Chapter 2: The Sino-Soviet War
I. The Plan of Operations
The Sino-Soviet War set the pattern for all later operations by the Red Army, if not the Red Fleet nor the Red Air Force, and thus bears close inspection. This is because most of the later leadership of the Red Army were involved directly in this war, whether as field commanders, such as Zhukov and Vasilievski, or as advisors to the Chinese Communists, such as Rokossovski and Chuikov. These men used the war as an opportunity for testing new ideas and technologies, such as the mechanized-armored concept of warfare and the development of units specifically trained for mountain warfare. Additionally, the Sino-Soviet War set the pattern for all of Comrade Trotsky's later military-political maneuvering, including the philosophy of "gambling high" and the determination that allied governments of acceptable ideology which sustained the war in an acceptable manner were to receive much, if not all, of the direct benefits.
In China, this last was born of necessity: the Soviet Union had neither the interest nor the capacity to establish village soviets in the occupied territories, while the Chinese Communist Party had the means to do so, and the imposition of direct rule by Comrade Mao's Party in occupied regions strengthened the claim of that organization to be China's legitimate government, in the face of the apparently overwhelming strength of the Kuomintang and as a further proof of Soviet distance from the popular front policies of the 1920s.
"Gambling high," as Trotsky described it, was an adaptation of the general philosophy behind the imperialist Schlieffen Plan of 1914. Where no suitable means presented itself in the existing sphere of conflict, Comrade Trotsky simply widened the conflict, in order first to propagate the Revolution, and second to allow the Red Army the full freedom of maneuver required to prosecute the war. In China, this meant that individual warlord cliques, such as the Ma Clique or the East Turkestan "Republic," were overrun to strengthen Comrade Mao's hand and weaken the Generalissimo's.
This method had two rationales, one political, the other military. Politically, as mentioned, it meant the strengthening of Chinese Communist authority and weakening of Kuomintang control of the outlying provinces. This was, surprisingly, more in keeping with Mao's philosophy of guerilla warfare, relying upon control of the countryside and peasantry rather than the urban proletariat, than with the Russian model, relying heavily upon the control of major cities and production facilities. The military reasoning was that an infinitely extended flank would benefit the Red Army, more mobile and better led, more than it would the Kuomintang, who relied heavily on mass peasant levies. This proved at all events to be somewhat optimistic, but as a prediction it was essentially true: the Red Army could more easily concentrate at any given point than the Kuomintang forces, especially in the Mongolian deserts where so many of the fugure armored spearhead commanders were tested against Chinese cavalry.
In executing this plan, of course, the Red Army faced one massive disadvantage in that China was more or less fully mobilized thanks to Chiang's endless campaigns against local warlords, the Chinese Communists, and occasionally a true imperialist enemy, the Japanese. Comrade Trotsky ordered the levy of thirty-six new infantry divisions and an unheard-of new force of twenty-four motorized divisions, which were meant to augment the Red Cavalry rather than to fight as infantry traditionally had. This mobile force would be heavily engaged in China, and at war's end, fewer than half of these divisions were considered salvageable, but they proved that the essential principles behind them were sound.
The calculation behind this year-long buildup of forces was simple: the Chinese could not easily reach the Soviet border, even through Mongolia, and therefore the widely-feared bisecting of the Trans-Siberian Railroad was simply a phantom. The Red Army could afford an initial sluggish period because the Chinese had a long, long distance to travel before they could execute any effective operations. When the Chinese did choose to engage, it was in the difficult, poorly mapped foothills of western Mongolia rather than across the Gobi Desert, playing to the strengths of the Mongolian-Soviet forces, as this very region was where the Red Army was most easily able to concentrate against Chinese aggression.
After Comrade Trotsky's speech at the Party Congress, there was a great deal of concern that the Western powers would intervene. Trotsky, as ever one of the shrewdest judges of conditions outside the Soviet Union from his extensive travels, disagreed, with reason. The Western Allies were too concerned about the deteriorating situation in Germany, where the Bonapartist regime of Chancellor Schleicher continued to be deeply embroiled in the suppression of fascist uprisings and the deliberate eradication of what remained of the Communist Party in Germany; this merely drove the Party in Germany underground, where the Party membership intermingled with and eventually overtook the Social Democrats. Similarly, Poland was too involved with German affairs, and Romania too weak, to cause any trouble on the mainland of Europe. In Scandinavia, the newly-formed Scandinavian Empire displayed its fascist tendencies immediately, calling for a distinct rebuff from Comrade Trotsky, but as in Germany, their own internal affairs precluded any foreign adventures.
Thus, the fundamental assumptions underlying Trotsky's war plan were the following. First, the Red Army would have sufficient time to build up in sufficient strength to act against the Nationalists. Second, the international situation from Murmansk to Baku would remain more or less stable, allowing the suction of experienced troops and commanders from the Second Civil War into the East. This would allow the Red Army sufficient time to make up its material and personnel deficiencies after Tukhachevsky's review of Second Civil War performance. Third, the Nationalist Chinese would be unable to act effectively to protect the imperialist warlords in China's west.
Of these assumptions, the first was accurate; a wave of enthusiasm for the Revolution led to volunteers on a scale which overwhelmed even Trotsky's planned mobilization orders. They needed less time to find men than to train and organize them; given that the standards of organization and training were much simpler and more robust than in 1914, to the point that most infantry divisions went into the field equipped with rifles and little else, finding men to lead them was more difficult than any other measure of organizing the divisions. Trotsky returned to the Civil War standby of soldiers' soviets electing their officers to company level, while promoting interbellum officers extensively to fill the gaps in battalion, regiment, brigade, and division commanders.
The second assumption was less accurate, but remained valid. There was the distinct possibility throughout the last quarter of 1933 and first quarter of 1934 that the Scandinavians would declare war, but the situation from Poland to Persia remained remarkably stable. Komandarm Tukhaschevsky conducted extensive maneuvers among the western troops in exercise of his theory of deep operations, impressing the Poles with the Red Army's ability to put large forces on their border at the same time as fighting a major war in China. This was mostly successful due to a lack of western observers on the Chinese front, where operations were essentially noexistent during this period.
The last assumption was the weakest. Chinese forces, especially the Ma generals' divisions, were able to begin early operations, but they were impeded by poor maps, poor roads, and a general lack of interest in the vigorous prosecution of a campaign that the Mas themselves saw as one more of Chiang's campaigns to centralize his authority. General Ma Hongbin, the only one of the Ma Clique generals who chose to side with the Chinese Communists, described it rather aptly: "
Chiang wanted to humble a foreign power before he proclaimed himself Emperor; mere rule of China would not have given him sufficient influence to do that, but defeating the Soviets would." Because of this general perception, and the belief that the Nationalists' leadership would expend northwestern-frontier troops at will before committing their own lowland veterans, the Ma Clique troops on the border prosecuted the initial stages of the war with amazing laxity.
It was an attitude which would do little to protect them when the Red Army deployed fully.