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This is how I understand the war ended. I'm no phd, and the account has a Canadian bias, but hey We get the Candian history channel here so that's what I'm going with 
In short the war ended because the British, French and German armies had beat each other to a pulp, and then all of a sudden a fresh new army appeared: the Americans. While the Americans might not have been much of a fighting force when they got there, they hadn't learned the tactics yet and didnt have a adequate supply of mg's. It was obvious to the Germans that they were in no position to put up resistance for long.
At the start of the 1918 the German had new troops, mostly 18 and 19 years old, Stormtoopers, armed with new weapons: submachine guns and flame throwers. They went on the offensive. They were winning for a while but their attack sputtered, and they were beaten back. Having wasted their last force capable of attacking the Germans dug into the Hindenberg line and prepared to defend their country.
Then the Allies went on the offensive. At this point the French army was wasted, it had actually mutinied in 1917. The soldiers were done being sent to charge mg's. The British army was actually in it's fourth form. The standing army at the start of the war was mostly gone by then end of 1914. The second army was mostly volunteers, and they were mostly gone by 1916. The third army was conscripts and they were mostly gone by 1917. After that they drafted everyone who was unfit to be drafted for the 3rd army.
But while the quality of troops had gone down, the tactics and leaders were a lot better. Brtish artillery gunners now knew what they were doing. They could do a rolling artillery barage and have the troops walk in behind it. They combined this with tanks and aircraft to have modern combined arms tactics, led by leaders who understood that if you wanted to win a war your troops had to survive.
The Canadian forces had stood the test of the war rather well, and after Vimy ridge had begun to function as an elite unit, since they were mostly volunteers. The British held them in reserve during the German attacks at the start of 1918, moving them into postion behind the lines to lead the attack on the Hindenberg line. Then they, under a Canadian general, backed by awesome British artillery attacked and smashed through the Hindenberg line.
With their defensive line broken, and insane amounts of fresh US troops arrving daily, the Germans decided to pack it in.
I'm sure others can add to / correct this.
In short the war ended because the British, French and German armies had beat each other to a pulp, and then all of a sudden a fresh new army appeared: the Americans. While the Americans might not have been much of a fighting force when they got there, they hadn't learned the tactics yet and didnt have a adequate supply of mg's. It was obvious to the Germans that they were in no position to put up resistance for long.
At the start of the 1918 the German had new troops, mostly 18 and 19 years old, Stormtoopers, armed with new weapons: submachine guns and flame throwers. They went on the offensive. They were winning for a while but their attack sputtered, and they were beaten back. Having wasted their last force capable of attacking the Germans dug into the Hindenberg line and prepared to defend their country.
Then the Allies went on the offensive. At this point the French army was wasted, it had actually mutinied in 1917. The soldiers were done being sent to charge mg's. The British army was actually in it's fourth form. The standing army at the start of the war was mostly gone by then end of 1914. The second army was mostly volunteers, and they were mostly gone by 1916. The third army was conscripts and they were mostly gone by 1917. After that they drafted everyone who was unfit to be drafted for the 3rd army.
But while the quality of troops had gone down, the tactics and leaders were a lot better. Brtish artillery gunners now knew what they were doing. They could do a rolling artillery barage and have the troops walk in behind it. They combined this with tanks and aircraft to have modern combined arms tactics, led by leaders who understood that if you wanted to win a war your troops had to survive.
The Canadian forces had stood the test of the war rather well, and after Vimy ridge had begun to function as an elite unit, since they were mostly volunteers. The British held them in reserve during the German attacks at the start of 1918, moving them into postion behind the lines to lead the attack on the Hindenberg line. Then they, under a Canadian general, backed by awesome British artillery attacked and smashed through the Hindenberg line.
With their defensive line broken, and insane amounts of fresh US troops arrving daily, the Germans decided to pack it in.
I'm sure others can add to / correct this.
That is a (unfortunately longlived) myth. Moltke's changes to the Schlieffen-plan was probably sound. Check out Hew Strachan's WW1 book if you need the evidence...
A few clarifications on the Schlieffen-plan:
1. The far right wing was supposed to be the strongest of the armies---the men in that 5th army group were supposed to "brush the Channel" with their right shoulders. The left wing was to launch a limited offensive and/or hold the French in close and allow the sweeping right (like a door) close shut on the French armies from behind.
2. The original plan called for the right wing to come down behind Paris.
3. The original plan called for the Eastern armies simply to screen the Russians---not prevent them from entering Prussia, and await the reinforcements from a quick victory in France.
Von Moltke changed the plan because he continously reinforced the left flank and the Eastern front. For political reasons, he wanted to make sure the East wasnt overwhelmed and Prussian soil was not touched by the Russians...the entire General Staff was Prussian, hence the reluctance to sacrifice a bit of land in the East.
Additionally, he felt that by reinforcing the left he could launch a double envelopement offensive that would result in mirroring Hannibal's victory at Cannae. Schlieffen understood, correctly, that this was not possible----the left flank would be going up against the bulk of the French Army and would not have the numbers. That is why he went with the heavy "right hook" with the idea of holding the French in close on the left.
If Von Moltke had adhered to the plan as originally intended, would it have worked?? Who knows, but IMO, the Germans chance of a quicker victory in 1914 would certainly be increased. The bottomline is this, once the decision was made to mobilize, everything was prepared according to a strict time schedule and moved forward like clock-work. The other thing is that Schlieffen's plan adhered to a strict timetable with very very limited ability for commanders to use initiative---a problem, for as they say, no plan survives first contact.
It is often said that Von Moltke and his counterparts on the French and Russian sides would tell the politicians that once mobilization began, it could not be stopped. By doing so, the ability to make decisions left the hands of the politicians and decision makers and was given to the bueraucrats. That is part of the problem with the month of political negotiations prior to the outbreak of WWI. Alot of the politicians, advised by the military, began to believe that war was a fait accompli, and the overwhelming sense of dread that permeated from the top was confirmed after the first month's casualty reports came in.
1. The far right wing was supposed to be the strongest of the armies---the men in that 5th army group were supposed to "brush the Channel" with their right shoulders. The left wing was to launch a limited offensive and/or hold the French in close and allow the sweeping right (like a door) close shut on the French armies from behind.
2. The original plan called for the right wing to come down behind Paris.
3. The original plan called for the Eastern armies simply to screen the Russians---not prevent them from entering Prussia, and await the reinforcements from a quick victory in France.
Von Moltke changed the plan because he continously reinforced the left flank and the Eastern front. For political reasons, he wanted to make sure the East wasnt overwhelmed and Prussian soil was not touched by the Russians...the entire General Staff was Prussian, hence the reluctance to sacrifice a bit of land in the East.
Additionally, he felt that by reinforcing the left he could launch a double envelopement offensive that would result in mirroring Hannibal's victory at Cannae. Schlieffen understood, correctly, that this was not possible----the left flank would be going up against the bulk of the French Army and would not have the numbers. That is why he went with the heavy "right hook" with the idea of holding the French in close on the left.
If Von Moltke had adhered to the plan as originally intended, would it have worked?? Who knows, but IMO, the Germans chance of a quicker victory in 1914 would certainly be increased. The bottomline is this, once the decision was made to mobilize, everything was prepared according to a strict time schedule and moved forward like clock-work. The other thing is that Schlieffen's plan adhered to a strict timetable with very very limited ability for commanders to use initiative---a problem, for as they say, no plan survives first contact.
It is often said that Von Moltke and his counterparts on the French and Russian sides would tell the politicians that once mobilization began, it could not be stopped. By doing so, the ability to make decisions left the hands of the politicians and decision makers and was given to the bueraucrats. That is part of the problem with the month of political negotiations prior to the outbreak of WWI. Alot of the politicians, advised by the military, began to believe that war was a fait accompli, and the overwhelming sense of dread that permeated from the top was confirmed after the first month's casualty reports came in.
Originally posted by Rundris
This is how I understand the war ended. I'm no phd, and the account has a Canadian bias, but hey We get the Candian history channel here so that's what I'm going with
In short the war ended because the British, French and German armies had beat each other to a pulp, and then all of a sudden a fresh new army appeared: the Americans. While the Americans might not have been much of a fighting force when they got there, they hadn't learned the tactics yet and didnt have a adequate supply of mg's. It was obvious to the Germans that they were in no position to put up resistance for long.
At the start of the 1918 the German had new troops, mostly 18 and 19 years old, Stormtoopers, armed with new weapons: submachine guns and flame throwers. They went on the offensive. They were winning for a while but their attack sputtered, and they were beaten back. Having wasted their last force capable of attacking the Germans dug into the Hindenberg line and prepared to defend their country.
Then the Allies went on the offensive. At this point the French army was wasted, it had actually mutinied in 1917. The soldiers were done being sent to charge mg's. The British army was actually in it's fourth form. The standing army at the start of the war was mostly gone by then end of 1914. The second army was mostly volunteers, and they were mostly gone by 1916. The third army was conscripts and they were mostly gone by 1917. After that they drafted everyone who was unfit to be drafted for the 3rd army.
But while the quality of troops had gone down, the tactics and leaders were a lot better. Brtish artillery gunners now knew what they were doing. They could do a rolling artillery barage and have the troops walk in behind it. They combined this with tanks and aircraft to have modern combined arms tactics, led by leaders who understood that if you wanted to win a war your troops had to survive.
The Canadian forces had stood the test of the war rather well, and after Vimy ridge had begun to function as an elite unit, since they were mostly volunteers. The British held them in reserve during the German attacks at the start of 1918, moving them into postion behind the lines to lead the attack on the Hindenberg line. Then they, under a Canadian general, backed by awesome British artillery attacked and smashed through the Hindenberg line.
With their defensive line broken, and insane amounts of fresh US troops arrving daily, the Germans decided to pack it in.
I'm sure others can add to / correct this.
Perhaps but the biggest factor was the allied blockade and dont forget that Austria/Turkey/Bulgaria collapses were also major factors. A starving population on the verge of revolt was what the Germans were facing in 1918...it was victory then or never. Even if we Americans had not entered the War the chances for a German victory would have been slim.
I agree that chances of victory would have been slim but so would have chances of such a complete defeat.
All sides were being bleed to death. When the Americans entered the war the Germans were forced into risky offensives before the full force of the Americans arrived on the battle field. It was the defeat of these last desparate offencesives that hastened the end of the war. If the Americans had never entered the war the allies and Germany would both be in terrible predicaments and at somepoint a truce would have to be called.
In hindsight this may not have been a bad thing given the aftermath of the Treaty of Versaille....
Yes a defeat the magnitude the Germans suffered would not have occured without us entering on the allied side but I still think the Germans would have surrendered conditionally on account of starvation.
I still think we did the right thing by entering the war. Wilson blew it and lost the peace but then again so did Lloyd George and Clemenceau.
Schlieffen Plan, and all about why WWI ended, from this KwangTigerian point of view :
Shleffen
----------
As Willard posted earlier, it was supposed to be a quick hook action around and behind Paris, but due to some generals thinking their troops were exhausted and vulnerable, they didn't go that far. Also, the left wing (Basically Alsace and Lorraine) was supposed to be a defensive front, because the German generals thought (correctly) that the French would try and retake these lands first. Anyway, plan veered off course, because the people that executed it and modified it weren't willing to take the risks it involved.
End of WWI
--------------
As Rundris said, basically the entrance of a whole new army into the war changed this. The Americans fought like it was the opening months of 1914, and the exhausted Germans basically collapsed on themselves, because the 'old' German Army on the Western Front was at the breaking-point morale (Most of their best troops at the end of the war IIRC were from the Eastern Front), and well... the Germans couldn't hold on for much longer. There was mutinies in the Navy, riots in the cities, a possible communist revolution, starved millions.... they basically thought that if they were going to get the best peace, they should do it ASAP.
Shleffen
----------
As Willard posted earlier, it was supposed to be a quick hook action around and behind Paris, but due to some generals thinking their troops were exhausted and vulnerable, they didn't go that far. Also, the left wing (Basically Alsace and Lorraine) was supposed to be a defensive front, because the German generals thought (correctly) that the French would try and retake these lands first. Anyway, plan veered off course, because the people that executed it and modified it weren't willing to take the risks it involved.
End of WWI
--------------
As Rundris said, basically the entrance of a whole new army into the war changed this. The Americans fought like it was the opening months of 1914, and the exhausted Germans basically collapsed on themselves, because the 'old' German Army on the Western Front was at the breaking-point morale (Most of their best troops at the end of the war IIRC were from the Eastern Front), and well... the Germans couldn't hold on for much longer. There was mutinies in the Navy, riots in the cities, a possible communist revolution, starved millions.... they basically thought that if they were going to get the best peace, they should do it ASAP.
Ah...the Treaty of Versallies...quite a picky. Well, if my thread has been hi-jacked then i guess i should add my two cents; Germany's ensuing collapse, starvation, etc. is in most part, its own fault. While the Treaty was harsh, think about it in these terms...$32 billion in war reparations, $100 billion for the war effort. She broke herself, and would have been broken even if she had won, just as the Allies became. of the treaties with the
All the factors for a second war (Nazi, Weimar, or Imperial) were there the moment the first one started. There were too many factors in Europe that had been idle for too long to tie up all in one war.
All the factors for a second war (Nazi, Weimar, or Imperial) were there the moment the first one started. There were too many factors in Europe that had been idle for too long to tie up all in one war.
Couldn't the Germans have shipped in grain from Russia and let the Russians starve?
Yeah... even though there was a lot of grain potential from the Ukraine and over there, the problem was that Germany neither had the occupation forces to get all of it or the infrastructure (or willingness of the peasants) to get it fast enough.
A good point was brought up. The magnitude of the defeat we inflicted - or, rather, the magnitude of defeat that the allies were capable of inflicting, with the Americans - gave significant strength to the allied demands at Versailles. Truly, they could not have enforced as heavy a treaty on the Germans.
Alternatively, they might have fought to the death anyway - god knows that the Americans, even whilst neutral, were supplying the allies. In the case that they fought fully to the death, the French were considerably more likely to get their full demands - meaning, moreover, the complete dismemberment and de-industrialization of Germany. Wilson refused this 'ultra-Versailles' settlement.
A reduced Versailles in the first case - of itself - makes a peaceable Germany a lot more likely. There are other factors involved - the possibility of a new Franco-British conflict or the impact of the Soviet Union, or lingering doubts about the Polish frontier, etc.
The latter - the dismemberment of Germany into its member states such as Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Saarland - would have left Germany absolutely unable to industrialize if a complete blow was dealt by the Versailles peace. Thus, peace is ensured by the evacuation of Germany, leaving Europe much as it was in the eighteenth century with a convenient vacuum for GPs to duke it out in.
Again, this latter peace leaves out the possibilities of a Franco-British row or the impact of the Soviets. But, in either case, I think that a non-middling Versailles that wasn't trying to make both Washington and Paris happy would have been more effective in making a stable international system.
Alternatively, they might have fought to the death anyway - god knows that the Americans, even whilst neutral, were supplying the allies. In the case that they fought fully to the death, the French were considerably more likely to get their full demands - meaning, moreover, the complete dismemberment and de-industrialization of Germany. Wilson refused this 'ultra-Versailles' settlement.
A reduced Versailles in the first case - of itself - makes a peaceable Germany a lot more likely. There are other factors involved - the possibility of a new Franco-British conflict or the impact of the Soviet Union, or lingering doubts about the Polish frontier, etc.
The latter - the dismemberment of Germany into its member states such as Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Saarland - would have left Germany absolutely unable to industrialize if a complete blow was dealt by the Versailles peace. Thus, peace is ensured by the evacuation of Germany, leaving Europe much as it was in the eighteenth century with a convenient vacuum for GPs to duke it out in.
Again, this latter peace leaves out the possibilities of a Franco-British row or the impact of the Soviets. But, in either case, I think that a non-middling Versailles that wasn't trying to make both Washington and Paris happy would have been more effective in making a stable international system.
about Schlieffen's plan.
As stated earlier on the material conditions weren't met for it to be fully implemented, but do not forget the moral of the french troops at that time.
I have read that the germans would have entered Paris unopposed with their 2nd army had they gone according to the plan. Put this is simply not true.
We have a bias due to WWII, when Paris fell like a fruit in german hands, being declared open city by the french government.
But in 1914 the situation was very different, the french had been preparing for the war, at least mentally, since the 1870 crushing blow. French were litteraly ready to fight to the death ( actually so they did ). The government had left Paris for Bordeaux and Paris defence was under the command of Marshall Gallieni, a colonial hero, kinda Kitchener for the British. All the forts around Paris had been reequipped an d the city was ready for house by house fight
I know some of you might think this is an overstatement, but it isn't. Bear in mind that all the war on the western front was waged on the french soil ( ok some belgian as well ).
The key point of the failling of the modified Schlieffen pla was french retreat. After having counterattacked in Belgium and suffered horrendous losses at Charleroi and Namur, the French understood their mistake and retreated ( something they were not able to do in 1940 ). Actually even if tactically they had it all wrong in 1914 with their Napoleonical all out infantry offensive doctrine, the 1914 retreat is a masterpiece of strategical adaptation.
Indeed , by mid august th efrench realised that they were being outflanked by the germans on their left, so they needed to stop their fruitless attacking in Alsace and send troops there. But here the french railroad is a key factor. France is a very centralised country unlike germany and all the railroad web was built in a star/spider web shape, which means all railroads led to Paris, but they were no railroads going from the east to the north along the front.
So the french were unable to send troops ther fast enough. So they took the only possible decision at that time : retreat to have the front be a horizontal line going From Paris to the east. during the retreat they mustered troops coming from the east around their only railroad hub ( Paris ), forming the 6th army under Maunoury's command and waited for the German line to be overstretched to counter attack.
Schlieffen's goal was to encircle the french army by outflanking it. This plan had already failed whit the French army retreating in proper order. By this point the all out offensive they were carriyng was doomed to fail because of overstretched supply lines ( German forces in the west in 1914 numbered 1.8 million soldiers ).
Von kluck's turn to the east was a minor event that the french chose to exploit to counterattack. But had he not done it, he was going to face a newly mustered force anyway, just north from Paris.
The Germans retreated on the Aisne were they had prepared their new defensive line, not because they were beaten, but because they were running short on ammunition and supplies. The battle Of the Marne is actually a draw, after a 6 days fight the two armies were holding their ground, but instead of risking the loss of its westerner army ( Von kluk's first ) and maybe the second one too, which was also suffering from lack of ammunition at that time, he chose to retreat to buy some time.
this isn't a mistake, Moltke was a sound general, not a fanatic and he was not ready to sacrifice Von Kluck's army in a futile attempt to reach or encircle Paris. Although we cannot compare the battle of La Marne and Stalingrad, because they differ to almost every point, all Moltke did was avoiding what happened to Von Paulus army bogged down and unsupplied.
You must understand that for the german military doctrine, army destruction was the goal, and in the case of their armies the ultimate catastrophy to be avoided. They were still thinking in terms of decisive battle at time. whether it took place near Paris or near Berlin did not matter that much, if the German army had lost Von Kluck's, they risked not being able to adapt quickly enough to the new situation ( Being 400 kilometers deep in ennemy territory, in a time when soldiers walked all the way long, at least for the fighting units ).
I am not saying that in the battle of La Marne Von Kluck's arlmy was on the brink of destruction, but Moltke could simply not afford the risk, and as the momentum was lost, the moral as well, their was nothing else to do but to fall back on their defense line, which was only 70 Kms to the north ( he did not retreat until Germany and kept most of the gains made ).
Schlieffen's plan was too ambitious, and as the germans were not able to move their troops and most of all supplies fast enough, they needed a huge French mistake to be committed, such as the one they did in 1940 by running into Belgium. But as the french understood the extent of the risk and retreated, Schlieffen's plan was doomed by mid-august.
Woo... I am exhausted, my brain hurts so I'll adress the end of the war in an other post.
As stated earlier on the material conditions weren't met for it to be fully implemented, but do not forget the moral of the french troops at that time.
I have read that the germans would have entered Paris unopposed with their 2nd army had they gone according to the plan. Put this is simply not true.
We have a bias due to WWII, when Paris fell like a fruit in german hands, being declared open city by the french government.
But in 1914 the situation was very different, the french had been preparing for the war, at least mentally, since the 1870 crushing blow. French were litteraly ready to fight to the death ( actually so they did ). The government had left Paris for Bordeaux and Paris defence was under the command of Marshall Gallieni, a colonial hero, kinda Kitchener for the British. All the forts around Paris had been reequipped an d the city was ready for house by house fight
I know some of you might think this is an overstatement, but it isn't. Bear in mind that all the war on the western front was waged on the french soil ( ok some belgian as well ).
The key point of the failling of the modified Schlieffen pla was french retreat. After having counterattacked in Belgium and suffered horrendous losses at Charleroi and Namur, the French understood their mistake and retreated ( something they were not able to do in 1940 ). Actually even if tactically they had it all wrong in 1914 with their Napoleonical all out infantry offensive doctrine, the 1914 retreat is a masterpiece of strategical adaptation.
Indeed , by mid august th efrench realised that they were being outflanked by the germans on their left, so they needed to stop their fruitless attacking in Alsace and send troops there. But here the french railroad is a key factor. France is a very centralised country unlike germany and all the railroad web was built in a star/spider web shape, which means all railroads led to Paris, but they were no railroads going from the east to the north along the front.
So the french were unable to send troops ther fast enough. So they took the only possible decision at that time : retreat to have the front be a horizontal line going From Paris to the east. during the retreat they mustered troops coming from the east around their only railroad hub ( Paris ), forming the 6th army under Maunoury's command and waited for the German line to be overstretched to counter attack.
Schlieffen's goal was to encircle the french army by outflanking it. This plan had already failed whit the French army retreating in proper order. By this point the all out offensive they were carriyng was doomed to fail because of overstretched supply lines ( German forces in the west in 1914 numbered 1.8 million soldiers ).
Von kluck's turn to the east was a minor event that the french chose to exploit to counterattack. But had he not done it, he was going to face a newly mustered force anyway, just north from Paris.
The Germans retreated on the Aisne were they had prepared their new defensive line, not because they were beaten, but because they were running short on ammunition and supplies. The battle Of the Marne is actually a draw, after a 6 days fight the two armies were holding their ground, but instead of risking the loss of its westerner army ( Von kluk's first ) and maybe the second one too, which was also suffering from lack of ammunition at that time, he chose to retreat to buy some time.
this isn't a mistake, Moltke was a sound general, not a fanatic and he was not ready to sacrifice Von Kluck's army in a futile attempt to reach or encircle Paris. Although we cannot compare the battle of La Marne and Stalingrad, because they differ to almost every point, all Moltke did was avoiding what happened to Von Paulus army bogged down and unsupplied.
You must understand that for the german military doctrine, army destruction was the goal, and in the case of their armies the ultimate catastrophy to be avoided. They were still thinking in terms of decisive battle at time. whether it took place near Paris or near Berlin did not matter that much, if the German army had lost Von Kluck's, they risked not being able to adapt quickly enough to the new situation ( Being 400 kilometers deep in ennemy territory, in a time when soldiers walked all the way long, at least for the fighting units ).
I am not saying that in the battle of La Marne Von Kluck's arlmy was on the brink of destruction, but Moltke could simply not afford the risk, and as the momentum was lost, the moral as well, their was nothing else to do but to fall back on their defense line, which was only 70 Kms to the north ( he did not retreat until Germany and kept most of the gains made ).
Schlieffen's plan was too ambitious, and as the germans were not able to move their troops and most of all supplies fast enough, they needed a huge French mistake to be committed, such as the one they did in 1940 by running into Belgium. But as the french understood the extent of the risk and retreated, Schlieffen's plan was doomed by mid-august.
Woo... I am exhausted, my brain hurts so I'll adress the end of the war in an other post.
Well Austria had collapse and Turkey was done. So the Germans were in a desperate position anyways and Luddendorf had had a nervous breakdown. However he decided to give up before everything disintegrated. The allies decided there had been enough butchery but the when the war stopped, the German army was still holding its conquest everywhere.
So the Germans who has just made Brest Litovsk, and who only a few months ago still had grand plans for turning Europe into a German colony started complaining about the peace conditions that were imposed on them and managed to largely evade paying the compensations they had to.
Incidentaly after the defeat of 1870 the French paid the whole of their war indemnity to Germany
Veji-
You make some excellent points.
Just a couple of issues I'd like to talk about.
First your comment:
I have to disagree with this statement. The plan itself would have had a greater chance of success had all the preconditions been adhered to. The fact of the matter is that Von Moltke's constant tweaking and pulling troops away from the right flank seriously hampered the ability for a "knock-out" right hook.
The fact of the matter, is that the French played right into the Germans hands. The offensive launched by the Army of the Lorraine into the German center was an unmitigated disaster and exactly what Schlieffen was planning on them to do. He expected the French to immediately attack the Alsace-Lorraine area to "liberate" the French in the area. However, the French took horrendous losses and gained nothing of strategic value---if anything their left flank became extremely vulnerable to the German right hook of the German 1st Army.
As for the French retreating??? The armies in the center routed---there was no orderly retreat. If it wasnt for Lanzerac's (who was relieved right at the beginning of early September ironically) 6th army's heroic efforts to hold off the German "right hook." Paris would have taken easily. Lanzerac was the only French general who recognized what the Germans were doing, and that was in early August. His repeated pleas for disengagement and retreat were denied numerous times by Joffre. Joffre was asleep at the wheel. Joffre begrudgingly ordered the withdrawal of the French armies only when the rout was a "fait accompli." Lanzerac also pleaded for help from the Gen French and his British Ex Force with no success.
Any characterization of a French stategic withdrawal is pure revisionist history. They were routed and beaten.
The only thing that saved them, besides Lanzerac's efforts, was that the German right hook was weakened enough---due to the removal of troops to cover the Belgian forces in Antwerp, some harassing by the Brits and more importantly Von Moltke's constant shuffling of troops---to the point that it couldnt make the knock-out blow. Like a boxer, by early September, the German offensive had "punched itself out" in the first round.
Another issue you brought up---that of the numbers German troops---1.8 million, is important for two reasons.
First, the bulk of these forces were supposed to deployed on the right flank. Schlieffen had calculated the number (I dont recall it off hand) based upon the # of troops per kilometer of frontage * the distance needed to travel. This calculation took into account the necessary attrition factors.
Second, the German Army could not support the requisite numbers. Therefore, 2nd and 3rd grade brigade formations were interspersed with the front line troops to make up for the deficit. The French on the other hand were unwilling, due mostly to arrogance, to use these classes until massive losses and necessity required their deployment in late August and early September.
That does explain to extent the abysmal beating they took in the first month---they were simply worn down. The French Army, numbering 1.6 million, took upwards of 300,000 in casualties in little under a month---most of which occured during the four days of the Battle of the Frontiers launched by the Army of Lorraine. That is why there was no orderly retreat but a rout. The French center essentially disintegrated!!!
You make some excellent points.
Just a couple of issues I'd like to talk about.
First your comment:
I have to disagree with this statement. The plan itself would have had a greater chance of success had all the preconditions been adhered to. The fact of the matter is that Von Moltke's constant tweaking and pulling troops away from the right flank seriously hampered the ability for a "knock-out" right hook.
The fact of the matter, is that the French played right into the Germans hands. The offensive launched by the Army of the Lorraine into the German center was an unmitigated disaster and exactly what Schlieffen was planning on them to do. He expected the French to immediately attack the Alsace-Lorraine area to "liberate" the French in the area. However, the French took horrendous losses and gained nothing of strategic value---if anything their left flank became extremely vulnerable to the German right hook of the German 1st Army.
As for the French retreating??? The armies in the center routed---there was no orderly retreat. If it wasnt for Lanzerac's (who was relieved right at the beginning of early September ironically) 6th army's heroic efforts to hold off the German "right hook." Paris would have taken easily. Lanzerac was the only French general who recognized what the Germans were doing, and that was in early August. His repeated pleas for disengagement and retreat were denied numerous times by Joffre. Joffre was asleep at the wheel. Joffre begrudgingly ordered the withdrawal of the French armies only when the rout was a "fait accompli." Lanzerac also pleaded for help from the Gen French and his British Ex Force with no success.
Any characterization of a French stategic withdrawal is pure revisionist history. They were routed and beaten.
The only thing that saved them, besides Lanzerac's efforts, was that the German right hook was weakened enough---due to the removal of troops to cover the Belgian forces in Antwerp, some harassing by the Brits and more importantly Von Moltke's constant shuffling of troops---to the point that it couldnt make the knock-out blow. Like a boxer, by early September, the German offensive had "punched itself out" in the first round.
Another issue you brought up---that of the numbers German troops---1.8 million, is important for two reasons.
First, the bulk of these forces were supposed to deployed on the right flank. Schlieffen had calculated the number (I dont recall it off hand) based upon the # of troops per kilometer of frontage * the distance needed to travel. This calculation took into account the necessary attrition factors.
Second, the German Army could not support the requisite numbers. Therefore, 2nd and 3rd grade brigade formations were interspersed with the front line troops to make up for the deficit. The French on the other hand were unwilling, due mostly to arrogance, to use these classes until massive losses and necessity required their deployment in late August and early September.
That does explain to extent the abysmal beating they took in the first month---they were simply worn down. The French Army, numbering 1.6 million, took upwards of 300,000 in casualties in little under a month---most of which occured during the four days of the Battle of the Frontiers launched by the Army of Lorraine. That is why there was no orderly retreat but a rout. The French center essentially disintegrated!!!
Perhaps you will find this interesting:
http://www.europa-universalis.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=49497
http://www.europa-universalis.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=49497
I've said it before on Languish and I say it again.
I think that the Germans would have a far larger change of winning if instead of building a battlefleet which wasn't used to break the blockade, they build more motorized vehicles. They had to abandon alot of offensives because the supply couldn't keep up with the pace of the army.
I think that the Germans would have a far larger change of winning if instead of building a battlefleet which wasn't used to break the blockade, they build more motorized vehicles. They had to abandon alot of offensives because the supply couldn't keep up with the pace of the army.
Yeah, but if they don't build the battlefleet, they don't need motorized vehicles as much, because the British aren't fighting the war. Without the increase in tenstions between the 1890s and 1914 caused by the German battlefleet, you would have a Britain who would be much more likely to simply allow the Continent to sort out it's own affairs, and profit in much the same way the US did.Originally posted by HJ Tulp
I've said it before on Languish and I say it again.
I think that the Germans would have a far larger change of winning if instead of building a battlefleet which wasn't used to break the blockade, they build more motorized vehicles. They had to abandon alot of offensives because the supply couldn't keep up with the pace of the army.
willard said :
Any characterization of a French stategic withdrawal is pure revisionist history. They were routed and beaten.
I do agree with that, I haven't made myself clear : The French wer awfully beaten in Alsace of course and in Belgium as well when they counterattacked near Charleroi. this is a certainty. What I meant is that even if they took horrendous losses in the process the French army as a whole, an organised body of troops, did manage to retreat more or less in an organised manner :
The center of the french front was indeed routed, one of its main components, Foch's 9th army was virtually out of order. But unlike what happened in 1870 when Bazaine and Mac Mahon did not coordinate their retreats and were bottled up in Metz and Sedan, or in 1940 when the commanding line just fell apart after the crossing of the Meuse and the Ardennes blow, the French command managed to pull through the crisis and salvage its army.
Of course Joffre's plan XVII was a disaster and so was his counterattack in Belgium, but the French left flank retreated in order so as not to be isolated from the rest of the army following the center's collapse. and this more or less orderly retreat allowed Joffre to muster troops in a hurry near Paris while fighting rearguards action along the way in order to be able to retake initiative once the occasion would arise.
so yes the French were defeated and had undoubtably lost the battle of frontiers, but they managed through effective commanding to make up for this initial failure by retreating, even if it required costly rearguard actions. that you cannot take away from them, even german generals' testimonies explain how surprised they were not to see the French army fall apart after its initial desasters
i hope I have clarified my point here.
About schlieffen's plan, history can be Whatifed quite easely but I am definitely not sure that 100 000 more soldiers on the german right flank would have made the difference knowing that they would have lacked supplies and ammunition quite quickly and unmistakenly slowed Von Kluck's army's advance during the month of august. But on these points we could argue forever.
I reckon that Shlieffen's plan was a formula 1 racing in a potato field, and could not stand in front of the many difficulties that arose ( belgian resistance, BEF, russian advance ). It wasn't flexible enough in my opinion.
I tned to consider that indeed Von Moltke could have won the war early, but not by maintainig his right hook as strong as it was supposed to be, rather by striking in the center where the french armies had collapsed. this is where lies the responsability of the german HQ. Schlieffen's manouver was already a failure once it was known that the French had managed to pull through and retreat, adapting more radically the plan the Germans could have won, instead they altered it too late for it to be effective IMHO.
Any characterization of a French stategic withdrawal is pure revisionist history. They were routed and beaten.
I do agree with that, I haven't made myself clear : The French wer awfully beaten in Alsace of course and in Belgium as well when they counterattacked near Charleroi. this is a certainty. What I meant is that even if they took horrendous losses in the process the French army as a whole, an organised body of troops, did manage to retreat more or less in an organised manner :
The center of the french front was indeed routed, one of its main components, Foch's 9th army was virtually out of order. But unlike what happened in 1870 when Bazaine and Mac Mahon did not coordinate their retreats and were bottled up in Metz and Sedan, or in 1940 when the commanding line just fell apart after the crossing of the Meuse and the Ardennes blow, the French command managed to pull through the crisis and salvage its army.
Of course Joffre's plan XVII was a disaster and so was his counterattack in Belgium, but the French left flank retreated in order so as not to be isolated from the rest of the army following the center's collapse. and this more or less orderly retreat allowed Joffre to muster troops in a hurry near Paris while fighting rearguards action along the way in order to be able to retake initiative once the occasion would arise.
so yes the French were defeated and had undoubtably lost the battle of frontiers, but they managed through effective commanding to make up for this initial failure by retreating, even if it required costly rearguard actions. that you cannot take away from them, even german generals' testimonies explain how surprised they were not to see the French army fall apart after its initial desasters
i hope I have clarified my point here.
About schlieffen's plan, history can be Whatifed quite easely but I am definitely not sure that 100 000 more soldiers on the german right flank would have made the difference knowing that they would have lacked supplies and ammunition quite quickly and unmistakenly slowed Von Kluck's army's advance during the month of august. But on these points we could argue forever.
I reckon that Shlieffen's plan was a formula 1 racing in a potato field, and could not stand in front of the many difficulties that arose ( belgian resistance, BEF, russian advance ). It wasn't flexible enough in my opinion.
I tned to consider that indeed Von Moltke could have won the war early, but not by maintainig his right hook as strong as it was supposed to be, rather by striking in the center where the french armies had collapsed. this is where lies the responsability of the german HQ. Schlieffen's manouver was already a failure once it was known that the French had managed to pull through and retreat, adapting more radically the plan the Germans could have won, instead they altered it too late for it to be effective IMHO.