Bismarck didn't take any land off Austria (a sound decision strategically, as it turned out), but did he at any point consider doing so? I would have thought either the Austrian alps or the Sudentenland must have been tempting
Bismarck didn't take any land off Austria (a sound decision strategically, as it turned out), but did he at any point consider doing so? I would have thought either the Austrian alps or the Sudentenland must have been tempting
Do you mean they would invite Austrian revanchism, or the lands themselves would be problematic?
The Habsburg part of Silesia? It had mining and forests but not much in the way of people or industry. More of a symbolic booty than a real prize.Interesting stuff guys, and yes the Austria alps makes no sense at all, sorry about that. I suppose Silesia would be the best one, and that was fairly industrialised too, wasn't it?
It would have been bad, but not that bad... they had French and British support, and the Hungarians had zero love for the Russians. They survived worse. They would have pulled themselves together after some drama. But Bismarck could have kissed any chances at an alliance good-bye, and would have to watch his back.Even the OTL beating Austria took was enough for it to completely and utterly reform itself into Austria-Hungary, heaping a lot of the burden onto Hungarys shoulders. A truly beaten Austria would not be able to keep Hungary, or more outward parts, in the empire, and this would basically set of a big balkan clustercopulation furter north. A scramble to get the most of the disintegrating kingdom, be it by outright annexation (think a reversed Bosnia here), or by economic and diplomatic vassalisation (think OE). None of this would have helped Prussia, which needed time to unify Germany proper, and industrialize and arm itself up against France.
In czarist Russia, alliance sets up you!I hate to second-guess Bismarck, but in hindsight the smarter move would have been to take more from Austria and set up a long-term alliance with Russia. Prussia/Germany has nothing to gain and lots to lose by fighting Russia. On other hand, Prussia/Germany has much to gain (early Anschluss) and low risk by remaining hostile to Austria as long as Russia is friendly. Russia and Austria distrusted each other due to the Crimean war, so all Bismarck had to do was keep that distrust going, which would have been easy due to Balkan questions.
Bismarck might have wanted to make an alliance with the Russians, but the Russians had a mind of their own about those things. Pissing off Austria and betting everything on Russian sympathies means Bismarck would risk a lot. The czars were not nearly as easily influenced (pushed around) as the Habsburgs, and Prussia/Germany could easily find itself entirely without friends if there was a cooldown in relations with the czar (for whatever reason). And if that happened, it would only be a matter of time before Austria and France would attack Prussia-Germany with the intent to totally dismember it. Britain and Russia would just stand by and watch it happen.
Pursuing Russia while antagonizing Austria would put Germany in a position where it needed Russia far more than Russia needed Germany. It was almost the reverse with Austria.
Even the OTL beating Austria took was enough for it to completely and utterly reform itself into Austria-Hungary, heaping a lot of the burden onto Hungarys shoulders. A truly beaten Austria would not be able to keep Hungary, or more outward parts, in the empire, and this would basically set of a big balkan clustercopulation furter north. A scramble to get the most of the disintegrating kingdom, be it by outright annexation (think a reversed Bosnia here), or by economic and diplomatic vassalisation (think OE). None of this would have helped Prussia, which needed time to unify Germany proper, and industrialize and arm itself up against France.
But an Anschluss was the last thing Bismarck wanted, and the exact opposite of his policy. Before he came along, most German nationalists expected a united Germany would include Austria. Bismarck was the one who said no, leave them out so that the German Empire will be dominated by Prussia alone.Prussia/Germany has much to gain (early Anschluss) and low risk by remaining hostile to Austria
But I don't think anyone in 1870 was anticipating such a dramatic collapse of a Great Power.
How did it differ from the numerous French revolutions of the last 80 years? Yet nobody doubted France was a Great Power.They need but look back 20 years to 1848, and see the utter clustercopulation that the Hungarian Revolution was.