asia is to become one of the centres of the world. Afterall, we would not be the Great Power we are without China, and this needs to continue well after the war so that we retain legitimacy.
However we cannot take on too much for ourselves. If Zongren makes his territorial claims in Indochina, then he can be responsible for their industrialisation, after all he has already done much in the last couple decades for southern China so we know he is up to the task.
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Disclaimer: 'In Character' opinions, not meant to offend anybody.]
