Strangely enough, I always thought that was the case, however on the recommendation of
@Zebedee I picked up The Blitzkrieg Legend by Frieser and it puts the campaign into a different context. I would absolutely recommend it. The first part of the book is dedicated to proving the points that the German high command absolutely did not want to fight the western allies, either in 1939 nor 1940. However after Poland, they had no choice.
What you see is Hitler believing his gift for short term gains - thus their aim for 1940 was to capture territory and force a favourable situation for an attritional war. They had only 14 mobile divisions (less than 10% of their strength). They were actively planning to fight a static war with huge numbers of marginally trained infantry divisions. All of their mobile forces were concentrated to force the British to 'pull back' and maintain the left flank (and the line of supply/communications) with the UK
The allies gifted the strategic victory by pushing the bulk of their best forces into Belgium to counter the expected 'strong right flank' coming through Belgium.
You can see from Tooze that this was supported economically. Firstly you had the massive build up of munitions in the 6 months leading up to the invasion of France, principally using the coal/steel taken from civillian sector. This had huge problems, with an acknowledged detriment of the long-term economic build up of the reich, putting the nation into material and food deficit during that period. Furthermore, there were the horses - the German army of 1940, relied on more horses than the German army of 1914.
It is a fascinating read, and I am sure that you will be able to appreciate the original German version. Just reminds me that as much as I think i know, I still have much to learn.