WW I Blockade of Germany - Why Not Break It?

[gagenater]

IMHO it would be a form that the Entente have to give up the Dover Barrage and supply their troops using a longer trip. Because if the Royal Navy is gone it does not mean that the HSF automatically gains control over the North Sea, rather the reverse of the original status. Now the Entente have to pull back to their coastal waters to have a fighting chance against a numerically superior enemy. Sure the threat of the Thames Estuary and/or the Dover Barrage might be enough to change the balance on the continent, but it is still a long way till the Germans can convert it to actually winning the war.

I wouldn't expect that the Germans would attempt to force their way into the Thames Estuary or the Dover ports. All they need to do is intercept shipping headed to France from anywhere on the Atlantic coast.

I agree with a lot of these points, but there are other things which need to be considered. Let us suppose that the Germans achieve a great victory over the Royal Navy and shatter its Battleship fleet and its ability to maintain supreme control over the North Sea and German ability to sail into the Atlantic.

The first point to consider is that the UK was in no way as dependent as Germany on the import of many goods. The UK did import many grain products from overseas it was was more productive than Germany in terms general agriculture

For example Britain was both more productive despite being a smaller nation in terms of many sectors, the most important of which are agriculture are probably those of agriculture and construction (where the UK was more productive). What was actually seen in the UK was that agriculture had shifted with imports focusing on grain, wheat and potatoes and home production focusing on meats and dairy produce. There is already historical precedence for the UK agriculture sector being able to absorb a drop in imports in this sector - in 1916 the US harvest was particularly poor, yet by 1918 UK home production of grains and potatoes had grown by around 1/3 while the meat/dairy had shrunk by a proportional amount [1,2]. That is, the UK was more robustly able to absorb changes in world markets and import situations.

To be decisive for the prospects of the war, the Germans don't really have to blockade things trying to get tothe UK - what they need to do is ensure that things the UK is trying to get to France either don't make it, or only arrive via such a circuitous route that they aren't very useful. From the German perspective, it doesn't matter what the UK is doing on/in it's island, because they can effectively prevent them from usefully participating in the war just by preventing the flow of supplies and manpower to their armies on the continent.

Now, lets entertain the idea that Germany forces on the RN a defeat which reverses the situation ... that is the Grand Fleet does not leave its harbors for the remainder of the war. Would Germany be able to impose a blockade of similar severeness as the UK? Probably not - in the first instance, the UK was able to blockade at range, closing the north sea and English Channel, where all of the German import docks were established along a single coast. To do so, Germany would have to close off the entire Atlantic something that would be logistically a challenge and would force German forces to 'disperse' their strength - that is, battleships/cruisers acting in isolation could be forced to fight strategically disadvantaged actions. So yes, Germany could have an effect, but no they would not cut off trade as completely as the UK was able to.

The other consideration is that the German fleet wasn't really a High Seas fleet ... it was a North Sea Fleet. The ships were principally coal powered and given that Germany had no overseas bases from which to conduct coaling operations, their forrays into the Atlantic would have been relatively short, before they need to sail back to Germany and re-load. That is, sailing into the middle of the Atlantic already uses about 1/3 of their sailing range.

The principal area that the Germans would want/need to disrupt transport through would be the Bay of Biscay, and the Atlantic approaches to the English Channel. This would be sufficient to block shipping coming in to France from the New world. This shipping was critical for France, and for the UK as vast quantities of food and war material were shipped directly from the New World, to the continent via this route. They couldn't reasonably cut off transport through the French Mediterranean ports, but shipment overland from this area to the critical areas around Northeastern France would be far more of a challenge for France than the real life transport from the Atlantic and Channel ports to the front lines was.

The idea that Germany might disrupt shipping in the English Channel is also a little erroneous. There was one of the worlds largest destroyer fleets stationed in the channel (Dover I think) and were highly effective at engaging battleships (with Torpedos) in constrained waters. The German destroyer torpedo volley was one of the things which helped to cover the German high seas fleet as it disengaged.

I wouldn't expect the Germans would blockade that part/end of the Channel with capital ships. Instead, their battlefleet would be split into 2 or even 3 parts/stations - one part in the Bay of Biscay and Atlantic approaches to the Channel preventing shipping from getting to France via the Atlantic, and for torpedo boats, destroyers and submarines to be patrolling the north sea approaches and English channel proper. The other portion of the German battlefleet would be at home port, ready to relieve the 'active patrol' portion in the Atlantic approaches, and to sail out and 'cover' the small ships enforcing the blockade in the channel proper if necessary. If a 3 part split is possible, the 3rd part would be conducting harrassment of coastwise trade around the UK which was considerable. I doubt the Germans could maintain a 100% effective 'close blockade' of the entire channel, but they could certainly make life miserable for anyone trying to get across. Instead of large organized convoys going from the UK to France on a regular basis, think individual ships dashing across under cover of night, large troopships and transports being individually watched and sunk by dedicated subs, constant harrassing gunfire and torpedo attacks on blockade runners, and a never ending struggle to get vital ammunition and supplies to the British armies on the continent. The Germans wouldn't ever try to go as far as the mid Atlantic.

[1] THE UNITED KINGDOM DURING WORLD WAR I: BUSINESS AS USUAL? Stephen Broadberry 2003.
[1] “Anglo-German Productivity Differences, 1870-1990: A Sectoral Analysis”, European Review of Economic History 1, 247-267.


I think that this is the crux - a German victory would be bad, but not the end of allied operations. The high seas fleet was actually a North Seas fleet. Germany did not have the overseas logistics to sustain such a world-wide fleet as the Anglo-Americans operated. Even if they win, they gain superiority in the North Seas but struggle to project their power anywhere that would have a decisive impact.

I mostly agree, but think the Germans could do a somewhat effective job of intercepting materials headed to France via the Atlantic and the UK. Given how closely matched WWI was at many times, this could have had a decisive impact. Of course it requires the Germans to beat the high seas fleet, which had no realistic chance of taking place.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Of course it requires the Germans to beat the high seas fleet, which had no realistic chance of taking place.

Thats just nonsense, the Germans sunk it at Scapa Flow with minimal casualities.

 

[Henry IX]

Of course it requires the Germans to beat the high seas fleet, which had no realistic chance of taking place.

The problem with beating the British navy is that for there to be enough damage inflicted on it to cripple it enough to give Germany naval superiority outside the Baltic they would have to engage the larger and more powerful battleship squadrons, at which point their chances of winning become much smaller. It would require repeated ambushes and highly successful actions, each one whittling down the Royal Navy, followed by a grand fleet action, won by a decisive margin, cripple the Royal Navy to point that blocking British supplies to France becomes doable.

 

[Director]

@Easy-Kill - I think the point you should remember is that merchant ship losses were already high and the British economy was suffering. Any further interference with shipping would force Britain to make some hard choices, one being how to continue to reinforce, equip, feed and supply the BEF and other armies overseas. As news of a serious British naval defeat in the North Sea spread, the Admiralty would have had to make some hard choices about routing shipping to west coast ports from the east and southern coasts. That could include affecting shipping to/from London, no small matter. You don't have to sink a merchant ship to affect shipping; slowing it down, re-routing it, overburdening existing ports and so forth all have serious effects. If British control of the North Sea is in question, shipping will be hurt.

I don't think Germany had the ability to sink a very large number of the British battleships. But Jutland shows that the British battlecruisers, at least, were vulnerable and could be sunk with little effort. The original German plan for Jutland was to catch a 'fast reaction force' of battlecruisers and perhaps fast battleships away from the British battle-line and sink them with the combined power of the whole German fleet. Catching an exposed section of the British Fleet was the only way Germany could 'even the odds' with Britain's superior numbers but it failed in part because of superior British intelligence (and bad German radio discipline).

I believe I also did say that the German victory would have to be so one-sided as not to require German ships to remain in port for an extended period. I'll go further and say it would require German admirals to have the political freedom and the daring to exploit such a victory - I'm not confident that would be so.

The single greatest concern for the Admiralty was German interference with shipping to the BEF. The idea that a battlecruiser squadron (or even light cruisers) could raid that shipping had given the Royal Navy ulcers in 1914 and would again in the wake of a defeat. British public opinion after a defeat at Jutland would have been both outraged and panicked. They had in the past literally court-martialed, ostracized or hung admirals for less (Byng, famously, but also Milne of recent memory). In this environment, the admiral in charge of the Grand Fleet - likely not Jellicoe or Beatty anymore - would have been under enormous pressure to secure a decisive victory and to do it with much reduced means. A daring stroke or two - more German battlecruiser raids on coastal towns, or into the Thames estuary or the Channel, raids which a British fleet without battlecruisers could not intercept or stop - and the Admiralty and public would be in full panic. An invasion does not have to be credible to us with the benefit of hindsight (think about how long it would take to assemble troops) for the threat of it to move a nation to panic. Look at the public reaction after the shelling of the coastal towns and the outrage after Jutland - and imagine it after a thorough British defeat at sea.

British capital ship construction had virtually ceased, other than completing vessels already laid down. After a Jutland defeat, capital ship construction would be kicked into high gear and Army projects like artillery, tanks and machine guns would all be have to be shorted or halted. That means an end to any significant BEF operations for a year or more.

I don't think a German victory at Jutland would be so great as to render the Royal Navy impotent. I do think the public panic would be very great, the civilian and military supply lines seriously disrupted while the effects were worked out, and the material diverted to capital ship construction would cripple any BEF buildup. Those are all extremely serious effects on the Allied war effort, even if there is no permanent shift in control of the North Sea.

@gagenater - I believe you and I see this along the same lines.

@Henry IX - I do believe a serious reverse could leave the bulk of the British battleline intact and still have enormous effect on the BEF and the war in Europe. For one thing, what would be the effect on the war in Russia if the Germans know the BEF is unable to make an offensive effort?

 

[Henry IX]

I do believe a serious reverse could leave the bulk of the British battleline intact and still have enormous effect on the BEF and the war in Europe. For one thing, what would be the effect on the war in Russia if the Germans know the BEF is unable to make an offensive effort?

Absolutely - if the RN was badly beaten at Jutland then the effects on the British war effort would be significant, in all likelihood way out of proportion to the magnitude of the defeat. Jellico may not actually have the ability to lose the war in an afternoon, but he certainly could oversee a massive blow against it.

 

[Avernite]

I do believe a serious reverse could leave the bulk of the British battleline intact and still have enormous effect on the BEF and the war in Europe. For one thing, what would be the effect on the war in Russia if the Germans know the BEF is unable to make an offensive effort?

For that matter, what if the French, Italians, Russians, and Romanians know?

 

[alpreb]

They could, but then they get smashed by steaming directly into the guns of the vastly more powerful grand fleet, and Germany's situation moves from 'under distant blockade' to 'fighting off landings at Hamburg while every town and village of Germany within 20 km of the coast is shelled 24/7 for the remainder of the war'

That is rather unrealistic esp. any attempt at damaging Hamburg. Nearly the entire coast of Western Germany is shallow (below 5 meter depth) from the coastline and 20 km out. Only exceptions is the area bordering the Netherlands which instead has a line of islands 10 km from the coast. Anything above destroyer size would only be able to hit the very coastline which would mean Bremerhafen and Wilhelmshafen (ports who at this point of the war has little to no strategic importance for Germany).

Alternatively you could traverse the waterways to Hamburg or Wilhelmhaven, but you are not only sailing fairly blind through them, the German onshore artillery would have excellent recognisances because they have accurate naval charts and messages from observation post, zeppelins and aircraft.

An amphibious landing would make Operation Neptune seem unambitious.

For the eastern side, you do still have to a) remove the mines Denmark put out (easy) b) Accept Denmark as a part of the axis whether Denmark want it or not (easy).
Then the Allies are facing with either invading the various island or accept being shelled when sailing through the straights (Harder). Btw sailing through Denmark is even today not entirely safe and large ships are encouraged to hire a pilot to navigate, something the Royal Navy wouldn't have access to. The mines would be cleared and the Sunds would eventually be charted properly, but that would take time and has to be done by very small vessels, who would be vulnerable to attacks from brown-water navy ships (ships Germany could supply even with the HSF destroyed).

While I am not doubting the eventuality of bombing East German ports, the timeframe from starting the operation and any success could easily be a year or two.

 

[gagenater]

That is rather unrealistic esp. any attempt at damaging Hamburg. Nearly the entire coast of Western Germany is shallow (below 5 meter depth) from the coastline and 20 km out. Only exceptions is the area bordering the Netherlands which instead has a line of islands 10 km from the coast. Anything above destroyer size would only be able to hit the very coastline which would mean Bremerhafen and Wilhelmshafen (ports who at this point of the war has little to no strategic importance for Germany).

Alternatively you could traverse the waterways to Hamburg or Wilhelmhaven, but you are not only sailing fairly blind through them, the German onshore artillery would have excellent recognisances because they have accurate naval charts and messages from observation post, zeppelins and aircraft.

An amphibious landing would make Operation Neptune seem unambitious.

For the eastern side, you do still have to a) remove the mines Denmark put out (easy) b) Accept Denmark as a part of the axis whether Denmark want it or not (easy).
Then the Allies are facing with either invading the various island or accept being shelled when sailing through the straights (Harder). Btw sailing through Denmark is even today not entirely safe and large ships are encouraged to hire a pilot to navigate, something the Royal Navy wouldn't have access to. The mines would be cleared and the Sunds would eventually be charted properly, but that would take time and has to be done by very small vessels, who would be vulnerable to attacks from brown-water navy ships (ships Germany could supply even with the HSF destroyed).

While I am not doubting the eventuality of bombing East German ports, the timeframe from starting the operation and any success could easily be a year or two.

Surely it's ambitious, and the Germans could retaliate, but it's not as hopeless as you suggest. There ARE deeper channels coming towards the coast of northwest germany. NOT a lot of them, but they exist. The RN also had a considerable number of 'coastal monitors' shallow draft vessels mounting 12" or larger gun turrets specifically designed for use in coming nearshore and shelling targets. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_I_monitors_of_the_United_Kingdom

With respect to getting through Denmark, there are several options. One is what you suggest - that the Danes be 'driven' towards the central powers, but it could just as well go the other way around if the allies make some sort of deal with the Danes and deploy forces along the Jutland Peninsula to block the Germans overland. The Germans could (and would) resist along their baltic coast with their remaining 'brown water' forces, but the Allies, and particularly the UK have forces of these sorts also. It would open up an entire front for the war that didn't exist in real life.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

Surely it's ambitious, and the Germans could retaliate, but it's not as hopeless as you suggest. There ARE deeper channels coming towards the coast of northwest germany. NOT a lot of them, but they exist. The RN also had a considerable number of 'coastal monitors' shallow draft vessels mounting 12" or larger gun turrets specifically designed for use in coming nearshore and shelling targets. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_I_monitors_of_the_United_Kingdom

With respect to getting through Denmark, there are several options. One is what you suggest - that the Danes be 'driven' towards the central powers, but it could just as well go the other way around if the allies make some sort of deal with the Danes and deploy forces along the Jutland Peninsula to block the Germans overland. The Germans could (and would) resist along their baltic coast with their remaining 'brown water' forces, but the Allies, and particularly the UK have forces of these sorts also. It would open up an entire front for the war that didn't exist in real life.

The royal navy had "copenhagened" the danish fleet and it’s capital twice. I do not believe that Denmark would voluntarily drop it’s neutrality and join the allies without actually been attacked by Germany.

 

[gagenater]

The royal navy had "copenhagened" the danish fleet and it’s capital twice. I do not believe that Denmark would voluntarily drop it’s neutrality and join the allies without actually been attacked by Germany.

Altogether true, but the Germans took Danish territory in the meantime as well (Schleswig-Holstein) The Danes might be persuaded to go the other way around. Northern Schleswig was in fact actually returned to the Danes following WWI in a referendum. The allies could easily decide to throw in the southern portions as well (which in fact voted against rejoining Denmark) as a war prize. The southern portion actually wanted/tried to rejoin Denmark after WWII as well. It would have been perfectly easy for the allies to give/promise the whole area to Denmark after WWI.

 

[Henry IX]

I doubt that bombarding the German coast is something the RN would do much of, even with a crushing victory at sea. They might to it once or twice, just to demonstrate their capability and to force Germany to garrison its coasts and invest in more coastal defence vessels, but it is overall a high risk, low gain strategy. Blockade is the low risk, high gain strategy. There is simply no need to risk the RN to bombard a few coastal towns.

 

[demanvanwezel]

Altogether true, but the Germans took Danish territory in the meantime as well (Schleswig-Holstein) The Danes might be persuaded to go the other way around. Northern Schleswig was in fact actually returned to the Danes following WWI in a referendum. The allies could easily decide to throw in the southern portions as well (which in fact voted against rejoining Denmark) as a war prize. The southern portion actually wanted/tried to rejoin Denmark after WWII as well. It would have been perfectly easy for the allies to give/promise the whole area to Denmark after WWI.

funnily enough after the war it came out that the danish government had been extremely close to joining the war at the beginning

on the side of the central powers, yes I also don't know what they would hope to gain, maybe that's what ultimatly stopped them (also apparantly the swedes were so close to the germans that a russian commander started drafting up plans for a defence of petrograd against a combined swedish-german amphibious landing)

 

[Riotkiller]

funnily enough after the war it came out that the danish government had been extremely close to joining the war at the beginning

on the side of the central powers, yes I also don't know what they would hope to gain, maybe that's what ultimatly stopped them (also apparantly the swedes were so close to the germans that a russian commander started drafting up plans for a defence of petrograd against a combined swedish-german amphibious landing)

They didn't sell the Danish West Indies til halfway through the war - perhaps they would've looked to try and make them profitable instead by gaining some of the British or French caribbean islands?

Norway did lean heavily toward the allies, so perhaps Denmark could try and reconquer it if it was being really ambitious. If Sweden were also on board they might be able to come to some sort of deal where Sweden got Finland back and Norway went to Denmark.

 

[Director]

That's an interesting point. If Denmark could be kept out of the Central Powers camp, there is no better way to limit the German Navy than by giving the Kiel Canal to another country.

 

[gagenater]

I doubt that bombarding the German coast is something the RN would do much of, even with a crushing victory at sea. They might to it once or twice, just to demonstrate their capability and to force Germany to garrison its coasts and invest in more coastal defence vessels, but it is overall a high risk, low gain strategy. Blockade is the low risk, high gain strategy. There is simply no need to risk the RN to bombard a few coastal towns.

They might very well do it, because it's no longer high risk. It would also be the start of a probing and data gathering campaign with the end objective of making a landing in force somewhere on the German coast. In real life, such a scenario is as ridiculous to contemplate as how the high seas fleet might blockade France after trouncing the Royal Navy. However, if the high seas fleet were truly broken and sunk nearly in it's entirety, with the remaining major combatants under close blockade in their home ports, the RN would most definitely begin to plan and execute operations of this sort.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

funnily enough after the war it came out that the danish government had been extremely close to joining the war at the beginning

on the side of the central powers, yes I also don't know what they would hope to gain, maybe that's what ultimatly stopped them

Denmark had tried Neutrality and armed neutrality before, e.g.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_League_of_Armed_Neutrality
but always with some other big neutral member. The 2nd attempt
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_League_of_Armed_Neutrality
ended with Britain copenhagening the danish fleet and bombarding it’s capital (for fear that the danish fleet might join the french fleet and combined become a threat to the UK - practically the same argument for the attack on Mers-el-Kebir in WW2).

So if you can’t defend yourself alone and no other big neutral country wants to risk joining you the only choice left would seem to join one side of the war.

Now what side to choose - the one that attacked Denmark twice in their capital and sunk their fleet while Denmark was just trying to be neutral, or the side that actually had a land border with Denmark, had proven that it could easily brush away any danish defence efforts on land and was the largest importer of danish foodstuff?

So yes, I can understand that Denmark did consider to join Germany at the start of WW1.

(also apparantly the swedes were so close to the germans that a russian commander started drafting up plans for a defence of petrograd against a combined swedish-german amphibious landing)

Nystad was just 200 years ago (remember that Germany lost the lands in Alsace-Lorrain around 1689 that it took back in 1871 so that is not too long a time for a state to remember),

 

[Henry IX]

They might very well do it, because it's no longer high risk. It would also be the start of a probing and data gathering campaign with the end objective of making a landing in force somewhere on the German coast. In real life, such a scenario is as ridiculous to contemplate as how the high seas fleet might blockade France after trouncing the Royal Navy. However, if the high seas fleet were truly broken and sunk nearly in it's entirety, with the remaining major combatants under close blockade in their home ports, the RN would most definitely begin to plan and execute operations of this sort.

The waters around the coast of Germany are the worst possible area for the RN to operate: they are shallow, restricted, heavily mined and close to a hostile coast with plenty of small torpedo boats and subs to threaten the RN's capital ships. Close blockade of German ports is simply not feasible: ships sitting in relatively static positions near the coast are prime targets for MTBs and subs. There have to be large capital ships as part of the blockade to stop the surviving German capital ships from attacking the blockade and these are horribly vulnerable to torpedo attacks by expendable small ships.

Why would you risk this when a distant blockade is almost as effective and very low risk?

 

[bz249]

The waters around the coast of Germany are the worst possible area for the RN to operate: they are shallow, restricted, heavily mined and close to a hostile coast with plenty of small torpedo boats and subs to threaten the RN's capital ships. Close blockade of German ports is simply not feasible: ships sitting in relatively static positions near the coast are prime targets for MTBs and subs. There have to be large capital ships as part of the blockade to stop the surviving German capital ships from attacking the blockade and these are horribly vulnerable to torpedo attacks by expendable small ships.

Why would you risk this when a distant blockade is almost as effective and very low risk?

A distant blockade is probably more effective because it allowed to control the stuff going to the Netherlands/Denmark without a de iure blockade of those countries. In case of a close blockade the Germans would have much more use of proxy trade (or the UK have to take diplomatic damage of bullying small neutral countries)

 

[Director]

The idea of a close blockade goes back to Napoleonic times and was intended to keep the French fleet from getting to sea (and improving their seamanship) in addition to hindering his maritime commerce. The main French naval ports were heavily reliant on coastal traffic for supplies, naval stores, ironwork and so forth - one handy reference is that it cost less to ship goods across the Atlantic than to move them 30 miles overland. Napoleonic France was perhaps less dependent on overseas commerce than Wilhelmite Germany, but the combination of the Berlin Decrees and British blockades of ports definitely did hurt. It also prevented French fleets from getting to sea without, within hours, being forced to fight a major fleet action at a considerable disadvantage. Accounts of the period routinely note that French and Spanish warships newly at sea usually suffered damage to masts, sails and rigging in even light weather. Interestingly, during the Napoleonic Wars we see the British moving to a more distant blockade, keeping a few scout ships on watch and the bulk of the fleet over the horizon in order to temp the French into coming out. Nelson did this before Toulon and Cadiz in 1805 and 06, though the Channel Fleet remained close-in, so it was not a new idea in 1914.

By the start of WW1 the British had already decided on a distant blockade, probably because of fleet exercises and definitely before 1904, when the decision was made to base the fleet at Scapa Flow instead of Portsmouth. Somehow that came as a nasty shock to the Germans, who were rather counting on a close blockade. The Germans intended to let British ships wear themselves out on constant patrol while sniping with mines, submarines and small-unit actions before bringing on a major fleet action at more equal odds. The Royal Navy, however, calculated that they could cut off German commerce at the top and bottom of the North Sea without caring overmuch about whether the High Seas Fleet came out or not... in fact, permitting such a sortie improved the chances of a major fleet action, and in British eyes the chances of a major German defeat. The result of a major fleet action would not be as one-sided as the British thought, but keeping the blockade distant, however annoying to neutrals, proved the right strategic choice. For the German part, a distant blockade did permit some coastal trade, especially in the Baltic Sea, and railroads were able to adequately manage their internal transport needs. It was only their lack of a good land connection to a friendly or neutral power that made the blockade effective (Switzerland and the Netherlands notwithstanding as shipments to and through those nations were closely monitored by the Allies).

Just goes to show that you should never depend on your enemy doing what you need them to do.

 

[demanvanwezel]

The idea of a close blockade goes back to Napoleonic times and was intended to keep the French fleet from getting to sea (and improving their seamanship) in addition to hindering his maritime commerce. The main French naval ports were heavily reliant on coastal traffic for supplies, naval stores, ironwork and so forth - one handy reference is that it cost less to ship goods across the Atlantic than to move them 30 miles overland. Napoleonic France was perhaps less dependent on overseas commerce than Wilhelmite Germany, but the combination of the Berlin Decrees and British blockades of ports definitely did hurt. It also prevented French fleets from getting to sea without, within hours, being forced to fight a major fleet action at a considerable disadvantage. Accounts of the period routinely note that French and Spanish warships newly at sea usually suffered damage to masts, sails and rigging in even light weather. Interestingly, during the Napoleonic Wars we see the British moving to a more distant blockade, keeping a few scout ships on watch and the bulk of the fleet over the horizon in order to temp the French into coming out. Nelson did this before Toulon and Cadiz in 1805 and 06, though the Channel Fleet remained close-in, so it was not a new idea in 1914.

By the start of WW1 the British had already decided on a distant blockade, probably because of fleet exercises and definitely before 1904, when the decision was made to base the fleet at Scapa Flow instead of Portsmouth. Somehow that came as a nasty shock to the Germans, who were rather counting on a close blockade. The Germans intended to let British ships wear themselves out on constant patrol while sniping with mines, submarines and small-unit actions before bringing on a major fleet action at more equal odds. The Royal Navy, however, calculated that they could cut off German commerce at the top and bottom of the North Sea without caring overmuch about whether the High Seas Fleet came out or not... in fact, permitting such a sortie improved the chances of a major fleet action, and in British eyes the chances of a major German defeat. The result of a major fleet action would not be as one-sided as the British thought, but keeping the blockade distant, however annoying to neutrals, proved the right strategic choice. For the German part, a distant blockade did permit some coastal trade, especially in the Baltic Sea, and railroads were able to adequately manage their internal transport needs. It was only their lack of a good land connection to a friendly or neutral power that made the blockade effective (Switzerland and the Netherlands notwithstanding as shipments to and through those nations were closely monitored by the Allies).

Just goes to show that you should never depend on your enemy doing what you need them to do.

see also all the TEAW games we ever had in the OT