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Chapter Five, Part Six: Sino-Japanese War / War with the Allies
Oct 1943 - Jan 1944

Previously in the Influence Wars...


Two Japanese offensives in China failed to encircle and destroy the bulk of the Chinese forces in the Gullin salient, but we made considerable progress in Northern China. In the Pacific, Oosthaven and Batavia were taken and the Japanese naval blockade resulted in the destruction of many Allied warships, but the conquest of Java and Borneo is not yet over.

In Europe, the Axis pushed the Allies back to the sea in France and regained the initiative in Spain, but was also pushed back itself in the Eastern Europe and is now clearly on the defensive there.


And now, the conclusion...


War in China






The Chinese were unable to exploit the failure of our offensives and mount a strong counter-attack. It was clear that the enemy was too exhausted and demoralised to wage major offensives. The Southern HQ received orders to hold the line and attack only when the odds clearly favoured us, which basically stopped the potential counter-strike in its infancy. We also managed to destroy 5 enemy divisions in Yiyang, although it was a close call. Unfortunately, it was impossible to rescue the two Japanese divisions that were trapped in a pocket in the south-west and they were destroyed.






Our own offensive began in November. It quickly became apparent that the Chinese were in no condition to fight - their troops were deserting and for the first time in years they did not have enough fresh reserves to plug the holes in the frontline. With mounting casualties and economically significant territory being lost at a worrying rate, Chiang's popularity quickly hit the bottom and the agrarian Chinese economy could no longer support the war effort adequately. Nevertheless, harsh terrain and the abundance of mountain forts meant that some battles were still costly and lengthy.








Chongqing fell in December and the fall of the city marked the end of organised resistance of the nationalists. Chaos ensued. The fate of Chiang is unknown. In order to secure our position in the region and increase available manpower, we immediately began conscription of the pro-Japanese Chinese from newly aquired territories and mobilised our reserves in Japan, too. The Administration believes that this action will give us enough manpower to sustain years of warfare if necessary.

With the nationalists out of equation and the communists being confined to a small area in Northern China, it did not last long for the Ma Clique to inherit the mantle of resistance. The clique's centre of power is located in the north-western part of China, a region largely covered by mountains and deserts, with abysmal infrastructure. The Muslim part of the Chinese population in the region is especially ferocious and unruly.

Politically, the fall of the nationalists made Japan much more threatening in the eyes of the world. Some were shocked by the news, but for many it was a sign or a confirmation (depending on the point of view) that Japan has become a great power capable of fighting and winning major conflicts. There was little coincidence in the Japanese victory over the nationalists - it was the result of superior strategy, greater economic and technological potential and military prowess. It may appear strange, but for a moment Roosevelt and Churchill were the happiest politicians in the world, because our victory in China convinced many Americans and British that Japan was a real - and imminent - threat, a country with considerable power, determined and able to project power on a major scale and end stalemates even when they appeared unending. The idea of pre-emptive strikes suddenly gained many new supporters. This was especially important for Roosevelt and the Democrats, because while the British War Cabinet is bipartisan and supposedly represents the united effort of British political elites, it is not the case in the USA, where the role of the President is significant and the lines between the ruling party and the opposition are much more clearly marked. The impact of looming December 1944 elections, which are the source of many heated debates, cannot be ignored, either. One of the American newspapers proclaimed: "If militaristic and expansionist Japan was able to conquer most of China while it was also waging war in the Pacific Theatre, then how can one claim that it was not a lurking predator just waiting to attack us at the first sign of our weakness? What guarantee there was that we would not be next, if the balance of power in Asia and Japan's geostrategic position clearly indicated that the war with the West was inevitable?". Many still blame Roosevelt and his administration for the disastrous American defeats suffered in 1941-1942 and some are demanding his resignation, but there are more and more patriotic calls to continue the war until the USA is clearly victorious in order to avoid the prospect of starting a new conflict within the next 10-20 years.

However, the real question was how would Stalin react and it still remains unanswered. We know that Xinjiang is very closely aligned to the Soviets and that Mao is requesting support from the Soviet Union, but for the moment the Soviet Union remains strangely silent.


The Pacific Theatre





Our troops continued to advance on Java in October, but were stalled at Soerabaja. Despite the support of aircraft and big guns of battleships and cruisers and overwhelming numerical superiority, capturing Soerabaja still took a lot of time and effort. On Borneo, the situation was even worse, because the Allies managed to bring even more troops to the area and achieved local numerical superiority.





In order to crush the Allies on Borneo once and for all, we decided to strike right at Balikpapan, the only port on Borneo still under Allied control. Full strength of the SNLF was assembled and the invasion began in late November. The Allied tanks were a nasty surprise for our marines and prolonged the battle, but when our regular infantry joined the fighting, we gained a significant numerical superiority and used battleships and aircraft to dilute any advantage tanks could provide. The battle finally ended on 8th of December and after that, securing the rest of Borneo was easy.

There were some minor naval clashes with the Royal Navy, but only one major one - on 12th of November we managed to intercept the Allied transport fleet and obliterated it entirely. We believe that it was on a return voyage to Burma or India and contained no troops. Besides that, there were some clashes with Allied submarines and our aircraft managed to destroy several submarine groups.





The Americans took advantage of the fact that we were still embroiled in fighting in the South Pacific and conquered the Wake Island and Hana. Despite the fact that our garrisons were twice as strong as on other islands, the Americans did not have much trouble in overwhelming them. It appears that the enemy built an airfield on Midway, which indicates that a slow, steady and methodical advance in the Central Pacific is the foundation of the Allied strategy in this region.







The western part of Indonesia is secured, but the feasibility of further operations in the South Pacific will be determined by the availability of our fleets, which may be needed in the Central Pacific, where the Americans are roaming free. We are reaching the point where it will not be possible to ignore further intrusions into our Defence Perimeter, but at the same time, it appears that our fleets can now begin a counter-strike in force.


Overall strategic situation


The following months will be very demanding logistically. The Chinese Theatre tied about 70% of our armed forces, but given the state of infrastructure in western China and our needs in other regions, it will neither be feasible nor desirable to keep as many troops in China. At the same time, we can expect a resurgence of partisan activity in the region - it will take years to fully integrate millions of Chinese into the Empire and the Chinese society will be plagued by economic, social and political problems for a long time, all of which makes the prospect of rebellions, strikes and civil disobedience more likely. Soon we may also share a common border with the Allies near Burma, which will open an another front. Redeployment and transportation of troops will take a lot of effort in the following months.


Other matters





Winter slowed down progress in all European theatres, but the strategic situation remains the same - the Soviets are advancing in the Eastern Europe, while the Allies are on the defensive in Spain. The Allies may be pressured politically and strategically to make an another attempt to land somewhere else in Europe in spring - France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy are all viable options.





According to our spies, the Americans are investing heavily in submarines, jet aircraft and nuclear research. Heavy focus on experimental projects indicates that the enemy may try to gain a decisive advantage with superior technology. According to our scientists, the Americans may have enough resources to construct an explosive of unprecedented destructive power in the following years. If the theories are correct, the Americans would become the first nation with weapons that could revolutionise the concept of strategic bombardment. Moreover, the potential power of those weapons would make them a very strong diplomatic tool.

We still lag behind in rocketry, but on the other hand, we have made major strides in the recent years in that field of knowledge.





The collapse of the nationalists considerably increased our economic potential, both in terms of available resources and industrial and agricultural production. This will free some of our domestic industry to produce warships and specialised equipment.

Construction of the sixth rocket test site will be finished in February. Also, two new light cruisers will become available soon.

We've formed our first mechanised division and two new ones were ordered. Hopefully, we will be able to form a first corps by early 1945.

Our shipping capacity remains a major issue. Currently the production of merchantmen and convoy escorts consumes about 10% of our (high) production budget and in the future we may be forced to increase production even further.

*Tech screens are available here.
 
Memorandum:

It is imperative that we attempt to close down the Allies propaganda attempts against us. Hence it is important as ever that we begin a period of consolidation within China and that governance of the Chinese provinces recently defected to our cause retain their existing power structure, just now under Empire auspice rather than Chiang’s. What we need to insure as best as can be, is that the transition of power is direct and not broken by extended periods of unrest which may lead to communist or nationalist sentiments growing.

The Empire wide census as part of our war effort will passively garner able-bodied Chinese men to our cause, but we should not let it drive us too hard. The main reason for it should be consolidation of the Empire as a whole, to represent the fact that as far as practical, we are reaching the extent of the Co-prosperity Sphere, and now our strategy on the mainland should be one focused at holding ground and a slow steady march to the Burma-China border, and a the mountain corps into Golmud and futher.


As part of this, we should invite the world leaders to a conference to state Japanese position, as well as allow Stalin to voice his fears over our actions in China, and for us to allay the Allies fears. Above all, securing a strong pact with the Soviets regarding spheres of influence could be a major boon to us. If regions like Xijing are ceded to the Soviets we loose little. Likewise the Ma's territories are not particularly strategic in scope. While neither are likely to give up the war on their own, if there is any international pressure we can hope to apply it would be better to try and opt for this method, rather than to march through the mountains with the threat of the Soviets always on our back.

The Americans on the otherhand, are becoming a thorn in our side and if reinforced garrisons are not enough to deter attacks, then we need to change our approach. Direct confrontation is not desirable, so we shall need to expand our reserves by a fair way in the coming months. The fact that many Chinese and Filipinos are standing with us will help here.


Garrison of Java, Sumatra and Borneo-Malaysia:
I feel that our current garrison forces will need to be supplemented with additional forces in order to insure we have a better defence perimeter here. I suggest;

Malaysia-Borneo
3 General Infantry Divisions / 2 General Infantry Divisions
(2xINF + 1xART/1xAC/1xAA)

Sumatra
4 GI Divisions

Java
3 GI Divisions

In total 12 new divisions for the defence of the territories. Malaysia-Borneo is a strategic asset to us providing most of our oil and a good portion of metals, and rare materials for our war effort. Unlike the pacific islands which have limited strategic significance, these islands hold massive significance for us in trade, let alone the naval bases.

It is this admirals opinion, that we cannot allow the Allies to even get a foot hold back here.

We should as well consider reinforcing the Philippines garrison via recruiting locals for between 4-6 general infantry divisions such that in the event the Americans ever got to trying to land here there would be substantial resistance against them, more than the token resistance our brave island garrison troops have already provided.


Pacific Garrisons:
Obviously, we need to take the fight back to the Americans. While we consolidate, we don't want to be seen as 'on the defensive', nor do we want to be seen as 'overly aggressive'. These juxtapositions dictate that we should be as cautious as the Americans in taking the fight back to them. Our spy rings have been picking up intelligence that the Americans are working on a top secret project within the nuclear sciences. We know how radiation can effect the body and that it can be used in principle to release vast quantities of energy. Hence it is quite possible the Americans are researching some as of yet unknown weapon system and are getting the engineering principles behind a nuclear 'bomb' ironed out.

Unfortunately, our home experts on these matters have never received funding, Dr.Nishina applications for cyclotrons and state investment never amounting to anything. While it would be far too late at this time of urgency to indulge in such funding, we should recognise that the balance of power might shift very quickly yet again with American and Japanese jet aircraft, and the Americans experimenting with nuclear technologies.

Thus our strategy for the Pacific should be aimed at getting the Americans as far away from the home islands or bases that they could deploy these new weapons to. We must also be prepared for the event that such weapons may be used against us.


From looking at the current American attacks, it looks like the Americans are attacking at between 5 to 1 and 3 to 1 odds, thus we may need to increase our garrisons up to 5-fold in order to deter such attacks. This is concerning since the islands themselves are not great supply dumps, and we may have to be creating full garrison corps for our bases at Guam, Saipan and Truk. The other great worry is that when an island is overrun we loose the garrison present. Heavy defence will be risky.

6x {
1xCorps HQ
----------------
2xGAR + 1xAA
4xGAR
4xGAR
4xGAR
}

I believe off hand that gives us good general frontage for the critical islands. Where islands have multiple zones, such as at Saipan (Tinian), Truk or Hawaii (outside Honalulu) we should consider an attachment of 2xMAR as a 5th division within the corps structure.



Manchuria and the Soviet Threat:
Stalin is ever increasingly becoming a worry. With Chiang’s government collapsed, then some troops may have been freed up in the case of a 3rd Sino-Soviet War. While the army will have to comment more strongly, I believe strongly that Japan needs to build a large strategic reserve. There are two solid reasons for this;

1. Even if the Allies come to defeat us at sea, with continental holdings in China they will never be able to mass the manpower to take us out if we take full advantage of the unity of the peoples of Asia.

2. It means in the event the Soviets do attack, we have manpower enough to operate on several theatres at the same time.

The main concern is that widespread recruitment takes time, and will generate a lot of threat. Already if we are to consolidate against the Allies, it will use up a lot of our resources training, and building the equipment to compete, all creating threat. Then looking at the Soviets, we may need 4-8 corps, or two more armies just to give them a good fight, and 6-12 three armies to actually be able to hold the line independently.

With current laws, and using 20% of our production budget unto this end, it might take ~2.3 years to build such vast quantities of infantry. Neglecting modernisation.


Sub-point Production Budgets:-
As of this time the IJN is requisitioning 24% of the production budget. The air force is currently taking up about 14% on the new rocketry bases, however I expect their budget needs to jump to about 18% (~28IC) mid-year as we produce our first jet fighters. The IJA is currently taking up about 38% of the budget, yet construction is taking up a massive ~24% of the budget alone!

While there are good reasons for infrastructure programs, and radar sites, I am coming to the conclusion, that more boots on the ground may give us overall a better strategic position. Hence I would like to see the construction budget halved in the coming months, allowing about 4 more infantry divisions to enter the recruitment queue. Even then its a year to build just the south-pacific garrisons!


Annoyingly, I cannot really see how we can reduce naval building, nor fail not to take up the air budget. Hence, we must recognise that we will be unable to fill all strategic needs. Hence we either need Soviet assurances, so we can focus on the pacific, or we need to seriously consider evacuating the pacific islands and giving them up. This will be in effect admitting defeat to the Allies.

I do not believe we can will this war by half-hearted attempts vs the Allies and any war with the Soviets will mean we loose the mainland, or the pacific and if we don't focus on one, then we shall more than likely loose both.


This is not defeatism, this is pragmatism.


International Conference of Leaders:
It is with pragmatism in mind, and considering our successes in China, we should call a meeting of heads of state. Given the shift in our position, all the world leaders will be interested in what will happen in post-Chiang China and whether or not it will be a prelude to further war, or step towards reconciliation. Stalin of course will soon share a much larger border with us, and the Americans are worried about the industrial potential we inherit to make the pacific part of our sphere of influence. We need to allay such fears, as well as begin the necessary steps to discuss a future armistice.

The Euro-axis position also looks not to have improved. While we are nominally allied with them via common enemies, it is this admirals position that any dealings with have with the other leaders will be much improved if we do not try and support the Euro-axis cause. Indeed, we should attempt to distance ourselves from the Germans war and even go so far as to not invite any of the Euro-axis leaders. Overall, we should make our point that Japan considers the Axis bloc as a far more threatening and warmongering bloc than our own. We can use this as both a bargaining point, and a statement of intent such that we want to conclude our affairs independently within the near future.

If we can state our position at such a conference that the Empire is now concluding business in China and has no more intent to occupy further lands in South Asia, and seeks a détente with Stalin. Then we can hopefully erode some threat against us. Practically, we as the high command would need to place guarantees of independence on Burma, Thailand and Indochina, as well as Australia and New Zealand as a public/national acknowledgement that we shall not go no further.

What needs to happen is for us to find common ground with Stalin, and the Allies such that we may progress to a legitimate peace in the long term, and attempt to prevent bi-lateral talks occurring between the Soviets and Allies and keep discussion in open forum.


In order to sway opinion we should look to bring equal sized contingents of our fervent supporters from both the Philippines, Indonesia and Coastal China and allow the other leaders to liaise with them as well as our Imperial Contingent, the aim being to show a united pan-asian front as well as to allow foreign leaders to get 'word of mouth' impressions of the Empire as a whole.

As things stand, the Americans feel entitled, the British have revenge for their navy in mind, and Stalin is ever paranoid. Where we have done well, we alienate, we we haven't we have given ground. Hence we must prevent the diplomatic situation deteriorating further.


Shipping:
Does the administration have a direct number of convoys lost during the period so that replacement rate can be calculated? As things stood approximately two parallel builds of convoys should keep us operating a near current levels of supply in the pacific.


Research:
In line, with improving our strategic reserve and combat potential, I foresee a need to focus on the spheres of army infantry equipment and training, industrial production techniques with the doctrines focus being downgraded in favour of future technologies. Indeed, some experimental helicopter designs would do well to providing medical evacuation from difficult terrain, thus helping to reduce some of the war weariness in our troops in the medium future when they know that should they become injured they are more likely to survive, thus increasing the ferocity at which they may fight.

In general, our army equipment is beginning to lag behind that of the allies, as such it becomes important that they see some investment here. In particular the training techniques improving our organisational skills.
 
While there are good reasons for infrastructure programs, and radar sites, I am coming to the conclusion, that more boots on the ground may give us overall a better strategic position. Hence I would like to see the construction budget halved in the coming months, allowing about 4 more infantry divisions to enter the recruitment queue.
Admiral, how do you expect to use massive number of troops in Asia if infrastructure will prevent us from supplying them?

Does the administration have a direct number of convoys lost during the period so that replacement rate can be calculated? As things stood approximately two parallel builds of convoys should keep us operating a near current levels of supply in the pacific.
*This info is available in the Influence Levels post. We lost 16 convoys during the course of the last update.

The Administration wants to emphasise the fact that larger garrisons mean larger supply consumption and larger supply consumption means that more convoys are needed to supply our troops on islands.

In general, our army equipment is beginning to lag behind that of the allies, as such it becomes important that they see some investment here.
How did you arrive at that conclusion?
 
Note on China

The fall of Chiang regime is not the last fight in China, many of the nationalist Generals have joined the Xibei San Ma to continue the fight. Should many of them succeed in withdrawing into the Ma territory we might have a long fight ahead of us still.
It is therefore of great importance that we cut off as many divisions as possible in the south before they escape north.

With our current deployment we have several options.
the North east front could try to reach Golmund before them, I deem this is problematic even if the forces opposing them are weak the infrastructure is weak too and could not support forceful advance that would be needed.
The strong forces concentrated in the south could try to overrun the remaining forces down there, this is also not that likely as the enemy troops are holding a line of land two provinces deep and are seeking to widen that. I would guess we will only push them back a little and making a minor encirclement in the south with the rest being pushed north.
As a third option we can continue the offensive on the central front to try to cut off the southern armies, the current force distribution is not well suited for this.

Short term plan.
As consequence of this I suggest the following plan one of the Canton Ichigun is dissolved, and we distribute its 3 Homengun, one each to North east, North(engineers) and 1 to Central.

Manchuria front will make many prayers and offerings that no-one takes offence at their existence before reinforcements arrive.

North will need its extra forces to envelop the remaining 3 Communist provinces and start reducing them, ideally swapping out the current troops with engineers. This should free up some troops from North east to help them continue west. North must also guard the gap into Mongolia that is right behind the communist strongholds. Also Norths Cavalry is our primary partisan hunters one of its cavalry Gundan should spread out in the liberated areas, one division between Peking and Shanghai, one between Shanghai and Canton and one between Peking and Canton, the final will be placed on the east border of the former Ma territory when they have fallen.

North east should be the Ichigun that continue west, depending on the opposition and supplies along with a weakened central. immediate goals are defeating the communist pocket, supporting central fronts efforts and to strike west themselves.

The remaining troops of Canton HQ continue pressing west, the lessened forces should ensure they advance slower than the central front and thereby creating a large southern pocket. After reducing the pocket they will be border guard against Indochina, Burma and Tibet, 3 Homengun should be enough for that. In case the mountain passes into Burma are none-passable a further Homengun can be freed up.

The central fronts task is the same as before with utmost speed and disregarding any casualties to advance to the Tibetan border to stop any southern troops from escaping, when the Tibetan border is reached. When the pocket is created lend 2 Homengun to Canton to reduce it, these go to Manchuria after that. The rest continue to attack west into the Ma clique on the southern flank of North-east which at this point should be renamed West (north), the central is then West (south).

buildings:
Extending the western rail going roughly Northwest from the (Yellow?) river fork.
Improve the province just east of Chungking to level 6.
Improving the rail to the Mongolian gap to level 5. (see map on p.17) It should go north of the current communist positions, might need to clear our some Ma troops first.


Medium time plan
The current forces deployed on the continent at the current time is Canton I+II: 6, Central: 4, North-east: 4, North 2 and Manchuria 1 Homengun for a total of 17 Homengun plus some Gar and Cav. Any troops in the south pacific should remain there unless a large emergency appears.
After the reduction of the south Chinese in the former Yunnan area we will need the following forces for defence.
Indochina boarder/Guangxi: 1 Homengun as border guard and security force.
Burma boarder: this is currently seen as impassible (OOC: or do I remember wrongly that you blocked this as in the newest patch 3.06.2???) else park the mountain Homengun here.
Tibet: if they are not close to joining anyone the cavalry division that is in this area anyway can patrol the boarder and catch any goat thieves that crosses the boarder.
Sakhalin: 1 Gundan as defensive guards.
Manchuria: 4 Homengun as defence.
Anti-Partisan duty: 1 Gundan cavalry
Eastern Mongolian gap (between the Gobi desert and the eastern mountains): 1 Homengun. This is currently held by the Ma's but it looks like there are no troops there currently so it should be ours by the time the short term operation are done.
Encircling and reducing the communists: 3 Homengun, 18 Shidan should be able to make the final attack on Jin'an with another 6 in reserve.
Attacking the Ma: 6 Homengun+whatever is left.

Buildings:
Continue the west rail roughly Northwest of the river fork and then along the Gobi's southern edge. Must be able to support at least 8 Homengun.
Improve the province just east of Chungking to level 6.
Improving the rail to the Mongolian gap to level 5.

Long term plans
At least 3 contingencies exists at this time
A) The passes to Burma are passable.
B) The Soviets are not attacking
C) The Soviets attack.

A) Burma, this is a problem as now every goat-herder with a gun from here to Uganda has been converging on our positions and a huge army will already be on its way along with regular UK and Australian and New Zeeland reinforcements with the occasional US division. This has been happening since the fall of Yunnan so we must guard against it as offensive operations are impossible.

B) Same as the Burma problem, when we take out the last warlord we will have a common boarder with India (unless the passes are blocked) but now we have an option to go for India while they still don't have an overwhelming force there. (***dig up plan from for 3-4 turns ago***)

C) Oh well, Banzai!!!


Nitpicking:
The Mech shidan currently in Japan should immediately be transfered to the Northeast Ichigun to test its effectiveness and strategies.
 
Admiral, how do you expect to use massive number of troops in Asia if infrastructure will prevent us from supplying them?

The Administration wants to emphasise the fact that larger garrisons mean larger supply consumption and larger supply consumption means that more convoys are needed to supply our troops on islands.

How did you arrive at that conclusion?

1) The imperial clerk raises a good point there about the infra structure but the Admirals point on needing more boots is also valid but where to conjure up the IC for that is another question.

2) The garrisons can't stand alone, they must be able to hold long enough for the fleet to attack the invaders OR sail more reinforcements in. To be able to do that they will either need to be reinforced before invasions or have forts to support the defence.

3) I think the general thinks we can't fight a war in '44 with '42 equipment, but we plan to research the 4 basic infantry technologies in the coming months, in fact small arms are already being researched.
 
Burma boarder: this is currently seen as impassible (OOC: or do I remember wrongly that you blocked this as in the newest patch 3.06.2???) else park the mountain Homengun here.
*After fall of China it is no longer blocked. In fact, it wasn't an issue, because China didn't join the Allies.

3) I think the general thinks we can't fight a war in '44 with '42 equipment, but we plan to research the 4 basic infantry technologies in the coming months, in fact small arms are already being researched.
He cannot possibly know how advanced the Allies are in that area. They have many pressing needs at the moment and they are as overstretched as we are, although their economic capabilities are greater.
 
General Surt,
the Natioalist forces who have joined the XSM could turn out to be a blessing. The warlords to have basically not industry at all. Their few factories will be overwhelmed by the demand the "new" forces put on them in terms of reinforcements and supplies. These units were not in perfect shape to start with. I'd expect the Chinese formations to fall back quickly in the face of renewed attacks.
 
Memorandum:

From the intelligence reports given out in the pacific, local commanders are suggesting the Allies have an equipment and training effectiveness of 3:2 over our troops, then on top of that a 3:1 to 5:1 numerical advantage*. This is very bad for us, not because our equipment isn't up-to-date, but because its relatively out of date to that of the Allies, in particular the Americans. Suggesting that they have recently improved their general infantry weaponry. Indeed, our soliders noted how US Marrines armed with Thompson submachines were very effective at clearing out our garrison positions.

It could be likely that the Americans recently improved their general standard issue weapons, which thus brought about the current American campaign in the Pacific.

While I cannot tell directly how advanced the Allied weapons are, from the information gathered it looks like the Allies have stolen an advantage on us here. This is a great worry, since it will reflect badly when our marrines try to retake these islands when their equipment is not top of the range. I consider this a terrible discovery since land operations against the Allies are likely to increase in coming months and we won't be fighting with equal troop strength. This is why we must prioritise general infantry weaponry in this current quater to close the gap. Simmilarly we need to get some simmilar numerical advantages out in the pacific if we are to have even a hope of holding onto these islands.

While the Americans are poor at conducting naval landings in comparison to our high command, the fact that the Americans have made multiple operations within a short space of time shows that their high command feels it has overcome a threshold level of strenght to attack aggressively and often. Our current defenses are not up to dealing with the American threat and I fear that we may loose more islands before we can take the fight back effectively.


*Thus our combat effectiveness with allied forces is running between 9:2 or 15:2. If you look at the battle for Wake and Hana for instance and compare casulities inflicted this bares direct evidense to support this fact.



As part of a comprehensive plan, I feel that a strategic reserve should be an aim we try and hold ourselves to. New infantry divisions that are not earmarked for China can be kept in reserve for the case the Soviets attack or to repulse any major American landings.

Looking at the fact that we are outmatched by the Allied forces on the ground, we cannot rely on garrisons 'holding out' till the fleets arrive. That concept needs to be removed from our thinking totally. Our navy has to act together in the same zone of operation, thus leaving extremes of the PDP vulnerable with no chance of naval support if the fleets are damaged or involved in another theatre.

In the near future we shall be taking the fight back to the Americans, this shall mean that the South Pacific will loose naval patrols for the duration, meaning that garrisons there need to be able to defend these regions with the assumption that support may not available.

Even as we retake islands, there is no point garrisoning them with forces that will just get overrun. Hence if they are to be garrisoned we need to put more troops on the islands to give us that time window, but they quickly consume more supply meaning the islands become more dependent on a strong navy. All this means more troops, more convoys. Neither of which we have at this time.


Fortifications do not care who owns the island, nor are they cost efficient to build. In the first case if the Americans overrun a location, they get our forts to use for themselves, in the second case its cheaper and quicker to build the larger garrison forces in their stead. The downside being the supply issues, and constant maintenance cost.


Overall I would like to see defence from boots on the ground ready, then us trying to hold together fronts on a shoestring. What I would like to try is an island based defence in depth with operational level sized garrisons for key bases, then reforming the PDP before we consider garrisoning other islands.

Hopefully this should minimise number of convoys needed in the short term and leave key bases safe while our marines island hop back to Hawaii.

I would also seek to get Gen. Holy Death on-board with responsibilities in the Philippines, Borneo-Malaysia, Java and Sumatra since while these are islands, IJN Garrisons and SNLF divisions are not enough to fully defend these regions, and they will need their own Corps/Army command level HQs set up, as well as general theatre allocations as we make a more formal consolidation in these regions.

I would also like to stress that in terms of war goals, Indonesia and Borneo-Malaysia should be liberated as independent states in the post-war world, and we should not seek long term annexation or occupation movements here. Although resource interests will be stressed to these governments in return for industrialisation investment, and support of their national sovereignty and interests with Empire realpolitik.
 
The Imperial Administration's analysis of strategic warfare in years 1941-1943

Since members of the IGHQ expressed concern over the state of our merchant marine, the Administration conducted an analysis of the impact of enemy submarines on our economic and strategic position.


Direct impact of enemy submarine activity





Even at a glance one can notice that the direct economic impact of enemy attacks on our supply and trade lines is becoming higher and higher as years pass. In ICdays, more than 40% of our total losses were inflicted during 1943. There are several reasons why this was the case. Firstly, when the Commonwealth supported the United States of America, the number of submarines and the number of ports available to our enemies in the Pacific was greatly increased. Secondly, the Americans constructed many modern submarines in 1942-1943, which are considerably more effective than the older models. Thirdly, our supply and trade lines became more vulnerable to enemy attacks when we gained more territory in the Pacific.

However, in purely economic terms the losses we suffered in years 1941-1943 are actually not that crippling. In ICdays, the cost of our losses is comparable with the cost of construction of two mechanised divisions, not including maintenance. There can be no doubt that when comparing nominal costs, the submarine losses suffered by the Allies cost them far more than the losses that their submarines actually inflicted. However, when we take the disparity between the total industrial potential of the Empire of Japan and its enemies into account, the ratio may become more favourable for the Allies.


Indirect impact of enemy submarine activity


In fact, it is possible that the indirect impact of submarine attacks on our convoys was far more important than direct one. Unfortunately, it is much harder to measure it, but at the very least it consists of the following elements:

1. Research effort spent on ASW. Even when submarines were not sinking many of our ships, we could not ignore the threat they posed and hence we were forced to spent some of our limited research potential on ASW.

2. Fuel and supplies used on anti-submarine patrols. Our hunter-killer groups rarely achieved major successes and most of the time they did not even manage to locate their targets, but the groups were still constantly burning fuel and required supplies to function. Cost of repairs also cannot be ignored. All this increased our "real" losses in ICdays.

3. Loss of national unity. Even when the effects were not economically significant, attacks on our convoys were a cause of big concern for both soldiers and civilians. This required intervention of our agents on several occasions.

4. Loss of opportunity. There were many situations when our production budget was heavily strained, but our shipyards were producing merchantmen and convoy escorts on a semi-continuous basis. Therefore, in many cases we lost the opportunity to produce something else and were not gaining as much valuable experience in other areas as we could. Despite this, as of 2nd of January we are far behind the desired "safe" threshold of available reserves, which means that in reality we did not produce as many merchantmen and escort ships as we planned.

It should also be noted that even if the enemy failed to sink any of our convoys, the pressure put on our merchant marine would still be increased due to new conquests.
 
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The defeat of Nationalist Chinese forces is great news to us, without a doubt. The Xibei San Ma will struggle to feed so many new mouths and I fully expect another victory within the year where the infrastructure will, yet again, prove to be our greatest adversary. As far as Xijnjang is concerned, I support the notion that it should be left alone and that Stalin should be asked whether he would be interested to add them to his sphere of influence. Of course, such an agreement would mean that the conflict with these warlords would end diplomatically. Stalin, never a man to shy away from opportunities, will most likely accept.

This only leaves Communist China. Since they are in the midst of our realm, we can not ignore them, nor can we allow them to join the Comintern. The war here must end quickly. Fortunately, they got a good part of their armed forces stuck in XSM territory, so we can hope that these fewer forces will not be able to withstand our assault. However, I fully expect losses to be serious. The Communists had years to dig in and their mountain fortresses are extensive. We will need every piece of artillery, plane and man to defeat them and even then it'll be bloody. Still, rooting them out is vital.

Considering the poor infrastructure in most of China, I assume that the army will have to redistribute it's forces so that the few roads don't get choked with supplies. This in turn would allow us to properly garrison our holdings in the South Pacific. Here I concur with Adm Yamamotos suggestion regarding Malaya-Singapore, Sumatra, Java and Borneo. These additional forces should be taken from existing army formations, though, as long as they are not needed in China.

Considering both the overwhelming attacks of the USA and the merchantmen situation, I conclude that we should cut our losses here. All non essential islands should not have any garrison at all. Only important places should have garrisons of at least 4x Gar brigades. It is this admirals opinion that nothing we have can withstand the kind of overwhelming attacks the US are conduction right now. Sun Tsu teaches us that we should not put forces where we can not win, we should act accordingly.

The important islands need to be guarded and Adm Yamamoto has made a valid point here. However, I believe that we do need to increase the ammount of support brigades in these garrison forces as well, else we will simply use our men to soak up bullets, hoping that the enemy runs out of shells before we run out of men. We should be able to inflict severe casulties to them as well and for this we need artillery and anti air weapons.

By the same notion, we do need to construct fortifications in important places, so our troops benefit from hard bunkers instead of foxholes and simple trenches.

If in doubt, we could still withdraw surplus garrison forces to China where they might be used to directly guard vital provinces of industry or resources. In the end, this will result in fewer supply lines being needed at sea, thus cutting down the possibilites for the Allies to attack our merchants in the first place.

I also do agree that we need to take the fight to the enemy. Thus we will have to assemble our fleets and the SNLF and re-conquer what the US have take from us, including Hawaii. Once there, we will make sure to root out any remaining US port we can reach so we can minimise the threat of further merchant losses and also limit the area of operation of the enemy.


Edit:
Something totally different: Since we now won over National China, should we re-establish the Guanxi Clique? They were our allies after all.
 
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To Admiral Baltasar,

I am disappointed by the fighting ability of the Quangxi and would therefore will not support their resurrection at the present time.
Also I think your incorrect in your assessment of Xijnjang (OOC: aren't they already at war with us?) its our only access to the vital regions of USSR, beyond outer Manchuria there is not much of value in the far east USSR. If they join the USSR while at war with us they can call on the USSR to protect them.
 
To Adm. Yamamoto,

I can't figure our where you got the those numbers from, could you supply a page or note nr. where said information about the US effectiveness can be calculated?
 
Note to the administration regarding convoy warfare.

We won't have much success against the modern submarines unless we ourself got modern technology.
And we can't make omelet without smashing some eggs therefore as long as we have even one resource convoy coming in we will lose convoys.
While we have anti-submarine patrols running around other groups doesn't have to be eternal on patrol, often sortie or intercept are more economic in fuel.

So to improve our situation there are several things that needs improving.
Our ASW techs are still lagging behind in area.
ASW needs to be overwhelming to have a fast effect, ie. all battlefleets patrolling the same area has a great effect and relative fast, a single DD running around nearly never catch and sink a sub. Generelly the more, faster and better tech'ed wins the day. Also larger groups have greater chance of sinking and not only damaging the subs.
The base they operate from can be eliminated, this helps move the problem out of the central areas but doesn't stop it totally.
Bombing submarine bases can also be done, again overwhelming force must be applied and bases with major enemy fleets in them must be avoided as they just damage our bombers. Small bases with just a sub or 2 in it are good targets.
Edit: building more ASW forces are also good.
 
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To Admiral Baltasar,

I am disappointed by the fighting ability of the Quangxi and would therefore will not support their resurrection at the present time.
Also I think your incorrect in your assessment of Xijnjang (OOC: aren't they already at war with us?) its our only access to the vital regions of USSR, beyond outer Manchuria there is not much of value in the far east USSR. If they join the USSR while at war with us they can call on the USSR to protect them.

My point exactly (OOC assuming that they are at war with us already). If they want to ally with Russia, they should do so, but at the same time we could suggest to Stalin that with Xijnjang under the Communist banner, the war could as well be over as we do not have any ambitions out there. Stalin gets another puppet, Xijnjang doesn't have to bother about us and we're finally done in China.
 
Short term perspectives:
Pacific:
With Borneo and Java firmly in our grasp I think now it's the time to make counter-offensive against the USA gains in Pacific. The most important should to to capture all major ports that we've lost as they can supply larger forces which can be used for invasion on the neighbouring islands. Our priority is Wake, Midway and Hawaii. After that any other American port in the area, save for one bordering Australia directly. We have 15 divisions of marines that can be used for the task. If the IJN thinks it won't be enough it should be safe to redeploy a few infantry divisions (or all marine divisions, if there are left any) from China.

China:
We must not underestimate the Xibei San Ma as they can cause problems in West China if we allow them to dig in. The best course of action will be to cut off enemy troops in our territory from any possible support from the north-west. Then we can can start closing our grip, killing or capturing any enemy unit that didn't make it in time to escape the encirclement. At the same time I'd be good to completely encircle the People's Republic of China strongholds and not allow Mao to reinforce them, we are very close of doing so already. Once encirclement is completed we should wait for reinforcements and storm the communist's base of operation. With them gone nothing will stand in our way to attack Xibei San Ma from the east.

Long term perspectives:
Once we are done with Xibei San Ma, People's Republic of China and USA we can think what to do next. My proposition is to exploit our gains in China to invade Indochina. We can attack from the north and land invasion forces by sea, this shouldn't be problem as we are in control of the sea and have sufficient holdings in the area to transport units and supplies from. After that Thailand will be exposed from multiple directions. It surely can't stop us when we'll attack. With capture of Thailand Burma will happen to be in same situation as Thailand - dangerously exposed from mutliple directions. The IJN can, in the meantime, continue to capture the British holdings in Pacific, but I don't think we should engage against Australia. We should do this before the Axis coallition will collapse.
 
OOC: aren't they already at war with us?
Yes, but if they join Comintern, that won't put as at war with the USSR automatically. I will also manually peace them out, assuming that the USSR took them under their "protection". If they don't join, they will continue the war normally.

So to improve our situation there are several things that needs improving.
Our ASW techs are still lagging behind in area.
ASW needs to be overwhelming to have a fast effect, ie. all battlefleets patrolling the same area has a great effect and relative fast, a single DD running around nearly never catch and sink a sub. Generelly the more, faster and better tech'ed wins the day. Also larger groups have greater chance of sinking and not only damaging the subs.
The base they operate from can be eliminated, this helps move the problem out of the central areas but doesn't stop it totally.
Bombing submarine bases can also be done, again overwhelming force must be applied and bases with major enemy fleets in them must be avoided as they just damage our bombers. Small bases with just a sub or 2 in it are good targets.
Edit: building more ASW forces are also good.
Our carriers proved that they are quite effecting at sinking submarines, but they are usually needed in our main fleets and our main fleets have usually more important tasks than ASW patrols. They also consume much, much more fuel and supplies.

Sorties were tried and they were ineffectve. Patrols worked much better, as then our hunter-killer groups actually had a chance of locating and engaging enemy submarines. The groups themselves are usually formed of whatever is available, but the number of spare destroyers has shrunk considerably recently.

Bombing submarine bases is a good idea on paper, but again, our main fleets always have more important tasks than that. We could try to form some specialised hunter-killer groups with CVLs or use reserve CAGs to attack submarine bases in the South Pacific, but that's for the Admiralty to decide.
 
There is another option to develop efficient anti-submarine tactic. Maritime patrol aircraft. In detail we could develop anti-naval aircrafts designed to counter submarine groups alone. Aircraft can scout larger areas and engage spotted hostile targets much easier, it can be redeployed in any place of the Empire as needed. Considering how costly submarine attacks are I think it'd be wise to consider developing and enacting this strategy.
 
This will hardly be possible. Engineering such aircraft would mean that we have to invest in multiengine aircraft. We'd have to start from scratch and those aircraft would be very costly and time consuming to build. It may even be quicker and more cost effective to build more escort carriers instead.
 
The Administration believes that we could try to use our reserve CAGs in that role and see how efficient they are. However, previous experiences show that our CAGs suffer heavily in battles involving our main fleets, which mean that in many cases they will not be available for ASW roles, as damaged CAGs will be replaced by the ones that are in better condition.

Concerning the air force, the Administration would like to hear the thoughts of Generals and Admirals about the deployment of air wings in various theatres.
 
Regarding ASW

Our reserve CaG's are our Navs, they should be used when possible in ASW roles.
As well as we got to few of everything CAG's are also a limited resource where we could use more, especially as we also need to keep practical up an not single plane is building right now.
 
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