Dien Bien Phu

Jove said:

I have a question.

Why did the French not try to push a land force from Hanio to Dien Bien Phu when it was encircled and they knew it was going to fall?

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If you look at this map then you will see that the distance from Hanoi which is at coast to Dien Bien Phu was quite long:



I would also assume that the terrain was jungle, some hills and perhaps even mountains. That terrain was perfect for guerilla war.

There was something called "Operation Condor" but it was stalled in the jungle or something o ...

IIRC, Dien Bien Phu was partially chosen in order to try and lure the enemy in to a fight. If this was the case, then I assume it's isolation was deliberate.

Hanoi isn't on that map (Ho Chi Minh City was actually Saigon before 1975), but it still is some distance away. And that distance is through terrain almost devoid of any infrastructure for French reinforcements. And the French had learned that marching through the jungle was not an effective way of winning, besides, IIRC most forces left were on the De Lattre Line.

My understanding was also that the french in Dien Bien Puh had basically been ordered to withdraw already. The fact that they were even there was due to insubordination.

Jove said:

I have a question.

Why did the French not try to push a land force from Hanio to Dien Bien Phu when it was encircled and they knew it was going to fall?

Click to expand...

A website about Dien Bien Phu: http://www.dienbienphu.org/english/index.htm

AFAIK, the French didn't control the roads going there in the first place, that's why all supplies and reinforcements were sent by air.

Cat

An image is worth a thousand words ?

How the area looks like from Google Earth :



Cat

You may think it would be possible to get out (or in) from the South East, along the river, but this valley is in fact going towards Cambodia, not anywhere near Hanoi.

To go to Hanoi you will have to go East, using very poor mountain roads in the jungle. And this roads were constantly ambushed by the Vietnamese.

In no way can you push a land force quickly from Hanoi to relieve the place before it falls.

Cat

Here, I have put an arrow, in the direction of Hanoi, at the bottom of the map:



As you can see: Mountains, mountains, mountains, everywhere around Dien Bien Phu.

There are really no possibility to reinforce the place quickly whatsoever...
Except by air. It was the plan, it failed.

Cat

Arilou said:

My understanding was also that the french in Dien Bien Puh had basically been ordered to withdraw already. The fact that they were even there was due to insubordination.

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My understanding is that it's a bit more complex than that. During the initial NVA artillary barrage and assault, the local artillary commander shot himself, and the garrison commander cracked up and decided he was going to surrender.

The commander of one the parachute regiments (Pierre
Langlais) then basically took over, locked the original commander out of his office, put trusted REP soldiers in command of the whole area and proceeded to continue the fight for another two months or so.

What people tend to forget about Dien Bien Phu is that the french, many of whose foreign legionaires were *excellent* former Wehrmacht troops, actually fought off the initial rush and subsequently counterattacked and managed to silence a lot of the Vietnamese artillary which had been emplaced in fixed positions to shell the airfield and hence couldn't be used well in a mobile battle. After that, Giap switched the battle over to a siege and eventually ground down the French, but it took him two months to manage that.

Jove said:

I have a question.

Why did the French not try to push a land force from Hanio to Dien Bien Phu when it was encircled and they knew it was going to fall?

Click to expand...

The French eventually sent a relief expedition to Dien Bien Phu, but it consisted of only 8,000 men and was still 80 kilometers away when it fell (and the terrain on the way there was mostly mountains and jungle). French forces in Vietnam were stretched too tightly for them to be able to quickly mount an expedition to relieve a fortress besieged by 50,000 enemy troops. Also, French commanders were slow to comprehend how desperate the situation in Dien Bien Phu had become.

I will try to give you some informations about Dien Bien Phu:

1) Localisation : it's in a mountainous place, located in the middle of the Thai tribes. Located in the North west, not far of china, the place have jungle and as well is very humid.

2) Political situation : France is exhausted by the WWII, the needs to create and support 14 division in germany (NATO demands), and by this war who kill every year one St Cyr promotion (25 % of the new officers). At Diem Bien Phu time, the french governement have already decide to finish with the vietnamese problem (following the needs of the majority of the population and the majority of the political parties). Vietnam is cutting in 2 parts : Annam and Tonkin are "protectorate" under the rule of the emperor (Bao Dai) the french are theorically here only to help, the Cochinchine is a colony and people living there are reputate french (even if only 10 % are legally french).

3) Military situation :After 10 years of fighting, the situation is not that well. If the french army have successfully won several regular battles, fact is the viet minh are building are regular army and the partisants power is going stronger.

4) Strategic idea or strategic concept : the system of fortified places installed for a short time seems to be succesful. With a small amount of troops and a air support, it's possible to keep at bay important VM forces, and it let the main french manoeuvre force the possibility to do an operation in place where the VM can not oppose a concrete force. Due that , the french commandement decided to repeat this system in the north western region, and then make an operation with the mobiles groups in the "plaine des Jarres" where the VM GQG was supposed to be. Due the distance with the tonkin airports, it was creation of a local airport and some planes were stationned there. Also , at the opposite of what many think, at first the hills were controled by the french troops. Last but not the least, a mobile force constituated by a regroupment of the local militia was created and get the mission to "gravitate" around DBM to offert a mobile support using anti guerilla warfare. The main idea was to keep at bay the new born VM army (5 divisions), cut the supply road from china, and to size the VM GQG. Globally all those goals were reach: after DBM it have take several month to the Gal Giap to recreate a valid force, also Giap himself was threatened by the communist party due the amount of dead. The plaine des jarres operation was a success, and during all the DBP battle the suplly from china were gravely pertubated.

4) Why a defeat?

Well, if the strategic goals are reach, why DBM is considered as a defeat, both military and politically? Several reasons : the airforce could not afford to support efficency the base. The counter battery plan was totally wrong and leaded to the suicide of the artillery commander the 2nd day of the battle when he suddently discovered he did wrong!!The luck that allowed the viet minh to capture the 2 nothern bastions, one with a french foreign legion btllon(several shells hitted the QG at the start of the night and the bataillon was fighting without commander and without anyone knowing the commander was dead) another one with a north african bataillon (after a night of fight when the tank reached the place a misinterprated order (misgiven?) made everybody going back and not forward.)After some days , vietminh got the hills and then the local airport was useless. The french GQG assumed it could be possible to have a draw (keep the VM at bay there the time to operate the plaine des jarres operation) and then retreating. Due the pursuit of the VM ofensive, they decided to commit more troops to DBM defense, and then decided to ask the USA for help. The help could have been a nuke + a B 52 operation on the back of the VM army (operation Vulture). The idea was refused by the pentagone, then the secodn idea was vulture, simply strenghten the groupement of militia and ask them to give a hand directly to DBM (they arrived there the day after the redition!!!!). The main problems about DBM was the public opinion, the political moment, and the army moral.

After some years (10 or so) of fighting an invisible ennemy, the soldiers are ready to fight for real, and also they is a need to help those that are fighting already ... it lead to hundreds individual soldiers dropped there (not as members of a constituate units) ... more soldiers mean more prisonners, mean biggest defeat.

Politically, the french governement WANT to stop vietname affair, but need a victory (or at least something that can be presented as a victory ) to have better negociations and keep the public opinion quiet (after vietname , Tunisia is in the governement agenda). So the pressure on Genral Navarre is important, and at no moment he have the opportunity to order a retreat (could have be made after the first 2 days).Also some generals seems to have play a political game for some political party.The choice of the 6th BPC and his charismatic commander (Bigeard) was mostly political (even if it was one of the best french unit)

Finally the public opinion was pressed also for a victory, a real one ... how to accept to see those young men be killed be prisonners or simply to be ashamed to be defeated by a gang of chinese bandits????DBM was the first mediatised battle for France ...


What was the result of DBM?

Well those battle was an attrition battle, and french can not handle it. So VM forces at the end of the day won the battle. The result was 5 VM divisions not able to operate for at least 6 month (at this moment the VM army was constituated by 5 divisions). The battle was obviously a defeat, but could have been an episode due the strategical success of the whole operation if the political moment have been better, and maybe if someone like De Lattre (Marechal de France) was the commander. Fact is , due the defeat,
French have to withdraw from Vietnam, and can NOT keep a military base (that is the only former colony where french do not have any military). Soldiers were send to prisonner camps, were reeducated , then went back to france to fight in North Africa. This reeducation have at the end lead to the "Alger coup" . One movie with Alain Delon show what happened to the soldiers mind.

One question why not reinforce from Laotian side? Is the terrain just as bad on that side too?

For all the WHAT IF possible, and there are so many, we have to remenber that key :

At Diem Bien Phu time, the french governement have already decide to finish with the vietnamese problem (following the needs of the majority of the population and the majority of the political parties).

Several solutions existed, several options for each and every solutions ... Fact is it was the last round and noone planned something for after ... Even in the hystorical case (plain defeat in DBP), if the GQG and/or the governement have decide to continue the fight for one year, then the strategic situation would be trully better for the french than before DBM, the core of the new born VM army was simply so badly hurt that it would be impossible to use it during 6/12 month. The situation would be the same as in cocinchine after the Tam Bo revolt (the VM in the south of vietnam started an armed revolt that was stopped in a blood bath by the french army/police).

Just at this time, france, french army, french GQG have already give up to the concept of indichina ... and appart some units with a fighting spirit that can be called Nietschism (nietscheen in french) as the paratroopers or nihilism as the french legion, the main idea was only to be back in france without problem (mean not hurt, with the money made in vietnam, with the same level a lifestyle as in vietnam. ...).

Laos was an option, mostly the militia that operate around DBP was thai and laotian, but to send terrestrial reinforcement from Laos, it simply imply it was already troops there .... The reference to De Lattre de Tassigny call also the move he organised to send troops from cocinchine to tonkin with a aerial bridge (ALL, including JU 52, planes (civil include) were used to move the soldiers from south to north). But noone at this time had the needs or the guts to do so. the hierarchy had simply give up to those war.


I had the chance to serve in the french army under 2 personns who were there, both of them (retired by now, Colonel in the early 80') have always give those reasons for the final fate of DBM :

1) too much non combattants that was impossible to evacuate, people that have take supply , and also space ... they were called Nam youn rats, by derision, but they were simply people who were in the wrong place at the wrong tme, and that shuld have been evacuate immediatly. They were a huge pain for the supply and the moral. They also count for a huge parts of the prisonners but they were not fighting people.

2) the local hierarchy that was not able to handle a camp as DBM (I spoked about the Lt Colonel in charge of artillery, but even the C in C of DBM was cleary not at the level of that task. A man like Gal Coigny should have been send there (he asked but the request was denied due the fact he was already the C in C of the north vietnam.


3) Globally everybody (governement, GQG, civil , many soldiers also ) had only one idea : go back home.

pcasey said:

My understanding is that it's a bit more complex than that. During the initial NVA artillary barrage and assault, the local artillary commander shot himself, and the garrison commander cracked up and decided he was going to surrender.

The commander of one the parachute regiments (Pierre
Langlais) then basically took over, locked the original commander out of his office, put trusted REP soldiers in command of the whole area and proceeded to continue the fight for another two months or so.

What people tend to forget about Dien Bien Phu is that the french, many of whose foreign legionaires were *excellent* former Wehrmacht troops, actually fought off the initial rush and subsequently counterattacked and managed to silence a lot of the Vietnamese artillary which had been emplaced in fixed positions to shell the airfield and hence couldn't be used well in a mobile battle. After that, Giap switched the battle over to a siege and eventually ground down the French, but it took him two months to manage that.

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Globally true, maybe the best short resume I have ever read. Nowaday I would like to correct some very small points :

at this time, the proportion of ex Wermacht or ex waffen SS was going down in Legion.

Mostly the main counter attack was the fact of the paratrooper + the tanks (until the last one was destroyed). Legion was used for counter attack only for the helping hand to the postion located just in the north of the airfield (the one keep bt the north african troops).

nominally, De castries was still the CC, but the operations were organised by the para commanders (Langleais + bigeard + the 5th BPVN when they arrived on the zone).

Dark Knight said:

The French eventually sent a relief expedition to Dien Bien Phu, but it consisted of only 8,000 men and was still 80 kilometers away when it fell (and the terrain on the way there was mostly mountains and jungle). French forces in Vietnam were stretched too tightly for them to be able to quickly mount an expedition to relieve a fortress besieged by 50,000 enemy troops. Also, French commanders were slow to comprehend how desperate the situation in Dien Bien Phu had become.

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Bearing in mind what happened during the battle of Cao Bang in 1950 to Charton and Lepage forces, it is no wonder that that forced failed to achieve anything at all. Dien Bien Phu was doomed since the very beginning of "Castor".

Aetius said:

One question why not reinforce from Laotian side? Is the terrain just as bad on that side too?

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Check out a map - you would have to trek through Burma and/or northern Thailand first to even get to Laos. It would likely take a few weeks just to figure out a route, and a month minimum to travel after having landed your troops at Bangkok

Kurt_Steiner said:

Bearing in mind what happened during the battle of Cao Bang in 1950 to Charton and Lepage forces, it is no wonder that that forced failed to achieve anything at all. Dien Bien Phu was doomed since the very beginning of "Castor".

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Kurt Steiner, mmmmmmm.... I like this author, even if the guy was a dentist, certainly one of the best SCI FI french writer for the 50/60.

No relation???? Yes , indeed there is one, Charton and Lepage was a different time, a different operation .... Cao bang was an evacuation, it was planned to be a military move (mean without civilian, but at then end the column was full of civilian, and if you never lived here you do not know the true meaning of "impedimenta").Also, and untill De Lattre it was the rule, the capability of the french was not enought ((in that case movement was slow, fire power was not enought, and the recon was not made ... to speak about them you should know they had to leave the main road and go throught the forest ...)

Diem ben Phu was doomed since the start because it was planned to do so, the goal was not to install a PERMANENT base, but simply a procisory blockade the will bleed the viet minh army while the main operation was runing in the Jarres plain.Fact is the GQG was enable to evacuate the troops when they had to go ,and so they had to accept an attrition battle untill the sad end. That kind of system was tried before and was succesful, because it was a reply road , it was also an aerial support. In DBP case, both was not existing due the distance with the main airports, that is why the fact the viet have won the artillery part was so important : they the possibility to make the local airport not working.

Cao bang was one of the numerous mistakes made by people who both over and underestimated the problem : Admiral d'Argenteuil polluated the mind of many by his stance Vietnam was french and should stay french. My 2 cents is we should have associate Vietnam to France as we did late for Pacific island or New caledonia , and it was planned in 1946 and strongly adviced by Leclerc.

One point, mostly forgot and that is sad, Vietnam was the last country to be a member of thefrench union, and that up to 1979 or 1980... Another point, the official stance for uncle Ho was it was not war against France or French people, but only a rebellion against some individuals or firm thjat was enslaved the na que : for exemple Bao Dai called traitor because if was a member of the communist party and a minister (personnal advisor of Hochi Minh) and then left to return to his emperor style life, another exemple is Michelin or Descour et Cabaud ....

gagenater said:

Check out a map - you would have to trek through Burma and/or northern Thailand first to even get to Laos. It would likely take a few weeks just to figure out a route, and a month minimum to travel after having landed your troops at Bangkok

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Burma ... LoS (thailand) ... OMG what for? If you mean reinforcement for france , let me laught ... It was not question to send any troops in more with the problem in north africa. Mediterannean sea is the river that cross france as Seine cross Paris, dixit General Massu about the independance of the french magrebh. If reinforcement it coud come from local (pre positionned troops) troops, or from the B52. The B52 option was cancelled after a boxing party tenue inside the pentagon(Pierre Messmer1 - Major Patty 0 defeat by Knock out). About map, well ever heart about Mekong river?that is a MAJOR problem that exist btw Laos and Thailand (Land of Smile), try to cross a Nong Kwai (small bridge in thai or somethng like that) and you will understand. When people speak about reinforcement from Laos, they must mean from the local expeditionary forces. Let it's easy , like the french campaign in Spain under Napoleon was easy .... no problem on the paper, but in real life ...