The Year of Strategic Crisis
Part 16: Littoral Expeditions III, November 20 – December 31, 1941
As had been noted previously, once the marines were ashore at Aden, Da Zara’s fleet was cut loose from providing close air support and could operate independently as the marines were occupied with taking the rest of the colonial territory. Da Zara had raided the island of Socotra and had sunk any and all British ships discovered there. This minor action did not, however, keep him occupied for long. In addition, Da Zara received reinforcements from Italy. Two brand new fleet carriers had been completed back in Ocotber, and by late November had been prepared for combat and sent down the Red Sea to join his fleet. These were the carriers RN Ilipa and RN Zama, named after two of Scipio Africanus’ most famous victories over the Carthaginians.
Thus, while the marines were marching through the deserts of Aden showing the flag to the various Bedouin tribes and showing the Italians to be the new masters of the area, Da Zara sailed further south. With two more fleet carriers, his airpower was doubled from four wings of carrier-borne warplanes to eight. Da Zara’s fleet had become truly awe-inspiring and formidable. The Italian Somali port of Muqdisho had fallen to a British overland invasion recently, and in preparation for a new marine operation in that area, Da Zara raided the port, as he had received intelligence that there was some sort of British naval presence in the area. It was only three squadrons of submarines, perhaps based there to attempt to interdict Italian maritime lines of supply and communication. Da Zara wiped them out.
The raid on Muqdisho.
Da Zar had worked out a way to use his overwhelming air strength without tying his own forces in a knot. He would use them on a 2/2 basis: two carriers dedicated to offensive operations, and two to defensive operations, or to a different offensive operation. This way, the Italian aviators would not have to worry about maneuvering in a sky bloated by Italian warplanes. While sensible and indeed correct, its first test proved awkward as superior British air forces based at Mombasa kept up a nonstop assault on Da Zara’s fleet and eventually forced it back beyond the range of those British fighters. This event changed the marines’ priority, fresh from occupying Aden, from recovering Muqdisho to assaulting and taking Mombasa, which was the only other port in British possession on the entire eastern half of Africa. It was a disaster in face of British resistance, the marines losing over two hundred and fifty men for no gain; only thirty-two British soldiers were killed. The marines landed at undefended Muqdishu instead, at least recovering that port for Italian use and denying it to the British.
The marines landing at Muqdishu after a defeat at Mombasa.
Da Zara, having recovered somewhat from the aerial pounding his newly strengthened fleet had taken, moved back down the coast of Kenya on a search and destroy mission to wipe out whatever British naval strength he could find. For a fleet of his size, the pickings were minor. There was no British battlefleet to destroy, merely isolated naval units. One destroyer flotilla was sunk by his action up through the end of the year, as were four transport flotillas, two submarine flotillas, and a light cruiser. It was likely a hemorrhage of local British naval strength, but compared to the potential pickings of Tel Aviv it was paltry. As an admiral, even one assigned to littoral operations, Da Zara still thought in terms of naval strategy rather than maritime strategy. The former concerned merely ships, their deployment and their use in combat against the enemy. The latter concerned the relation of ships and their effects on sea to events on land. Da Zara preferred to strike at the Mediterranean Fleet rather than simply blockade it. Fortunately, Mussolini understood maritime strategy and could control his admirals. Da Zara would stay off the coast of Kenya, covering the marines as they began their overland march to Mombasa.
The marines’ overland march to Mombasa.
Balsti’s 2a Divisione was quickly pulled off the march to Mombasa, however, to deal with a British threat that had materialized north of Muqdisho in the form of an infantry division. If both marine divisions left the port then the British might take advantage of circumstance to reoccupy it and wreck the marines’ logistics. Balsti attacked the British, but was unable to force them out of their positions. Re had to make the march to Mombasa on his own. Reaching the outskirts of the capital of Kenya, he attacked but too was thwarted. The marines, having split their strength to deal with two threats, were unable to defeat either of them. The British, superior in numbers by two brigades, were operationally concentrating in time, forcing the marines to disperse in space to deal with them. The marine response had failed.
Re’s failed attack on Mombasa.
The third littoral operation of the year was turning into a more protracted campaign than expected by Italian strategists and policymakers. The coup-de-main against Mombasa failed, and the marines were now dispersed in an attempt to deal with two threats at once. In the new year they would have to rethink their operation and concentrate to defeat each threat singly, together with massive support from Da Zara’s fleet. Italian operations for the year ended in stalemate everywhere. The marines were thwarted in Africa, the Soviets were stopped in Dacia and stalled despite recurrent pressure in Anatolia.
Part 16: Littoral Expeditions III, November 20 – December 31, 1941
As had been noted previously, once the marines were ashore at Aden, Da Zara’s fleet was cut loose from providing close air support and could operate independently as the marines were occupied with taking the rest of the colonial territory. Da Zara had raided the island of Socotra and had sunk any and all British ships discovered there. This minor action did not, however, keep him occupied for long. In addition, Da Zara received reinforcements from Italy. Two brand new fleet carriers had been completed back in Ocotber, and by late November had been prepared for combat and sent down the Red Sea to join his fleet. These were the carriers RN Ilipa and RN Zama, named after two of Scipio Africanus’ most famous victories over the Carthaginians.
Thus, while the marines were marching through the deserts of Aden showing the flag to the various Bedouin tribes and showing the Italians to be the new masters of the area, Da Zara sailed further south. With two more fleet carriers, his airpower was doubled from four wings of carrier-borne warplanes to eight. Da Zara’s fleet had become truly awe-inspiring and formidable. The Italian Somali port of Muqdisho had fallen to a British overland invasion recently, and in preparation for a new marine operation in that area, Da Zara raided the port, as he had received intelligence that there was some sort of British naval presence in the area. It was only three squadrons of submarines, perhaps based there to attempt to interdict Italian maritime lines of supply and communication. Da Zara wiped them out.
The raid on Muqdisho.
Da Zar had worked out a way to use his overwhelming air strength without tying his own forces in a knot. He would use them on a 2/2 basis: two carriers dedicated to offensive operations, and two to defensive operations, or to a different offensive operation. This way, the Italian aviators would not have to worry about maneuvering in a sky bloated by Italian warplanes. While sensible and indeed correct, its first test proved awkward as superior British air forces based at Mombasa kept up a nonstop assault on Da Zara’s fleet and eventually forced it back beyond the range of those British fighters. This event changed the marines’ priority, fresh from occupying Aden, from recovering Muqdisho to assaulting and taking Mombasa, which was the only other port in British possession on the entire eastern half of Africa. It was a disaster in face of British resistance, the marines losing over two hundred and fifty men for no gain; only thirty-two British soldiers were killed. The marines landed at undefended Muqdishu instead, at least recovering that port for Italian use and denying it to the British.
The marines landing at Muqdishu after a defeat at Mombasa.
Da Zara, having recovered somewhat from the aerial pounding his newly strengthened fleet had taken, moved back down the coast of Kenya on a search and destroy mission to wipe out whatever British naval strength he could find. For a fleet of his size, the pickings were minor. There was no British battlefleet to destroy, merely isolated naval units. One destroyer flotilla was sunk by his action up through the end of the year, as were four transport flotillas, two submarine flotillas, and a light cruiser. It was likely a hemorrhage of local British naval strength, but compared to the potential pickings of Tel Aviv it was paltry. As an admiral, even one assigned to littoral operations, Da Zara still thought in terms of naval strategy rather than maritime strategy. The former concerned merely ships, their deployment and their use in combat against the enemy. The latter concerned the relation of ships and their effects on sea to events on land. Da Zara preferred to strike at the Mediterranean Fleet rather than simply blockade it. Fortunately, Mussolini understood maritime strategy and could control his admirals. Da Zara would stay off the coast of Kenya, covering the marines as they began their overland march to Mombasa.
The marines’ overland march to Mombasa.
Balsti’s 2a Divisione was quickly pulled off the march to Mombasa, however, to deal with a British threat that had materialized north of Muqdisho in the form of an infantry division. If both marine divisions left the port then the British might take advantage of circumstance to reoccupy it and wreck the marines’ logistics. Balsti attacked the British, but was unable to force them out of their positions. Re had to make the march to Mombasa on his own. Reaching the outskirts of the capital of Kenya, he attacked but too was thwarted. The marines, having split their strength to deal with two threats, were unable to defeat either of them. The British, superior in numbers by two brigades, were operationally concentrating in time, forcing the marines to disperse in space to deal with them. The marine response had failed.
Re’s failed attack on Mombasa.
The third littoral operation of the year was turning into a more protracted campaign than expected by Italian strategists and policymakers. The coup-de-main against Mombasa failed, and the marines were now dispersed in an attempt to deal with two threats at once. In the new year they would have to rethink their operation and concentrate to defeat each threat singly, together with massive support from Da Zara’s fleet. Italian operations for the year ended in stalemate everywhere. The marines were thwarted in Africa, the Soviets were stopped in Dacia and stalled despite recurrent pressure in Anatolia.
