Reaching into the Reich: Espionage, assassination and partisans, Aug-Oct 1941
By the start of August the German offensive had pushed almost half the distance from the pre-war border to Moscow. The RKKA had tried a number of operational methods to derail this onslaught and, at best, all they had managed was to kill large numbers of the aggressors. Only a few German divisions at this stage were rendered combat incapable while about 20% of the available Soviet formations were pulled to the rear in an attempt to reinforce and reorganise (this force, of course, was to be instrumental in the subsequent Kalinin battles). Equally, STAVKA was becoming increasingly aware of an emerging crisis in Central Asia where Japan's agressive intentions were now clear.
If the immediate solution could not be found on the battlefield, the Soviet state still had the means to reach beyond the front lines. This response fell into two distinct categories.
The start of the Partisan War
Within the borders of the Soviet Union (especially the pre-1939 border), the GKO (
Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony - State Defense Committee) ordered all party formations in occupied territories to shift to an active partisan war mainly, at this stage, of sabotage rather than the establishment of liberated zones. This was assisted first by the elements of Red Army formations that had been overrun but had escaped capture and secondly by using Po2 light aircraft to infiltrate NKVD formations to direct the resistance.
(these light wooden planes were the backbone of the Soviet command, control and supply of the partisan movements)
(a large number of Po-2s and their, often female, pilots were lost on hazardous missions)
This campaign had early sucesses across the occupied zone as the Germans and their allies had to either accept raids on their vital supply lines or divert front line troops. In particular the German forces to the south of Bryansk were almost constantly out of supply due to a highly effective partisan movement in the eastern Pripyet sector.
(Soviet partisans near Homyel)
This was both essential at delaying the German offensive at Bryansk and in assisting Roskossvky's 5th Army in their later counterblow.
(The German rear at Bryansk became so dangerous that all trucks had to move in convoy)
Equally such a campaign had the benefit of reasserting Soviet state power in the occupied zones. The Germans were well aware of how important it was to secure at least the passive acceptance of the occupation and their propoganda was aimed at ensuring the populace believed the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse.
(German propoganda poster detailing Soviet losses)
To the Party leadership, armed actions – the propoganda of the deed – was an essential reminder that the Soviet state was not defeated.
(such images were as much part of the partisan war as armed actions - in this case it was a constant reminder to the local populace that the Soviet state was still present)
Reaching into the West
The GKO had greater ambitions than just disrupting German supply lines within the borders of the USSR. They had the means to reach into the occupied west and the Reich itself.
The NKVD had penetrated the German state (in part based on the shattered cadres of the KPD) and, at least in France, the Communist Party already had an armed wing (FTP –
Franc Tireur Partisans) that was undertaking limited acts of resistance.
(extracts from a radio broadcast by Maurice Thorez on 1 August 1941)
The Communist Parties in occupied Europe were ordered to follow this model, to build alliances as they could with other anti-German forces, and were given stocks of weapons and explosives. Again, the Germans had to accept either reduced supplies and industrial output or divert forces to guard critical sites. Equally, a campaign of assassination meant that German troops could no longer freely move around occupied cities such as Paris, London, Amsterdam or Edinburgh.
The assassination campaign was also targetted within the Reich itself. Here the targets were often senior officials in
seemingly unimportant roles. They were not well protected but their deaths would damage the German war machine. Some such attempts failed but the Luftwaffe was badly disrupted by the deaths of two senior officials and this contributed to the VVS regaining air parity over the battlefields in August and September.
In each case, close colleagues were brought to cooperate with the NKVD on the promise that family members (who had been in the KPD) would be freed from jails and moved to Scandinavia. That such prison raids also released large numbers of criminals was a small bonus as far as the NKVD was concerned.
By mid-September the Soviet intelligence structure in German had been effectively eliminated.
What was not clear was whether or not the short term gains would have a significant impact on the battlefield. However, by September, the VVS had sufficient control over the skies that Soviet tactical bombers were able to concentrate almost at will on the German logistical systems - a factor that was to start to bring the initial German offensive to a pause.