The divided Germany

[RedRalphWiggum]

Yes, and then look forward. the USSR knew that a unified Germany would not stay a benign and pacifist country for long. They also would have done everything they could to Finlandise it, regardless of the agreement with the Americans, and the Americans would have done everything they could to make it a NATO member in everything but name. The Finland example is not apt because Finland would never have been able to threaten the USSR on its own and had never caused Russia any serious problems before. Germany was a very different beast.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying the plan didn't have positives, I'm saying you are presenting it as if everyone would have pleyed honest, everyone would have forgiven the past and no one would have worried about the future. A few years after having 27,000,000 people killed by the Germans, it would have been pretty hard to convince the Russians to just take Germany at its word that it would promise not to cause them any trouble again. I think you are trying to make 1952 decisions with 2011 hindsight.

 

[RedRalphWiggum]

To clarify: I'm not saying Leviathan's scenario is implausible or far-fetched. I'm saying that maybe things wouldn't have gone so smoothly, maybe German nationalism could have made a return, maybe Germany could have ended up aligned to the west, maybe a million other things could have happened that would have terrified the USSR. we can't take a best-case scenario counterfactual and assume that is definitely what would have happened.

 

[chepaeff]

Yes, and then look forward. the USSR knew that a unified Germany would not stay a benign and pacifist country for long. They also would have done everything they could to Finlandise it, regardless of the agreement with the Americans, and the Americans would have done everything they could to make it a NATO member in everything but name. The Finland example is not apt because Finland would never have been able to threaten the USSR on its own and had never caused Russia any serious problems before. Germany was a very different beast.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying the plan didn't have positives, I'm saying you are presenting it as if everyone would have pleyed honest, everyone would have forgiven the past and no one would have worried about the future. A few years after having 27,000,000 people killed by the Germans, it would have been pretty hard to convince the Russians to just take Germany at its word that it would promise not to cause them any trouble again. I think you are trying to make 1952 decisions with 2011 hindsight.

If there to be a unified and neutral Germany (which we can agree will never happen without mutual Soviet-Allied agreement) both sides would definitely make sure that Germany would stay neutral.
And well, are Germans so stupid to go into nationalism, alliances, etc again? I think 2 times is enough

 

[RedRalphWiggum]

If there to be a unified and neutral Germany (which we can agree will never happen without mutual Soviet-Allied agreement) both sides would definitely make sure that Germany would stay neutral.
And well, are Germans so stupid to go into nationalism, alliances, etc again? I think 2 times is enough

How? If the Germans began to re-arm, what would they have done? We'd been through all that only 20 years before. You think they could have been straightjacketed like Japan but by both the US and the USSR?

And yes the Germans, like every other country on Earth, would have been perfectly capable of making stupid mistakes only twice in a row. They are human, after all.

 

[chepaeff]

How? If the Germans began to re-arm, what would they have done? We'd been through all that only 20 years before. You think they could have been straightjacketed like Japan but by both the US and the USSR?

And yes the Germans, like every other country on Earth, would have been perfectly capable of making stupid mistakes only twice in a row. They are human, after all.

Sanctions (so 1990's hehe), military inspectors - by 1945 it was obvious that Versailles-style wasn't the way to go. Meh, no foreign troops, profitable trade with both sides - that's a very rare chance given to defeated country, especially after war during which Germany managed to spoil it's reputation for decades ahead. It's like a big "don't fuck it up again". And seriously were there so many people in Germany keen to go to war again? FRG did quite a good job wiping out old Prussian militarism, the new Germany can do it as well.

 

[RedRalphWiggum]

Sanctions (so 1990's hehe), military inspectors - by 1945 it was obvious that Versailles-style wasn't the way to go. Meh, no foreign troops, profitable trade with both sides - that's a very rare chance given to defeated country, especially after war during which Germany managed to spoil it's reputation for decades ahead. It's like a big "don't fuck it up again". And seriously were there so many people in Germany keen to go to war again? FRG did quite a good job wiping out old Prussian militarism, the new Germany can do it as well.

You are misunderstanding me: I'm not claiming Germany would have become a militaristic, nationalistic society again, I'm saying it could have, and from a Soviet point of view even a small chance of that happening is something to be avoided at almost any cost. But it's foolish to say "by 1945 the Germans had learnt their lesson, there's no way they would have run amuck again", things don't work that way. Nations, like people, can make the same mistake an almost infinite number of times. There was nothing about German society in the late 40s that guaranteed they would become largely peaceful as they did in actuality.

 

[unmerged(75409)]

I would like to commend you for this part of the post in particular. It's very well written, and has lots of food for thought. Love it!

Thanks I'm a fan of historical speculation, and the postwar/cold war era is one of my favorites. It's fresh on everyone's memory and it's very relevant to us today - yet you hardly ever find anyone musing about whether everything really had to happen this way.

Yes, and then look forward. the USSR knew that a unified Germany would not stay a benign and pacifist country for long. They also would have done everything they could to Finlandise it, regardless of the agreement with the Americans, and the Americans would have done everything they could to make it a NATO member in everything but name. The Finland example is not apt because Finland would never have been able to threaten the USSR on its own and had never caused Russia any serious problems before. Germany was a very different beast.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying the plan didn't have positives, I'm saying you are presenting it as if everyone would have pleyed honest, everyone would have forgiven the past and no one would have worried about the future. A few years after having 27,000,000 people killed by the Germans, it would have been pretty hard to convince the Russians to just take Germany at its word that it would promise not to cause them any trouble again. I think you are trying to make 1952 decisions with 2011 hindsight.

You're totally right about the risks and dangers. It was not a given that Germany would become Europe's teddybear, a self-centered nation with a defensive-statist-100%-risk-averse foreign policy, happy to let others decide the big questions in Europe, eager to please and happy to make up for past violence with buckets of money.

A reunited Germany in 1952 is not the same as a reunited Germany in 1990, whose political, social and cultural world view has been shaped by 40 years of having the Iron Curtain run right through the country. In 1952 many of the wounds torn by war and defeat were still fresh.

There's this episode where Germany won the world championship in 1954, and when they played the melody of the national anthem, the crowd in the stadium (Switzerland) sang not the third stanza ("unity and law and freedom") which had become the national anthem in 1949, but the first stanza ("Deutschland über alles, from the Meuse to the Memel") which had been the anthem throughout the Weimar and Nazi years. It's not a complete picture of mindsets but it's an indicator that old habits were still deeply ingrained.

A reunited Germany would probably be forced (more or less) to sign a peace treaty where they accept the Oder-Neisse border as definite. This would be a major challenge, politically, and force them to face realities that the Germany of our history did not accept until the 1970s. It would generate a lot of opposition from large sections of the population - in our history, throughout 1950s no major party in Germany was ready to give up the claim to Silesia, East Prussia and Pommerania.

Other things would be controversial as well... would they really hold all those denazification trials that in OTL dragged on throughout the 1950s? If they raise a new army, how do they define its political outlook? In 1952 the ideas that would shape the attitudes of the Bundeswehr after 1955 were all already there but would they put them into practice? Without the looming shadow of the western powers, would the (west) Germans really

But on the other hand you also have the east German communists who could become a factor in Germany's politics. Or not? How does the west German establishment react when Stalin dumps east Germany into their laps, with its strong and well funded communist party SED? (Which is led by Stalinists and has thoroughly pissed off the social democrats during their brief time as east Germany's dominant party.) I assume the SED would pull ~8-15% of the vote in all-German free elections which would not make them a large party, but a very well organized one, possibly with hidden caches of weapons and loads of money funneled their way by the Soviet authorities. The establishment could crack down hard on them once the Soviets move out of the country. Or could they?

Mainstream West Germany was throughout the 1950s and 1960s politically firmly aligned with the goals of Konrad Adenauer: a pacifist foreign policy, firm attachment to the west and firm commitment to free market economics. However there was also a strong undercurrent of not-quite-missing the old times, but dwelling in the memories of wartime cameraderie, scapegoating "a few criminals" for the bad things that undoubtedly happened, and denying that there had been a big picture of systematic genocide and intentional war crimes. Does that undercurrent reassert itself? Maybe in the wake of a big crisis over the outlawing of the communist party? Or is a reunited Germany too busy with other things?

In any case I don't think that all of this was really something that would have influenced the Soviets against a neutral Germany. You have to keep in mind that in their view, all of it was already happening, in West Germany, outside their control! In their view, Adenauer was a sinister capitalist who ran a government full of unredeemed ex-Nazis, ruling over a country that dwelt on revanchist dreams and was even encouraged in this by the western Allies who equipped Adenauer's new Wehrmacht with the biggest and best weapons that US factories could produce.

Neutralizing Germany does not make anything worse - on the contrary, it improves the situation for them. Of course, only as long as there are safeguards that the reunited Germany does not renege on its promise of neutrality. It's actually in Stalin's interest to encourage a neo-Prussian renaissance in Germany, a renaissance of anti-western sentiment that sees Adenauer toppled. It would turn the clock back to the 1920s, when Germany was still under boycott by the west and ran trade and secret military deals with Stalin's young USSR. A time Stalin would remember well

 

[chepaeff]

You are misunderstanding me: I'm not claiming Germany would have become a militaristic, nationalistic society again, I'm saying it could have, and from a Soviet point of view even a small chance of that happening is something to be avoided at almost any cost. But it's foolish to say "by 1945 the Germans had learnt their lesson, there's no way they would have run amuck again", things don't work that way. Nations, like people, can make the same mistake an almost infinite number of times. There was nothing about German society in the late 40s that guaranteed they would become largely peaceful as they did in actuality.

You are overestimating the fear of Germany. The situation may look like France' wishes to eliminate Germany after WWI, but its not. This time Germany was utterly crushed and what's more important the German threat was now replaced by a US threat, which was unlike Germany alive and kicking.
From a soviet point of view having a neutral Germany was profitable. Not only some of Soviet leaders considered it possible but this thought was kinda popular among "masses" - I watched one documentary about post-war occupation where historian Lev Bezymensky (I think Leviathan might know who he is) who served as an officer in occupation troops said there was a widespread belief among officers that having a big buffer between systems would be better.

 

[RedRalphWiggum]

@Leviathan

Your last two paragraphs - very true when we speak of Stalin, but not so when Khrushchev takes over (I'm moving the goalposts a bit, but as a fellow alt-history enthusiast I know you won't mind that too much). Khrushchev would have been well aware of the dangers of a potential revived nationalist Germany, and being grounded in reality unlike his predecessor, I doubt he would have esuated the FDR with the Nazis (maybe publicly for propaganda, but he was a sensible man so I doubt he felt that way privately).

The problem is though that at that stage, the USSR was in no condition to fight the west and it knew it. It punched above its weight because of the legacy of WW2, but let's imagine for a second the USSR and Us agree to a neutral, unified Germany. A few years later, this Germany starts making noises about taking back parts of Poland, uniting with Austria etc* - then what? Is the US going to stop them from making these threats? No, very unlikely given its track record of supporting literally anyone as long as they weren't the USSR. Can the USSR attack unilaterally? No, it was in no condition to fight WW3 and it knew it. So what is left? Nothing. there would have been nothing they could have done, and all those veterans of WW2 would have been saying "you idiots, we had them divided and neutralised and you let the leash off again!". Now i know this is a worst-case scenario for Moscow, and I don't consider it a likely one. But why, from the Kremlin's POV, would you even allow a slim chance for this to happen? Think of the history within living memory for those people. It really wouldn't have seemed to far-fetched to them.

What I expect to have actually happened, though, is that Germany would have become very western-leaning, but remained generaly militarily neutral. the cold war would have been less tense and the USSR wouldn't have had the PR disaster that was the Berlin wall. They probably would have been viewed somewhat more positively around the world by the public and Khrushchev would have been in power for longer.




*unrealistic, probably, but a nightmare that would have haunted the Kremlin, and somewhat understandbly

 

[RedRalphWiggum]

You are overestimating the fear of Germany. The situation may look like France' wishes to eliminate Germany after WWI, but its not. This time Germany was utterly crushed and what's more important the German threat was now replaced by a US threat, which was unlike Germany alive and kicking.
From a soviet point of view having a neutral Germany was profitable. Not only some of Soviet leaders considered it possible but this thought was kinda popular among "masses" - I watched one documentary about post-war occupation where historian Lev Bezymensky (I think Leviathan might know who he is) who served as an officer in occupation troops said there was a widespread belief among officers that having a big buffer between systems would be better.

Yes yes yes a neutral, demilitarised Germany would have been great - but what fool would have staked his life and the lives of his country on them staying neutral and militarised when he could remember them twice destroying western Russia in his own lifetime? When they were bound to gravitate towards the enemy camp? When they had the demographic and industrial potential to become a threat again within less than a generation?

 

[unmerged(195591)]

Now assume Germany is allowed to go neutral in 1952/53, has free elections, signs a peace treaty with the western powers and the USSR, and then becomes neutral. Does not join the Coal-and-Steel-Union. Does not join NATO. Is free to trade with the Soviets as well as the western powers. Where does that put them politically? They can no longer freely draw on Marshal Plan funds, so reconstruction is a bit slower. They institute regular passport controls on their western borders, just like those on the eastern borders with Czechoslovakia and Poland. All occupation troops are removed - no G.I. Elvis Presley in Germany, less jazz, less black people in the streets (none actually), less foreign languages in general. Germany becomes a very different country, its affinity for the US, France and Britain develops much less strongly. It would have been very much a gain for the Soviets.

That's very interesting. A neutral Germany would mean no EEC...which fundamentally alters the course of European history.

Also interesting to compare this imagined Germany with the historical experience of neutral Austria. They sound very similar.

 

[unmerged(75409)]

Yes yes yes a neutral, demilitarised Germany would have been great - but what fool would have staked his life and the lives of his country on them staying neutral and militarised when he could remember them twice destroying western Russia in his own lifetime? When they were bound to gravitate towards the enemy camp? When they had the demographic and industrial potential to become a threat again within less than a generation?

I think you greatly underestimate the power that the USSR could wield under Khrushchev. They had hydrogen bombs, an army of several million men, as well as a vast and powerful strategic air force. And almost a continent for themselves. Germany on the other hand would by treaty be forbidden from developing nukes (or even a domestic nuclear industry!), would at best field a medium sized army (600,000-700,000 men) and its central geographic position without any strategic glacis whatsoever and no independent access to the world's resources would dictate that it would have to bow to the naval and aerial superpowers of the day, lest it would face isolation and annihilation. There would not have been a contest at all! 1958 would not be 1938 - an independent Germany would be in no position at all to make any sort of demands on its neighbor states without overt support from one of the two superpowers. That would not be speculation, but obvious facts to contemporaries of the 1950s.

Germany did not actually have the demographic and industrial potential to become a threat to anyone. The age of coal and steel was over by 1952 - the age of oil and aluminum was dawning quickly, and Germany had none of either. You have to wonder, if Germany had such a huge potential, how comes its role since 1945 has been that of an object of history, rather than a subject?

Your last two paragraphs - very true when we speak of Stalin, but not so when Khrushchev takes over (I'm moving the goalposts a bit, but as a fellow alt-history enthusiast I know you won't mind that too much). Khrushchev would have been well aware of the dangers of a potential revived nationalist Germany, and being grounded in reality unlike his predecessor, I doubt he would have esuated the FDR with the Nazis (maybe publicly for propaganda, but he was a sensible man so I doubt he felt that way privately).

Actually, the image of west Germany as a capitalist, revanchist place whose lower ranks of government were crawling with unredeemed old Nazis was not a Stalinist peculiarity. It's been a part of the Soviet world view all the way until the 1980s. And in the Russian world view the Hitlerite destruction of 1941-1945 actually has very little connection to WW1. WW1 was (in their view) an imperialist conflict brought about by impersonal events, like a train accident or a hurricane. Russia's loss of life is blamed not on any inhuman or unusual actions from the Germanic powers (GER/A-H) but the incompetence of the Czar and his government. There is no talk of Russia being "twice destroyed", there was just one such attempt, earlier events are old stuff.


Khrushchevian propaganda (and that of the late Stalinist era) was actually focused on pointing out how superior the USSR had become in terms of power, industry and social progress compared to the rest of the world, including Germany. Being afraid of a resurgent Germany did not really fit into that world view. I consider it very likely that Stalin really meant what he said in his 1952 note.

 

[unmerged(75409)]

The problem is though that at that stage, the USSR was in no condition to fight the west and it knew it. It punched above its weight because of the legacy of WW2, but let's imagine for a second the USSR and Us agree to a neutral, unified Germany. A few years later, this Germany starts making noises about taking back parts of Poland, uniting with Austria etc* - then what? Is the US going to stop them from making these threats? No, very unlikely given its track record of supporting literally anyone as long as they weren't the USSR. Can the USSR attack unilaterally? No, it was in no condition to fight WW3 and it knew it. So what is left? Nothing. there would have been nothing they could have done, and all those veterans of WW2 would have been saying "you idiots, we had them divided and neutralised and you let the leash off again!". Now i know this is a worst-case scenario for Moscow, and I don't consider it a likely one. But why, from the Kremlin's POV, would you even allow a slim chance for this to happen? Think of the history within living memory for those people. It really wouldn't have seemed to far-fetched to them.


*unrealistic, probably, but a nightmare that would have haunted the Kremlin, and somewhat understandbly

If Germany made any noises about taking back territory, the USSR would threaten to drop a hydrogen bomb on Berlin, and that would be the end of it.

Appeasement in the 1930s failed because UK/F were weak (or considered themselves weak) and had nothing to threaten Hitler with. A nuclear armed USSR would never find itself in that sort of situation.

 

[RedRalphWiggum]

I think you underestimate how much countries plan for a worst case scenario. Why do you think even this week the US is sending troops to Australia to intimidate China when it has a huge superiority over them already? If they have a potential enemy down they tend to want to keep them down as much as possible. And if the USSR's stated ideological view of the FRG was their real view of it, they would not have expected it to act alone against the warsaw pact but in concert with or even as part of NATO (or whatever organisation may have appeared in this alternate timeline).

In any case, I understand that the USSR could have flattened Germany easily in Khrushchev's time. What I don't understand is why they would risk putting themselves in a situation where they had to, when instead they could keep half the country more-or-less directly controlled from Moscow? Why risk trying to gain what may give you an advanatge under ideal conditions for keeping what definitely will give you an advantage (having the west's balls in your fist)?

Actually, the image of west Germany as a capitalist, revanchist place whose lower ranks of government were crawling with unredeemed old Nazis was not a Stalinist peculiarity.

If this is true, then why on Earth would they let them off the leash?

 

[safferli]

If this is true, then why on Earth would they let them off the leash?

It was a propaganda lie to keep the DDR people quiet. No-one after the 1970s really believed it.

 

[RedRalphWiggum]

It was a propaganda lie to keep the DDR people quiet. No-one after the 1970s really believed it.

But if the Khrushchev government knew that, then surely the idea would have been more viable under him, as I said? I still don't see how the potential gains would have outweighed the risks, but I would have most people would have agreed Khrushchev had a far more realistic view of the world than Stalin.

Both the east and west used propaganda Safferli, and both sides lied through their teeth. you don't strike me as a naieve idealist so I'm sure you know that already. And both the DDR and FRG did have revanchist ideas; they both wanted to annex eachother!

 

[RedRalphWiggum]

Something else to ponder: if a united Germany had tried to join the nonaligned movement, would it have been allowed to do so?

 

[unmerged(75409)]

Something else to ponder: if a united Germany had tried to join the nonaligned movement, would it have been allowed to do so?

The movement only started in the 1960s, no? I doubt they would want to be part of it, it was a soapbox for leftist agitation from third world countries. United Germany would be a conservative, firmly capitalist place, they would not join the NAM as we know it.

 

[RedRalphWiggum]

The movement only started in the 1960s, no? I doubt they would want to be part of it, it was a soapbox for leftist agitation from third world countries. United Germany would be a conservative, firmly capitalist place, they would not join the NAM as we know it.

It was not only for leftists, even Suharto was a part of it, along with US puppets like Colombia. I agree they probably wouldn't wanted to have joined, but I just wonder how independent they would have been, i.e. if they tried to would they be allowed?

 

[unmerged(75409)]

It was a propaganda lie to keep the DDR people quiet. No-one after the 1970s really believed it.

DDR people would be the ones least likely to believe, actually - except for those few who did not receive western TV, and except for the ideological "true believers"

It's a propaganda trope that sold well throughout the communist bloc (and outside of it). Propaganda tropes have a way of becoming ingrained in peoples' beliefs...

The Soviet army for example was very much indoctrinated with the belief that NATO was an aggressive alliance that was likely to attack the Warsaw Pact nations as soon as an opportunity presented itself. We do not see things this way - we in the west considered Warsaw Pact as the alliance that was always plotting how to best catch the west unaware and reach the Rhine within seven days. But their view was the opposite, they were told to stay sharp because a NATO attack could happen. That kind of attitude becomes part of their belief systems, if perpetuated long enough. Where did it ever start? I don't think Khrushchev or Stalin made a mental distinction between "real west Germany" and "west Germany as portrayed by propaganda". Neither man had any experience abroad at all. If they wanted to know what Germans were up to, they would ask KGB for a briefing. And KGB knew full well how many ex-Nazis the Adenauer government had. (Plenty!)

In any case we'll probably only know whether Stalin was honest when the Russians finally open the Kremlin archives. So many things are difficult to answer - what did Stalin really think about Germany?

Reading the Wiki article, it seems the majority of historians believe that Stalin was not sincere in his offer. On the other hand none of them could really prove this with sources. It remains to be seen whether maybe in the future someone can answer the question conclusively.